Kelsey v Logan City Council (No. 6)

Link copied
Case Copied 79 min read

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No. 6)  [2025] ICQ 002

PARTIES:

SHARON RAE MARIE KELSEY

(Appellant/Applicant)

v

LOGAN CITY COUNCIL

(First Respondent)

CHERIE MARIE DALLEY

(Third Respondent)

RUSSELL BRUCE LUTTON

(Fourth Respondent)

STEPHEN FREDERICK SWENSON

(Fifth Respondent)

LAURENCE WILLIAM SMITH

(Sixth Respondent)

PHILLIP WAYNE PIDGEON

(Seventh Respondent)

TREVINA DALE SCHWARZ

(Eighth Respondent)

JENNIFER RACHAEL JULIE BREENE

(Ninth Respondent)

CASE NO:

C/2021/8

PROCEEDING:

Appeal and Applications in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

29 January 2025

HEARING DATES:

The applications for costs were determined on the papers without an oral hearing

DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

The First Respondent's written submissions filed on 27 August 2024

The Third to Ninth Respondents' written submissions filed on 27 August 2024

The Applicant/Appellant's written submissions filed on 16 September 2024

The First Respondent's written submissions in reply filed on 30 September 2024

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Merrell DP

Brisbane

ORDERS:

The orders contained in paragraph [164] of these reasons for decision

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – POWERS OF COURT – COSTS – application to appeal against decision of Queensland Industrial Relations Commission on various grounds of errors of law and errors of fact – interlocutory application by the Appellant seeking leave to amend application to appeal – by agreement, application for leave to amend application to appeal and substantive appeal heard together – none of the proposed grounds of appeal pursued by the Appellant made out – parties heard about costs – whether the Court satisfied of any of the circumstances contained in s 545(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 so as to enliven the Court's discretion to make an order for costs – Court not satisfied the discretion to make an order for costs is triggered under s 545(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of the IR Act – applications for costs by the First Respondent and by the Third to Ninth Respondents dismissed

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 14A

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s 197A

Fair Work Act 2009, s 570 and s 611

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, s 31A

Industrial Relations Act 1988, s 347

Industrial Relations Act 1999, s 335

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 285, s 306, s 545, s 565 and s 571

Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), s 198J and s 198M

CASES:

AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300

Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2022] ICQ 019

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Parker [2017] FCA 564; (2017) 266 IR 340

Australian Workers' Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd and Others (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 23; (2013) 232 FCR 428

Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139

Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166; (2014) 145 ALD 548

Baker v Salva Resources Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 4014; (2011) 211 IR 374

Board of Bendigo…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kelsey v Logan City Council (No. 6) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] ICQ 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kelsey v Logan City Council (No. 6), the parties involved were Ms Kelsey, the Appellant, and Logan City Council, along with several Councillors, the Respondents. The dispute centred around an appeal against a decision made by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) on various grounds of errors of law and errors of fact. The matter was heard in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission Appeals Division, presided over by Justice Ryan.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the court should grant leave to amend the application to appeal and whether the court's discretion to order costs should be exercised under section 545(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act). The court had to determine whether the proposed grounds of appeal made out and whether the Appellant's application for leave to amend the application to appeal should be allowed. Additionally, the court needed to decide whether any of the circumstances specified in section 545(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of the IR Act were met, thereby triggering the court's discretion to make an order for costs.

The court found that none of the proposed grounds of appeal were made out, and thus, the application for leave to amend the application to appeal was not pursued. The court also concluded that neither section 545(2)(a)(i) nor (ii) of the IR Act provided a basis for the exercise of the court's discretion to make an order for costs. The court was not satisfied that it would have been reasonably apparent to the Appellant that the application, or the response to the application, had no reasonable prospect of success. Consequently, the applications for costs by the First Respondent and by the Third to Ninth Respondents were dismissed.

The final orders of the court are contained in paragraph [164] of the reasons for decision, which outlined the dismissal of the applications for leave to amend the application to appeal and the applications for costs by the First Respondent and by the Third to Ninth Respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

The orders contained in paragraph [164] of these reasons for decision

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thus, my discretion to make an order that a party pays the costs incurred by another party will be enlivened, pursuant to s 545(2)(a)(ii) of the IR Act, if I am satisfied it would have been reasonably apparent to the party that the application, or response to the application, had no reasonable prospect of success. The Court's earlier decision about costs Although not referred to by the parties, it is appropriate to refer to the earlier decision of the President by which his Honour made an order that Ms Kelsey pays the costs of the Council and the Councillors regarding her application to appeal and her application to amend. In Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 3),[66] the President ordered that Ms Kelsey pay the Council and the Councillors' '…costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs and the costs of the written submissions on costs' on the standard basis.[67] [66] [2022] ICQ 021.[67] Ibid [51]. In making that order, the President concluded that while it could not be said that Ms Kelsey's prosecution of her application to amend was done vexatiously, Ms Kelsey never '… had reasonable cause to commence or prosecute the appeal.'[68][68] Ibid [42]. In coming to the latter conclusion, his Honour stated (citations omitted):[43] No reasonably arguable reason was ever identified upon which there could be any real prospect of leave being given under s 557(1) to rely upon a ground of appeal other than error of law. Given the limited nature of the appeal which Ms Kelsey could mount under s 557(1) of the IR Act, she faced insurmountable difficulties given the findings made by the QIRC adversely to her credit, favourably to the respondents' credit and in particular as to the true motivations of the third to ninth respondents in voting in favour of her employment being terminated. [44] As previously explained, if, as is the case, there was no basis to attack those findings, other grounds of appeal fall. [45] All that was left was ground 1 which was an alleged misdirection as to how to assess the lawfulness of the respondents' decision to vote for the termination of the applicant's employment, ground 3, which alleged an inadequacy of reasons, and ground 5, which alleged error in the application of the rule in Browne v Dunn. For the reasons explained in the primary judgment, none of these have substance. None, in my view, gave reasonable cause to institute and prosecute the appeal. [46] There is no need to consider the jurisdictional fact identified by s 545(2)(a)(ii). The jurisdiction to award costs has clearly arisen. [47] Even disregarding Ms Kelsey's conduct in filing the application to appeal in the form that it was and, having regard to the policy behind s 545 of the IR Act, the respondents make a very strong claim for an exercise of discretion in their favour. While Ms Kelsey's application in the QIRC faced some legal hurdles, the central factual question was, and was always going to be, as to the motivation of the third to ninth respondents in voting for the termination of her employment. That was extensively litigated. She lost on that critical factual issue. [48] Ms Kelsey's appeal as finally framed was bound to fail as there was no basis upon which to upset the critical findings against her. Notwithstanding those insurmountable obstacles, Ms Kelsey proceeded and put the respondents to what is obviously very considerable expense.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.