Serpanos v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Serpanos v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 1226   

File number: VID 224 of 2020
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 18 October 2022
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – employment – adverse action –whether the applicant was subjected to adverse action in contravention of s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – applicant dismissed from his employment, purportedly for having contravened standards expected of him – whether applicant made complaints or inquiries amounting to the exercise of “workplace rights” pursuant to s 341 of the FW Act – whether adverse action was taken because the applicant had exercised workplace rights – operation of statutory presumption in s 361 of the FW Act – identification of the person or people who decided to take adverse action – whether corporate state of mind resided (or partly resided) in a person who did not make the relevant decision – relevant actors were not actuated by the applicant’s exercise of workplace rights – application dismissed
Legislation:

Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 14(2)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) pt 3-1 - ss 340, 341, 342, 346, 347, 360, 361, 539, 570, 793

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) ss 10, 13, 29

Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2016 (Cth) 

Cases cited:

 Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 261 FCR 347

Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses’ Union of Employees (2019) 273 FCR 332

Australian Workers’ Union v John Holland Pty Ltd (2001) 103 IR 205

Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2010) 193 IR 251

Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2011) 191 FCR 212

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (No 2) (2012) 248 CLR 549

Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 697

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clermont Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 253 IR 166

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal (2015) 231 FCR 150

Elliott v Kodak Australasia Pty Ltd (2001) 129 IR 251

Ermel v Duluxgroup (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 17

Fountain v Alexander (1982) 150 CLR 615

General Motors Holden Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 12 ALR 605

Greater Dandenong City Council v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (2001) 112 FCR 232

Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109

Maritime Union of Australia v CSLAustralia Pty Ltd (2002) 113 IR 326

Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34

Messenger v Commonwealth of Australia (Represented by the Department of Finance) [2022] FCA 677

National Tertiary Education Union v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (2013) 234 IR 139

O’Grady v The Northern Queensland…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1226
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Serpanos v Commonwealth of Australia, the applicant, Mr Serpanos, sought relief in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on the basis that his dismissal from employment was a form of adverse action taken against him for exercising his workplace rights. The central issue before the court was whether the applicant's dismissal was a contravention of section 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which prohibits adverse action in the context of exercising workplace rights. The court had to determine if the adverse action was taken because of the applicant's exercise of workplace rights as outlined in section 341 of the FW Act, and whether the statutory presumption in section 361 applied to identify the person or people who decided to take the adverse action.

The court examined the evidence provided and addressed the conflicting accounts of events presented by the parties. The judge found that the evidence of the complainants was credible, despite the applicant's claims of collusion and fabrication. The court considered the nature of the allegations, the timing of events, and the reluctance of some employees to report the behaviour of a more senior colleague. After weighing the evidence, the court concluded that the applicant was dismissed due to his contravention of the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct, not because of his exercise of workplace rights. The court found that the investigation leading to the dismissal was flawed, but this did not necessarily imply improper conduct on the part of the decision-makers. The court was not persuaded that the reasons provided by Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd for their actions were incorrect.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant's dismissal was not due to his exercise of workplace rights but rather due to his breach of the APS Code of Conduct. The court found that the statutory presumption did not apply as the decision-makers were not actuated by the applicant's exercise of workplace rights. The application was dismissed, and no orders were made in favour of the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In reaching those conclusions, Ms Kotronakis confronted the apparent conflict in the evidence with which she had been provided. She addressed that conflict as follows:DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE21.There are differing accounts of critical events grounding the suspected breaches. Several general observations may be made in advance about the state of the evidence.22.First, all the allegations (with the exception of the email correspondence with Ms Chang, which is discussed further below) are made by women in the team, or women who had dealings with women in the team: Ms Peeters, Ms Cavanagh, Ms Kim, Ms Prosch and Ms Dickman. Mr Serpanos alleges these women are all friends and says the allegations have been concocted to destroy his character ‘making up untrue allegations’ and naming him in these allegations when he was clearly not involved. He says this has now caused damage to his reputation with the ATO and in the future by portraying him as a ‘sexual offender and a monster’. There are no specific complaints about others in the team apart from Mr Serpanos, although Mr Vydelingum and Mr Bartholomeusz appear to have had a role in transmitting some of the relevant information to the complainants. I am not persuaded that the fact the complainants are allegedly friends, or that they have not complained about others, affects the credibility of their evidence.23.Second, most of the allegations date from 2016 to 2018. The age of the allegations also does not concern me for several reasons. Some of the allegations were reported or discussed by the complainants contemporaneously, so this is not a case where allegations are being made for the very first time in 2019. Also, and more importantly, I find it entirely plausible that these employees, particularly Ms Kim and Ms Peeters, who had recently been employed as graduates under the ATO’s graduate program, would have been reluctant to report the behaviour of a more senior colleague.24.Third, what is alleged here appears to be a prolonged pattern over several years of sexualised comments and harassment in the workplace. In that context, exact dates and times of events are less important than establishing the existence of the pattern. I have taken a holistic approach to the evidence, rather than considering the details of each allegation in paragraph 7(a) of the Notice in isolation.25.I have given serious consideration to making enquiries with other potential witnesses, particularly Mr Vydelingum and Mr Bartholomeusz. In the end, I have not done so, partly because some of what they are likely to have to say is already recorded and partly because they appear to have been acquiescent in some of the conduct that has been reported. In addition, I note Mr Bartholomeusz has since left the ATO.26.I am reluctant at this stage to draw current team members into this investigation. In deciding against drawing more team members into this investigation, I have also considered Mr Serpanos’s submission that the allegations have been made up to cause damage to his reputation and whether I should therefore discount the probative value of the complainants’ evidence. As will become clear from the discussion below, I reject the proposition that the complainants are engaged in some kind of collusion against Mr Serpanos. A more plausible explanation for the similarity of their evidence is that they witnessed the same conduct by Mr Serpanos and others, or were aware of the conduct because they discussed it contemporaneously. I am prepared to accept that the complainants are fundamentally witnesses of the truth. That reinforces my decision not to draw in other members of the team to take sides in dispute as to the facts.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Boyd did not dismiss Mr Serpanos because he had made or maintained the complaint articulated in his pleading. She dismissed him because she considered that he had contravened the APS Code of Conduct in ways that warranted his dismissal.8.2.3 Conclusions—dismissal not because of complaints It can readily be accepted—indeed, the ATO did not dispute—that the investigation that Ms Kotronakis conducted and that Ms Boyd followed was open to legitimate criticism. The decision to proceed without interviewing potentially relevant witnesses was unorthodox. Ms Kotronakis’s conclusion that what Mr Serpanos had demanded in the Second Concerns Notices was unreasonable (and the reliance that she placed to that end upon what Mr Sheil had said to her) was similarly unorthodox. Ms Boyd’s unquestioned acceptance of Ms Kotronakis’s findings—and her failure to inquire about or query what perhaps ought to have been the shortcomings apparent in the investigation process that led to them—was regrettable. In inviting the court to reject the evidence that Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd gave about why they each did (and did not) do what they relevantly did, Mr Serpanos’s submission reduces to this: that the investigation that led to the findings that were made against him was defective to a point so obvious that Ms Boyd and Ms Kotronakis simply must have been conscious of it. From their collective failure to address the defects of which each should be presumed to have been aware, it is said that the court should infer that what Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd told the court about the reasons that animated their conduct at the time was wrong (whether because it was deliberately untrue or otherwise). That submission requires successive inferences, each of which lacks a proper foundation. First, the court is invited to infer from the nature of the defects that attended the investigation, and from Ms Kotronakis’s and Ms Boyd’s seniority and experience, an awareness on the part of Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd that the findings that Mr Serpanos had contravened the APS Code of Conduct were unsound or ought not to be acted upon. Second, the court is invited to infer, from the fact that Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd proceeded, despite that presumed awareness, to do as they did, that the reasons that each gave for their conduct were in fact not the reasons for which that conduct was engaged in. There is a healthy degree of speculation in what Mr Serpanos posits. I mean no disrespect in saying so—it must, of course, be borne in mind that Mr Serpanos was hardly in a position to lead evidence of his own about why others did things. Nonetheless, the ultimate inference that the court is asked to draw—namely, that the reasons that Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd identified for the conduct in which they relevantly engaged were, in fact, not the reasons for which they engaged in it—cannot safely be drawn. It cannot safely be drawn because the inference that underpins it—namely, that Ms Kotronakis and Ms Boyd were both aware that the findings made against Mr Serpanos were unsound or unreliable—also cannot safely be drawn. The decisions to make and then act upon those findings in the circumstances that prevailed were just as likely products of carelessness, inattention, misjudgment or oversight as of calculated impropriety.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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