Fair Work Ombudsman v University of Melbourne

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fair Work Ombudsman v University of Melbourne [2024] FCA 330

File number(s): VID 446 of 2022
Judgment of: DOWLING J
Date of judgment: 5 April 2024
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – admitted contraventions of s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – agreed penalties and declarations – determination of contraventions – determination of appropriate penalties – determination of appropriateness of declarations – course of conduct – nature and seriousness of conduct – need for deterrence – corrective action – impact of contraventions – contrition – cooperation – penalties imposed – declarations made
Legislation:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 191

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 13, 14, 335, 340, 341, 342, 361, 539, 545, 546, 793

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21

University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic) ss 4, 6

Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCAFC 113; 254 FCR 68

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13; (2022) 399 ALR 599

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Employsure Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 5; 407 ALR 302

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; 340 ALR 25

Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; 258 CLR 482

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Limited (No 3) [2018] FCA 1395

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Milin Builders Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1070

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 894; 225 IR 113

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Williams [2009] FCAFC 171; 262 ALR 417

Mornington Inn Pty Ltd v Jordan [2008] FCAFC 70; 168 FCR 383

Pilbrow v The University of Melbourne [2022] FedCFamC2G 1001

Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1990] FCA 521, [1991] ATPR 41-076

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 85
Date of hearing: 5 March 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms F Knowles
Solicitor for the Applicant: Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R P P Dalton KC with Ms R Preston
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ashurst Australia

ORDERS

VID 446 of 2022
BETWEEN:

FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN

Applicant

AND:

THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

DOWLING J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 APRIL 2024

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The respondent contravened s 340(1)(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) on 7 August 2020 by taking adverse action against Mr Andrew Slyfield and Ms Renee Tsongas by threatening to prejudice their expectations or prospects of continuing work in the Melbourne Graduate School of Education because they exercised a workplace right, namely they made a complaint or inquiry in relation to their…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 330
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The University of Melbourne was sued by the Fair Work Ombudsman for breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009. The dispute centred on the university’s failure to prevent bullying and retaliation against two employees. The Federal Court was tasked with determining the nature of the contraventions, the appropriate penalties, and the necessity of declarations. The court was required to decide whether the university had contravened specific provisions of the Fair Work Act by allowing adverse action against employees who exercised their workplace rights. This included assessing whether threats made by a supervisor and subsequent refusal to re-employ amounted to contraventions of the Act, and whether these actions prejudiced the employees’ expectations or prospects of continuing work. The court also needed to determine the appropriate penalties for these contraventions, taking into account the statutory framework, the agreed penalties, and the relevant principles.

The court found that the university had contravened the Fair Work Act by allowing a supervisor to threaten two employees and subsequently refusing to re-employ one of them, actions that prejudiced their workplace rights. The university admitted these contraventions, which aligned with the court’s findings based on the Statement of Accepted Facts. The court accepted the agreed penalties submitted by the parties, considering the principles of predictability and appropriateness in civil penalty proceedings. The court was satisfied that the proposed penalties were within a permissible range and appropriate given the circumstances. The university was ordered to pay a total of $74,590 in pecuniary penalties for the contraventions, to be paid within 28 days.

The university was found to have contravened the Fair Work Act by allowing a supervisor to threaten employees who exercised their workplace rights and by refusing to re-employ one of them. The court accepted the agreed penalties of $37,295 for each contravention, totaling $74,590, to be paid within 28 days. The decision underscores the importance of preventing workplace bullying and retaliation, and the court’s commitment to imposing appropriate penalties to ensure compliance with workplace laws.

Orders

Orders of the court

3. The respondent pay a pecuniary penalty of $37,295 for the contraventions on 7 August 2020, set out in paragraph 1 above.

4. The respondent pay a pecuniary penalty of $37,295 for the contravention on 9 February 2021, set out in paragraph 2 above.

5. The penalties be paid within 28 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept those submissions of the Ombudsman. They are consistent with the scheme of the Act, consistent with the evidence before me, and consistent with the approach of Katzmann J in Pilbara and Wigney J in De Martin.Conclusions on contravening conduct Based on the matters set out above and the evidence contained in the SOAF I am satisfied that:(a)the complaint made by Mr Slyfield and Ms Tsongas in the 7 August Meeting was a complaint or inquiry within the meaning of s 341(1)(c)(ii) of the Act;(b)the ability to make that complaint or inquiry was a workplace right within the meaning of s 341 of the Act;(c)the threat of the Supervisor in the 7 August Meeting constituted adverse action within the meaning of s 342(1) item 1(c) of the Act; namely, it was a threat to alter the position of each of Mr Slyfield and Ms Tsongas to their prejudice;(d)the threat prejudiced Mr Slyfield’s and Ms Tsongas’ expectations or prospects of continuing work in the MGSE;(e)the Supervisor took the adverse action because Mr Slyfield and Ms Tsongas exercised a workplace right; and(f)the conduct of the Supervisor is the conduct of the University as provided for by s 793 of the Act; and(g)the University has accordingly contravened s 340(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. Based on the matters set out above and the evidence contained in the SOAF I am satisfied that:(a)the complaint or inquiry made by Ms Tsongas by submitting the 8 February Timecard on 8 February 2021 was a complaint or inquiry within the meaning of s 341(1)(c)(ii) of the Act;(b)the ability to make that complaint or inquiry was a workplace right within the meaning of s 341 of the Act;(c)the conduct of the Supervisor in refusing to re-employ Ms Tsongas in the MGSE constituted adverse action within the meaning of the s 342(1) item 2(a) of the Act;(d)the Supervisor took the adverse action because Ms Tsongas exercised a workplace right; and(e)the conduct of the Supervisor is the conduct of the University as provided for by s 793 of the Act; and(f)the University has accordingly contravened s 340(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.PECUNIARY PENALTIESThe statutory framework As set out above, s 340 of the Act is a “civil remedy provision”. Once the Court is satisfied that a person has contravened a civil remedy provision it may: (a)make any orders it considers appropriate, including binding declarations of right (see ss 539(1) and 539(2) item 11 of the Act and s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)); and (b)order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty that it considers appropriate (see s 546(1) of the Act). At the time of the contravening conduct a Commonwealth penalty unit was defined to mean the amount of $222.00, consequently the maximum penalty for the University for each contravention is $66,600.00 (see s Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 4AA(1) and (3), and ss 539(1) item 11 and 546(2) of the Act).Principles on agreed penalties The parties agree on the applicable principles where penalties are agreed and submitted to the Court by the parties. The principles can be summarised as follows:(a)There is an important public policy involved in promoting predictability of outcome in civil penalty proceedings. The practice of receiving and, where appropriate, accepting agreed penalties increases the predictability of outcomes for regulators and wrongdoers (see Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; 258 CLR 482 (the Agreed Penalties Case) at [46] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ, Keane J agreeing)).(b)Subject to the Court being sufficiently persuaded of the accuracy of the parties’ agreement as to facts and consequences, and that the penalty which the parties propose is an appropriate penalty, it is highly desirable for the Court to accept the parties’ proposal and impose the agreed penalty (see Agreed Penalties Case at [58] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ, Keane J agreeing)).(c)The Court is more than a rubber stamp, and it must be satisfied that the proposed penalty is an appropriate one in all the circumstances (see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Employsure Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 5; 407 ALR 302 at [111], citing with approval Agreed Penalties Case at [58] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ).(d)If the agreed penalty is within a permissible range, where it cannot necessarily be said to be more appropriate than another, the Court should not depart from the agreed penalty merely because it might have been disposed to select some other figure (see Agreed Penalties Case at [47] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ, Keane J agreeing)).Principles on assessing penalties

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The University admits that the threat by the Supervisor in the 7 August Meeting, was a threat to alter the position of Mr Slyfield and Ms Tsongas to their prejudice within the meaning of s 342(1) item 1(c) of the Act. The University admits that the threat prejudiced Mr Slyfield and Ms Tsongas’ expectations or prospects of continuing work in the MGSE (see SOAF at [73]).A ‘positive finding’ versus the operation of the reverse onus In its written submissions the University contends that whilst the SOAF provides a “factual basis for the conclusion, by operation of the reverse onus not being discharged, that the University … took the adverse action … the SOAF does not provide a basis to infer a positive finding that the Supervisor … was actuated by the proscribed reasoning” (the University’s submissions dated 20 October 2023 at [35], original emphasis). Mr Dalton KC for the University made clear in oral submissions that that submission is “not raised in mitigation”, but rather it is to guard against “the notion of any aggravating features” (Transcript page 11 lines 9-13). The Ombudsman submits that, by operation of s 361 and the reverse onus, there is a basis to make positive findings that the University engaged in the adverse action for the proscribed reasons. The Ombudsman seeks those positive findings (Transcript page 3 lines 38-44). As is clear from its terms, s 361 operates in such a way that where it is alleged that a person took action for a particular reason, it is presumed that the action was taken for that reason unless the person proves otherwise. On the evidence contained in the SOAF I find, where the Supervisor has not proved otherwise, that the Supervisor made the threat for the reason that Mr Slyfield and Ms Tsongas had made the complaint. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 894; (2012) 225 IR 113, Katzmann J said at [21]:I fail to see how the mode of proof has anything to do with the gravity of the contraventions. In this respect I would adopt the applicants’ submissions. Section 361 is a procedural provision. It facilitates proof of facts which (generally speaking) only the alleged wrongdoer knows. The fact that I found that the respondent had not rebutted the presumption does not detract from or diminish the importance of the conclusions that the Act had been contravened. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Limited (No 3) [2018] FCA 1395, Wigney J said at [49]:The action taken by De Martin & Gasparini was taken because the workers had those workplace rights, or had exercised them. The fact that the finding that De Martin & Gasparini took the action for that reason, or with that intent, was the outcome of the presumption in s 361 of the Fair Work Act, as opposed to a positive finding, does not lessen the seriousness of the contravention. The fact remains that De Martin & Gasparini was unable to prove that the action was not taken for that reason, mainly because the evidence of their senior officers was found to be unreliable and to lack credibility.