Background
Background to the litigation
I earlier refused the application, and now provide reasons for that decision.Background and History of Proceedings The first respondent, Mr Boatman, is a director and shareholder of Boatman Nominees Pty Ltd trading as Stawell Aviation Services (‘Stawell Aviation’). The second respondent Ms Kennedy is an employee of Boatman Nominees Pty Ltd. That company held an air operator’s certificate authorizing it to conduct charter operations. Mr Boatman held a commercial pilot licence endorsed with a condition requiring him, for medical reasons, to have a qualified co-pilot. He also held a private pilot and a student pilot licence, neither of which had that condition endorsed on it. Ms Kennedy also held a commercial pilot licence, private licence, student pilot licence and radio telephone licence. The various licences are species of ‘authorisations’ under the Act. On 29 April 2004, Mr Boatman was the pilot of a Cessna 172K aircraft, flying with a holder of a student pilot licence and two other passengers, one of whom was a fare-paying passenger who chose to fly in that plane. Ms Kennedy was the pilot of a Cessna 172RG aircraft, carrying two fare paying passengers and one other passenger. Each aircraft took off along a public road, Browne Street, in Innamincka, South Australia, a very small and isolated settlement. The matter came to CASA’s attention and CASA staff made preliminary enquiries. On 13 May 2004 and pursuant to s 30DC(1) of the Act, CASA suspended the civil aviation authorisations held by the respondents. As will be seen in more detail below, the legislation envisages a scheme which enables CASA to act in the perceived interests of safety, but allows quick and interim review by this Court. A case like this would often involve a decision by CASA to suspend an authorisation in circumstances where time has not permitted a proper investigation to occur, an application by CASA to the Federal Court within five days for adjudication of that suspension, and an early hearing of that application by the Court, taking into account the possibility that CASA may need more time for a full investigation. However, this matter has followed a much more protracted course. Prior to the substantive issue being heard, the matter was twice before a Full Federal Court, first in relation to the validity of s 30DE of the Act, the validity of the section being upheld: Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman [2004] FCAFC 165 (‘CASA No 1’); and secondly, in relation to confusion over consent orders that are not relevant to the present proceedings: Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman (2004) 139 FCR 444 (‘CASA No 2’).Statutory Framework The statutory framework was set out and considered, from the viewpoint of constitutional validity, in the first Full Court judgment in this matter (CASA No 1). I reproduce Sundberg J’s summary (at [2]-[11]): ‘Sections 30DC and 30DE are in Division 3A of the Act, which is headed “Serious and imminent risks to air safety”. Division 3A was inserted by the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 2003 (the 2003 Act). Subdivision B, which consists of ss 30DB to 30DD, is headed “Suspension for contravening the serious and imminent risk prohibition”. Section 30DB provides:“The holder of a civil aviation authorisation must not engage in conduct that constitutes, contributes to or results in a serious and imminent risk to air safety.”The expression “civil aviation authorisation” is defined in s 3 of the Act as“an authorisation under the Civil Aviation Regulations to undertake a particular activity (whether the authorisation is called an authority, licence, certificate, rating or endorsement or is known by some other name”.Section 30DC(1) provides:“Where CASA has reason to believe that the holder of a civil aviation authorisation has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in, conduct that contravenes section 30DB, CASA may suspend the authorisation by giving written notice to the holder.”The subsection is followed by a “Note” that CASA is not required to give the holder a show cause notice before making a decision under the subsection. Subsection (3) provides:“The suspension ends at the end of the fifth business day after the day on which the holder was notified of the suspension, unless before that time CASA makes an application to the Federal Court under section 30DE.”A “Note” to the subsection informs the reader that if CASA makes an application in time, the suspension continues in force until it comes to an end under s 30DJ.Subdivision C, which consists of ss 30DE and 30DF, is headed “Court order in relation to the serious and imminent risk prohibition”. Section 30DE is as follows:“(1)If CASA suspends a civil aviation authorisation under section 30DC, CASA may, before the end of the fifth business day after the day on which the holder of the authorisation was notified of the suspension, apply to the Federal Court for an order under this section.(2)If the Federal Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the holder has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in, conduct that contravenes section 30DB, the Court must make an order that prohibits the holder from doing anything that is authorised by the authorisation but that, without the authorisation, would be unlawful.(3)In deciding under subsection (2), the Federal Court must have regard to section 3A and subsection 9A(1).(4)Subject to section 30DF, an order continues in force for the period determined by the Federal Court when making the order, being the period (not more than 40 days) that the Court considers reasonable to allow CASA to complete an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to CASA’s decision to suspend the authorisation.”Section 30DF empowers the Court to extend (by not more than twenty eight days) or shorten the period determined under s 30DE(4).Sections 3A and 9A(1), referred to in s 30DE(3), are as follows:“3AThe main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation, with particular emphasis on preventing aviation accidents and incidents.…9A(1)In exercising its powers and performing its functions, CASA must regard the safety of air navigation as the most important consideration.”CASA’s functions are listed in s 9. They include the function of conducting the safety regulation of civil air operations in Australian territory in accordance with the Act and the regulations.Subdivision D, which consists of ss 30DG to 30DJ, is headed “Investigation and further action by CASA”. Section 30DG provides:“If the Federal Court makes an order under section 30DE in relation to a civil aviation authorisation, CASA must, by the end of the period that the order is in force, complete an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to CASA’s decision to suspend the authorisation under section 30DC.”Section 30DH provides:“(1)This section applies if, after CASA’s investigation under section 30DG:(a)CASA has reason to believe that a serious and imminent risk to air safety would exist if the civil aviation authorisation were not varied, suspended or cancelled; and(b)the grounds for CASA’s belief are related to the circumstances that gave rise to CASA’s decision to suspend the authorisation under section 30DC.(2)CASA may, within 5 business days after the last day on which the order is in force:(a)give the holder of the authorisation a show cause notice; and(b)allow the holder to show cause, within such reasonable time as CASA specifies in the notice (not more than 28 days), why the authorisation should not be varied, suspended or cancelled.”Section 30DI provides:“(1)This section applies if, after the end of the period specified in a show cause notice given under section 30DH:(a)CASA is satisfied that a serious and imminent risk to air safety would exist if the civil aviation authorisation were not varied, suspended or cancelled; and(b)the grounds for CASA’s belief are related to the circumstances that gave rise to CASA’s decision to suspend the authorisation under section 30DC.(2)CASA may vary, suspend or cancel the authorisation, by written notice given to the holder of the authorisation within 5 business days after the end of the period specified in the show cause notice.”Section 30DJ provides:“If CASA suspends a civil aviation authorisation under section 30DC and applies to the Federal Court for an order under section 30DE, the suspension continues in force until the time worked out under the table (unless earlier revoked).”The effect of the table is that:·if CASA’s application for an order is withdrawn or refused, the suspension ends at the time of withdrawal or refusal·if in the five business days after the last day on which the order was in force CASA does not give the holder a show cause notice under s 30DH, the suspension ends at the conclusion of the fifth business day after the order ceased to be in force·if CASA varies, suspends or cancels the authorisation under s 30DI, the suspension ends at the time the holder is notified of the variation, suspension or cancellation·if CASA has given the holder a show cause notice under s 30DH, but in the five business days after the last day of the period specified in the notice does not vary, suspend or cancel the authorisation, the suspension ends at the conclusion of the fifth business day after the last day of the period specified in the show cause notice.The respondents attack the validity of s 30DE on two grounds. The first is that it purports to confer on the Court a power that is not judicial power. The second is that the provision does not assign jurisdiction to the Court in a “matter” for the purposes of s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act or s 76 of the Constitution.The regulatory regime preceding that introduced by the 2003 Act was contained in regs 268 and 269 of the Regulations. The effect of reg 268 can be summarised as follows:·where CASA had reason to believe that there may be a serious risk to air safety if an authorisation were not suspended, it could suspend the authorisation ·where CASA suspended the authorisation it was required forthwith to investigate the matter, and the suspension would cease upon completion of the investigation or at the expiration of twenty eight days from the date on which the suspension took effect, whichever was the earlier·where upon completion of the investigation CASA gave the holder a notice under reg 269, the authorisation remained suspended during the time specified by CASA in that notice as the time within which the holder may show cause why the authorisation should not be varied, suspended or cancelled under reg 269.The effect of reg 269 can be summarised as follows:·CASA was empowered to vary, suspend or cancel an authorisation when it was satisfied that one or more specified grounds existed (including contravention of the Regulations and breach of the duty to operate aircraft safely)·before taking action to vary, suspend or cancel an authorisation, CASA was required to give notice to the holder of the facts that in its opinion warranted consideration being given to the variation, suspension or cancellation, and allow the holder to show cause why the authorisation should not be varied, suspended or cancelled.As can be seen, the Court had no role in this scheme. CASA was the sole actor.In the second reading speech introducing the bill that became the 2003 Act, the Minister said:“The bill also introduces new enforcement measures, which will provide CASA with a wider range of enforcement tools to better match the regulatory action to the seriousness of the breach. These measures will help to ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done by providing a range of options for CASA to vary, suspend or cancel aviation authorisations such as licences and air operators certificates. This is consistent with a risk based approach to safety management ...Very importantly, included in these enforcement tools will be a scheme to allow an automatic ‘stay’ of CASA’s final decision to vary, suspend or cancel an authorisation in cases other than a serious and imminent risk to air safety. The automatic stay will enhance fairness by reducing the time an authorisation holder is grounded while awaiting a review of CASA’s decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.The bill introduces the concept of a Federal Court exclusion order, where there is a serious and imminent risk to air safety. Under the new enforcement regime, CASA will retain the power to immediately suspend an authorisation where there is a serious and imminent risk to safety, but it will be required to apply to the Federal Court within five days of its decision for the court to adjudicate the suspension.These new reforms address the perception in aviation circles that CASA is somehow judge, jury and executioner.” The automatic stay provisions are found in s 31A, nothing in which prevents CASA from suspending an authorisation under s 30DC: s 31D.The two tiered regime introduced by the 2003 Act (serious and imminent risk to air safety and less serious cases) left CASA’s role substantially unchanged as to the latter, but introduced the Court as a player at one stage in relation to the former. In serious and imminent risk cases, CASA is empowered to impose a suspension that concludes at the end of the fifth business day after the holder is notified of the suspension: s 30DC. CASA is not required to give the holder notice before imposing the suspension. This short term suspension was not inappropriately described by the Solicitor‑General as an interim disqualification, similar to that imposed by courts on applications for interim injunctions. If there is to be any extension of the interim suspension, it can only be done by the Court. Any such extension is analogous to the grant of an interlocutory injunction prior to the expiration of an interim injunction. …’ (the added emphasis is mine, not Sundberg J’s)
Decision
Reasons for decision
MADGWICK J
In certain strictly defined emergency circumstances, regulatory breaches will apparently, at least de facto, be excused in the case of a ‘mercy flight’. Such flights are not however, under the instructions governing them, to be undertaken when, among other things, ‘the crew and other occupants of the aircraft involved will be exposed to undue hazard’. This seems to underline that, in the Australian flying context, the seriousness of a risk ought not be regarded as affected by the reason the risk is undertaken or encountered. Whether Mr Boatman committed any regulatory breach by asserting the possibility of a mercy flight when none existed is not a matter before me.CONCLUSION Accordingly, in my opinion there is not reason to believe that either respondent engaged in conduct that constituted, contributed to resulted in a serious and imminent risk to air safety.Costs The applicant seeks to be relieved of any liability as to costs before the Full Court’s second judgment of 24 December 2004. The respondents seek such costs. They also submit that all costs should be ordered to be paid on a solicitor-client basis. It is by no means clear to me that there is any substantial amount of costs unaccounted for by the costs orders made by the Full Court. If there is, I see no adequate reason why the usual rule should not also apply to such costs. That view is reinforced by the consideration that a short and minor issue, the first respondent’s medical condition, was to no ultimate point raised by the applicant. On the other hand, no adequate basis is shown for awarding costs on other than the usual party and party basis. CASA’s case was fairly arguable, notwithstanding the choice (probably a considered one) by its expert Mr South not to express his own view on the ultimate issue for the Court. There was material from which a respectable argument could be and was put by CASA, notwithstanding that I have rejected it. Further, CASA and Mr South put forward their positions in good faith in intended pursuit of the public interest. In a protective context, the Court should not be too quick to discourage public authorities from acting, even though the outcome might be uncertain.Orders1.The period in which any notice of appeal may be filed is extended until 19 May 2006, being 21 days from the date of publication for the reasons for judgment herein.2.The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs including any costs incurred before 24 December 2004 which are not the subject of previous final orders of the Court, to be agreed or assessed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
MADGWICK J
The respondents say that if there were a strong chance of some quite minor harm, that is not what the section is concerned with. Neither, if there were a miniscule chance of major harm, is such the concern of the section. All flying involves a degree of risk. A really significant chance of significant harm occurring is what the section contemplates.(iii) Consideration In CASA No 1, Sundberg J observed at [15]: ‘The power conferred by s 30DE is no different in its nature from that routinely exercised by a court of determining whether a motor vehicle is being driven dangerously, recklessly or negligently’. It was not in dispute that all flying involves risks to life and limb and that no flying avoids all outside chances. This is a significant aspect of the context. The section cannot be concerned simply with the seriousness of the consequences if the risk of an accident should become an actuality. The phrase ‘a serious and imminent risk to air safety’ is a difficult one to comprehend fully in relation to all possible circumstances in which it might fall for consideration. It is, to a degree, a composite phrase: it is not appropriate to see ‘serious’ as only referring to the risk of harm occurring. In the context, ‘serious’ means something like ‘really significant’. However, if a licence holder had done something indicative of very poor regard for safety but the potential consequences were only very slight then it might be unfair to call that a serious and imminent risk to air safety. I agree with the applicant that the level of a risk is a product of a number of factors which include the probability or likelihood of its occurring, the degree of exposure and the potential consequences. Nevertheless, in most cases attention will focus on the degree of likelihood that a risk to air safety would eventuate. At least that is, to my mind, true of the present case. As counsel for the respondents Mr Langmead SC (no doubt drawing on his experience as a pilot) submitted:‘To fly into a thunderstorm with little flying experience, to fly at wire height in the vicinity of wires without inspecting the area first, or to perform low level aerobatic manoeuvres without proper training … would be to engage in conduct that constitutes a serious and imminent risk to air safety, because great harm is very likely to happen very shortly.To engage in a takeoff where risks are present, but rather than being serious and imminent they are merely outside chances, is to engage in conduct which does not constitute a serious and imminent risk to air safety. There is no flying which avoids risks that are outside chances.’That is, all flying entails risks which, it is hoped, are remote. The underlying concern of the legislation seems to be: in the interests of air safety, is the conduct of the authorisation holder such as to warrant immediate, temporary withdrawal of the rights of the authorised person, even though that might, in some (but, of course, not all) cases, mean the destruction or significant impairment of the holder’s livelihood? At least the statutory test has, in my opinion, to be viewed with that notion as part of the context.