FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2013] FCA 1362
Citation: Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2013] FCA 1362 Appeal from: Sullivan and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2013] AATA 425 Parties: MARK SULLIVAN v CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY File number: NSD 1413 of 2013 Judge: JAGOT J Date of judgment: 17 December 2013 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – cancellation of pilot licence – Briginshaw principle – fit and proper person – relevant considerations – adequate reasons Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth)
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth)Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67
British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; [2011] HCA 2
Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408
Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman [2006] FCA 460
McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139
Re Kirby and Collector of Customs (1989) 20 ALD 369
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Brown [2006] NSWCA 220
Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2013] AATA 425
Tisdall v Webber (2011) 193 FCR 260Date of hearing: 29 November 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Applicant: AW Street SC with J Anderson Solicitor for the Applicant: MBG Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: I Harvey Solicitor for the Respondent: Legal Branch, Civil Aviation Authority
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1413 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: MARK SULLIVAN
ApplicantAND: CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
Respondent
JUDGE:
JAGOT J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 DECEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1413 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: MARK SULLIVAN
ApplicantAND: CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
Respondent
JUDGE:
JAGOT J
DATE:
17 DECEMBER 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1. THE QUESTIONS OF LAW
In this appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming the decision of the respondent, the Civil Aviation and Safety Authority (CASA), to cancel his licence, the appellant, Mark Sullivan, contends that seven questions of law arise as follows:
1.Whether…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1362
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues revolved around the application of the Briginshaw principle, the relevance of certain considerations in determining Mr Sullivan's fitness to hold a pilot's licence, and whether the Tribunal provided adequate reasons for its decision. Specifically, the Court had to assess whether the Tribunal adequately considered the 12-month exclusion period and the guilty pleas in determining Mr Sullivan's fitness and whether it provided sufficient reasons for rejecting certain evidence.
The Court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in its application of the Briginshaw principles, as it had provided a detailed explanation for its findings, which were reasonably open on the evidence. The Court rejected the argument that the Tribunal was required to consider specific matters such as the exclusion period and guilty pleas, as these were not mandated by statute. Furthermore, the Court found that the Tribunal's reasons were adequate, as they addressed the contested evidence and provided a clear rationale for its decision.
The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that Mr Sullivan pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The judgment emphasised that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and provided sufficient reasons for its decision, aligning with the statutory requirements and the principles of administrative law.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The only other observation that should be made in this context is that it cannot in any event be inferred that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the seriousness of its findings against Mr Sullivan and that this informed the kinds of material the Tribunal considered sufficient to satisfy it that these findings should be made. It may be accepted that the Tribunal did not say as much in terms. But that alone does not lead to an inference that the Tribunal failed to appreciate what it was doing in making the numerous findings against Mr Sullivan. As the respondent submitted, the principles in Briginshaw may be applied implicitly (British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; [2011] HCA 2 at [117]). In the present case, the matters were self-evidently serious. The Tribunal explained at some length why it found Mr Sullivan to lack credit. These were all matters the Tribunal was entitled, indeed bound, to resolve. There is no suggestion the findings were not reasonably open with due regard to the principles in Briginshaw and there was logically probative material, albeit disputed material, to support them. Resolving the disputed questions of fact, however, was the essential function of the Tribunal. I am not prepared to infer that the Tribunal failed to apply the principles in Briginshaw but, more importantly, it did not err in discharging its function even if it did not apply Briginshaw. 4. RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS (QUESTIONS 3 AND 4) These questions contend that the Tribunal was bound to take into account the 12 month period of exclusion and guilty pleas in determining whether Mr Sullivan was a fit and proper person. It is important to note that the complaint is a failure to consider a relevant matter not a failure to provide adequate reasons. The duty to give adequate reasons, even in the context of the limits on the duty of the Tribunal under s 43(2B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, is shaped by the contentions which the parties put. Relevant considerations, however, are determined by the statute (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40). As noted in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 at [75], this is not to say that the conduct of the parties cannot affect the practical content of the duty of the Tribunal to consider relevant matters. Just as a matter may have to be considered in order to afford procedural fairness because it is a principal contested issue between the parties, so too the parties may by their conduct entitle a decision-maker to assume that a relevant consideration is not in dispute and thus does not require specific focus. The statutory scheme does not disclose that either matter is one the Tribunal was bound to consider in deciding whether Mr Sullivan was a fit and proper person within the meaning of reg 269(1)(d). It is true, as submitted for Mr Sullivan, that the most important consideration of the safety of air navigation specified in s 9A of the Civil Aviation Act informed both the criminal proceedings and penalties imposed as a result of them and the matter before the Tribunal. But that does not mean that the Tribunal was bound to consider the guilty pleas and exclusion period as relevant matters to the question whether Mr Sullivan was a fit and proper person. The Tribunal could have considered those matters. They were not irrelevant considerations. What is lacking, however, is the identification of the source of any obligation to consider them. The only potential source is the statutory scheme and nothing suggests that these matters have to be considered when deciding whether or not to cancel a licence on the ground that the holder is not a fit and proper person.