Buitendag v Ravensthorpe Nickel Operations Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 60 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   BUITENDAG -v- RAVENSTHORPE NICKEL OPERATIONS PTY LTD [2014] WASCA 29

CORAM:   McLURE P

PULLIN JA
MURPHY JA

HEARD:   23 OCTOBER 2013

DELIVERED          :   6 FEBRUARY 2014

FILE NO/S:   CACV 144 of 2012

BETWEEN:   ISAK BUITENDAG

Appellant

AND

RAVENSTHORPE NICKEL OPERATIONS PTY LTD
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :LE MIERE J

Citation  :BUITENDAG -v- RAVENSTHORPE NICKEL OPERATIONS PTY LTD [2012] WASC 425

File No  :CIV 1444 of 2009

Catchwords:

Contract of employment - Summary termination of employment contract - Conflict of interest - Whether involvement in establishing sports club gave rise to a conflict of interest - Whether duty to avoid conflict of interest modified or excluded by contract or otherwise - Whether conflict rule confined to propriety or financial interest - Breach of fiduciary duty - Whether breaches justified summary dismissal - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr G R Ritter QC & Ms S P J Tan

Respondent:     Mr K J Mony De Kerloy & Ms O J Klimczak

Solicitors:

Appellant:     HopgoodGanim

Respondent:     Herbert Smith Freehills

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118

Settlement Agents Supervisory Board v Property Settlement Services Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 143

  1. McLURE P:  The appellant appeals against an order made by Le Miere J on 15 November 2012 dismissing his claim against his former employer, Ravensthorpe Nickel Operations Pty Ltd (the respondent) for wrongful termination of his employment contract.

  2. The respondent is a wholly owned subsidiary of BHP Billiton Plc and a member of the BHP Billiton group.  The appellant was the general manager of the respondent's nickel mine and processing operations near the town of Ravensthorpe in south west Western Australia.

  3. From 1 October 2007 Mr Buitendag was employed by the respondent under a written contract of employment dated 10 September 2007 (the employment contract).  The employment contract is titled 'Nickel West Employment Agreement'.  Nickel West is a division of the BHP Billiton Stainless Steel Materials Group (SSM).  The respondent's Ravensthorpe operations were part of Nickel West which ran BHP Billiton group nickel mines and processing sites in Western Australia.  At the material time, the appellant reported directly to Mr James Wilson, President of SSM.

  4. On 23 January 2009 the respondent summarily dismissed the appellant.  The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claim that the respondent had wrongfully terminated his employment contract, finding that the appellant had breached his employment contract in six areas.  In particular, the appellant:  (1) failed to make full and fair disclosure and made misleading statements to Mr Wilson in relation to the donation of a transportable house to the Hopetoun Clay Target Club (the Club) of which the appellant was a founding member; (2) requested an employee of the respondent to prepare drawings for the Club's clay target range; (3) requested an employee…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Buitendag v Ravensthorpe Nickel Operations Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] WASCA 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Buitendag v Ravensthorpe Nickel Operations Pty Ltd, the appellant, Mr Buitendag, appealed against the dismissal of his claim for unfair dismissal and associated penalties. Mr Buitendag had been employed by the respondent, Ravensthorpe Nickel Operations Pty Ltd, and was summarily dismissed following an investigation into allegations of misconduct, including that he had a conflict of interest in relation to his involvement in establishing a sports club. The primary dispute was whether the involvement in the sports club constituted a conflict of interest that justified his summary dismissal. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The court needed to determine several legal issues. First, it had to ascertain whether Mr Buitendag's involvement in establishing the sports club constituted a conflict of interest under the employment contract. Second, the court had to examine whether any duty to avoid conflict of interest was modified or excluded by the contract or otherwise. Third, the court had to decide if the conflict rule applied solely to propriety or financial interests. Finally, the court needed to evaluate whether the alleged breaches justified the summary dismissal, considering the breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found that Mr Buitendag's involvement in the sports club did not constitute a conflict of interest as defined in the employment contract. The court held that the conflict of interest rule was confined to propriety or financial interests and did not extend to other activities. Additionally, the court concluded that the breaches of the conflict of interest rule did not warrant summary dismissal, as there was no evidence of significant harm to the employer or breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Buitendag to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: On the delivery of the judgment in this appeal on 6 February 2014 the respondent sought the following orders:1.The appeal be dismissed.2.The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, including any reserved costs, to be taxed if not agreed.3.The taxing officer make reasonable allowance for the respondent's lead counsel under scale item 23(h) - Counsel fee for Senior Counsel (including preparation).4.The limits on costs allowable under the Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 be removed in respect of the following items of work:(a)scale item 23(b) - Respondent's Answer;(b)scale item 23(g) - Counsel fee on hearing (including preparation); and(c)scale item 23(h) - Counsel fee for Senior Counsel (including preparation). Proposed orders 1, 2, 4(a) and (b), were made by the court with the agreement of the parties. There being opposition to proposed orders 3 and 4(c), the court ordered the filing of written submissions in relation to those proposed orders. The Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (the Determination) applies to the costs of the appeal. The court has the power to remove the limits on costs fixed in the Determination if it is of the opinion that the amount of costs allowable thereunder is inadequate because of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter: Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 280(2)(c). In the parties agreeing to, and the court making, the orders in terms of pars 4(a) and 4(b) it has been accepted that the appeal involved unusual difficulty, complexity or importance. The only outstanding issue is whether the costs of lead counsel for the respondent should be assessed at the rate applicable to Senior Counsel. Lead counsel for the respondent in the appeal is a partner of the firm of solicitors representing the respondent and an experienced counsel, but has not been appointed Senior Counsel. The term 'Senior Counsel' is defined in the Determination to include reference to Queens Counsel or Senior Counsel appointed in Western Australia, or appointed in any State or Territory in Australia and whose appointment is afforded recognition by the Chief Justice of Western Australia. It is only in very exceptional cases that a person who has not been appointed Senior Counsel, with its attendant rights and responsibilities, would have their costs assessed at the rate designated for Senior Counsel in the Determination. There is nothing in the subject matter or conduct of the appeal in this case that would justify such a course. The power of the court to remove the limits on costs in this case derives primarily from the factual complexity of the appeal which was unduly increased by the unorthodox approach taken in the Appellant's Case. We would decline to make the orders sought in pars 3 and 4(c). Notwithstanding the appellant's agreement to orders 4(a) and 4(b) on 6 February 2014, he now seeks to retreat from the full effect of those orders by excluding hourly rates from any increase in the costs limits.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.