FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Investa Properties Pty Ltd v Nankervis (No 7) [2015] FCA 1004
Citation: Investa Properties Pty Ltd v Nankervis (No 7) [2015] FCA 1004 Parties: INVESTA PROPERTIES PTY LTD (ACN 084 407 241) and INVESTA RESIDENTIAL GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 098 527 390) v ASHLEY COLIN NANKERVIS, ADAM KIMBERLY BARCLAY and OLIVER HUME SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND PTY LTD (ACN 128 863 230) File number: QUD 231 of 2011 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 10 September 2015 Catchwords: EQUITY – whether senior employee owed fiduciary duties to property developer employer – fiduciary relationship – principles in Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296 considered – duty to avoid conflict of duty and interest – principles in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 and ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 309 ALR 445 considered – whether properties sold at undervalue – where senior employee allegedly misrepresented nature of development site to property developer employer – where senior employee allegedly failed to inform property developer employer of design work to flatten development site – where senior employee allegedly failed to disclose agreement with third party and the individual real estate agent acting on behalf of employer – where senior employee allegedly performed services for third party purchaser of property outside employment relationship – where senior employee allegedly knew of real estate agent purchasing property subject of agency
EQUITY – whether sales office moved without authority – whether removal of sales office by senior employee constituted breach of fiduciary duty or breach of term of employment
EQUITY – nature of fiduciary relationship between real estate agent and principal – whether limited to obligation of disclosure – where applicants claimed against real estate agency company and individual real estate agent – potential liability of both real estate agency company and individual real estate agent where property sold to company controlled by spouse of individual real estate agent – attribution of knowledge of individual real estate agent to real estate agency company – alleged fraud by individual real estate agent on real estate agent company – whether individual real estate agent breached duty of full and frank disclosure and duty of good faith
EQUITY – principles in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 – accessorial liability – “knowing assistance”
REAL PROPERTY – whether applicants failed to comply with regulations 7(1), 11, 14 and 16 Property Agents and Motor Dealers (Property Developer Practice Code of Conduct) Regulations 2001 (Qld) (the PAMDA Regulations) – where applicant and real estate agency company entered into an agreement pursuant to Form 22a Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (PAMDA) in respect of one property but not the other property – whether individual real estate agent or real estate agency company owed obligations in respect of residential property where there was an absence of formal agreement – where the PAMDA Regulations similar to obligations imposed in equity
AGENCY
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1004
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The cross-claim of Ashley Nankervis against Adam Barclay and Oliver Hume South East Queensland Pty Ltd ACN 128 863 230 filed 15 November 2013 be dismissed.
2. The cross-claim of Adam Barclay against Ashley Nankervis filed 18 November 2013 be dismissed.
3. The cross-claim of Adam Barclay against Oliver Hume South East Queensland Pty Ltd ACN 128 863 230 filed 15 December 2012 be dismissed.
4. The cross-claim of Adam Barclay against Vero Insurance Limited ABN 48 005 297 807 filed 15 December 2012 be dismissed.
5. The cross-claim of Oliver Hume South East Queensland Pty Ltd ACN 128 863 230 against Adam Barclay filed 10 December 2012 be upheld.
6. Costs be reserved.
7. The matter be listed for further directions at 9.30 am on 21 October 2015 in respect of:
(a) remedies of the applicants under the amended application filed 17 October 2013;
(b) remedies of Oliver Hume South East Queensland Pty Ltd ACN 128 863 230 in respect of its cross-claim filed 10 December 2012;
(c) costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Oliver Hume SEQ also denies having received any benefit from Mr Barclay’s entry into the agreement with Mr Tonuri and Mr Nankervis as it did not receive any commission from any person or entity at all upon the purchase of Lot 170 from Investa Residential and was not engaged as the seller’s real estate agent upon sale of lots in the development undertaken by Two Eight Two Nine on Lot 170 or receive any commission for such sales.Consideration The cross-claim of Mr Nankervis is referable to Lot 170 and any breach of fiduciary obligation by him in respect of that property. I have found that Mr Barclay and Oliver Hume SEQ were not in a fiduciary relationship with either of the applicants in relation to Lot 170, and therefore neither respondent breached any fiduciary obligation to either of the applicants in that respect. However, Mr Nankervis was in a fiduciary relationship with the applicants in relation to Lot 170, and breached relevant fiduciary obligations. Mr Nankervis claims equitable contribution by Mr Barclay and Oliver Hume SEQ on the basis of their co-ordinate liability as knowing participants in his breach of fiduciary duty. Mr Nankervis does not specifically plead “knowing assistance” by Mr Barclay and Mr Nankervis in his breach of fiduciary obligation in terms of the liability contemplated by the well-known case Barnes v Addy [1870] LR 9 Ch App 244. Although this appears to be the basis of his cross-claim. He does not particularise his claim by reference to relevant facts. For this reason Mr Nankervis’ cross-claim cannot be substantiated and should be dismissed. There is no claim, so far as I can tell, that Mr Barclay has “received trust property” as is generally understood when parties make claims pursuant to the principles articulated in Barnes v Addy. The issue of accessorial liability in equity has been vexed since the decision in Barnes v Addy. In light of that decision, for many years accessorial liability would only be imputed where a person had assisted with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees (per Lord Selbourne LC in Barnes v Addy at 252). A modern interpretation was accorded to these principles however in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, where the Privy Council found that accessorial liability did not depend on knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design. Authoritative explanations of relevant principles can be found in the decisions of the High Court in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 and Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, and the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Grimaldi. In Farah, Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ discussed the “second limb” of Barnes v Addy in the following terms:160.As conventionally understood in Australia, the second limb makes a defendant liable if that defendant assists a trustee or fiduciary with knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee or fiduciary.161.Several points of a general nature should be made here. The first concerns the scope of the second limb. This was not expressed by Lord Selborne LC as an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which a third party who has not received trust property and who has not acted as a trustee de son tort nevertheless may be accountable as a constructive trustee. Before Barnes v Addy, there was a line of cases in which it was accepted that a third party might be treated as a participant in a breach of trust where the third party had knowingly induced or immediately procured breaches of duty by a trustee where the trustee had acted with no improper purpose; these were not cases of a third party assisting the trustee in any dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee.162.Secondly, the distinction has been recognised in the Australian case law but, on one reading of Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan, may have been displaced by the Privy Council in favour of a general principle of “accessory liability” expressed as follows:A liability in equity to make good resulting loss attaches to a person who dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation. It is not necessary that, in addition, the trustee or fiduciary was acting dishonestly, although this will usually be so where the third party who is assisting him is acting dishonestly. “Knowingly” is better avoided as a defining ingredient of the principle.163.Thirdly, whilst the different formulations of principle may lead to the same result in particular circumstances, there is a distinction between rendering liable a defendant participating with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design, and rendering liable a defendant who dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation where the trustee or fiduciary need not have engaged in a dishonest or fraudulent design. The decision in Royal Brunei has been referred to in this Court several times but not in terms foreclosing further consideration of the subject in this Court, in particular, further consideration of the apparent necessity to displace the acceptance in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd of the formulation of the second limb of Barnes v Addy were Royal Brunei to be adopted in this country. Until such an occasion arises in this Court, Australian courts should continue to observe the distinction mentioned above and, in particular, apply the formulation in the second limb of Barnes v Addy.(footnotes omitted.)