K & S CORPORATION LTD v SPORTINGBET AUSTRALIA
[2003] SASC 96
Civil
BESANKO J:
Introduction
Dennis Craig Telford (“Telford”) was an employee of K & S Corporation Limited (“K & S Corporation”). Telford gambled heavily on horse races. In 2001 and early 2002 he placed large wagers with at least two sports bookmakers, one of whom is the defendant Sportingbet Australia Pty Ltd (“Sportingbet”) and its predecessor, Number One Betting Shop Limited (“NOBS”). In early April 2002, and without the consent of his employer, Telford arranged for the sum of $3 million to be transferred from his employer’s bank account with the Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“the ANZ account”) to Sportingbet’s bank account with Westpac Banking Corporation (“the Westpac account”). At the time of the transfer Telford owed Sportingbet the sum of $2,680,000. After the transfer the records of Sportingbet show that Telford’s account with Sportingbet was in credit in the sum of $320,000.
2 The fraud perpetrated by Telford was discovered shortly after the payment was made and a warrant was issued under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 1996. This led to the seizure of the monies. Orders made by this Court on 9 May 2002 resulted in the payment of the sum of $320,000 to K & S Corporation and the payment of the sum of $2,680,000 to an account with the Bendigo Bank under the control of the solicitors for K & S Corporation and the solicitors for Sportingbet. This action concerns the entitlement to the sum of $2,680,000 (“the disputed monies”).
There were two other parties to the action, namely, the Director of Public Prosecutions and Telford. In the course of the trial, I made an order by consent dismissing the plaintiff’s action against the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is the Administrator under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. The Administrator is the person nominated by the Attorney-General to administer property forfeited or subject to restraining orders under the Act. I made no order as to costs. The third defendant, Telford, took no part in the action and the plaintiffs do not seek any orders against him.
At the start of the trial I made an order giving K & S Corporation leave to join K & S Group Pty Limited (“K & S Group”) as a plaintiff. The action proceeded as an action by K & S Corporation and K & S Group against Sportingbet for the recovery of the disputed monies. The principal basis of the plaintiffs’ claim is an assertion that there is a constructive trust over the disputed monies in their favour. The plaintiffs assert that Sportingbet had the required level of knowledge or notice as to the source of the monies and the circumstances under which they were paid to make Sportingbet a constructive trustee of the monies. Sportingbet denies that it had the required level of knowledge or notice. In addition, it raises various defences including change of position, the provision of good consideration for the…
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- Case
- [2003] SASC 96
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined several factors to ascertain Sportingbet's knowledge of the misappropriation. These included Sportingbet's failure to inquire about the source of funds, its interest only in Telford's past ability to settle debts, and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the payments. The court found that Sportingbet had indeed wilfully and recklessly failed to make the necessary inquiries, thereby acquiring the requisite knowledge. The court dismissed Sportingbet's defences of change of position and good consideration, as these defences required innocence, which was not present given Sportingbet's knowledge. The court concluded that Sportingbet was liable to return the misappropriated funds to K & S Corporation.
In light of the findings, the court ordered Sportingbet to pay K & S Corporation the sum of $1,667,000, representing the misappropriated funds, along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 15 April 2002 until the date of judgment, and costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Sportingbet raised a number of defences, namely, change of position, the provision of good consideration for the payment, estoppel and election.Change of Position and the Provision of Good Consideration for the Payment The plaintiffs seem to accept that change of position was a defence. In Koorootang v ANZ Banking Group, Hansen J expressed the view that the liability of a recipient of trust property is restitution-based and there is a strong argument that liability should be strict, subject to defences of bona fide purchase and change of position. However, in view of the way that case was conducted, it was unnecessary for his Honour to decide the point. In Gertsch v Atsas & ors, Foster AJ said that as the imposition of a constructive trust was based on some degree of “blameworthiness” on the part of the defendant, and the defence of change of position was based on the innocence of the defendant, it was clear that the defence was not available to resist a claim for a constructive trust. I am inclined to agree with this view. I note also that in a claim asserting a trust over property which has passed from a trustee to a third party, the third party would ordinarily only have a defence if he could prove that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If that was the relevant defence in this case it could not be established because of the findings as to knowledge. As I have said, the plaintiff proceeded on the basis that the defence of change of position was available to Sportingbet. As it happens, I do not think that the defence can be made out on the facts and in those circumstances it is not strictly necessary for me to decide the point. In the ordinary case, a change of position must be an innocent change of position made on the faith of the receipt of the monies. The change of position asserted here cannot be considered innocent because of the findings I have made about knowledge. However, it is appropriate that I proceed to consider whether the three matters raised by Sportingbet could constitute a change of position. First, Sportingbet points to the fact that it has paid turnover tax. This submission fails. The turnover tax is paid on the wagers made not on whether they are ultimately paid (s 106 Racing and Betting Act). The liability to pay turnover tax was incurred when the wagers were accepted and they were accepted by Sportingbet in the belief that Telford would pay, not that he had paid. Secondly, Sportingbet points to the fact that it has paid the Goods and Services Tax on the receipt of the disputed monies. This submission fails. It is not entirely clear whether the tax is payable on the wager or on the payment. If it is the former (which it would seem to be) then the submission fails for the same reason as the submission in relation to turnover tax fails. Even if it is the latter there is no evidence excluding the possibility that the payment of tax may be recovered if it is found that Sportingbet has no entitlement to the disputed monies. Thirdly, there seemed to be an argument put that but for the seizure of the disputed monies they would have been remitted to the parent company in the United Kingdom. I cannot see how that constitutes a relevant change of position. Nor can I see how the mere fact that the funds remained in the Westpac account for a few days and normal trading continued can constitute a relevant change of position.