Minter Ellison (A Firm) v Raneberg

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM) & ANOR v RANEBERG

[2011] SASC 159

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray

29 September 2011

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - EX PARTE APPLICATIONS - GENERALLY

PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - PROCEEDINGS IN OPEN COURT OR IN CAMERA

The plaintiffs sought and obtained an urgent ex parte freezing order over the defendant's assets, in circumstances where the plaintiffs claim that the defendant, as accounting and finance manager employed by them, embezzled monies over some years - further interim orders were made to ensure confidentiality, including orders as to the sealing of documents on the court file - the plaintiffs now seek the continuance of orders to maintain confidentiality over limited material, that material relating to the plaintiff firm's partner's personal funds - whether there is a legitimate claim to confidentiality - whether appropriate in the circumstances of the case that the order as to confidentiality continue.

Consideration of the principle of open justice.

Held: the order as to confidentiality is to continue.

Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 69A and s 49; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 4 and r 247(3); Supreme Court Practice Directions 2006 (SA), referred to.
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228; Black v S Freedman & Company (1910) 12 CLR 105; Sullivan v Sclanders (2000) 77 SASR 419; Lloyds Bowmaker Ltd v Britannia Arrow Holdings plc [1988] 3 All ER 178; Brink’s Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1988] 3 All ER 188; Dormeuil Freres SA v Nicolian International (Textiles) Ltd [1988] 3 All ER 197; Behbehani v Salem [1989] 2 All ER 143; Thomas A Edison Ltd v Bullock (1912) 15 CLR 679; Re South Downs Packers Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 559; Lane v Channel 7 Adelaide Pty Ltd (2004) 232 LSJS 234; Digital Equipment Corporation v Darkcrest Ltd [1984] Ch 512; Coulthard v South Australia (1995) 63 SASR 531; J N Taylor Holdings Limited (in liq) (2007) 249 LSJS 80; Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495; Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417; Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 275 ALR 408, considered.

MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM) & ANOR v RANEBERG
[2011] SASC 159

Civil

GRAY J:

  1. The plaintiffs are a firm of solicitors and their incorporated administration company.  The defendant was employed by the plaintiffs initially as their accounting and finance manager, and later as chief financial officer.  The plaintiffs claim that the defendant in the course of his employment embezzled monies over some years. 

  2. The plaintiffs sought and obtained an urgent ex parte freezing order over the defendant’s assets.  Interim orders were made to ensure confidentiality.  These orders initially precluded access to the Court file.  The proceedings were heard in a closed Court.

    Background

  3. Reasons for these orders included the serious nature of the allegations being made about the defendant without his being served…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASC 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiffs in this case sought and obtained an urgent ex parte freezing order over the defendant’s assets, alleging that the defendant, who was their accounting and finance manager, embezzled funds over several years. To maintain confidentiality, interim orders were made, including sealing the court file. The plaintiffs now seek to continue the orders to maintain confidentiality over limited material, specifically relating to the plaintiffs’ partner’s personal funds. The central legal issues were whether there was a legitimate claim to confidentiality and whether it was appropriate to continue the order in the given circumstances.

The court considered the balance between the principles of open justice and privacy, citing the observations of Deane J in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish, which emphasized the importance of respecting legitimate claims to confidentiality. The court acknowledged the risk of damage and hardship to the partners from the legal processes if the confidentiality order were to be discharged, without evidence of prejudice to the general administration of justice or the legitimate claims and expectations of others. The court concluded that there was a legitimate claim to confidentiality in this case, and the paramount objective of achieving justice required maintaining the confidentiality order. The court found that the balance between the principles of open justice and privacy favored maintaining the confidentiality order.

The High Court in Hogan v Hinch provided a comprehensive review of the open court principle, highlighting that while it is a fundamental characteristic of courts to sit in public, the principle is not absolute and may be limited where necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. The court referenced various categories of cases where confidentiality may be preserved, such as in proceedings involving a secret technical process, in actions for injunctive relief against an anticipated breach of confidence, and in cases involving national security. The court determined that the confidentiality orders in this case fell within the permissible exceptions to the open court principle, as there was no public interest in releasing the information contained in the documents.

In conclusion, the court decided to maintain the confidentiality orders, limiting them to documents and submissions that relate to the private affairs of the plaintiffs and the partners of the firm. The court's decision was based on the legitimate claim to confidentiality and the balance between the principles of open justice and privacy.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiffs sought and obtained an urgent ex parte freezing order over the defendant’s assets. Interim orders were made to ensure confidentiality. These orders initially precluded access to the Court file. The proceedings were heard in a closed Court.Background Reasons for these orders included the serious nature of the allegations being made about the defendant without his being served and in his absence, and the plaintiffs’ claim to confidentiality of private material. The confidentiality orders have been varied. However, the plaintiffs seek orders to maintain confidentiality over limited material. In my view it is appropriate to continue limited orders as to confidentiality. My reasons follow. At the outset, it is relevant to recall the observations of Deane J in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish:[1]There lies at the heart of our legal system the ideal of the attainment of justice under the law in the individual case. Justice can be denied as much by effectively closing the doors of the courts to litigants as it can by an unjust or wrong decision. The results of an undue discounting of legitimate claims to confidentiality are likely to be both the deterrence of the subject from having recourse to courts of justice for the vindication of legal rights or the enforcement of criminal law and the discouragement of willing co-operation on the part of witnesses whose evidence is necessary to enable the ascertainment of truth. The interests of the administration of justice plainly make it desirable that obligations of confidence be not lightly overruled and that legitimate expectations of confidentiality as to private and confidential transactions and affairs be not lightly disregarded.In some cases, where publicity would destroy the subject matter of the litigation, the avoidance of prejudice to the administration of justice may make it imperative that the ordinary prima facie rule of open justice in the court room gives way to the overriding need for confidentiality. Even where publicity would not destroy the subject matter of the litigation, the need to respect legitimate claims to confidentiality will be a factor—and in some cases a determining factor—to be placed in the overall balance in considering whether an order under s 50 should be made. Damage and hardship to the individual from the working of legal processes can only be justified if they are warranted by countervailing benefit, or avoidance of prejudice, to the general administration of justice or by the legitimate claims and expectations of other individuals. When not so warranted, such damage or hardship is to the overall prejudice of the administration of justice.[1] Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 43 FLR 129, 157-158. Three affidavits were filed in support of the application for freezing orders, being an affidavit of Nigel Fergus McBride dated 21 July 2011 and two affidavits of Andrew Christie Mailler both dated 21 July 2011. Two additional documents were tendered by counsel at the hearing – a chronology and a summary of losses.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

During the course of the interlocutory hearings, I expressed the view, having regard to the contents of the affidavits and documents and the submissions advanced, that there should be a relevant disclosure to the Police, to the Law Society and to the public of the allegations concerning the defendant’s conduct. I considered that a prima facie case had been established to support the plaintiffs’ claims for interlocutory relief. It was submitted to me that there had been no apparent misapplication of trust funds and I considered that it was important that this information be disclosed to the Law Society. I also formed the view that the material suggested the possibility of criminal conduct and that in these circumstances it was a matter for disclosure to the Police. I have now been informed of the disclosure that has been made to the Police, the Law Society and to the public. Conclusion The present orders for confidentiality are restricted to documents and submissions that relate to the private affairs of the plaintiffs and the partners of the firm. I do not see any proper public interest in the release of the information contained in the documents and referred to in submissions. There is a risk of damage and hardship to the partners from the working of the legal processes if the order for confidentiality were to be discharged. There is no evidence of prejudice arising to the general administration of justice or of the avoidance of prejudice to the legitimate claims and expectations of others. I consider there to be a legitimate claim to confidentiality in the within proceeding. I consider that the paramount object – to do justice – in this particular case, having regard to the circumstances, is to be achieved by the maintaining of the confidentiality order. In short, it is my view that the balance between the principles of open justice and of privacy come down on the side of the maintaining of the confidentiality order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Recently, the High Court in Hogan v Hinch[19] had occasion to consider the open court principle. French CJ addressed the topic and reviewed relevant authorities from most common law jurisdictions:[20]An essential characteristic of courts is that they sit in public[21]. That principle is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Its rationale is the benefit that flows from subjecting court proceedings to public and professional scrutiny[22]. It is also critical to the maintenance of public confidence in the courts. Under the Constitution courts capable of exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth must at all times be and appear to be independent and impartial tribunals. The open-court principle serves to maintain that standard[23]. However, it is not absolute[24].It has long been accepted at common law that the application of the open justice principle may be limited in the exercise of a superior court's inherent jurisdiction or an inferior court's implied powers[25]. This may be done where it is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice[26]. In a proceeding involving a secret technical process, a public hearing of evidence of the secret process could "cause an entire destruction of the whole matter in dispute"[27]. Similar considerations inform restrictions on the disclosure in open court of evidence in an action for injunctive relief against an anticipated breach of confidence. In the prosecution of a blackmailer, the name of the blackmailer's victim, called as a prosecution witness, may be suppressed because of the "keen public interest in getting blackmailers convicted and sentenced" and the difficulties that may be encountered in getting complainants to come forward "unless they are given this kind of protection."[28] So too, in particular circumstances, may the name of a police informant or the identity of an undercover police officer[29]. The categories of case are not closed, although they will not lightly be extended[30]. Where "exceptional and compelling considerations going to national security" require that the confidentiality of certain materials be preserved, a departure from the ordinary open justice principle may be justified[31]. The character of the proceedings and the nature of the function conferred upon the court may also qualify the application of the open-court principle. The jurisdiction of courts in relation to wards of the State and mentally ill people was historically an exception to the general rule that proceedings should be held in public because the jurisdiction exercised in such cases was "parental and administrative, and the disposal of controverted questions … an incident only in the jurisdiction."[32] Proceedings not "in the ordinary course of litigation", such as applications for leave to appeal, can also be determined without a public hearing[33]. It is a common law corollary of the open-court principle that, absent any restriction ordered by the court, anybody may publish a fair and accurate report of the proceedings, including the names of the parties and witnesses, and the evidence, testimonial, documentary or physical, that has been given in the proceedings[34].[19] Hogan v Hinch (2011) 275 ALR 408. [20] Hogan v Hinch (2011) 275 ALR 408, [20]-[22]. [21] Daubney v Cooper (1829) 10 B & C 237 at 240 [109 ER 438 at 440]; Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50; [1913] HCA 77; Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417; Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495 at 520 per Gibbs J; [1976] HCA 23.[22] Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495 at 520 per Gibbs J.[23] Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45 at 76 [64], 81 [78] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ; [2006] HCA 44. [24] Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 at 359 [56] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ; [1999] HCA 9, adopting the remarks of Gaudron J in Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 at 150; [1991] HCA 9, referring to "limited exceptions" to the open and public inquiry involved in the exercise of judicial power. [25] Inferior courts lack the "inherent jurisdiction" of superior courts, but have analogous implied powers: Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 15-17 per Dawson J; [1989] HCA 45; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344 at 354 [28] per Spigelman CJ, Handley JA and M W Campbell A-JA agreeing at 368. In federal courts created by statute implied incidental powers also take the place of "inherent jurisdiction": DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 at 240-241 [25] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; [2000] HCA 17; Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 618-619 per Wilson and Dawson JJ, 623-624 per Deane J, Mason CJ agreeing at 616, 630-631 per Toohey J; [1987] HCA 23. [26] John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 476‑477 per McHugh JA, Glass JA agreeing at 467.[27] Andrew v Raeburn (1874) LR 9 Ch 522 at 523. See also Nagle-Gillman v Christopher (1876) 4 Ch D 173 at 174 per Jessel MR; Mellor v Thompson (1885) 31 Ch D 55; Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 436-437 per Viscount Haldane LC, 443 per Earl of Halsbury, 445 per Earl Loreburn, 450-451 per Lord Atkinson, 482-483 per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline.[28] R v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd; Ex parte Attorney-General [1975] QB 637 at 644 per Lord Widgery CJ, Milmo and Ackner JJ agreeing at 653, referred to with apparent approval in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 at 452 per Lord Diplock, 458 per Viscount Dilhorne, 471 per Lord Scarman. See also John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 at 141 per Kirby P. [29] Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 at 246 per McHugh JA; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 472 per Mahoney JA, 480 per McHugh JA, Glass JA agreeing at 467; John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 at 141 per Kirby P, 159 per Mahoney JA, Hope A-JA agreeing at 169; Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [1999] 1 VR 267 at 293 [85]; R v Lodhi (2006) 65 NSWLR 573 at 584 [25]-[26] per McClellan CJ at CL. [30] R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335 at 340-341 [12]-[14] per Hodgson JA, 343-344 [29]-[31] per Howie J, 345-346 [38]-[39] per Rothman J; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 70 NSWLR 643 at 648 [32]-[38] per Mason P, Ipp JA agreeing at 657, 658 [90]-[91] per Basten J; P v D1 [No 3] [2010] NSWSC 644 at [11]-[20]. [31] A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532 at 599 per Deane J; [1984] HCA 67; John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 at 141 per Kirby P; R v Lodhi (2006) 65 NSWLR 573 at 584-585 [26] per McClellan CJ at CL; R v Governor of Lewes Prison; Ex parte Doyle [1917] 2 KB 254 at 271-272 per Viscount Reading CJ; Taylor v Attorney-General [1975] 2 NZLR 675.[32] Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 437 per Viscount Haldane LC. See also John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General(NSW) (2000) 181 ALR 694 at 723 [165] per Meagher JA.[33] Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350 at 356 per Mason CJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ; [1988] HCA 3.[34] Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 at 450 per Lord Diplock, 459 per Lord Edmund-Davies, 469 per Lord Scarman; Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47 at 55 per Kirby P, 61 per Samuels JA; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 476-477 per McHugh JA, Glass JA agreeing at 467; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 at 43 per Toohey J; [1995] HCA 19; J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10 at 44 per Fitzgerald P and Lee J; Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 327 at 335 [15] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J; [2003] HCA 52; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344 at 353 [20] per Spigelman CJ, Handley JA and M W Campbell A‑JA agreeing at 368.Consideration of the Application