Dickason v Dickason

[1913] HCA 77

17 CLR 50

DICKASON (OTHERWISE CALLED WILLIAMS) DICKASON

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Practice- - High Court-Appeal from Supreme Court of State-Hearing in camera

- Matrimonial cause-Nullity-Judiciary Act 1903-1910 (No. 6 of 1903-No. 34 of 1910), sec. 15.

In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary the jurisdiction of the Sept. 11.

High Court must be exercised in open Court. MOTION.

Before Hood J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria a petition was heard whereby Daisy Wycott Dickason (otherwise Daisy Wycott Williams) sought a declaration that her marriage with Thomas Henry Dickason was null and void. The learned Judge having dismissed the petition and directed the parties to abide their own costs of the cause, the petitioner appealed to the High Court.

The petitioner now applied to the High Court by motion that the appeal should be heard in camera, the respondent con- senting to the application being granted.

Morley, in support of the motion. This Court has inherent jurisdiction to hear an appeal in camera.

[ISAACS J. Under sec. 15 of the Judiciary Act the jurisdic- tion of this Court must be exercised in open Court.]

17 CLR 51

That is only an empowering section. Under secs. 16 and 21 of the High Court Procedure Act, rules might be made allowing hearings in camera. The effect of a hearing in open Court may be to prevent persons coming forward to give evidence, and SO to prevent justice being done. [He also referred to Scott v. Scott 1; Harrison v. Harrison 2; Marriage Act 1890 (Vict.), sec. 121.]

BARTON A.C.J. This application cannot be granted. The matter appears to be concluded by the judgments of the Lords in Scott v. Scott (1), the effect of which is that there is no inherent power in a Court of justice to exclude the public, inasmuch as one of the normal attributes of a Court is publicity, that is, the admission of the public to attend the proceedings. Power to exclude may be conferred expressly by law, but there is no law which empowers us to proceed otherwise than with the ordinary publicity of a Court of justice. On the contrary, secs. 15 and 16 of the Judiciary Act show clearly an intention on the part of the legislature that the jurisdiction of this Court should be publicly exercised.

ISAACS J. I agree.

GAVAN DUFFY J. I concur.

POWERS J. I concur.

RICH J. - I concur.

Motion dismissed. The appeal subsequently, on 15th October, came on for hearing before Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Powers JJ., and turned wholly on questions of fact.

Morley, for the appellant.

129 T.L.R., 520 ; (1913) A.C.,417. 22 N.S. W.L.R. (D.), 1. 17 CLR 52

W. W. Rogers, for the respondent, was not called on.

THE COURT dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed. Solicitors, for the appellant, Hedderwick, Fookes &Alston. Solicitors, for the respondent, Rogers &Rogers.

[HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.]

IN RE BYRNE.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Barrister and solicitor--Admission to practise-Managing clerk--Supreme Court

Act 1912 (Vict.) (No. 2437), sec. 3.

Sec. 3 of the Supreme Court Act 1912 provides that Notwithstanding MELBOURNE,

anything contained in any Act of the Parliament of Victoria or any Rules May 15.

made in pursuance of any such Act the Supreme Court consisting of three Judges of whom the Chief Justice shall be one may where under special to any person who shall within one year after the passing of this Act satisfy the said Court that he has before the commencement of this Act served for ten years in Victoria as a managing clerk to some practising bar- rister and solicitor or barristers and solicitors and has been for such period of ten years bond fide engaged under his or their direction and supervision in the transaction and management of such matters of business as are usually trans- acted by barristers and solicitors order that such person shall upon passing" a certain examination "be entitled to admission to practise as a barrister and solicitor for the Supreme Court without entering into or serving under articles of clerkship," &.

The Supreme Court having decided that a person who had the control and management of the costs department of the office of a barrister and solicitor was not a "managing clerk" within the meaning of that section,