Winn v Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Winn v Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 1652  

Appeal from:

Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd v Winn [2021] FedCFamC2G 44

Winn v Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 1067

File number(s): NSD 494 of 2021
QUD 311 of 2021
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 10 December 2021
Catchwords:  BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – courts and judges – whether service of bankruptcy notice by email to debtor’s email address in accordance with reg 16.01(1)(e) of Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) valid – whether Federal Circuit Court of Australia had jurisdiction under s 41(6A) of Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to extend the time for compliance with bankruptcy notice after commission of act of bankruptcy – whether Registrar’s orders extending time under s 41(6A) after expiry of time for compliance of any legal effect – where no application made to set aside judgment debt or extend time before expiry
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – service by post – service of bankruptcy notice by prepaid post – whether presumption of service seven business days after posting in s 160 of Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and reg 16.01(1)(a) of Bankruptcy Regulations applies to service by prepaid post of bankruptcy notice
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – practice and procedure – service of bankruptcy petition – where debtor filed appearance under r 6.06(2)(a) of Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) before being served with petition – whether service by post in accordance with reg 16.01(1)(a) of Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 and s 160 of Evidence Act to debtor’s address for service in notice of appearance sufficient service
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 30, 41, 44, 52

Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) reg 16.01

Evidence Act1995 (Cth) s 160

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 rr 6.06, 8.01

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Cases cited:

Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 269 CLR 333

Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466

Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50

Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651

James v Abrahams (1981) 34 ALR 657

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361

Leveraged Equities Ltd v Goodridge (2011) 191 FCR 71

Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417

Spencer v Coshott [2021] NSWCA 235

Streimer v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211

The Queen v Ross-James; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 10 December 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant did not appear
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr M Harley

ORDERS

QUD 311 of 2021
BETWEEN:
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1652
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Winn v Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd involves Ms Winn, who was the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding brought by Boss Lawyers, her former legal practitioners. The dispute centres on the validity of the service of a bankruptcy notice and petition, the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to extend time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice, and the effect of the Registrar's orders extending time under section 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) after the expiry of the time for compliance. Additionally, the case addresses the service of a bankruptcy notice by email, the presumption of service seven business days after posting under section 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and whether service by prepaid post of a bankruptcy notice complies with the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth). The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the service of a bankruptcy notice via email was valid, if the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice under section 41(6A), and whether the Registrar's orders extending time had any legal effect after the expiry of the compliance period. Furthermore, the Court had to consider if the presumption of service under section 160 of the Evidence Act and the Bankruptcy Regulations applied to service by prepaid post of a bankruptcy notice. The Court also examined whether service by post of a bankruptcy petition was sufficient if the debtor had filed an appearance under rule 6.06(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) before being served with the petition.

The Court's reasoning focused on the validity of the service of the bankruptcy notice and petition. It held that the service of the bankruptcy notice by email was valid under regulation 16.01(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth). The Court clarified that the presumption of service under section 160 of the Evidence Act and regulation 16.01(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Regulations applied to service by prepaid post of a bankruptcy notice, presuming it was received seven business days after posting. Regarding the extension of time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice, the Court noted that it had the power to extend time under section 41(6A) if an application to set the bankruptcy notice aside or an appeal from the decision on which it was founded had been made. However, in this case, no such application was made within the prescribed time, and thus, the Court could not extend the time retrospectively. The Court also found that Ms Winn's arguments regarding the invalidity of the creditor's petition and the necessity of personal service before the first return date were without merit. Finally, the Court addressed the issue of costs, concluding that the order for costs was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.

The Court dismissed the interlocutory application and the appeal, ordering that Ms Winn pay the respondent's costs. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory and regulatory requirements for service in bankruptcy proceedings and highlights the limited circumstances in which the Court can extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed on 24 October 2021 be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The draft notice of appeal repeats those assertions. There does not appear to have been an affidavit in support of the application for leave to appeal.Background to the petition proceeding Boss Lawyers filed the creditor’s petition on 10 February 2021. It was returnable in the Registrar’s list on 17 March 2021. Ms Winn filed a notice of appearance in the petition proceeding on 16 March 2021 giving her residential address as her address for service. However, she did not appear before the Registrar on the return date of 17 March 2021. Mr Harley informed the Registrar that the petition had not yet been served on her. It was adjourned to 24 March 2021. After the hearing on 17 March 2021, Mr Harley sent by express post a copy of the creditor’s petition to Ms Winn with a notice of the adjourned hearing date on 24 March 2021. He made an affidavit of service on the same day. Ms Winn did not seek to cross-examine Mr Harley before the Brisbane judge, but asserted that she had not been personally served with the creditor’s petition or supporting documents and, therefore, somehow the proceeding was invalid, and that until she had been personally served no further steps could be taken in the proceeding. His Honour correctly observed that Ms Winn was wrong for two reasons. First, under r 6.06(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, having filed an appearance on 16 March 2021 containing an address for service, being her home address, Mr Harley was entitled to use it to serve her there, so that it was no longer necessary to personally serve her by hand. This was because, his Honour found, r 6.06(2)(a) provided that personal service was not required if “there are current proceedings for which there is a notice of address for service for the person to be served.” His Honour found the second reason that Ms Winn’s proposition was also without substance was because of reg 16.01(1) of the Bankruptcy Regulations and the provisions of s 160 of the Evidence Act. His Honour found that the documents Mr Harley posted on 17 March 2021 were presumed to have been received by Ms Winn on 26 March 2021, and that there was no evidence to the contrary of that presumption. Accordingly, when his Honour dealt with the matter on 14 September 2021, Ms Winn’s claim that she had not been served was nonsense as the Brisbane judge cogently explained. Ms Winn made a further meritless argument that, because the petition had not been served on her prior to the first return date, it somehow became invalid. There is no statute, rule or reason why that could happen. The validity of a creditor’s petition does not depend on whether or not it is served prior to the first return date fixed for hearing. Debtors who seek to evade service are not unknown, and often, courts have to make orders for substituted service after attempts to serve the debtor well after the first return date have failed. Ms Winn made a number of other spurious arguments to his Honour, including that it was necessary to amend the petition to change the return date, and that despite the hearing before the Brisbane judge occurring on 14 September 2021, being nearly six months after she entered her appearance, she did not have sufficient notice before the hearing. Ms Winn then asserted to his Honour that somehow, the petition was invalid because s 44(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act required it to be presented not less than six months after the act of bankruptcy on which the petition was founded had been committed. That proposition only needs to be stated to see how baseless it was. The act of bankruptcy occurred on 29 December 2020 and the petition was presented promptly thereafter on 10 February 2021.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Their Honours noted that the Court had power to extend time where either limb of the s 41(6A) had been engaged by, relevantly, an application to set the bankruptcy notice aside or appeal from the decision on which it was founded, as held by the Full Court in Streimer v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211. In that case, a judge had overlooked extending the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice under s 41(6A) when he adjourned overnight. The Full Court held that no act of bankruptcy was committed because the Court could extend the time retrospectively once an application for an extension of time or a challenge to the judgment debt had been made within the time prescribed in the chapeau of s 41(6A). The transfer decision In her supplementary notice of appeal, Ms Winn challenged the Sydney judge’s further decision not to transfer the proceeding, even though she was not the applicant for transfer and had commenced the proceedings in the Sydney Registry. She asserted that his Honour committed some form of error in not dealing with that application by Boss Lawyers before determining whether her proceeding was within the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction. That was a misconception. It is the duty of every Court, and in particular a court of limited jurisdiction, to determine whether it has jurisdiction in a matter: The Queen v Ross-James; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185 at 193 per Gibbs CJ with whom Mason J agreed at 203; at 213 per Wilson and Dawson JJ; at 222–223 per Deane J. Once his Honour found that he did not have jurisdiction, it was not necessary for him to deal with any application for transfer, nor did Ms Winn suggest there was any prejudice to her in his not doing so. Ms Winn also seeks orders that his Honour’s criticisms of her behaviour and lack of professionalism in his reasons somehow should be expunged. This Court does not have jurisdiction to edit his Honour’s reasons for judgment unless an exception to the principle of open justice makes it necessary to do so in the interests of justice: Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 437–438 per Viscount Haldane LC; Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 at 663–664 [29]–[33] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ. It would be most unusual, once reasons for judgment have been published on the internet and available for a considerable time, that any circumstance could be suggested in which an appellate court could suppress or edit parts of those reasons. I am not satisfied there is any basis for doing so. Ms Winn also challenged the Sydney judge’s order that she pay Boss Lawyers’ costs fixed at $9,000. In the proceeding before his Honour, Boss Lawyers had appeared and prepared extensive written submissions. His Honour found it was appropriate for Boss Lawyers to obtain counsel. When I raised with Mr Harley during the hearing of the appeal whether costs could be awarded today and below, given that Boss Lawyers, as solicitors, were acting for themselves, having regard to Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 269 CLR 333, he informed me that the costs were ordered by his Honour only in respect of disbursements for counsel’s fees. In those circumstances, there is no evidence before me that his Honour made any error in respect of the order for costs: see too Spencer v Coshott [2021] NSWCA 235 at [63]–[67] per Simpson AJA with whom Bell P and Emmett AJA agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed the validity of service of bankruptcy notice by email, affirming that such service is permissible under the Bankruptcy Regulations. The court then examined the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court to extend compliance time post-bankruptcy act under s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act, finding the court does indeed have such jurisdiction. Regarding the effect of extending compliance time after its expiration, the court ruled that such extensions have no legal impact. The presumption of service under s 160 of the Evidence Act and the corresponding regulation was found applicable to service by prepaid post of a bankruptcy notice. Finally, the court upheld that service by post to the debtor's address for service, as indicated in the notice of appearance, is sufficient under the regulations and the Evidence Act. The court relied on previous case law, particularly the Full Court's decision in Streimer v Tamas, to substantiate its findings on jurisdiction and the effect of extending compliance time. The binding legal principle established is that the Federal Circuit Court can extend compliance time post-bankruptcy act if an application is made within the prescribed period, but extensions made after the compliance period expires are ineffective.