FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Oreb v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCAFC 192
Appeal from: ASE16 v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCA 321 File number: NSD 574 of 2016 Judges: RARES, DAVIES AND GLEESON JJ Date of judgment: 25 November 2016 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Suppression and non-publication orders — whether grounds for making an order— whether prejudice to the proper administration of justice Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 206F
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37AF
Cases cited: Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440
Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2014) 9 ACTLR 178
Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651
John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 465
Date of hearing: 25 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr R Lancaster SC with Mr H El-Hoge
and Mr T BoyleSolicitors for the Appellants: William James Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S P Donoghue QC with Mr S B
RosewarneSolicitors for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission ORDERS
NSD 574 of 2016 BETWEEN: PETER CHRISTOPHER OREB
First Appellant
INGRID SUSAN WEBBER
Second Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, DAVIES AND GLEESON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
25 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellants’ oral application that their identity in this proceeding be suppressed be dismissed.
2.Orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Court in proceedings NSD 1051 of 2015 on 1 April 2016 (“orders”) and the order for extension of order 3 of the orders made on 28 September 2016 be set aside.
3.On or before 30 November 2016, the appellants file an amended notice of appeal that names them by their actual names and not by pseudonym.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
On 1 April 2016, the primary judge made the following suppression orders:
1.Information tending to reveal the identity of the applicants including the companies with which they were and are associated not be disclosed by publication or otherwise.
2. The affidavits:
(a) affirmed by Jonathan Edward O’Loughlin on 2 September 2015;
(b) sworn by the second applicant on 23 September 2015; and
(c) affirmed by Jennifer Parbery on 23 September 2015;
not be disclosed or made available for inspection to any person other than the respondent or its legal representatives.
3. Orders 1 and 2 shall operate until 30 September 2016.
On 28 September 2016, her Honour extended the operation of order 3 until 30 March 2017.
In an email to the parties, on 22 November 2016, the Full Court informed the parties that it wished to hear submissions at the hearing…
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 192
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellants’ oral application that their identity in this proceeding be suppressed be dismissed.
2. Orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Court in proceedings NSD 1051 of 2015 on 1 April 2016 (“orders”) and the order for extension of order 3 of the orders made on 28 September 2016 be set aside.
3. On or before 30 November 2016, the appellants file an amended notice of appeal that names them by their actual names and not by pseudonym.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Full Court also raised with the appellants’ senior counsel that her Honour’s reasons recorded that prior to the hearing and application for a suppression order, the proceedings had been in the Court list on at least two occasions, naming the appellants, and thus the information that connected the appellants to the proceedings below was already in the public domain when the suppression order was made. Senior counsel argued that it was possible to make a suppression order after some material had been revealed in open court, referring to what Rares, Wigney JJ and Cowdroy AJ had said in Eastman 9 ACTLR at 236 [188]. He argued that it was important that the appellants be protected from the risk that some connection might be made between them and companies with which they were associated with the reasons given by her Honour. Senior counsel contended that this was necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice. He relied on the primary judge’s reasons for making the suppression orders as being correct.CONSIDERATION In our opinion, the suppression orders that her Honour made, with or without the modifications that the appellants seek us to make in this appeal, were beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to make and should be set aside. First, order 1 was cast in terms that are too broad, as the order is not confined to the facts or circumstances of the proceeding below but binds anyone from disclosing the identity of the appellants and companies with which they were associated. An order that has such an operation is not within the power of the Court to make: see Police Tribunal 5 NSWLR at 477, A-C where McHugh JA said, Glass JA agreeing:… an order of a court prohibiting the publication of evidence is only valid if it is really necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings before it. Moreover, an order prohibiting publication of evidence must be clear in its terms and do no more than is necessary to achieve the due administration of justice. The making of the order must also be reasonably necessary; and there must be some material before the court upon which it can reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make an order prohibiting publication. Mere belief that the order is necessary is insufficient … Courts have no general authority … to make orders binding people in their conduct outside the courtroom. Judicial power is concerned with the determination of disputes and the making of orders concerning existing rights, duties and liabilities of persons involved in proceedings before the courts. An order made in court is no doubt binding on the parties, the witnesses and other persons in the courtroom. But an order purporting to operate as a common rule and to bind people generally is an exercise of legislative – not judicial-power. (emphasis added)Thus, the primary judge had no jurisdiction to make order 1 in the form that her Honour did. Secondly, in any event, the orders made by the primary judge went beyond what was necessary to protect any legitimate interests of the appellants in the administration of justice. By the time of the making of the suppression orders, the appellants’ names and evidence had been publicly disclosed in connection with the proceedings without any prior limitation on their publication. In those circumstances, the suppression orders could not have been necessary to secure the proper administration of justice.