Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 20

Appeal from:

Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd(No 7) [2022] FedCFamC2G 590

Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd (No 8) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1033

File number: NSD 1126 of 2022
Judgment of: NICHOLAS, ROFE AND JACKMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 4 March 2024
Catchwords:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – proceeding brought by appellants against respondents for (inter alia) alleged infringement of copyright in computer programs – whether appellants were denied procedural fairness as a consequence of primary judge disallowing questions in cross-examination or otherwise curtailing cross-examination of respondents’ witnesses – whether questions proposed to be put to witnesses tendered and rejected – whether rejection of any questions or line of questions had the effect of denying the appellants the opportunity to put their case or depriving them of a fair trial – whether primary judge failed to consider the inherent improbability of respondents’ case as a whole – whether evidence of events given by respondents’ witnesses was glaringly improbable – where primary judge’s acceptance of respondents’ witnesses’ evidence heavily influenced by demeanour – relevance of lengthy delay between hearing and judgment

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether allegation that a witness has given a false account of events or has fabricated, concealed or destroyed evidence constitutes an allegation of fraud which must be pleaded in circumstances where such conduct is not an element of the cause of action

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where appellants claimed additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) relying upon (inter alia) alleged fabrication, concealment and destruction of documents – whether appellants required to plead or particularise such allegations in support of claim for additional damages

Held: appeal allowed - new trial ordered

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law), s 18

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36, 38, 43B, 47B, 115

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 340

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 28, 37N

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 120, 123, 126

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 16.02(1)(d)

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 254

Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order 2020 (NSW) cll 5, 6, Schs 1, 2      

Cases cited:

3WJ Pty Ltd v Kanj [2008] NSWCA 321

Allen v Tobias (1958) 98 CLR 367

Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) [2012] FCA 748; (2012) 293 ALR 272

Australian Postal Commission v Bessey [2001] FCA 266

Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 87 ALR 283

Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226

Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Limited (1990) 169 CLR 279

Beaman v Bond [2017] FCAFC 142; (2017) 254 FCR 480

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67

Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd [2011] FCAFC 55; (2011) 192 FCR 445

Century Legend Pty Ltd v…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd, the primary dispute revolved around allegations of copyright infringement in computer programs, with Microsoft Corporation, the appellant, challenging the decision of the primary judge. The key legal issues included whether the appellants were denied procedural fairness due to the disallowance of questions during cross-examination of the respondents' witnesses, and whether the primary judge failed to consider the inherent improbability of the respondents' case as a whole. Additionally, the court examined whether the primary judge's acceptance of the respondents' witnesses' evidence was heavily influenced by their demeanour and the relevance of the lengthy delay between the hearing and the delivery of judgment.

The court found that the primary judge's rulings on evidence, including the findings that certain invoices were forgeries or not true and correct, were influenced by the denial of procedural fairness that precluded the appellants from pursuing the unpleaded fraud cause in cross-examination. Furthermore, the court held that the significant delay of almost three years from the trial to the delivery of judgment, from August 2019 to September 2022, adversely affected the primary judge's ability to properly consider the evidence, especially the inherent improbabilities in the respondents' defensive case. The appellants argued that the evidence put forward by the respondents was too reliant on cumulative coincidence and implausibility to be accepted, such as the merger of stock codes occurring on the very day of a significant purchase and a claimed power outage damaging the only hard drives containing relevant electronic records just days before a hearing.

The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, and a new trial ordered. The reasoning for this decision was that the primary judge's conclusions on the evidence were products of the denial of procedural fairness and the significant delay, which compromised the judge's ability to fairly consider the evidence and the broader submission that the respondents' version of events was inherently improbable. The orders included setting aside the primary judge's judgment, ordering a new trial before a different judge of the Federal Court, reserving the costs of the trial for determination by the retrial judge, and directing the respondents to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The judgment of the primary judge made on 6 December 2022 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that there be a new trial before a judge of the Federal Court of Australia on all issues except for those on which the appellants were successful at trial before the primary judge.

3. The costs of the trial before the primary judge be reserved for determination by the judge before whom the proceeding is retried.

4. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly, in my view, Grounds 3, 4 and 5 are made out. The orders of the primary judge should be set aside and there should be a new trial. I consider further below the appropriate nature of that new trial.Grounds 7 and 8: Rulings on Evidence Ground 7 contends that the primary judge erred by finding that no weight should be given to the Chen (LDS/manila) invoices. Ground 8 contends that the primary judge erred with respect to other rulings on evidence led by the Microsoft Parties, namely: (a) the finding that the 4 November 2015 email did not include as attachments the invoices to which it referred; (b) the finding that invoice ES 2015730C was a forgery; (c) refusing to admit invoice ES 20150817A into evidence; and (d) the findings with respect to the Alpine and AV2PC invoices. The primary judge’s reasoning in relation to the lack of weight to be given to the Chen (LDS/manila) invoices was heavily dependent on the primary judge’s overall finding that the Chen Invoices were not true and correct, which in turn was inevitably infected by the denial of procedural fairness which is the subject of Grounds 3, 4 and 5. It follows that the primary judge’s conclusions on this matter are also the product of the same denial of procedural fairness in wrongly precluding the Microsoft Parties from pursuing in cross-examination the Unpleaded Fraud Cause. The same difficulty applies to the other rulings on evidence which are the subject of Ground 8.Grounds 1 and 2: The Effect of Delay in the Delivery of Judgment Grounds 1 and 2 focus on the delay of almost three years from the trial in 2019 to the delivery of reasons for judgment on 30 September 2022. The evidence had been given from 19 to 23 August 2019, and final oral addresses had been made on 16 December 2019. The Microsoft Parties contend that the primary judge’s ability to consider properly Microsoft’s case, especially as to the inherent improbabilities in CPL’s defensive case, would have been affected by the significant delay, together with the real risk that the primary judge’s advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses was compromised. While the Microsoft Parties accept that the primary judge attempted to deal with the consequences of delay by focusing on written materials, and by reciting evidence and submissions systematically, the Microsoft Parties submit that that approach, coupled with the delay, affected the primary judge’s ability to consider the evidence as a whole, and the broader submission Microsoft was advancing that the CPL Parties’ version of events was inherently improbable and should not be believed. The Microsoft Parties submitted that, considered as a whole, the evidence put forward by the CPL Parties in support of the sets of invoices upon which they relied was too reliant on cumulative coincidence and implausibility to be accepted, pointing to such matters as the merger of the stock codes occurring purportedly to resolve a very longstanding issue on the very day of the June 2015 Purchase, the provision by Ms Li of invoices to Victoria Police which she had taken from the Chen Invoices purporting that they were true, and the claimed power outage or power surge on 21 November 2017 (only three days before the hearing of the leave to appeal application from the orders requiring discovery of the lost records) which had purportedly damaged the only hard drives on which the relevant electronic records were located.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge’s reasoning in relation to the lack of weight to be given to the Chen (LDS/manila) invoices was heavily dependent on the primary judge’s overall finding that the Chen Invoices were not true and correct, which in turn was inevitably infected by the denial of procedural fairness which is the subject of Grounds 3, 4 and 5. It follows that the primary judge’s conclusions on this matter are also the product of the same denial of procedural fairness in wrongly precluding the Microsoft Parties from pursuing in cross-examination the Unpleaded Fraud Cause. The same difficulty applies to the other rulings on evidence which are the subject of Ground 8.Grounds 1 and 2: The Effect of Delay in the Delivery of Judgment Grounds 1 and 2 focus on the delay of almost three years from the trial in 2019 to the delivery of reasons for judgment on 30 September 2022. The evidence had been given from 19 to 23 August 2019, and final oral addresses had been made on 16 December 2019. The Microsoft Parties contend that the primary judge’s ability to consider properly Microsoft’s case, especially as to the inherent improbabilities in CPL’s defensive case, would have been affected by the significant delay, together with the real risk that the primary judge’s advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses was compromised. While the Microsoft Parties accept that the primary judge attempted to deal with the consequences of delay by focusing on written materials, and by reciting evidence and submissions systematically, the Microsoft Parties submit that that approach, coupled with the delay, affected the primary judge’s ability to consider the evidence as a whole, and the broader submission Microsoft was advancing that the CPL Parties’ version of events was inherently improbable and should not be believed. The Microsoft Parties submitted that, considered as a whole, the evidence put forward by the CPL Parties in support of the sets of invoices upon which they relied was too reliant on cumulative coincidence and implausibility to be accepted, pointing to such matters as the merger of the stock codes occurring purportedly to resolve a very longstanding issue on the very day of the June 2015 Purchase, the provision by Ms Li of invoices to Victoria Police which she had taken from the Chen Invoices purporting that they were true, and the claimed power outage or power surge on 21 November 2017 (only three days before the hearing of the leave to appeal application from the orders requiring discovery of the lost records) which had purportedly damaged the only hard drives on which the relevant electronic records were located. The relevant principles regarding the significance of delay in giving judgment are as follows:(a)mere delay is not enough to uphold an appeal, and error must be shown: Monie v Commonwealth [2005] NSWCA 25; (2005) 63 NSWLR 729 at [44] (Hunt AJA, with whom Bryson JA agreed); (b)a delay of 12 months is generally “substantial” and “excessive”: Beaman v Bond [2017] FCAFC 142; (2017) 254 FCR 480 at [65(b)] (McKerracher J, with whom Gilmour and Charlesworth JJ agreed); and a delay of almost 17 months was described as “grossly inordinate” in Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 189; (2004) 140 FCR 17 at [75] (Carr, Emmett and Gyles JJ);(c)an operative delay alters the normal approach an appellate court takes: Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd at [75]-[76]; (d)the appellate court should be more disposed to find error where there has been “operative delay”, and such delay permits an appellate court more readily to infer that the judicial function has miscarried: Beaman v Bond at [65(c)]; (e)whatever the cause of any particular delay, its consequences must be examined with an eye to the fair administration of justice: Tattsbet Ltd v Morrow [2015] FCAFC 62; (2015) 233 FCR 46 at [2] (Allsop CJ, with whom White J agreed);(f)significant delay creates the need to look with special care at any finding of fact challenged on appeal, and the mere fact of a long delay itself weakens a trial judge’s advantage: Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd at [69]-[70]; Beaman v Bond at [65(e)];(g)where there has been a delay, the trial judge is obliged to give specific reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence of those witnesses whose evidence plays an important part in the factual finding made, and where there has been significant delay, there can be no assumptions that statements of a general assertive character made by the trial judge are based on a sufficient consideration of the evidence, or that evidence relevant to a particular finding not considered in the judgment has not been overlooked: Monie v Commonwealth at [43](5) and (6); Beaman v Bond at [65(e)];(h)the problems are not limited to fading memory, but include pressure which a judge may feel to complete a long-delayed judgment, and a losing litigant’s perception that the judge may not have grappled with the issues raised by them: Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd at [74]; Monie v Commonwealth at [43](7), (8) and (9).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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