Michalakellis v LMM Holdings Pty Ltd

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INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Michalakellis v LMM Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2024] ICQ 022

PARTIES:

Michalakellis, Dimitri
(Appellant)

v

LMM Holdings Pty Ltd
(First Respondent)

and

Reesby, Grant
(Second Respondent)

and

Gibson, Sam
(Third Respondent)

CASE NO:

C/2023/37

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

2 December 2024

HEARING DATES:

28 November 2023

MEMBER:

O'Connor VP

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS: 

1.       The appeal is dismissed.

2.       By 4.00 pm on Friday 20 December 2024 the Respondents shall file and serve written submissions on costs.

3.       By 4.00 pm on Friday 17 January 2025 the Appellant shall file and serve written submissions on costs in reply to the respondents' submissions.

4.       Each party may file and serve an application in existing proceedings to make oral submissions on costs by 4.00 pm on Friday 24 January 2025.

5.       In the absence of any application to make oral submissions being filed by 4.00 pm on Friday 24 January 2025 the question of costs will be dealt with on the papers without oral submissions.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW - QUEENSLAND - APPEALS - APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT - HUMAN RIGHTS - DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION - where the appellant filed a complaint in the then Anti‑Discrimination Commission Queensland alleging contraventions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (the AD Act) - where the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission dismissed the complaint - where the appellant filed appeal in the Industrial Court of Queensland - where appellant seeking six grounds of appeal - where appellant claims decision should be set aside by reason of delay between hearing the proceeding which ended on 3 September 2021 and the delivery of the decision on 30 August 2023 - where appellant alleges industrial commissioner plagiarised the respondents' post-hearing submissions - where appellant alleges industrial commissioner erred by prohibiting him from amending his statement of facts and contentions and for amending his complaint to add a sex discrimination claim - where appellant alleges industrial commissioner erred at law by relying on irrelevant material and reaching a mistaken conclusion in making credibility determinations against him - where appellant alleges industrial commissioner erred at law by dismissing the appellant's complaint based on the second respondent's perception that he was homosexual when the correct causation test is to apply an objective one - where appellant alleged industrial commissioner erred at law by inappropriately utilising hypothetical comparators - whether grounds of appeal allege error of law or excess, or want, of jurisdiction pursuant to s 557 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 - whether errors of law or errors of fact - whether appellant established treatment by respondents unlawful discrimination or victimisation under the AD Act

LEGISLATION:

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 7, s 8, s 9, s 10, s 15, s 118, s 129, s 130, s 166, s 178
Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557, s 565

CASES:

Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] ATPR 41-507
ACCC v Pratt (2009) 175 FCR 558
Ainger v Coffs Harbour City Council [2005] NSWCA 424
Amaca Pty Ltd…

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Details
Case
[2024] ICQ 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Michalakellis v LMM Holdings Pty Ltd involved the appellant, who had filed a complaint with the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, alleging that the respondents had discriminated against him on the basis of his presumed sexuality, race, and sex, as well as subjected him to victimisation. The complaint was initially heard by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, which dismissed the appellant's complaint. The appellant then filed an appeal in the Industrial Court of Queensland, seeking to overturn the Commission's decision on six grounds, including allegations of delay in delivering the decision, plagiarism by the industrial commissioner, errors in prohibiting amendments to the statement of facts and contentions, reliance on irrelevant material, and incorrect application of the causation test.

The court had to determine whether the grounds of appeal alleged errors of law or excess or want of jurisdiction, whether they were errors of law or fact, and whether the appellant had established that the treatment by the respondents constituted unlawful discrimination or victimisation under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). The court considered the nature of the proceedings, the extent of the copying from the respondents' submissions, whether the industrial commissioner had engaged in an independent analysis of the evidence and legal principles, and whether the judgment referred to and accepted aspects of the unsuccessful party's submissions.

The court found that, despite some concerns about the substantial copying from the respondents' submissions without attribution, the judgment as a whole demonstrated that the industrial commissioner had applied an independent and impartial mind to the evidence and issues. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and ordered the respondents to file written submissions on costs, with the appellant to respond in turn, and that any applications for oral submissions on costs must be made by specific dates, otherwise the matter would be dealt with on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. By 4.00 pm on Friday 20 December 2024 the Respondents shall file and serve written submissions on costs.

3. By 4.00 pm on Friday 17 January 2025 the Appellant shall file and serve written submissions on costs in reply to the respondents' submissions.

4. Each party may file and serve an application in existing proceedings to make oral submissions on costs by 4.00 pm on Friday 24 January 2025.

5. In the absence of any application to make oral submissions being filed by 4.00 pm on Friday 24 January 2025 the question of costs will be dealt with on the papers without oral submissions.

Background

Background to the litigation

In this matter no leave has been sought therefore the appeal is limited to grounds alleging an error of law or excess, or want, of jurisdiction.[3] [3] Respondents' submissions filed 3 November 2023, [5]; TR1-16, LL30-39.Background The Industrial Commissioner outlined the relevant factual background in paragraphs [4]‑[30] of her decision. I do not understand there to be any dispute as to the accuracy of those general facts. In summary, around December 2015 the Appellant commenced providing spray painting services to the First Respondent as an independent contractor until he ceased providing services around 13 April 2018. The Second Respondent was the Pre‑Delivery Manager for the First Respondent. The majority of the Appellant's work for the First Respondent was undertaken in the Pre-Delivery Yard. The Third Respondent was the direct Manager of the Second Respondent.[4][4] Respondent's submissions filed 3 November 2023, [8]. The Appellant made a complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland (as it then was) in June 2018. The complaint was referred to the Commission on 4 October 2018 pursuant to s 166(1)(a) of the AD Act. The Appellant's initial statement of facts and contentions ('SOFC') alleged he was subjected to bullying by the Second Respondent in many forms, including "derogatory comments" based on his presumed sexuality and his race which led to "further discrimination from other employees of the first respondent including the third respondent".[5][5] Filed 8 October 2018. The Appellant also raised a complaint that he was victimised by the Second and Third Respondents. On 16 June 2021, the Appellant filed an amended SOFC with new complaints about acts that were alleged to have occurred prior to the limitation date for the complaint, and a new claim of sex discrimination. An application was heard by the Commission and the Appellant was given leave to amend the SOFC to include new matters in the complaint. The matter before the Commission was heard over five days, commencing on 30 August 2021. Directions were made for the filing of closing submissions on 17 September 2021. The Appellant's closing submissions were filed on 4 November 2021. The Respondents' submissions were filed on 24 December 2021. The Appellant's submissions in reply were filed on 24 February 2022. In order to succeed, the Appellant had to establish, to the requisite standard that the Respondents had contravened the AD Act. The Industrial Commissioner dismissed the Appellant's complaint the Respondents had discriminated against him because of his sex, race, or because he was presumed to be homosexual. The Commission found the Respondents did not subject the Appellant to victimisation and otherwise declined to hear the new complaints of sexual harassment, direct discrimination, and victimisation, raised by the Appellant in his closing submissions.The statutory provisions Part 2 of Chapter 2 of the AD Act identifies 'Prohibited grounds of discrimination'. Section 7 prohibits discrimination on the basis of various defined 'attributes':

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Porter v The Queen,[27] a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Australian Capital Territory, dealt with the circumstances where a sentencing judge largely adopted the prosecution's submissions but expressed the final conclusion in her own words. The Court found:[27] [2024] ACTCA 9; (2024) 21 ACTLR 122, (Porter).[78] It is clear from the authorities outlined above that whilst the unattributed replication of a party's submissions in a judicial decision is to be strongly discouraged, such copying does not, without more, vitiate a judgment.[79] The vice in the copying of a party's submissions in a judgment is not plagiarism or the appropriation of a party's intellectual property. Accordingly, determining whether a judgment has been vitiated by unattributed copying does not involve an assessment of the proportion of original material contained in the judge's reasons. Rather, the question to be asked is whether the copying is such that it should be inferred that the primary judge has not made an independent decision on the whole of the evidence and the law.[80] As the appellant submitted, some of the features of a judge's reasons which may be relevant to determining whether the reasons indicate that the judge made an independent and impartial decision will include:(a)The nature of the proceedings being determined (for example, whether the proceedings are judicial or administrative, criminal or civil, final or interlocutory);(b) The extent of the reproduction, including both its volume and its nature (for example, whether the material copied is of uncontested evidence or established authority, or is of the party's arguments and conclusions);(c) Whether the adoption of a party's submissions was accompanied by an independent analysis of the evidence and/or the legal principles to be applied;(d)Whether the judgment refers to the submissions of the unsuccessful party, and whether any aspects of the unsuccessful party's submissions were accepted; and(e) Whether the judge edited parts of the submissions which had been copied.[81] Whether or not the copied material is attributed to its author is also relevant to this assessment. There is a qualitative difference between a judgment which cites portions (even extensive portions) of a party's submissions, and then indicates agreement with those submissions, and a judgment which adopts the submissions of a party as the Court's reasons without acknowledging the source of the material copied.[82] In particular, where a judge openly expresses agreement with the submissions of a party, there is a transparency in the reasoning that is entirely absent where the judge simply adopts a party's submission as their own reasoning. As Mr Game SC submitted on behalf of the appellant, where the copied material is not attributed, there is a "concealment" of the process by which the judgment was created. For this reason, where the copied portion of the judgment is not attributed, particularly careful attention will need to be given to the assessment of whether the judge has in fact made an independent decision on the whole of the evidence and the law.[83] As can be seen from Annexure A, a considerable portion of the primary judge's conclusions in the disputed facts judgment were copied from the prosecution's written submissions, without attribution. Nonetheless, as the authorities cited above make clear, where there are other sufficient indications in the judgment that the primary judge actively engaged with the evidence and the submissions of both parties, the judgment will not be set aside by reason of the fact of copying alone. The judgment will only be vitiated where the reasons are such that it should be inferred that they are not the product of the active application of an independent and impartial mind.[84] There are features of the reasons which are cause for concern. It is of concern that the judgment related to factual findings concerning the sentencing of an offender for grave criminal conduct, which carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years. It is of concern that the extracts of the prosecution's submissions that were adopted by the primary judge related to findings of credibility. It is of concern that the primary judge adopted the prosecutor's adjectives, without attribution and so presenting them as arrived at independently, when describing the evidence of the victim and the appellant, and that the primary judge used the prosecutor's examples (and no others) when illustrating the reasons for her findings of credibility of each. It is of particular concern that the primary judge did not cite the prosecutor's submissions, but rather adopted the prosecutor's prose as her own, without attribution, in a large portion of the conclusion. Each of these matters have caused us to approach the judgment with considerable caution.[85] However, despite these matters, we do not consider that it should be inferred that the primary judge did not apply an independent mind to the resolution of the issues before her.: Garay v The Queen (No 3) [2023] ACTCA 2 at [150]. The structure of the judgment is not determinative, and the concluding paragraphs of the judgment cannot be read in isolation: Garay (No 3) at [150].[86] While a substantial part of the primary judge's conclusions were copied from the prosecution's written submissions, other significant aspects of the primary judge's reasoning were not. In particular, the primary judge accurately summarised all of the evidence that had been given in the disputed facts hearing, addressed the submissions made on behalf of the appellant in the course of her summary of those submissions and reiterated her final conclusions as to the credibility of the appellant and the victim....[90] In summary, there are aspects of the judgment which are of concern (notably, the nature of the proceedings, the form and extent of the copying, and the lack of attribution). Nevertheless, when read as a whole, and particularly in light of the primary judge's extensive analysis of the evidence, engagement with the offender's submissions and reiteration of her Honour's conclusions, the reasons sufficiently demonstrate that the primary judge gave independent and impartial consideration to the evidence and the issues. Accordingly, ground 1 should be dismissed.[28] (emphasis added)[28] Porter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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