FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd (No 7) [2022] FedCFamC2G 590
File number(s): SYG 1205 of 2016 Judgment of: JUDGE BAIRD Date of judgment: 30 September 2022 Catchwords: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – COPYRIGHT – Infringement – computer programs – unauthorised use – use outside licensing and distribution scheme of copyright owner – copyright in Windows 7 computer programs – significant purchases alleged of loose certificates of authenticity of programs – genuine products – alleged reproduction of programs by installation and affixation of certificates to new computers – sales – authorisation of installations – authorisation of reproduction by end‑users – wholesaler – retailer – 30 admitted installations – egregious conduct alleged – 30 unauthorised reproductions and authorisation of reproductions established – compensatory damages on lost licence fees – flagrancy alleged post - no flagrant conduct – assessment of damages – no additional damages awarded
TRADE MARKS – Infringement of Windows and Microsoft trade marks – award of damages at large and additional damages – nominal damages – s 123 TM Act defence raised – s 123 TM Act defence established – no infringement
CONSUMER LAW – Misleading and deceptive conduct
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Adequacy of pleadings –fraud disavowed – admissibility – relevance – authenticity – documents subpoenaed from third party
HEARING ON REMITTAL
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law (schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) ss 18, 232, 236
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36, 38, 43B, 47B, 115
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 69, 135, 136, 140
Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 16.03, 16.08
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Intellectual Property Laws Amendments (Productivity Commission Response Part 1 and Other Measures) Act 2018 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 20, 120, 122A, 123, 126
Cases cited: Antov v Bokan [2018] NSWSC 1474
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 40; (2007) 157 FCR 564
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355; (2012) 207 FCR 448
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229
Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88
Campaigntrack Pty Ltd v Real Estate Tool Box [2022] FCAFC 112
Commissioner of Taxation v Cassaniti [2018] FCAFC 212; (2018) 266 FCR 385
CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd v Microsoft Corporation (No. 2) [2019] FCA 223
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471
Geneva Laboratories Limited v Prestige Premium Deals Pty Ltd (No 5) [2017] FCA 63; [2017] 122 IPR 279
Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Del Monaco [2019] FCCA 3848
Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Lucky Homes Pty Ltd (2016) 120 IPR 317
Inverness Medical Switzerland GMBH v MDS Diagnostics Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 108; (2010)…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 590
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether the affixing of COA labels to computers by CPL Notting Hill constituted trademark infringement. The legal issues involved interpreting section 123 of the TM Act, which provides a defence against trademark infringement where the trade mark is used in relation to genuine goods. Another issue was whether the COA labels applied to the computers created a connection in the course of trade between Microsoft and these computers, or if the connection was with the Windows 7 software pre‑installed on them.
The court found that the affixing of COA labels to the computers did not signify a connection in the course of trade between Microsoft and the computers. The relevant goods in issue were Microsoft’s Windows 7 software pre-installed on the computers, not the computers themselves. The reasoning followed from the Full Court's decision in Scandinavian Tobacco Group Ltd v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings Inc, which held that the goods connected in the course of trade were those to which the trade marks were affixed. Here, the Windows 7 COA labels were connected with the Windows 7 Pro software, not the computers. Microsoft's licensing of the COA labels to a Refurbisher Company meant they had consented to the application of their trade marks in relation to their software.
The court concluded that CPL Notting Hill had successfully made out their defence under section 123 of the TM Act. Therefore, Microsoft's trademark claim failed. For completeness, the court noted that if the Microsoft parties had succeeded in establishing their trademark case, it would have ordered only nominal damages, as the lost licence fee had already been awarded under the Copyright Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Microsoft parties submit that the CPL parties’ argument as to s 123 TM Act ignores the fact that the relevant use of the trade mark is when the COA label (which bears the trade mark) is applied to the assembled computer with unlicensed software on it. The CPL parties say this submission is incorrect. The Microsoft parties are misconceived as to the goods in issue. The relevant goods are not the computers supplied by CPL Notting Hill to which the COA labels are affixed, but Microsoft’s Windows 7 software pre‑installed on the computers. Consideration For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the CPL parties have made out their defence under s 123 TM Act, and accordingly the Microsoft parties’ trade mark claim is not made out. The affixing of the COA labels to new computers by CPL Notting Hill does not signify a connection in the course of trade between Microsoft and these computers. The Full Court’s reasoning in Scandinavian Tobacco relevantly applies. The computers themselves are connected in the course of trade only with their assembler, CPL Notting Hill. The affixing of the Windows 7 COAs to the assembled computers signifies a trade connection between Microsoft and the Windows software that has been pre‑installed on those new computers. By virtue of having licensed the production by the Refurbisher Company of loose COAs enabling activation of its Windows 7 Pro software, and by licensing the creation of the accompanying disks that were supplied to CPL, the Microsoft parties overlook that it consented to the application of its trade marks in relation to its software. The connection in the course of trade between the Windows 7 Pro COA, their associated Windows 7 Pro software and Microsoft is not severed by reason of those COAs having been physically affixed to new computers by CPL Notting Hill. Whether or not CPL Notting Hill’s own acts were licensed, they involved in substance no more than the supply of Microsoft’s Windows 7 Pro software under Microsoft’s own trade marks, in each case in relation to genuine Microsoft goods (as defined above). Although given my conclusions, the claim for relief does not arise, for completeness, I observe if however on the counterfactual, I had found that the Microsoft parties had been successful in establishing their trade mark case, and that the CPL parties failed to make out their s 123(1) TM Act defence, I would order only nominal damages, given the award of the lost licence fee, subsumed in the award under s 115(2) Copyright Act. Although the Microsoft parties do not make any claims against the third respondent, CPL Distribution, in the Claim nor seek any relief for infringement of trade mark against it, in ACS at [288] and in the final orders they propound, they seek relief, including pecuniary relief against all respondents. The claim for relief so formulated cannot succeed against CPL Distribution. For the above reasons I am satisfied that the CPL parties have made out their defence under s 123(1) of the TM Act. The trade mark claim fails.