Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick [2000] FCA 889

CONTRACT – letter from employer to employee offering employment on terms set out in the letter – acceptance by employee – incorporation of terms by reference to a Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual – Manual containing copy of redundancy agreement – whether employee entitled by contract to receive redundancy payment provided for in the agreement – whether the letter referred to the Manual – implication of terms.

Ryan v Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia [1996] 2 VR 235, cited
Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206, cited
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, cited
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, cited
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 (PC), cited
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, cited
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337, cited
Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596, cited
Schenker & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Maplas Equipment and Services Pty Ltd [1990] VR 834, cited
Life Insurance Co of Australia v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60, cited
News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 139 ALR 193, cited
Ansett Transport Industries v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, cited
National Coal Board v Galley [1958] 1 All ER 91, cited
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 28 NSWLR 234, cited
Spunwill Pty Ltd v Bab Pty Ltd (1994) 36 NSWLR 290, cited
White Property Developments Ltd v Richmond Growth Pty Ltd (Madgwick J, 28 January 1998, unreported), cited

RIVERWOOD INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED v GARY McCORMICK

V 718 OF 1999

LINDGREN, NORTH, MANSFIELD JJ
4 JULY 2000
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO MELBOURNE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 718 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RIVERWOOD INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
APPELLANT

AND:

GARY McCORMICK
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, NORTH, MANSFIELD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JULY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO MELBOURNE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 718 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RIVERWOOD INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
APPELLANT

AND:

GARY McCORMICK
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, NORTH, MANSFIELD JJ

DATE:

4 JULY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO MELBOURNE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LINDGREN J
Introduction

  1. The respondent (“Mr McCormick”) ceased being employed by the appellant (“Riverwood”) on 8 May 1998.  He had been employed in the same business for thirty…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 889
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick, the respondent, Mr McCormick, sought a redundancy payment after being dismissed from his employment with the appellant, Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd. The primary judge ruled in Mr McCormick's favour on two alternative bases: the express terms of the employment contract imported the terms of a redundancy agreement negotiated between Riverwood and the Printing and Kindred Industries Union, or it was an implied term of the employment contract that Mr McCormick had an entitlement to a redundancy payment according to that redundancy agreement. The case raises the legal issues of whether the terms of the redundancy agreement were incorporated into Mr McCormick's contract of employment by reference or by implication. The Court of Appeal found that neither of these grounds could be supported. The Court emphasised the importance of considering the context of the letter in which the terms of the redundancy agreement were mentioned and concluded that the term in question did not form part of Mr McCormick's contract of employment. The Court further noted that the silence of the human resources manager at a meeting with Mr McCormick did not constitute misleading or deceptive conduct. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd was ordered to pay Mr McCormick's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The learned primary judge upheld Mr McCormick’s claim on two alternative bases: first, that the express terms of the contract of employment imported by reference the terms of a redundancy agreement negotiated between Riverwood and the Printing and Kindred Industries Union (“the PKIU”) (of which Mr McCormick was not a member); secondly, that it was an implied term of the contract of employment that Mr McCormick had an entitlement to a redundancy payment in accordance with that redundancy agreement.Background facts The history of Mr McCormick’s employment in the business is somewhat complex. On 9 May 1961, Mr McCormick commenced employment in the “packaging systems” division of a cardboard packaging business. In addition to the packaging systems division there was a “cartons” division. In the late 1980’s the business was owned by companies associated with Mr Richard Pratt (they included Visy Board Pty Ltd and Visypack Pty Ltd) to which I will refer as the “Pratt companies”. The first of three written redundancy agreements to be mentioned was entered into on 28 October 1988 and was between the Pratt companies and the PKIU. It contained certain provisions that purported to burden and to benefit employees of the Pratt companies. It has not been suggested that this or either of the two later redundancy agreements gave Mr McCormick contractual rights directly, that is, by reason of its own terms and of his status as an employee; cf Ryan v Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia [1996] 2 VR 235. On a date not revealed by the evidence but prior to the sale referred to in the next paragraph, a second redundancy agreement was entered into. The parties to this undated second redundancy agreement were the Pratt companies and “the AMWU, CEPU, Printing & Kindred Industries Union”. In 1990 or 1991 the Pratt companies sold the business to Multiboard Packaging Pty Ltd (“MPP”), a then recently incorporated company not associated with Mr Pratt. On 20 November 1992, those controlling MPP caused “Riverwood Packaging Systems Pty Ltd” (“Packaging”) to be incorporated. In 1993 several events occurred. On 14 May 1993, the business of the packaging systems division, in which Mr McCormick was employed, began to be conducted by Packaging. This left the remainder of the business, the cartons division, being conducted by MPP, at least for the time being. There was a high degree of interaction between the activities of the packaging systems division and the cartons division. John Bradbury, although formally employed by MPP as its Human Resources Manager, also had responsibility for Packaging’s human resources issues. Mr Bradbury agreed before his Honour that he had understood that from 1990 to 1993, the terms of the second (undated) redundancy agreement, although made with the Pratt companies, applied to MPP employees, including those who, like Mr McCormick, worked in the packaging systems division. Moreover, he agreed that his view was that if there had been redundancies in the packaging systems division, before or after its transfer from MPP to Packaging, the employees would have been treated as covered by the second redundancy agreement as he understood those in the cartons division were.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant did not contest the finding, at least by inference, that the Manual was in existence at the time of the letter (not necessarily in its current form, as it was to use the words of counsel “a living document”). His Honour did not make that express finding, but it is in my view clear that he accepted that to be the case.The evidence The managing director of the appellant, Jeffrey Richard Smith (“Mr Smith”) was appointed to that position on 1 March 1998, but he had worked as its general manager from December 1997 and before that for Cartons from December 1995. He was unaware of the existence of the Manual, or of any policy of the appellant or of Cartons concerning redundancy payments, although he was in a very general way aware of the existence of some redundancy agreements. He assumed that a document such as the Manual existed, and was held by Mr Bradbury who was the Manager of Human Resources for Cartons, and also performed that role for the appellant. He was also unaware of the leave policy inserted into the Manual on 18 May 1994. Mr Smith said the redundancy payments made to other employees of the appellant following the sale of Cartons’ business to CHH were made ex gratia, using a formula used for earlier redundancy payments for Cartons’ employees. The eligibility for those payments in 1998 depended on CHH not offering employment to the appellant’s employees, including the respondent, following its acquisition of Cartons’ business. He said that the respondent was not given a redundancy payment because he had been offered ongoing employment by CHH. He described that position as being “the policy” of the appellant, namely that employees of the appellant would be given an ex gratia redundancy payment of three weeks wages for each year of service, unless an employee were offered ongoing employment by CHH. He also described that policy as being adopted at the time CHH took over Cartons’ business and that it was the same policy as was applied in 1997 to retrenchments of employees of Cartons. Mr Bradbury had been the Manager of Human Resources for Cartons since 1990. He became aware of the two earlier Redundancy Agreements when he started that employment. He regarded them as imposing on Cartons no legal obligations nor as creating any legal entitlements, but that there was an “honour system” attached to them so that (as he expressed it) you “ignore them at your peril”. Mr Bradbury was responsible for maintaining and updating the Manual, and for its contents. Although he did not expressly say that the Manual existed in some form prior to 1993, it is the clear inference from his evidence that that was the case. He described how he “revamped” the Manual in 1993, albeit not in any substantial way, including changing the name of the employer on the relevant documents to Cartons’ then name Multiboard Packaging Pty Ltd (“Multiboard”). One such document was the Leave policy now in the Manual, part of which refers to the Redundancy Agreement. A similar process was undertaken in respect of the Redundancy Agreement.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
Finally, his Honour thought it “not unimportant to note” that the senior management personnel of Packaging appeared to have assumed throughout that if Mr McCormick was not offered a position with CHH at a certain meeting on 27 March 1998, he would be entitled to a redundancy payment. In order to understand this statement of his Honour’s, it is necessary to know that there was another issue at trial which has not featured in the appeal: was Mr McCormick offered a position with CHH? At trial, Riverwood’s case was that Mr McCormick was, and Mr McCormick’s case was that he was not, made an offer of employment by CHH at a certain meeting on 27 March 1998. If he was made such an offer but declined it, he may have lost any entitlement to a redundancy payment, even in conformity with the terms of the third redundancy agreement. There was conflicting evidence as to what transpired at the meeting and his Honour found, favourably to Mr McCormick, that no such offer was made to him by CHH. His Honour said:“The possibility that [Mr McCormick] may not have had … an entitlement appears to have been considered for the first time only after the applicant brought these proceedings. That does not mean that the contention that there is no such entitlement so forcefully advanced before me lacks legal merit – only that it runs directly counter to the actual beliefs of those most centrally involved. Those beliefs should, in my opinion, be given appropriate weight.”My conclusions on the appeal With great respect to the learned primary judge, I do not think that either ground on which he found that the term in question formed part of Mr McCormick’s contract of employment can be supported. It is important, I think, to bear in mind that before us there is no question of the term’s having become part of Mr McCormick’s contract of employment except by incorporation through the Manual by reference or, on the other hand, by implication. There is no question of rectification of the contract; and there is no question of estoppel. Mr McCormick had pleaded a different estoppel. This was that Riverwood was estopped, as a result of representations made by it to him in March 1998, from denying that he was entitled to a severance payment, whether or not he chose to apply for a position with CHH or to accept an offer of employment by CHH. In this respect, Mr McCormick relied on the silence of Mr Bradbury at the meeting on 27 March 1998. Mr McCormick had also pleaded that Mr Bradbury’s silence constituted misleading or deceptive conduct within s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). His Honour found it unnecessary to consider either of these claims because of his conclusion that Mr McCormick succeeded on his contractual claim.Incorporation by reference I start with the proposition that the word “you” in the letter should not be construed to mean “you and the Company”. Neither party seems to have suggested that it should be construed in that way. The author used the expression “the Company” in the letter and so was mindful of the possibility of using it, yet did not do so in the critical paragraph.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

Mr McCormick had pleaded a different estoppel. This was that Riverwood was estopped, as a result of representations made by it to him in March 1998, from denying that he was entitled to a severance payment, whether or not he chose to apply for a position with CHH or to accept an offer of employment by CHH. In this respect, Mr McCormick relied on the silence of Mr Bradbury at the meeting on 27 March 1998. Mr McCormick had also pleaded that Mr Bradbury’s silence constituted misleading or deceptive conduct within s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). His Honour found it unnecessary to consider either of these claims because of his conclusion that Mr McCormick succeeded on his contractual claim.Incorporation by reference I start with the proposition that the word “you” in the letter should not be construed to mean “you and the Company”. Neither party seems to have suggested that it should be construed in that way. The author used the expression “the Company” in the letter and so was mindful of the possibility of using it, yet did not do so in the critical paragraph. The letter was presented to Mr McCormick by Packaging as a fait accompli. A purpose of the paragraph which suggests itself was, as a matter of more abundant precaution, to remind Mr McCormick that he must accept, and had no right to object to, Packaging’s “Policies and Practices”, present and future. On its face, the expression “Company Policies and Practices” refers to things that from time to time answer the description of a “policy” or “practice” of Packaging, whether contained in a document or not. The opposing view seems to be that Mr McCormick (and, for such significance as it might have, Packaging as well) was undertaking to abide by any stipulation of any kind that Packaging might choose to insert in a document called “Policies and Practices”. This seems to be an extreme view that should not be embraced unless necessary. The use of the words “all”, “them” and “any new ones” in the paragraph is clearly against the view that the paragraph is referring to a document and in favour of the view that it is referring to individual policies and practices. The relevant part of the definition of “policy” in the Macquarie Dictionary is:“1. a definite course of action adopted as expedient or from other considerations: a business policy 2. … 3. action or procedure confirming to, or considered with reference to, prudence or expediency: it was good policy to consent. 4. prudence, practical wisdom, or expediency. …”The same dictionary defines “practice”, relevantly, as follows:“1. habitual or customary performance: normal business practice. 2. a habit or custom. …” Although not conclusive, these definitions lend some support to my understanding of the meaning of the paragraph: Packaging must retain the right to lay down and alter, from time to time, such stipulations as it finds expedient in its interests, even if they have some impact on Mr McCormick, who is being required to accept this state of affairs. Of course, the paragraph must be construed in the context of the letter as a whole and Packaging would not be entitled to require Mr McCormick to submit to a policy or practice that would detract from the rights given to him expressly in the letter.