FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
D'Sylva v Ellenbrook Family Medical Centre Pty Ltd [2021] FedCFamC2G 319
File number(s): PEG 394 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV Date of judgment: 8 December 2021 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Small Claims – medical practice – part-time medical receptionist – whether employee not paid award entitlements to wages, overtime, public holidays and annual leave
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Awards – Health Professionals and Support Services Health Award 2010 – whether breach of award – whether underpayment of award entitlements – interpretation of award – principles
INDUSTRIAL LAW – ordinary hours of work – reasonable additional hours – whether reasonably predictable hours of work – whether rostered hours are ordinary hours of work – whether regularly rostered to work Sundays and public holidays – whether day worker or shiftworker – whether overtime payable
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Nature of employer’s obligation to maintain time records
EVIDENCE – Nature of evidence in small claims proceedings
EVIDENCE – Matters relating to proof – proof of award – whether award a matter of common knowledge – whether award a legislative instrument – proof of hours worked
EVIDENCE – Standard of proof – serious allegations of falsification of documents, conspiracy to defraud and theft
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY – Employer and employee obligations – whether bullying constitutes a hazard
WORDS AND PHRASES – “legislative instrument” – “ordinary hours of work” – “reasonable additional hours” – “reasonably predictable hours of work” – “regular pattern of work” – “roster” – “regularly rostered” – “regularly rostered to work Sundays and public holidays” – “day worker” – “shiftworker” – “hazard” – “bullying”
Legislation: Aged Care Award 2010 cl 10.3
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 69, 140, 143, 144
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 50, 62, 87, 99, 114, 115, 116, 168, 323, 535, 548, 548(1A), 570, 789FA, 789FD, 789FE
Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) regs 3.31, 3.32, 3.33, 3.34
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 8
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 45
Health Professionals and Support Services Health Award 2010 cll 3, 3.1, 10.3, 10.4, 13, 14.3, 23.1, 24, 24.1, 24.2, 24.3, 25, 26.1, 28, 28.1, 31.2, 32, 32.2, 33, Sch B
Legislation (Exemptions and Other Matters) Regulations 2015 (Cth) reg 6(1), Item 23(c)
Legislation Act 2015 (Cth) s 8
Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 7
Nurses Award 2010
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) ss 3, 19, 20
Public and Bank Holidays Act 1972 (WA) s 5
Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 228, 232
Cases cited: Amalgamated Collieries of WA v True [1938] HCA 19; (1938) 59 CLR 417; (1938) 11 ALJ 564
Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors [2005] HCA 10; (2005) 222 CLR 241; (2005) 79 ALJR 703; (2005) 138 IR 286; (2005) 214 ALR 56; (2005) 56 AILR 100-339
Annual Wage…
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- Case
- [2021] FedCFamC2G 319
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case included the interpretation of the Health Award, specifically regarding the classification of Ms D’Sylva's role, the determination of ordinary hours of work, and the employer's obligations concerning time records. The Court had to consider whether Ms D’Sylva was regularly rostered to work on Sundays and public holidays, and whether her role qualified her as a day worker or a shiftworker. Additionally, the Court needed to assess whether the employer was in breach of the award by not maintaining proper time records and underpaying the plaintiff.
In its reasoning, the Court noted that neither party had provided the Health Award as evidence, but it was necessary for the resolution of the case. The Court admitted the Health Award into evidence, relying on the Evidence Act, which allows for the recognition of legislative instruments without formal proof. The Court found that Ms D’Sylva was classified as a Support Service Employee - Level 3 under the Health Award and was entitled to be paid accordingly. The employer had failed to provide written classification details and had not maintained accurate time records, leading to underpayment. Consequently, the Court ordered the employer to pay Ms D’Sylva the sum of $7,735.44 by a specified date and made no order as to costs.
This case underscores the importance of proper classification and adherence to award entitlements in employment agreements, as well as the necessity for employers to maintain accurate time records.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It can be implied from its opposition to the claim that EFMC denies that the relevant classification is that of a Support Services Employee - Level 3 under the Health Award. Further, if not expressly put, it can also be implied that EFMC considered that Ms D’Sylva’s alleged performance was such as to not warrant her being paid as a Support Services Employee - Level 3 under the Health Award.ConsiderationHealth Award Provisions Clause 13 of the Health Award provides that: (a)employees covered by the Health Award must be classified according to the structure and definitions set out in Schedule B—Classification Definitions of the Health Award; and (b)employers must advise their employees in writing of their classification upon commencement, and of any subsequent changes to their classification. The Court might therefore have expected to find a classification level under the Health Award for the position of Medical Receptionist performed by Ms D’Sylva in either the Employment Contract or the Job Description, but EFMC did not include a classification level for that position. Otherwise, there is no evidence that EFMC advised Ms D’Sylva in writing of her classification upon commencement of her employment, or at any other time. Implicit in EFMC’s opposition to the Claim made by Ms D’Sylva was a claim that Ms D’Sylva was not performing at the level she claimed, namely, Support Services Employee - Level 3, and ought not to be paid as a Support Services Employee - Level 3. Schedule B—Classification Definitions of the Health Award in respect of Support Services employee - Levels 1, 2 and 3, provides as follows:Schedule BB.1 Support Services employees—definitionsB.1.1 Support Services employee—level 1Entry level:An employee with less than three months work experience in the industry and who performs basic duties.An employee at this level:•works within established routines, methods and procedures;•has minimal responsibility, accountability or discretion;•works under direct or routine supervision, either individually or in a team; and•is not required to have previous experience or training.Indicative roles at this level are: In interpreting the Health Award the Court must:(a)begin with a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words of the Health Award: City of Wanneroo at [53] per French J;(b)generally give ordinary or well-understood words their ordinary or usual meaning: Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 per Madgwick J (“Kucks”);(c)have regard to the context and purpose of the provision being construed, where context may appear from the whole of the text of the Health Award, the arrangement of the text, or the place in the text of the relevant provision: Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors [2005] HCA 10; (2005) 222 CLR 241; (2005) 79 ALJR 703; (2005) 138 IR 286; (2005) 214 ALR 56; (2005) 56 AILR 100-339 at [2] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J and [50] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; City of Wanneroo at [53] per French J; and(d)have regard, as a contextual consideration, to the fact that it is an industrial award being construed, and therefore not open to literal, narrow or pedantic construction: George A Bond & Co Ltd (In liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498 at 503-504 per Street J; City of Wanneroo at [57] per French J; Kucks at 184 per Madgwick J; Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (WA Branch) v Woolworths Ltd [2007] FCAFC 201; (2007) 164 FCR 420; (2007) IR 403; (2007) 244 ALR 658; (2007) 60 AILR 100-788 at [21] per Siopis J. Also, even where a provision in an industrial award is unambiguous, as was observed by Burchett J in Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 72; (1993) 40 FCR 511; (1993) 46 IR 128; (1996) 35 AILR 151 (“Hercus”); FCR at 517-518 (see too Drummond J, FCR at 523):No one doubts you must read any expression in its context. And if, for example, an expression was first created by a particularly respected draftsman for the purpose of stating the substance of a suggested term of an award, was then adopted in a number of subsequent clauses of awards dealing with the same general subject, and finally was adopted as a clause dealing with that same general subject in the award to be construed, the circumstances of the origin and use of the clause are plainly relevant to an understanding of what is likely to have been intended by its use. It is in those circumstances that the author of the award has inserted this particular clause into it, and they may fairly be regarded as having shaped his decision to do so. The rules of construction, Mason and Wilson JJ said inCooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth)(1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320, are really rules of common sense. Common sense would be much offended by a refusal to look at the facts I have summarised. As Isaacs J said in Australian Agricultural Co Ltd v Federated Engine-drivers' and Firemen's Association of Australasia(1913) 17 CLR 261 at 272, citing Lord Halsbury LC: “The time when, and the circumstances under which, an instrument is made, supply the best and surest mode of expounding it.”The context of an expression may thus be much more than the words that are its immediate neighbours. Context may extend to the entire document of which it is a part, or to other documents with which there is an association. Context may also include, in some cases, ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken. When the expression was transplanted, it may have brought with it some of the soil in which it once grew, retaining a special strength and colour in its new environment. There is no inherent necessity to read it as uprooted and stripped of every trace of its former significance, standing bare in alien ground. True, sometimes it does stand as if alone. But that should not be just assumed, in the case of an expression with a known source, without looking at its creation, understanding its original meaning, and then seeing how it is now used. Very frequently, perhaps most often, the immediate context is the clearest guide, but the court should not deny itself all other guidance in those cases where it can be seen that more is needed. In literature, Milton and Joyce could not be read in ignorance of the source of their language, nor should a legal document, including an award, be so read.That much is fairly clear. Where there is seen to be a difficulty, the court can often go to the history of the matter. Classification