Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177

Citation: Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177
Appeal from: Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439
Parties: LISA CAROLYN ROMERO v FARSTAD SHIPPING (INDIAN PACIFIC) PTY LTD (ACN 105 011 989)
File numbers: TAD 9 of 2014
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, RARES J AND MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2014
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – construction and interpretation of employment contract – whether an employer’s workplace discrimination and harassment policy formed part of the contract of employment – factors to be considered in determining that question – whether the policy was merely aspirational or directive – language of letter of engagement – context – reinforcement of policy terms – importance placed on terms – mutuality of promises – policy reflecting statutory obligations

INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether investigation conducted by the employer into a complaint made by an employee constituted a departure from the workplace discrimination and harassment policy – whether departure from the policy constituted a breach of the employment contract – whether departure from the policy constituted repudiation of the employment contract – whether employee entitled to damages for breach or repudiation of the employment contract

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – whether s 54(1) of Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) is a complete bar to the application – whether s 54 is directed to personal injury claims brought under the common law

Held: Appeal allowed

Legislation: Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) ss 3, 6, 54(1), 55
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 14(2)
Cases cited: Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co v Product Start Shipping Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397
Akmeemana v Murray [2009] NSWSC 979
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2013) 214 FCR 450
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 312 ALR 356
DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95
Foggo v O'Sullivan Partners (Advisory) Pty Ltd (2011) 206 IR 87
Gera v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2010) 201 IR 26
Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115
Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 623
McCormick v Riverwood International (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 689
Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick (2000) 177 ALR 193
Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 240 CLR 45
Re Rubel Bronze and Metal Co Ltd [1918] 1 KB 315
Schaale v Hoechst Australia Ltd (1993) 47 IR 249
Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596
Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620
State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344
Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen…
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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 177
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd, Ms Romero, a seafarer, brought an action against her employer, Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd, alleging that the employer breached her employment contract by failing to properly investigate a complaint of discrimination and harassment against her former captain. The employer had a workplace discrimination and harassment policy, which the court had to determine whether it formed part of Ms Romero's employment contract. The court also had to decide whether the employer's departure from the policy constituted a breach or repudiation of the employment contract. Additionally, the court had to determine whether a section of the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) barred the application.

The court found that the employer's workplace discrimination and harassment policy did form part of Ms Romero's employment contract. The court considered several factors, including the language used in the policy, the context in which it was presented, and the importance placed on the policy terms. The court also found that the employer's departure from the policy constituted a breach of the employment contract but not a repudiation. The court held that the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) did not bar the application.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the previous orders, and declared that the employer breached its employment contract with Ms Romero. The court remitted the questions of repudiation, damages, and any associated questions to a judge of the Court for rehearing. The employer was also ordered to pay Ms Romero's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. The orders made by the Court dated 6 May and 22 May 2014 be set aside and in partial replacement thereof:

(a) the Court declares that the respondent breached its employment contract with the applicant;

(b) the respondent pay to the applicant the costs of the hearing.

4. The question of repudiation and any associated questions such as affirmation or election and the question of damages be remitted to a judge of the Court for rehearing.

5. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP CJ, RARES J
Ms Romero is entitled to relief including damages for breach of the contract of employment to be determined by a judge of this Court if not agreed. THE DECISION AT FIRST INSTANCE In rejecting the sex discrimination claim, from which there is no appeal, his Honour was satisfied (at [17]) that if the behaviour of which Ms Romero complained did occur, it was not engaged in on account of Ms Romero’s gender. His Honour was also of the view that Captain Martin’s remarks as to the alleged incompetency of Ms Romero were not gender based. His Honour concluded that the poor relationship between Captain Martin and Ms Romero was the result of an escalating personality clash, rather than any sex discrimination on Captain Martin’s part. The primary judge also concluded (at [19]) that, even if Captain Martin was pleased with her departure, Ms Romero’s decision to leave Far Swan was driven by the deterioration of the relationship between Ms Romero and Captain Martin to a point where Captain Martin felt there was “no option” but to source a relief second officer. His Honour was also of the view that Ms Romero had a tendency towards an “exaggerated perception” of certain situations and that, in the case of Captain Martin, she had overreacted to a “relatively simple interpersonal conflict” (at [21]). None of those findings is challenged. On addressing the question of whether the Policy formed part of Ms Romero’s contract of employment, his Honour noted that the question of whether a policy was part of an employment contract was a vexed one and depended largely on the circumstances of any given case. His Honour referred to Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120 (at [29]) (partially reported on the issue of costs in (2007) 163 FCR 62) where Black CJ recognised that the test was “objective” and that ‘[w]hat matters is what the language used, in context, would have led a reasonable person … to believe”. Marshall J came to a similar conclusion (at [120]-[124]). His Honour also referred to Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick (2000) 177 ALR 193 per Lindgren J (at [43]) and to Black CJ in Nikolich (at [30]) where the Chief Justice said:The difficulty is that the statement in issue is not explicitly contractual in its language and could be seen as merely aspirational. It appears in a document of mixed content and purposes and, although these include contractual purposes, at least the primary repository of the employment contract is unambiguously elsewhere. The context is, however, decisive… if the statement that the firm “will take every practicable step to provide and maintain a safe and healthy work environment for all people” were no more than an aspirational representation, imposing no obligation on the maker, it would be seen as an exercise in hypocrisy. The statement is a reflection of, and is central to, WWU’s expression of the “culture” of the firm and its approach to its staff, and its aspirations about the approach the employees will take to each other. The language used, taken in the context as a whole, points to the statement embodying a contractual obligation and the trial judge was correct in holding that it was a term of the contract.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP CJ, RARES J

Similarly, in Foggo v O'Sullivan Partners (Advisory) Pty Ltd (2011) 206 IR 87, Schmidt J rejected as “defy[ing] both logic and common sense” the contention that although it was common ground that an employee was bound by a policy, the employer would not be contractually bound. Her Honour said (at [116]-[119]): 116That a reasonable person, in the circumstances, would have understood that the defendant, as well as Mr Foggo, was contractually bound to observe the grievance policy which it had implemented, unless varied or withdrawn, must be accepted. The policy envisaged that in the event that an employee had a grievance, he or she would advise the defendant, which would then take the steps specified in the policy to seek to resolve that grievance. That a reasonable person would understand that the employee was obliged to adhere to what the policy required of him or her, but that the defendant was not obliged to take the steps which the policy envisaged it would take, may not be accepted. That would defy both logic and common sense. 117That conclusion is reinforced, when clause 9 of the policy is considered. It gave the defendant unfettered rights to alter or bring the policy to an end, providing in clause 9: "9. Duration of this Policy 9.1This policy was brought into effect from 14 June 2010. 9.2It will be reviewed on a regular basis (and updated as deemed necessary) to ensure that it remains relevant and appropriate to OP. 9.3For the avoidance of doubt, this policy may be applied, varied or withdrawn at any time at OP's discretion." 118In my view, unless and until the defendant exercised such rights, it was contractually obliged to adhere to the policy it had brought into effect. That conclusion is supported by views expressed in Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick (2000) 177 ALR 193 and Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich (2007) 163 FCR 62, where similar questions arose for consideration. In both Riverwood and Goldman Sachs the question of whether the employer, as well as the employee, was contractually bound by the policy in question as an implied term of the contract, arose to be considered. The test is that discussed in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 282-3 and Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 442. 119That a term which requires an employer, as well as the employee, to adhere to a policy which the employer has devised and implemented and which the employee is contractually obliged to observe, by express provision, would be implied in order to give business efficacy to the contracted contract, is immediately understandable. In the case of the policy here in question, it is evident that the contract could not operate reasonably and effectively without such an implied obligation. It would make nonsense of the employee's ongoing obligation to act in accordance with what the policy required of him or her from time to time, if the employer had no obligation to act in accordance with what the policy required of it.