FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 120
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Details
- Case
- [2017] FCA 120
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In this case, Ms. Romero sought damages from Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd for alleged breaches of contract and contraventions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). Ms. Romero also sought an apology and compensation for economic loss, anticipated future economic loss, and general damages for dislocation of life, pain and suffering, stress, anxiety, and depression, humiliation and damage to reputation. Farstad made settlement offers in 2013 and 2014, which Ms. Romero did not accept. In November 2015, the parties executed a deed of settlement. The primary issue before the court was whether Ms. Romero was "successful" within the meaning of Pt 25 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and whether the settlement offers were effective to enliven the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333. The court held that Ms. Romero was not successful, in light of the award of nominal damages, and that the settlement offers were not effective because they were superseded by the execution of the deed. The court awarded Farstad its costs of the remitted hearing from 18 December 2015, on a party and party basis.
The court held that Ms. Romero was not successful in the proceeding, as she was only awarded nominal damages. The court noted that the execution of the deed in November 2015 was significant in determining whether Ms. Romero could be considered successful in the proceeding. The court held that the settlement offers made by Farstad were not effective because they were superseded by the execution of the deed. The court further held that the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank did not apply because the settlement offers were not effective. The court rejected Farstad's argument that Ms. Romero's conduct of the trial warranted an award of indemnity costs, stating that it was hardly a basis for such an award. The court held that Farstad should have its costs on a party and party basis from 18 December 2015. The court refused all other costs claims.
The court held that Ms. Romero was not successful in the proceeding, as she was only awarded nominal damages. The court noted that the execution of the deed in November 2015 was significant in determining whether Ms. Romero could be considered successful in the proceeding. The court held that the settlement offers made by Farstad were not effective because they were superseded by the execution of the deed. The court further held that the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank did not apply because the settlement offers were not effective. The court rejected Farstad's argument that Ms. Romero's conduct of the trial warranted an award of indemnity costs, stating that it was hardly a basis for such an award. The court held that Farstad should have its costs on a party and party basis from 18 December 2015. The court refused all other costs claims.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant pay the respondent’s party and party costs incurred on and after 18 December 2015.
2. All other costs claims be refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
For the reasons which follow, I have determined that Farstad should have its costs of the remitted hearing from 18 December 2015, on a party and party basis. There should be no other order as to costs.BACKGROUND Ms Romero’s originating application was dated 21 December 2012. In it, she sought, in respect of alleged breaches of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (“SD Act”) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (“DD Act”), an apology, and compensation for past economic loss (around $127,400), anticipated future economic loss (around $1.8M, subject to discounts for vicissitudes and net present value) and general damages for dislocation of life, pain and suffering, stress, anxiety, and depression, humiliation and damage to reputation ($250,000). Ms Romero also sought the following:“1.An order pursuant to s. 46PO(4) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) declaring that the Respondent has committed unlawful discrimination and victimisation against the Applicant contrary to s 14(2) and s 94 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and/or s 15(2) and s 42 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).2.An order pursuant to s. 46PO(4)(d) that the Respondent pay to the Applicant damages by way of compensation for the loss and damages she has suffered by reason of the said unlawful discrimination and victimisation.3.An order that the Respondent:(a)implement policies, practices and procedures in respect [of] sex discrimination and complaints of discrimination made to it on this ground;(b)implement risk management strategies to assist in the recognition and identification of discriminatory conduct (independent of whether a complaint is made); and(c)undertake regular management training in relation to the policies, practices and procedures referred to at (a) above.”She claimed costs, interest, and such further or other relief as the Court saw fit. She sought, also, damages for breach of contract. In her statement of claim dated 1 March 2013, Ms Romero pleaded contravention of the SD Act, DD Act, and breaches of contract. She pleaded, at [66], that she had suffered loss or damage arising out of those contraventions and breaches, particularised as follows:“(a)Offence, humiliation, distress, anxiety and depression (including sleeplessness, loss of motivation and self-esteem);(b)Dislocation to life;(c)Loss of income and other benefits as an employee of Farstad;(d)Damage to personal and professional reputation;(e)Further particulars to be provided prior to hearing” On 24 September 2013, Farstad made an offer of compromise to Ms Romero under r 25.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the Rules”), the offer being that Farstad would pay to Ms Romero $40,000 inclusive of costs and interest. Ms Romero did not accept that offer. On 18 October 2013, Ms Romero submitted a claim to Farstad under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) (“SRC Act”). On 23 October 2013, the then-docket judge ordered the exchange of contentions of fact and law. Ms Romero’s were filed on 12 February 2014. Contention H was as follows:“Ms Romero suffered damage and loss as a result of Farstad’s breaches of contract including;i. loss of 25% of her salary from December 2011 until May 2012;ii. loss of 100% of her salary from May 2012 to the present and ongoing;iii. retraining expenses;iv. medical expenses;Further particulars will be provided prior to trial.”
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The common law has, however, been displaced by s 131 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which provides (relevantly) as follows:“131 Exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations(1) Evidence is not to be adduced of:(a)a communication that is made between persons in dispute, or between one or more persons in dispute and a third party, in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute; or(b)a document (whether delivered or not) that has been prepared in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of a dispute.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if:…(h)the communication or document is relevant to determining liability for costs; or” I held in Alexander v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (No 2) [2010] FCA 467 that s 131(2)(h) had the effect that without prejudice communications relating to costs were admissible as an exception to the proscription imposed by s 131(1). See also: Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 135, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Limited (No 3) [2002] FCA 1294 at [17]–[19], and Pinot Nominees Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 181 FCR 392 at 397–8. The March 2014 settlement offer may, therefore, be taken into account.The Deed It will become apparent in what follows that I view the execution of the Deed in November 2015 as being of some moment. If, properly construed, the Deed settled a claim or a head of damages that was part of the subject matter of this proceeding, it assumes some importance in determining whether Ms Romero can be said to have been successful in this proceeding, and whether Farstad has bettered its offers. For that reason, it is appropriate to deal with the effect of the Deed before deciding how the competing costs claims should be resolved. The Deed recorded in its recitals, relevantly, the following:“A.[The Applicant] … claims that she suffered an adjustment disorder and/or a depressive anxiety condition and/or major depressive disorder … as a result of, or contributed to a material degree, by the Applicant’s perception of unfair treatment by Mr Cameron Martin, Master of MV Far Swan as a result of directions or lack of directions made by, or other behaviour by, the said Master Martin about November/December 2011, simulation/course requirements and the subsequent complaint by the Applicant in respect of her perceptions, meetings with the Respondent, communications with the Respondent and a report consequent upon the complaint, when in employment of the Respondent.B.The Applicant sought compensation in respect of the adjustment disorder and/or depression and claimed;(i)benefits pursuant to Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (‘SRCA’) including lost wages resulting from alleged incapacity to work;(ii)medical and related expenses.C.Liability to pay benefits in accordance with the SRCA in respect of the Applicant’s claim for compensation was refused by the Respondent in the course of a decision deemed to have been made in or about February 2014 by the operation of section 79(6) of the SRCA (‘Reviewable Decision’).D.The Applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) in Application No. 2014/0999 for a review of the Respondent’s Reviewable Decision in respect of the above claim.E.The Applicant also alleges that the adjustment disorder and/or depression was caused by the breach of her contract of employment with the Respondent and that she was, and is, entitled to claim damages for injury against the Respondent at common law as a result of breach of contract of employment constituted by the alleged actions and matters in paragraph A above and alleges claim [sic] to damages in respect the [sic] adjustment disorder and/or depression (hereinafter referred to as “common law claim”) which allegations, and the right to make the common law claim, the Respondent denies.”
Decision
Reasons for decision
The second issue is that Farstad complained about Ms Romero’s conduct of the trial. It did so in making its application for indemnity costs. The submission did not go further than the assertion that Ms Romero filed extensive medical evidence upon which she ultimately did not rely, and that she did rely, to some extent, upon previously-undiscovered material. That conduct may be suboptimal but, without much more detail than was given in Farstad’s written submission, it is hardly a basis for awarding Farstad its costs on an indemnity basis. Likewise, I do not think that anything turns on Ms Romero’s complaints in reply concerning Farstad’s late discovery of certain notes.CONCLUSION Neither party should have her or its costs prior to 18 December 2015 (excepting, of course, the costs of the appeal, which have already been dealt with by the Full Court). Farstad was the successful party on the remitted hearing. It should have its costs on a party and party basis from 18 December 2015. Farstad’s application that those costs be on an indemnity basis must be refused: its offer under Pt 25 of the Rules was ineffective, in light of the parties’ subsequent execution of the Deed. Were I wrong concerning the import of the Deed, I would have held that, although Ms Romero acted reasonably in rejecting Farstad’s offer, that did not provide a proper reason for displacing the effect of r 25.14(1). I would have awarded Farstad its costs on an indemnity basis from 11:00 am on the second business day after the offer was served, consistently with r 25.14(1)(b) of the Rules.
Ratio Decidendi