COSTS – application for indemnity costs by successful second respondent Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd against unsuccessful appellant regulator Australian Competition and Consumer Commission – whether the Commission, properly advised, should have known that the appeal was bound to fail and therefore it was unreasonable to have commenced or continued it – whether the Commission failed to challenge four sets of factual findings and whether challenging those findings was indispensable to the appeal succeeding, viewed prospectively – whether an offer of compromise was genuine and sufficiently clear – whether the Commission unreasonably failed to accept an offer of compromise – application dismissed.
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought proceedings against Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd and others for anti-competitive conduct in the laundry detergent market. The Commission's case failed at trial and on appeal. Colgate sought indemnity costs against the Commission for the appeal. The legal issues were whether the Commission should have known that the appeal was bound to fail, whether it unreasonably failed to accept an offer of compromise, and whether special considerations applied. The court found that the appeal raised legitimate legal issues and was not unreasonable, and that the offer of compromise was not clear and genuine. The application for indemnity costs was dismissed, and Colgate ordered to pay the Commission's costs.
The ACCC sued Colgate and others for anti-competitive conduct in the laundry detergent market. The Commission's case was that Colgate, along with others, had colluded to withhold the supply of standard concentration laundry powders until a specific date in March 2009, when they would simultaneously launch new ultra-concentrate formulations. The trial judge found that there was no such collusive arrangement, and that the transition to ultra-concentrate products was driven by the major retailers, Woolworths and Coles. The Full Court upheld the trial judge's decision, dismissing the Commission's appeal. Colgate then sought indemnity costs against the Commission for the appeal.
The court found that the appeal did not involve a proceeding that the Commission should have known was bound to fail. The appeal raised legitimate legal issues concerning the operation of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which the Commission is responsible for enforcing. The court also found that the offer of compromise was not clear and genuine, and that the Commission did not unreasonably fail to accept it. The application for indemnity costs was dismissed, and Colgate ordered to pay the Commission's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The second respondent’s interlocutory application for indemnity costs be dismissed.
2. The second respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application as assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
For the reasons that follow, the Cussons’ application for indemnity costs must be dismissed with costs, to be assessed upon the ordinary basis, or as agreed.Background As both the Trial Judgment and Appeal Judgment are lengthy and detailed, these reasons must be read with both to the extent that is necessary. This is so as to avoid lengthy repetition on the relatively narrow question of, in effect, the basis upon which the costs order already made, and not disputed, should be quantified. It is, however, useful to reproduce the introductory paragraphs of the Appeal Judgment in order to frame the reasons that follow:[1] In the year 2008, the Australian laundry detergent market was large with approximate sales of $500 million. The Respondents, PZ Cussons Australia Pty Ltd (‘Cussons’) and Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (‘Colgate’), together with Unilever Australia Limited (‘Unilever’) (collectively, ‘the Suppliers’) were the largest manufacturers and wholesale suppliers of laundry detergents in the Australian market having between them around an 80% market share.[2] In March 2009 there was a significant change in the market for powdered laundry detergents. The Suppliers each launched new formulations of their existing laundry powders which were twice the concentration of their existing powders. They supplied these new ‘ultra-concentrate’ formulations (as they were called) to their main customers: Woolworths Limited (‘Woolworths’), Coles Group Pty Ltd (‘Coles’) and the wholesaler, Metcash Limited (‘Metcash’). Over a relatively short period, and at approximately the same time, they ceased supplying their standard concentration laundry powders to Woolworths, Coles and Metcash, although they did continue to supply some of these powders to other independent retailers and variety stores. The overall effect, however, was that in a large part of the market for laundry powders all of the standard concentrate products disappeared and were quickly replaced by ultra-concentrate products.[3] Arising out of this event, the Appellant (‘the Commission’) sued Colgate and Cussons alleging anti-competitive conduct on their part. It also sued Woolworths and an officer of Colgate contending that they were knowingly concerned in or a party to the alleged contraventions. The Commission did not commence proceedings against Unilever, apparently because it was an immunity recipient. Prior to trial, all of these parties except Cussons settled with the Commission but the trial continued against Cussons. The Commission’s basic case was that the largely simultaneous and almost uniform transition from standard to ultra-concentrated powders resulted from a collusive arrangement or understanding between Colgate, Cussons and Unilever that they would hold off bringing the ultra-concentrate products to market until a date in March 2009 and at the same time cease supplying the standard concentrates thereafter.[4] Were it to be established, such an arrangement or understanding between Colgate, Cussons and Unilever would be between competitors containing exclusionary provisions restricting the supply of goods into a market. In the interests of brevity, it is useful to refer to this alleged arrangement or understanding as the Withhold Supply Arrangement, it being understood that the reference to an arrangement includes a reference to an understanding. There are complex prohibitions preventing, in many instances, the reaching by competitors of arrangements or understandings of this kind and there are related prohibitions against giving them effect. In the interests of completeness, we explain these provisions in the next section but they are of little moment for the purposes of the present appeal for there is no debate that if the Commission failed, as a matter of fact, to prove the existence of the Withhold Supply Arrangement, then its case had to fail. At trial, the Commission failed precisely on that basis. The trial judge concluded that the Commission had not succeeded in proving that Cussons had arrived at the Withhold Supply Arrangement with Colgate and Unilever. Whilst his Honour accepted that Colgate, Cussons and Unilever were conscious they were all going to transition to ultra-concentrates at the same time, his Honour did not think this was because they were acting pursuant to a collusive arrangement or understanding. Rather, the trial judge was impressed by evidence which suggested that it was Woolworths and Coles which had largely driven the timing of the transition to ultra-concentrates. This was so they could devote less shelf space to laundry powders, a product range which they did not regard as particularly profitable (that is, they did not wish to have both ordinary strength powder and ultra-concentrates taking up shelf space). The trial judge also accepted evidence which suggested that Cussons was, to a large extent, ignorant of what the other Suppliers and retailers were doing in the lead up to the transition in March 2009.[5] It is from these adverse conclusions that the Commission now appeals. By its amended notice of appeal, the Commission pursues ten grounds of appeal which it grouped together under five sections labelled A-E. Section A, which comprised Grounds 1-3, involved the basic contention that the trial judge, whilst correctly identifying the legal nature of an arrangement or understanding for the purposes of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’), had in substance erroneously applied a higher standard by requiring the Commission to prove the existence of a contract or agreement. Under Section B (Grounds 4-5), the argument was that [the] trial judge had erred in preferring the hypothesis of conscious parallelism over the existence of the Withhold Supply Arrangement. Under Section C (Grounds 6-7) the Commission took issue with the trial judge’s conclusion that the switch to ultra-concentrates had been driven by the attitudes of Woolworths and Coles. Under Section D (Grounds 8-9), the Commission argued that, in the event that it established on appeal that the Withhold Supply Arrangement had been reached, it had also been implemented. Under Section E (Ground 10) the Commission contended that the trial judge had made 11 errors of fact, which were identified in an annexure to the amended notice of appeal. In the event that the Commission succeeded in establishing error on the part of the trial judge, it then identified how its case operated at trial and invited the Full Court to reach the conclusions that the trial judge had refused to reach.(Emphasis added to the definitions for ease reading and for the reasons that follow)
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In response, the Commission relies upon [33] of its appeal reply submissions dated 3 August 2018 addressing the same issue, in which it was said (omitting footnotes and submission and Trial Judgment references):Evidence as to a meeting of minds: Cussons draws attention to the fact that certain witnesses refuted a meeting of minds concerning the Withhold Supply Arrangement, and that no Unilever witness gave evidence of a communication involving Cussons concerning the arrangement, or of being aware of such an arrangement. Although a Court may be less likely to draw inferences favourable to a party who refrains from asking questions of its own witness on an issue, it does not matter in this case. First, it is not to be expected that the subjective knowledge of these witnesses would have been probative of the requisite understanding in any event. A tacit understanding does not require an expressly communicated commitment. It may involve mere signalling by words or acts of an intention to act in a particular way, or a commitment that is inferred or implied from the parties’ dealings. If so, it cannot be expected that any of the relevant executives knew of any express communication concerning the arrangement or understanding, or were consciously aware of any commitment, when the relevant understanding was tacit and to be inferred from the parties’ dealings. Secondly, it is to be recalled that what the Act prohibits “is a decision which the maker has undertaken with others to make or has entered into a contract, arrangement or understanding with them that he will make. When he makes that decision it is necessarily a decision made “in accordance with” that arrangement or understanding although it might have been made without the decision maker having the arrangement or understanding in his mind”: Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pry Ltd (1985) 6 FCR 1 at 68 at 270 (Smithers J). Thirdly, even were this matter relevant, Cussons did not call the witnesses most apt to have such propositions put to them, such as its Managing Director (Mr Fatouros). The Commission further submits that any assertion by a witness as to the existence or non-existence of an arrangement or understanding, in the sense of its legal character, would not have been admissible or probative of any matter in issue. This is submitted to be the case because the existence of such an arrangement or understanding is a matter of law to be determined by the trial court. In support of this argument the Commission cites authority to the effect that a statement by a person involving the application of law to a factual situation is essentially meaningless, namely Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins [2003] HCA 51; 215 CLR 317 at [69]-[70] per Gummow J, and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Kelaher [2019] FCA 1521; 138 ACSR 459 at [135]-[136] per Jagot J. In Dovuro at [70], Gummow J quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Glass JA in Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 at 676: By extorting from a party an admission that he was negligent, or that he was not provoked, or that his grandfather possessed testamentary capacity, there is added to the record something which is, not merely of dubious value, but by definition valueless, owing to the witness’ unfamiliarity with the standard governing his answer.
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 24 May 2019, a Full Court, of which I was a member, dismissed an appeal by the applicant before the trial judge: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 83 (Appeal Judgment or AJ). The respondent to that appeal was the second respondent before the trial judge, PZ Cussons Australia Pty Ltd, against whom the case brought by the Commission failed: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd(No 4) [2017] FCA 1590; 353 ALR 460 (Trial Judgment or TJ). The case against the remaining respondents settled. The Full Court ordered the Commission to pay Cussons’ costs as assessed or agreed. The Commission does not dispute its liability to pay costs upon the ordinary basis. Seven months after the delivery of the Appeal Judgment, Cussons filed an interlocutory application dated 23 December 2019, seeking an order pursuant to r 40.02(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that the Commission pay its costs of the appeal proceedings on an indemnity basis, and in the alternative upon an indemnity basis for costs incurred either after 11.00 am on 11 May 2018 or alternatively after 23 May 2018. Section 25(2B)(ab) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides that a single judge, sitting in chambers or in open court, or a Full Court, may “make an interlocutory order pending, or after, the determination of an appeal to the Court”. The question of the jurisdiction of a single judge to hear Cussons’ interlocutory application was raised with the parties in light of that provision. It was not disputed that, as a single judge, I had jurisdiction to exercise the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and hear and determine Cussons’ interlocutory application for indemnity costs. The three-hour hearing of the application took place online using Microsoft Teams. Cussons relied upon two affidavits by solicitors (read without objection or cross-examination). Both parties furnished written submissions prior to the hearing and made oral submissions. A transcript was subsequently prepared, taking only a little longer than usual. Observers attended, including from the media. The hearing was therefore relevantly indistinguishable from a hearing taking place in Court, as it would have been prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cussons’ application for indemnity costs primarily relies upon acceptance of its characterisation of the appeal as a proceeding that the Commission should have known was bound to fail, such that it was unreasonable to bring the appeal at all. Alternatively, Cussons relies upon an offer of compromise dated 9 May 2018, which it contends the Commission unreasonably failed to accept. The Commission contends that neither basis for the award of indemnity costs has been made out. Instead, the Commission characterises its appeal as raising legitimate legal matters concerning questions of principle for consideration by the Full Court as to the operation of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) which the Commission is responsible for enforcing. The Commission contends that the appeal was no more than the unexceptional exercise of ordinary appeal rights, the failure of which was itself unexceptional. The Commission also asserts that special considerations apply to the question of unreasonableness in a case brought in good faith by a regulator discharging its public duties in the public interest.