Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) [2021] FCA 246

File number: NSD 2510 of 2013
Judgment of: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 19 March 2021
Catchwords: COSTS – Application for indemnity costs by successful respondent against applicant – where applicant, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, is a regulator – relevant principles regarding order for costs – whether Court should exercise its discretion to award costs other than on a party and party basis – whether ACCC should have been aware that its proceeding was “hopeless” and “bound to fail” before commencing proceeding – whether ACCC’s action against respondent was justified and reasonable in the circumstances – whether action against respondent was a circumstantial case where strength or weakness of proceeding could only be assessed once entire evidence had been presented – where litigation involved public interest – where ACCC had previously settled with other respondents in the proceeding also alleged to have engaged in collusive arrangements in contravention of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) – order for indemnity costs not warranted – application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 40.01, 40.02(a), 40.02(b), Sch 1

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (repealed), ss 45(2)(a)(i)-(ii), 45(2)(b)(i)-(ii), 44ZZRK

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 860

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 4) (2017) 353 ALR 460; [2017] FCA 1590

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 83

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 598

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1844

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) [2018] FCA 684

1           Cirillo v Consolidated Press Property Ltd (formerly known as Citicorp Australia Ltd) (No 2) [2007] FCA 179

Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225

De Alwis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 77

Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397

Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCAFC 97

Henke v Carter [2002] FCA 492

J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301

Kazal v Independent Commission Against Corruption and Ors (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 17

King v Yurisich (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 51

Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534

LFDB v SM (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 207

Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Whitton [2015] FCA 1352

Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Limited (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 116

Re Kingsheath Club of the Clubs Ltd(in liq) [2003] FCA 1589

Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 160; [2009] FCAFC 166

Smolle v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 246
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought a proceeding against Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd, alleging contraventions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). Colgate sought indemnity costs against the ACCC, arguing that the proceeding was hopeless and bound to fail, and that the ACCC should have realised this before commencing the proceeding. The court was required to decide whether the ACCC's action was justified and reasonable in the circumstances, and whether it should exercise its discretion to award costs other than on a party and party basis.

The court found that the ACCC's case was largely circumstantial and depended on the drawing of inferences from parallel conduct and communications between the parties. While the ACCC's case was difficult and complex, it could not be concluded that it was necessarily hopeless or foredoomed to fail. The court held that there were no other special or unusual features or circumstances which would warrant an order for indemnity costs. The court dismissed Colgate's application for indemnity costs and ordered that the costs of the interlocutory application be paid by Colgate.

The court considered that the ACCC, as a regulator, was often required to pursue hard cases and cases based on circumstantial or highly contentious evidence or unsettled areas of law. The court held that it might reasonably be expected that regulators will lose some cases, sometimes emphatically, and that this should be taken into account when assessing whether an indemnity costs order against a regulator is warranted. The court found that the ACCC's action against Colgate was justified and reasonable in the circumstances, and that there were no grounds for departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event. The court dismissed Colgate's application for indemnity costs and ordered that the costs of the interlocutory application be paid by Colgate.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the second respondent on 1 February 2018 be dismissed.

2. The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and associated with the interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It might also be added, in this context, that the legislation administered by Commonwealth regulators is often complex and the cases they commence and pursue are often difficult to prove. The public responsibilities of regulators mean that they must, on occasion, pursue hard cases; cases based on circumstantial or highly contentious evidence or perhaps unsettled areas of law. It follows that it might reasonably be expected that they will lose some cases, sometimes emphatically. A regulator who chooses only to pursue easy cases and easy targets might perhaps have an excellent strike rate in terms of winning cases, but it would not be doing its job. These types of considerations, which do not apply to ordinary civil litigants, should be taken into account when assessing whether an indemnity costs order against a regulator such as the Commission is warranted. Even in the case of ordinary civil litigants, indemnity costs “are not awarded as a means of deterring litigants from putting forward arguments that might be attended by uncertainty”: Hamod at [20].BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT These reasons should be read in conjunction with the Judgment. There would be little point in rehearsing or reprising the reasons for dismissing the Commission’s case against Cussons. The following general points can, however, be made. First, the Commission’s case was unquestionably largely circumstantial. It hinged on the inferences that could be drawn from two broad categories of facts and circumstances. The first circumstance was what appeared to be parallel conduct between Cussons, Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd and Unilever Australia Limited when they transitioned to ultra-concentrated laundry detergents, in conjunction with the major supermarket chains, in March 2009. The second circumstance was that there had been a series of meetings and communications between Cussons, Colgate, Unilever and the major retailers in the year or so leading up to the transition. Second, the Commission’s case was largely documentary. The documents relied on by the Commission largely comprised documentary records of the relevant meetings and communications. While evidence was called from officers of Unilever, that evidence largely related to the relevant meetings and communications and ultimately did not add much to the documentary records. The actual content of the communications, including at the meetings, was not particularly contentious. It was the inferences that could be drawn from what was said at the meetings, in the context of the evidence as a whole, which was in issue. Third, the Commission’s case was initially against Cussons, Colgate, Woolworths and an officer of Colgate. Colgate, Woolworths and the Colgate officer all settled with the Commission, in the sense that they admitted contraventions and agreed to certain facts relating to the contraventions. The Commission did not call any officers or employees of Colgate or Woolworths in its remaining case against Cussons. Fourth, while the Commission’s case relied on inferences that it contended should be drawn from the combination of the parallel conduct and the communications which occurred between Cussons, Colgate and Unilever in the period leading up to the transition, it would not be unfair to say that the Commission’s case lacked clarity and particularity in certain respects. The Commission was unable to, and until pressed during the trial, never really attempted to, pinpoint when the alleged arrangement or understanding was made or arrived at between Cussons, Colgate and Unilever in the lengthy period leading up to the transition. Nor was the Commission ever really able to identify the officers of those corporations who were said to have made the arrangement or reached the understanding on behalf of their employers.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, while Cussons contended that the Commission’s conduct of the case was wasteful in certain respects, that contention was not pursued by Cussons with any particular zeal. It was certainly not suggested that the alleged wastefulness alone would justify an order for indemnity costs. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the specific claims made by Cussons in this context in any detail. It suffices to note that there is merit in the Commission’s submission that its forensic decision to abandon one aspect of its case and not to cross-examine Cussons’ expert witness was unlikely to have caused Cussons to incur any additional or unnecessary costs. Although Cussons, in both its submissions and in an exhibit to an affidavit sworn by one of its solicitors, asserted that it had expended considerable costs in obtaining advice and evidence in relation to the abandoned allegation, Cussons did not adduce any evidence which particularised or quantified any such additional or unnecessary costs. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION Cussons’ case that it was entitled to indemnity costs rested almost entirely on the contention that the Commission’s case against it was hopeless or foredoomed to fail and that the Commission should have realised that to be the case either before it commenced the proceeding, or at least by the time of the trial. That contention cannot be accepted for the reasons given. There were no other special or unusual features or circumstances which would warrant an order for indemnity costs. It follows that Cussons’ application for indemnity costs must fail and the interlocutory application filed by Cussons on 1 February 2018 must be dismissed. There is no reason why the costs of the interlocutory application should not follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, while the Commission acknowledged that the Full Court’s rejection of its appeal had been equally emphatic, it pointed out that some passages in the Full Court’s judgment indicated that different views may have been open in respect of some of the evidence. In the Commission’s submission, the Full Court’s reasons indicated that the problem for the Commission was that the Court’s rejection of the inferences urged by the Commission, or the drawing of different inferences, was at least open. That is not to say that the Commission’s case was hopeless, or that the inferences that the Commission urged the Court to draw were not open on the evidence.CONSIDERATION There can be no doubt that the Commission’s loss at first instance in this case was emphatic. The Commission’s case failed at virtually every hurdle. In all the circumstances, however, it cannot be concluded that the Commission’s case was necessarily hopeless or foredoomed to fail. Still less can it be concluded that the Commission must or should have realised or appreciated, either prior to the commencement of the proceeding or at any point before or during the trial, that the evidence available to it could not support the inferences necessary for it to succeed against Cussons. The Commission’s case against Cussons was undoubtedly difficult and complex. It was a circumstantial case that ultimately depended on the drawing of an inference that the parallel conduct that occurred when Cussons, Colgate and Unilever transitioned to ultra-concentrated laundry detergents at the same time in March 2009 was the result of a collusive arrangement between those corporations, aided by at least one of the major retailers. There was no direct evidence of the existence of that arrangement or understanding, despite the fact that one of the supposed parties to it, Unilever, had obtained immunity from the Commission in exchange for it assisting the Commission in its investigation and prosecution of the proceeding against the other parties. The circumstantial nature of the Commission’s case did not change even after the Commission had exercised its compulsory powers, which resulted in it obtaining a vast trove of documents which recorded, amongst other things, essentially all of the communications which had occurred between officers of Cussons, Colgate, Woolworths and Unilever during the lengthy period leading up to the transition. There could be little doubt that, had the Commission stood back and assessed the evidence that it had amassed prior to the commencement of the proceeding, as it almost certainly did, it would, or at least should, have realised and appreciated that its case against Cussons had difficulties and potential weaknesses. Those weakness were to an extent exposed by the Commission’s pleading itself. The pleading did little more than provide a chronological recitation of communications that had occurred between the parties over a lengthy period of time and allege that, by reason of those communications, there was an arrangement or understanding which had been made or reached between the parties at some point during that lengthy period. The pleading did not identify with any degree of precision exactly when during that lengthy period of time the arrangement or understanding was made or arrived at, or identify the individual officers or employees who made the arrangement or arrived at the understanding on behalf of the relevant corporations. That was no doubt because the evidence available to the Commission was unable to provide any real clarity about those matters. The apparent inability of the Commission to identify, let alone prove, precisely when and by whom the arrangement was made, or the understanding reached, may not have been fatal to the Commission’s case; but properly considered, it should have at least rung alarm bells.