FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) [2021] FCA 246
File number: NSD 2510 of 2013 Judgment of: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 19 March 2021 Catchwords: COSTS – Application for indemnity costs by successful respondent against applicant – where applicant, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, is a regulator – relevant principles regarding order for costs – whether Court should exercise its discretion to award costs other than on a party and party basis – whether ACCC should have been aware that its proceeding was “hopeless” and “bound to fail” before commencing proceeding – whether ACCC’s action against respondent was justified and reasonable in the circumstances – whether action against respondent was a circumstantial case where strength or weakness of proceeding could only be assessed once entire evidence had been presented – where litigation involved public interest – where ACCC had previously settled with other respondents in the proceeding also alleged to have engaged in collusive arrangements in contravention of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) – order for indemnity costs not warranted – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 40.01, 40.02(a), 40.02(b), Sch 1
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (repealed), ss 45(2)(a)(i)-(ii), 45(2)(b)(i)-(ii), 44ZZRK
Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 860
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 4) (2017) 353 ALR 460; [2017] FCA 1590
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 83
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 598
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1844
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
De Alwis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 77
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397
Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCAFC 97
J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301
Kazal v Independent Commission Against Corruption and Ors (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 17
King v Yurisich (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 51
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534
LFDB v SM (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 207
Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Whitton [2015] FCA 1352
Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Limited (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 116
Re Kingsheath Club of the Clubs Ltd(in liq) [2003] FCA 1589
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 160; [2009] FCAFC 166
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 246
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the ACCC's case was largely circumstantial and depended on the drawing of inferences from parallel conduct and communications between the parties. While the ACCC's case was difficult and complex, it could not be concluded that it was necessarily hopeless or foredoomed to fail. The court held that there were no other special or unusual features or circumstances which would warrant an order for indemnity costs. The court dismissed Colgate's application for indemnity costs and ordered that the costs of the interlocutory application be paid by Colgate.
The court considered that the ACCC, as a regulator, was often required to pursue hard cases and cases based on circumstantial or highly contentious evidence or unsettled areas of law. The court held that it might reasonably be expected that regulators will lose some cases, sometimes emphatically, and that this should be taken into account when assessing whether an indemnity costs order against a regulator is warranted. The court found that the ACCC's action against Colgate was justified and reasonable in the circumstances, and that there were no grounds for departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event. The court dismissed Colgate's application for indemnity costs and ordered that the costs of the interlocutory application be paid by Colgate.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed by the second respondent on 1 February 2018 be dismissed.
2. The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and associated with the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, while the Commission acknowledged that the Full Court’s rejection of its appeal had been equally emphatic, it pointed out that some passages in the Full Court’s judgment indicated that different views may have been open in respect of some of the evidence. In the Commission’s submission, the Full Court’s reasons indicated that the problem for the Commission was that the Court’s rejection of the inferences urged by the Commission, or the drawing of different inferences, was at least open. That is not to say that the Commission’s case was hopeless, or that the inferences that the Commission urged the Court to draw were not open on the evidence.CONSIDERATION There can be no doubt that the Commission’s loss at first instance in this case was emphatic. The Commission’s case failed at virtually every hurdle. In all the circumstances, however, it cannot be concluded that the Commission’s case was necessarily hopeless or foredoomed to fail. Still less can it be concluded that the Commission must or should have realised or appreciated, either prior to the commencement of the proceeding or at any point before or during the trial, that the evidence available to it could not support the inferences necessary for it to succeed against Cussons. The Commission’s case against Cussons was undoubtedly difficult and complex. It was a circumstantial case that ultimately depended on the drawing of an inference that the parallel conduct that occurred when Cussons, Colgate and Unilever transitioned to ultra-concentrated laundry detergents at the same time in March 2009 was the result of a collusive arrangement between those corporations, aided by at least one of the major retailers. There was no direct evidence of the existence of that arrangement or understanding, despite the fact that one of the supposed parties to it, Unilever, had obtained immunity from the Commission in exchange for it assisting the Commission in its investigation and prosecution of the proceeding against the other parties. The circumstantial nature of the Commission’s case did not change even after the Commission had exercised its compulsory powers, which resulted in it obtaining a vast trove of documents which recorded, amongst other things, essentially all of the communications which had occurred between officers of Cussons, Colgate, Woolworths and Unilever during the lengthy period leading up to the transition. There could be little doubt that, had the Commission stood back and assessed the evidence that it had amassed prior to the commencement of the proceeding, as it almost certainly did, it would, or at least should, have realised and appreciated that its case against Cussons had difficulties and potential weaknesses. Those weakness were to an extent exposed by the Commission’s pleading itself. The pleading did little more than provide a chronological recitation of communications that had occurred between the parties over a lengthy period of time and allege that, by reason of those communications, there was an arrangement or understanding which had been made or reached between the parties at some point during that lengthy period. The pleading did not identify with any degree of precision exactly when during that lengthy period of time the arrangement or understanding was made or arrived at, or identify the individual officers or employees who made the arrangement or arrived at the understanding on behalf of the relevant corporations. That was no doubt because the evidence available to the Commission was unable to provide any real clarity about those matters. The apparent inability of the Commission to identify, let alone prove, precisely when and by whom the arrangement was made, or the understanding reached, may not have been fatal to the Commission’s case; but properly considered, it should have at least rung alarm bells.