FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Mann Travel Pty Ltd v Skyscanner Ltd (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 33
File number(s): MLG 2976 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE BAIRD Date of judgment: 2 February 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COSTS – No matter of principle. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules2021 (Cth), rr.13.08, 22.02, Schedule 2
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s.214
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.79
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.21.10, 21.11Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate‑Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) (2021) 151 ACSR 26; [2021] FCA 246
Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCA 424
Mann Travel Pty Ltd v Skyscanner Ltd [2021] FedCFamC2G 263
Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasure Wine Estates Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 116
TSG Franchise Management Pty Ltd v Cigarette & Gift Warehouse (Franchising) Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2016] FCA 828Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 26 Date of last submission/s: 26 November 2021 Date of hearing: Matter determined on the papers Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant A Skyes Solicitor for the Applicant Brett Samuel, Rosendorff Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent M Marcus Solicitor for the Respondent Rani John, Ashurst ORDERS
MLG 2976 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MANN TRAVEL PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: SKYSCANNER LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE BAIRD
DATE OF ORDER:
2 FEBRUARY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application in a case dated and filed 4 June 2020 is allowed.
2.Pursuant to r 22.02(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and concerning the applicant’s application in a case dated and filed 4 June 2020, on an indemnity costs basis, including without limitation:
(a)from the earlier of the communication by the applicant to the respondent of the quantum of its costs, or the respondent’s first without prejudice offer to resolve costs (in each case made after the acceptance of the offer); and
(b)all disbursements be allowed and paid in full.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE BAIRD
On 19 November 2021 the Court delivered its reasons for judgment and final orders on the construction of a costs term in an accepted Notice of Offer to compromise: Mann Travel Pty Ltd v Skyscanner Ltd [2021] FedCFamC2G 263 (judgment).…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Mann Travel Pty Ltd v Skyscanner Ltd (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 33
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Skyscanner should have known that it had no chance of success, and it persisted in a hopeless case. The court rejected Skyscanner's argument that the costs should be minimal, as costs fairly and reasonably incurred depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular dispute. The court also noted that the engagement of counsel was appropriate in this case. Ultimately, the court determined that Mann Travel's costs of and incidental to the application should be payable by Skyscanner on an indemnity costs basis, and that all disbursements be payable in full.
The court's decision was based on the principle that the fundamental purpose of a costs order is to compensate a successful party, rather than punish an unsuccessful party. The court found that the circumstances of this case warranted the award of indemnity costs, as Skyscanner's conduct was such that it should have known it had no chance of success. The court's determination was also influenced by the fact that the application should not have been necessary and that consent orders would have sufficed.
In conclusion, the court ordered that Mann Travel's costs of and incidental to the application be payable by Skyscanner on an indemnity costs basis, and that all disbursements be payable in full. The amount of these costs was not specified in the decision. The court's decision highlights the importance of considering the principles of costs in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia and the need to compensate a successful party, rather than punish an unsuccessful party.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Skyscanner submits that the present does not present any ‘special or unusual feature’ justifying a departure from the ordinary practice of awarding costs on a party-party basis. It seeks to distinguish itself from those types of cases and positions identified in Melbourne City Investments at [5], and ACCC v Colgate‑Palmolive at [8], [10] (see above at [8] - [11]).Consideration In the judgment I reached the view that the application should not have had to be brought, consent orders should have sufficed. I set out the circumstances in which the application was brought, so far as disclosed to the Court, at J [13] – [23] (background to dispute and procedural history of the proceeding), and J [25] – [29], [57] – [69]. My conclusion at J [87] (set out in these reasons at [12]) should be read in the light of my consideration at J [79] – [86], and my further consideration and determination at J [97] – [99]. It follows from that consideration and my conclusion that Skyscanner, properly advised, should at all times have known that it had no chance of success, and further, that upon the application being brought, it persisted in what should on proper consideration be seen to be a hopeless case (see above at [10]), not merely a weak or tenuous case (c.f., above at [11]). Nothing in Skyscanner’s submission now persuades me to the contrary. The course that followed the Resolution (save for without prejudice correspondence) as then disclosed to the Court is set out in the judgment. Not disclosed in the evidence or submissions before the Court on the application and considered in the judgment is the gravamen of Skyscanner’s dispute as to costs now revealed in the points Skyscanner relies on that I have set out at [13(a)-(c)]. Skyscanner states it genuinely regarded the claimed sum (that is, Mann Travel’s claimed costs of the proceeding further to the Offer) as ‘manifestly excessive’. Contrary to Skyscanner’s submission on the costs of the application, there is no necessary relationship between the quantum of a settlement sum and the amount of costs expended to reach such a settlement. So too, it does not invariably follow that because a proceeding had not proceeded beyond pleadings, or that Court appearances had been avoided, that costs should be minimal, or approximating $20,000, however that amount may be characterised. In each case costs fairly and reasonably incurred depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular dispute and what occurred in the course of that dispute and resultant litigation to the point of settlement. In the present case, see J [13] – [21], [66] - [67]; I note, inter alia, that orders made provided for certain discovery, for mediation, amended pleadings, and a cross‑claim, and that correspondence foreshadowed an application by Skyscanner for security for costs in the amount of $344,000 . I note at J [77], Skyscanner’s submission that the matter engendered “voluminous correspondence”. I have referred to the engagement of counsel at J [24]. To anticipate my orders on this costs determination, I consider that the engagement of counsel in the application and in this costs determination was appropriate.