Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland [2000] FCA 1106

COSTS – Costs of application to amend cross‑claim – no longer any issue of liability of respondents to applicant – substantive issues resolved – no judgment on applications on substantive issues – resolution of costs of application by reference to substantive issues although no judgment given on substantive issues.

PLEADINGS – Cross-claim – application to amend cross-claim – claim that amendment would cause irreparable prejudice – prejudice alleged on basis of length of time between initial hearing and proposed hearing of amended cross-claim – no irreparable prejudice.

DAMAGES – Damages on cross-claim - application to amend cross-claim – application based on claim for contribution – contribution claim based on Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) and on equity – claim based on statute inapplicable on facts – claim based on equity failed because of lack of co-ordinate liability or common burden.

ESTOPPEL – Issue estoppel – application to amend cross-claim – challenge to amendment of cross‑claim based on existence of issue estoppel – determination of ultimate fact and evidentiary fact – whether duty of care owed by solicitor to client same as duty owed by counsel to client – no identity of issues.

ESTOPPEL – Anshun estoppel – application to amend cross-claim – whether amendment of cross‑claim would create an inconsistent judgment – no inconsistent judgment.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): s 43

Federal Court Rules:  O 13 r2(7)

Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 3rd ed 1920
Spencer Bower et al, The Doctrine of Res Judicata 3rd ed 1996

Australian Securities Commission v Aust‑Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194 referred to
Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 284 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 143 ALR 1 referred to
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 distinguished
James Hardie & Coy Pty Limited v Seltsam Pty Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 53 distinguished
NRMA Ltd v Morgan & Ors (No 3) (Giles J, 4 August 1999, unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court) distinguished
Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1969) 121 CLR 342 distinguished
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 followed
Murphy v Abi‑Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 followed

Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 referred to
Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 VR 427 followed
Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141 followed
Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5 followed
North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners [1990] 3 All ER 547 distinguished
Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 referred to
Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93 not followed
O’Toole v Charles David Pty Limited (1991) 171 CLR 232 referred to

YATES PROPERTY CORPORATION PTY LIMITED v JOHN BOLAND (as representative of Abbott Tout Russell Kennedy Solicitors) & ORS

NG 44 of 1993

GOLDBERG…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland involves a dispute between Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd and several respondents, including Abbott Tout, Mr Simos, and Mr Webster. Yates, having had its land acquired by the Darling Harbour Authority, sought compensation which was initially set at $22,334,500. Yates later filed a claim against Abbott Tout, Mr Simos, and Mr Webster for alleged negligence in the presentation of its compensation claim, which resulted in inadequate compensation. The trial court dismissed Yates' claims, and this decision was appealed but later compromised. The central issue before the court was whether the amended cross-claim filed by Abbott Tout should have been allowed to proceed and, if not, who should bear the costs associated with the cross-claim and related motions. The court needed to determine whether the respondents had reached an agreement to not pursue the cross-claim at trial and whether this agreement was binding.

The court concluded that the respondents had indeed reached an informal understanding not to pursue the cross-claim at trial but to address it separately if necessary. This understanding was evidenced by correspondence and statements made during the trial proceedings. The court found that the agreement was valid and binding, and as such, Abbott Tout's amended cross-claim should not have been proceeded with at trial. Consequently, the court ordered that Abbott Tout pay the costs of the amended cross-claim up to a specified date, and that Mr Simos pay Abbott Tout's costs associated with certain motions. This ruling underscores the importance of clear communication and adherence to informal agreements in legal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent’s amended cross‑claim against the second respondent filed on 13 October 1995 is dismissed.

2. The cross‑claimant pay to the first cross respondent his costs of and incidental to the amended cross‑claim up to 25 January 1999 including costs reserved up to that date.

3. The first cross respondent pay to the cross‑claimant its costs of and incidental to the cross‑claimant’s motion filed 25 January 1999 and the first cross respondent’s motion filed 9 April 1999 including any costs reserved in relation thereto.

Background

Background to the litigation

The reasoning which follows is predicated on the basis that the appeal to the High Court by Abbott Tout and Mr Webster has not been determined and that the further amendment of the amended cross‑claim is a live issue. It is necessary to proceed on this basis in order to determine how the costs of the amended cross‑claim and the costs of the two outstanding motions should be borne.Background In June 1984 the Director of Public Works (NSW) informed Yates that its land in the Darling Harbour area was likely to be resumed by the proposed Darling Harbour Authority and that Yates should hold its development proposals in abeyance until the Authority could consider the matter. Proceedings by Yates to prevent the compulsory acquisition of the land were unsuccessful and on 7 May 1985 the land was acquired by the Darling Harbour Authority which became liable to pay compensation to Yates. Yates retained Abbott Tout to act for it in respect of a claim for compensation and Mr Simos and Mr Webster were retained as senior counsel and junior counsel respectively. Yates filed its claim for compensation with the Land and Environment Court on 2 January 1986. Thereafter substantial work was carried out to prepare the claim which was interrupted by the winding up of Yates and the appointment of a liquidator to it. Three valuers were retained to give evidence on behalf of Yates. The trial in the Land and Environment Court commenced on 30 January 1990 before Cripps CJ who handed down his decision on 1 May 1990 fixing the compensation payable to Yates at $22,334,500: Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1990) 70 LGRA 187. Yates appealed to the Court of Appeal in New South Wales and on 11 July 1991 the Court of Appeal by a majority found that Cripps CJ had erred when dealing with the claim made for special value and remitted the case to the Land and Environment Court to determine what additional compensation (if any) should be allowed for special value: Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR 156. When the matter came back before Cripps CJ His Honour refused Yates leave to reopen its case to lead evidence to quantify the economic value of Yates being in a position to develop a market on the land immediately and refused to increase his award. An appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales was compromised when the Authority agreed to pay Yates a further $1.25m. Yates claimed that it should have received larger compensation for the work it had performed in bringing the market project to a state of imminent development and said that but for the negligence of Abbott Tout and counsel it would have received further compensation. On 29 January 1993 Yates filed an application against Abbott Tout, Mr Simos and Mr Webster alleging that the claim in the Land and Environment Court had not been formulated or presented properly or in accordance with proper principles, that Yates incurred wasted expenditure and lost the opportunity to formulate and establish a claim for special value in accordance with proper principles and practice and valuation law and that it therefore received inadequate compensation for special value. Yates also sought damages for misleading and deceptive conduct against all respondents and breach of fiduciary duty against Abbott Tout. On 5 June 1997 Branson J dismissed Yates’ claims finding that none of the respondents had been negligent in relation to the investigation, preparation and presentation of Yates’ claim before the Land and Environment Court and that there was no misleading or deceptive conduct or breach of fiduciary duty: Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1997) 145 ALR 169.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GOLDBERG J (dissent)
On 27 September 1995 the solicitors for Abbott Tout sent an amended cross‑claim to the solicitors for Mr Simos seeking their consent to its filing, which consent together with the consent of the other parties was given. The amended cross‑claim was filed on 13 October 1995. The only amendment in it was to seek in addition to a declaration as to apportionment of liability, an order that such judgment against Mr Simos and Mr Webster be given as may be necessary to give effect to such apportionment of liability as was declared. In its amended form the cross‑claim was in the following terms:“If:(a)the cross‑claimant [Abbott Tout] is liable to the applicant upon any of the causes of action pleaded by the applicant in the further amended statement of claim; and(b)the first cross‑respondent [Simos] or the second cross‑respondent [Webster] or both the first and second cross‑respondents is or are also liable to the applicant upon any of the causes of action pleaded against them by the applicantthen the cross‑claimant is entitled to judgment against either the first cross‑respondent or the second cross‑respondent or both as the case may be, for contribution to any judgment which may be given against the cross‑claimant in favour of the applicant.The cross‑claimant claims:(i)A declaration as to the apportionment of liability between such of the cross‑claimant, first cross‑respondent and second cross‑respondent as may be held liable to the applicant upon any of the causes of action pleaded against them.(ii)Such judgment or other order or relief against the First and/or Second Cross Respondents as may be necessary to give effect to the apportionment of liability as declared pursuant to paragraph (i).(iii)An order that the first and second cross‑respondents pay the cross‑claimant’s costs of the cross‑claim.”(underlining in amended cross‑claim) The trial before Branson J commenced on 3 March 1997. A directions hearing was held on 17 February 1997. At that time it had been agreed between the respondents that the determination of Abbott Tout’s amended cross‑claim would not be dealt with at trial but cross‑claim issues would be resolved separately and subsequently if necessary. In the course of the directions hearing Branson J asked senior counsel for Mr Simos whether he had pursued the issue of a defence to the amended cross‑claim. Counsel responded:“I say this now, your Honour, my familiarity with the underlying facts are not perfect and I may need to raise it your Honour at a later date. As between the respondents, my understanding is that consequent upon the filing of the cross‑claim an agreement is being reached not to pursue that before your Honour in these proceedings.”Branson J asked whether the Court had been involved in that agreement and her Honour was told that the Court had not been involved. The following exchange then occurred between senior counsel for Mr Simos and her Honour:“HER HONOUR: For my own part, Mr Allsop, can I say anything that you ask me not to deal with I will be more than happy not to deal with it.MR ALLSOP: Your Honour, if contrary to all our views any one or more of the respondents are found liable we will sort it out in some place somewhere.HER HONOUR: Yes, there probably are more suitable places in the end, Mr Allsop, I agree.MR ALLSOP: Your Honour, just while I am on my feet in relation to the ---HER HONOUR: Sorry, is it agreed by all those involved with that cross‑claim that it is not a matter that is being tried with the claim.MR ALLSOP: As I understand it.HER HONOUR: Yes very well I will make that note.”The trial commenced two weeks thereafter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

On 25 May the solicitors for Mr Webster sent a letter to each of the solicitors for Abbott Tout and Mr Simos which recorded an understanding which had been reached by the respondents. The terms of this letter are relied upon by Mr Simos as identifying the understanding upon which his solicitors acted thereafter in relation to the preparation and manner in which they ran the trial on his behalf. It was in the following terms:“RE: WEBSTER & ORS ats YATES PROPERTY CORPORATION PTY LIMITEDYOUR CLIENT: ABBOTT TOUTWe refer to the telephone discussion between our Mr Connellan and your Mr Hill on 24 May 1995.This is [sic] letter is to record the understanding (as opposed to formal agreement) between the Respondents with respect to Cross Claims:1.each of the Respondents will file Cross Claims against each of the other Respondents expressed in ‘bland’ language simply asserting that the [sic] in the event that the Respondent making the Cross Claim is held liable to the Applicant that Respondent would seek contribution from each of the other Respondents;2.at the appropriate time the Respondents would seek an order from the Court that the hearing, in the first instance, would not require determination of the Cross Claims;3.in the event that the Court was not prepared to make such an order then the Cross Claims would be determined in the same hearing as the Applicant’s claims against the Respondents;4.in the case of either 2 or 3 the Respondents would not file evidence on the Cross Claims (e.g. expert evidence from solicitors barristers etc.) which might assist the Applicant’s claims against one or other of the Respondents; and5.in the event that at any stage leading up to the hearing of the matter one or other of the Respondents wish to depart from the above then that Respondent would give notice to the other Respondents of its intention to do so to enable some consultation and discussions to take place between the Respondents.In relation to the last item a suggestion has been made that if a Respondent wished to proceed on a more fully detailed, formulated or particularised Cross Claim that such Cross Claim be circulated amongst the Respondents without being formally filed until, for example, shortly prior to the hearing or, indeed, during the course of the hearing. If additional evidence was intended to be relied upon by a Respondent in relation to a Cross Claim that evidence might be circulated amongst the Respondents without being filed until absolutely necessary.Please let me know whether the matter set forth in this letter properly reflects the understanding between the Respondents as it currently exists.Yours faithfully”On 23 June 1995 Abbott Tout’s solicitors confirmed the understanding noted in the letter dated 25 May 1995 and on 15 November 1995 Mr Simos’ solicitors wrote a letter confirming the understanding set out in the letter. On 27 September 1995 the solicitors for Abbott Tout sent an amended cross‑claim to the solicitors for Mr Simos seeking their consent to its filing, which consent together with the consent of the other parties was given. The amended cross‑claim was filed on 13 October 1995. The only amendment in it was to seek in addition to a declaration as to apportionment of liability, an order that such judgment against Mr Simos and Mr Webster be given as may be necessary to give effect to such apportionment of liability as was declared. In its amended form the cross‑claim was in the following terms:“If:(a)the cross‑claimant [Abbott Tout] is liable to the applicant upon any of the causes of action pleaded by the applicant in the further amended statement of claim; and(b)the first cross‑respondent [Simos] or the second cross‑respondent [Webster] or both the first and second cross‑respondents is or are also liable to the applicant upon any of the causes of action pleaded against them by the applicantthen the cross‑claimant is entitled to judgment against either the first cross‑respondent or the second cross‑respondent or both as the case may be, for contribution to any judgment which may be given against the cross‑claimant in favour of the applicant.The cross‑claimant claims:(i)A declaration as to the apportionment of liability between such of the cross‑claimant, first cross‑respondent and second cross‑respondent as may be held liable to the applicant upon any of the causes of action pleaded against them.(ii)Such judgment or other order or relief against the First and/or Second Cross Respondents as may be necessary to give effect to the apportionment of liability as declared pursuant to paragraph (i).(iii)An order that the first and second cross‑respondents pay the cross‑claimant’s costs of the cross‑claim.”(underlining in amended cross‑claim)