Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

Matter No S24/1999

JOHN BOLAND  APPELLANT

AND

YATES PROPERTY CORPORATION
PTY LIMITED & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Matter No S28/1999

JOHN WEBSTER  APPELLANT

AND

YATES PROPERTY CORPORATION PTY
LIMITED & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited
Webster v Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited
[1999] HCA 64
9 December 1999
S24/1999 and S28/1999

ORDER

  1. Appeals allowed with costs.

  1. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 5 August 1998 (as varied by the orders made on 30 November 1998), and in place thereof, order that the appeals to that Court (other than the appeal of Ian Francis Yates against the order as to costs made against him by Branson J on 14 August 1997) are dismissed with costs.

  1. Remit to the Full Court for further consideration the appeal of Ian Francis Yates against the orders as to costs made against him by Branson J on 14 August 1997.

2.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

Matter No S24/1999

R B S Macfarlan QC with A G Bell for the appellant (instructed by
Minter Ellison)

D M Quick QC with C D Curtis for the respondents (instructed by Bruce and Stewart)

Matter No S28/1999

D F Jackson QC with S T White and E A White for the appellant (instructed by Moray and Agnew)

D M Quick QC with C D Curtis for the respondents (instructed by Bruce and Stewart)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited
Webster v Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited

Negligence – Professional negligence – Legal practitioners – Standard of care.

Acquisition of land – Determination of compensation – Special value of land to dispossessed owner – Theory of "head start" to developers.

Legal practitioners – Professional liability – Negligence – Barristers and solicitors – Immunity from action.

Words and phrases – "market value" – "special value" – "head start".

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52.
Public Works Act 1912 (NSW), s 124.
Darling Harbour Authority Act 1984 (NSW), s 12C.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   These two appeals were heard together.  They arise out of actions for damages for professional negligence.

  2. Each appellant is a legal practitioner.  The first respondent, Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited ("Yates") was the client of the appellants.  The first appellant, Mr Boland, was sued by Yates as a representative of Abbott Tout Russell Kennedy ("Abbott Tout"), a firm of solicitors engaged to act for Yates in the conduct of a compensation claim before the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales.  The second appellant, Mr Webster, is a barrister who acted as junior counsel in the proceedings before the Land and Environment Court.  Mr Webster was led in those proceedings by Mr Simos QC, who was also sued by Yates.  The second respondent to each…

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Details
Case
[1999] HCA 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by Mr Boland and Mr Webster against decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned allegations of professional negligence against legal practitioners, Mr Webster and the firm Abbott Tout, in relation to the acquisition of land by Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd and the determination of compensation. Yates alleged that the legal practitioners failed to properly advise and represent them, particularly concerning the concept of "special value" and a "head start" advantage in developing the acquired land.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Full Court of the Federal Court had erred in finding Mr Webster and Abbott Tout negligent, and whether the Full Court had correctly assessed the legal practitioners' standard of care. This involved examining whether the practitioners had failed to take into account a "head start" claim, which represented a potential advantage to the developer Yates due to its ability to commence development on the land more quickly than a hypothetical purchaser. The court also considered whether the Full Court had correctly applied the principles of professional negligence to the facts as found by the primary judge, Branson J.

The High Court found that the Full Court of the Federal Court had made significant factual errors and had failed to give due regard to the findings of fact made by Branson J. Specifically, the High Court noted that the Full Court had mischaracterised statements made by Handley JA regarding the "head start" theory, treating a possibility as a fact. Furthermore, the Full Court had disregarded Branson J's findings, which were based on evidence not before the primary judge and her assessment of Mr Yates' credibility, without providing adequate reasons. The High Court also determined that the Full Court had misunderstood the nature of the evidence Yates sought to adduce on remittal. The court concluded that the approach taken by Mr Webster and Mr Simos (junior counsel) in the primary litigation regarding special value was a view that could reasonably have been held by competent senior counsel at the time, a view supported by expert evidence.

The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeals to the Full Court, other than one concerning costs against Ian Francis Yates, were dismissed with costs. The appeal of Ian Francis Yates regarding costs was remitted to the Full Court for further consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeals allowed with costs.

2.

Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 5 August 1998 (as varied by the orders made on 30 November 1998), and in place thereof, order that the appeals to that Court (other than the appeal of Ian Francis Yates against the order as to costs made against him by Branson J on 14 August 1997) are dismissed with costs.

3.

Remit to the Full Court for further consideration the appeal of Ian Francis Yates against the orders as to costs made against him by Branson J on 14 August 1997.

2.

Background

Background to the litigation

The conclusions adverse to Mr Webster were based on considerations similar to those concerning Abbott Tout. However, nowhere in their reasons for judgment did the Full Court refer to the fact that there was no contractual relationship between Mr Webster and the lay client, that the action in negligence against him was framed solely in tort, and that damage was the gist of the action. There was no finding by the Full Court that the value of any head start claim, properly assessed, would have exceeded, or added to, the amount awarded by Cripps J for special value. The Full Court left unresolved the question of what, if any, damage resulted from what they found to be Mr Webster's negligence and, therefore, left undecided the question whether such negligence was actionable. Although the form of the order made by the Full Court remitted the matter for the assessment of damages, in so far as the claim again Mr Webster was concerned, there was an outstanding issue going to liability.The Full Court's approach to the facts It was submitted by the appellants in this Court that the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court was affected by significant factual errors, by a failure to have due regard to findings of fact made by Branson J, and by misunderstandings as to what had occurred at various stages of the primary litigation. It is necessary to deal with some only of the matters the subject of those submissions, which have been made out. First, on the factual basis of the head start claim, the Full Court incorrectly recorded what was said by Handley JA. The Full Court said[53] that Handley JA referred to the "fact" that Yates was in a position where it could construct a market on the land more quickly than any hypothetical purchaser, that this gave Yates an "advantage" and that Cripps J had failed to take this into account. Handley JA had not referred to such a "fact", but to a possibility, as a passage from his judgment quoted above demonstrates.[53]Yates Property Corporation v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84 at 96. Secondly, Branson J made findings contrary to the supposed "fact", which the Full Court disregarded. It gave no reason for departing from those findings, which were based in part upon evidence that had not been before Cripps J, and in part upon her views as to Mr Yates' credibility. Thirdly, the Full Court made an error in recording the history of the proceedings before Cripps J when the matter was remitted. Their Honours said[54] that counsel for Yates sought leave to reopen the case "to lead evidence to quantify the economic value to Yates of being in a position to develop a market on the land immediately". If that were so, it might have been regarded as an implied admission that there was available evidence, as to the head start theory, which should have been addressed in the first place. The Full Court appears to have misunderstood the nature of the evidence which Yates sought to adduce at the second hearing before Cripps J, and to have believed it was similar to the evidence Yates led at the hearing before Branson J concerning "head start". Leaving aside the minor matter of the supposed value of certain documents, the evidence tendered at the second hearing before Cripps J constituted an attempt to prove what it would have cost Yates to relocate to an alternative site. Cripps J took the view that this added nothing material to the evidence that had been before him on the first occasion.[54]Yates Property Corporation v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84 at 96.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ (dissent)
The appeal against the decisions in favour of Mr Webster and Abbott Tout was successful[24]. The Full Court of the Federal Court held that there had been negligence on the part of Mr Webster and Abbot Tout, and that there was no relevant immunity from action. The court ordered that the matter be remitted to a single judge to assess damages.[24]Yates Property Corporation v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84.The decision of Branson J[25][25]Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1997) 145 ALR 169. In the proceedings before Branson J, the defendants gave evidence. In addition, there was further evidence from expert valuers, and from senior counsel experienced in valuation law and practice. Her Honour relied upon that evidence, and upon her own opinions and judgment, in reaching her conclusions. Branson J addressed the contention by Yates that it was in an advantageous position at the date of the resumption of the subject land relative to any other prospective purchaser of the land wishing to build markets, and that this was the basis of a special value case that should have been, but was not, put in the primary litigation[26]. Her Honour observed that the expression "head start", in the context of special value, appeared to have been coined by Handley JA, and was not previously used in judgments, or professional literature, on the subject of valuation[27]. She then considered two decided cases referred to by Handley JA and relied upon by Yates to support its argument, namely, Kennedy Street Pty Limited v The Minister[28] and Baringa Enterprises Pty Ltd v Manly Municipal Council[29]. She noted that Mr Simos had appeared as junior counsel in Kennedy Street, and that the decision had been referred to both in argument before, and in the reasons for judgment of, Cripps J. She analysed the facts and decisions in the two cases.[26]Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1997) 145 ALR 169 at 198-199.[27]Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1997) 145 ALR 169 at 192.[28][1963] NSWR 1252.[29](1965) 15 LGRA 201. Branson J referred to evidence given before her by Mr Simos concerning his opinion on the relevant issues. She also referred to evidence given by two legal experts, Mr McClellan QC and Mr Davison SC. Mr McClellan was called by Yates, and Mr Davison was called on behalf of the defendants. Mr McClellan was not asked to, and did not, express an opinion on whether the approach adopted by Messrs Simos and Webster to the subject of special value was one which could reasonably have been taken by competent senior and junior counsel[30]. Mr Davison, a barrister with extensive experience of valuation law and practice, expressed the opinion that the views which had informed the presentation and conduct of the primary litigation by Mr Simos and Mr Webster were views which could reasonably have been held by competent senior counsel at the time of the proceedings and, in addition, were views with which Mr Davison personally agreed[31].[30]Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1997) 145 ALR 169 at 197.[31]Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (1997) 145 ALR 169 at 197.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.