SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
ANDERSON v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS
[2019] SASCFC 119
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Stanley)
4 October 2019
REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT
Appeal against the judgment of a judge of the Supreme Court.
The appellant had an interest in land acquired by the Commissioner of Highways under the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) (the Act). He claimed to have suffered personal injury (in the nature of psychiatric injury) as a result of the acquisition and that the injury was not attributable to the compulsory nature of the acquisition. He seeks compensation for this loss.
Section 22B of the Act provides an entitlement to compensation if a person's interest is divested or diminished or enjoyment of the interest is adversely affected. Section 25 prescribes the principles applicable to the determination of the entitlement to compensation.
The appellant referred a question arising in the course of negotiations to the judge pursuant to s 23C of the Act. The question was whether a personal injury of the nature suffered by the appellant is compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act. The judge answered the question in the negative.
The appellant appeals on one ground. The appellant submits that the judge erred in concluding that statutory compensation payable under the Act is limited to compensation for economic loss related to or arising in the appellant’s capacity as the holder of an interest in the acquired land and does not extend to damages for personal injury alleged to be caused by an acquisition.
Held, per Stanley J (Blue J and Kelly J agreeing):
1. The judge correctly found that compensation provided under the Act does not extend to compensation for personal injury arising from acquisition of land.
2. Appeal dismissed.
Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) ss3, 6, 10, 12, 12A, 14, 15, 16, 22B, 23, 23A, 23C, 24, 25; Highways Act 1926 (SA) s 20; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 14; Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925 (SA) ss 7, 12, 9; Public Works Act 1912 (SA) s 51; Land Acquisition Act 1978 (NT), referred to.
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, applied.
Northern Territory V Griffiths [2019] HCA 7, distinguished.
Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 4 SASR 476; Anderson v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (2018) 131 SASR 437; Commissioner of Highways v George Eblen (1975) 10 SASR 384; South Australian Land Commission v Bletas (1978) LSJS 344; Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603; Carr v Western Australia [2007] HCA 47; Chadrysiak v Commissioner for Highways (2018) 132 SASR 277; Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR…
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- Case
- [2019] SASCFC 119
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether the phrase "any loss" within section 25(1)(a) of the Act extended the statutory entitlement to compensation beyond economic losses to include damages for personal injury allegedly caused by the compulsory acquisition. The court was required to interpret the scope of the compensation provisions in light of the Act's text, context, purpose, and relevant case law.
The court reasoned that while section 25(1)(a) might, in isolation, appear to support a broad interpretation of "any loss," such a construction was contrary to the overall context and purpose of the Act. The court noted that the established legal basis for compensation for compulsory acquisition generally did not extend to personal injury, and any departure from this principle would require express legislative provision or a clear statement of intent. The court distinguished the present Act from other legislation, such as the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth), which contained specific provisions for non-economic loss. Furthermore, the court found that section 25(1)(g) of the Act expressly precluded compensation for certain non-economic losses, such as solatium, which could arise from the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The court concluded that the High Court's decision in *Northern Territory v Griffiths*, which concerned different legislation, did not undermine this interpretation.
The appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming the primary judge's conclusion that compensation under the Act was limited to economic loss arising from the acquisition of the land interest and did not extend to damages for personal injury. The parties were to be heard on the issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent submits that the judge was correct in his analysis of the text, context and purpose of the Act in determining the nature of the losses compensable under the Act. The judge did not misapply the dicta of Bray CJ and Wells J in Brewarrana. The respondent further submits that the appellant’s construction is acontextual and ahistorical. It would be erroneous to attribute to the legislature an intention to depart from the settled legal basis of compensation for compulsory acquisition, which does not extend to compensation for personal injury, in the absence of an express provision or, at the very least, a clear statement of such purpose in the second reading speech. Finally, the respondent submits there is nothing in the reasons of the High Court in Northern Territory v Griffiths that contradicts the judge’s reasons or conclusion in this matter. Consideration The issue on this appeal is whether the expression “any loss” in s 25(1)(a) extends the entitlement to compensation conferred by s 22B to a loss in the nature of personal injury suffered by reason of the acquisition of land. In my view, for the reasons that follow the judge was correct in holding that it does not. While the text of s 25(1)(a), considered in isolation, might lend some support to the construction pressed by the appellant, that construction is contrary to the context and purpose of the Act. Further, it is not supported by the authorities. The appellant emphasises the obiter observation of Wells J in Eblen that the meaning of “loss” in s 25(1)(a) is at large. That observation does not answer the question of constructional choice that arises on this appeal. The meaning of “any loss” in s 25(1)(a) is to be ascertained by application of the accepted principles of statutory construction. The appellant also seeks to rely on the reasons of Gaudron J in Marshall v Director-General[36] that:[37][T]he right to compensation for injurious affection following upon the resumption of land is an important right of that kind and statutory provisions conferring such a right should be construed with all the generality that their words permit. Certainly, such provisions should not be construed on the basis that the right to compensation is subject to limitations or qualifications which are not found in the terms of the statute.[36] [2001] HCA 37, (2001) 205 CLR 603.[37] [2001] HCA 37 at [38], (2001) 205 CLR 603 at 623. At issue on this appeal is what limitations or qualifications on the right to compensation, if any, are found in the terms of the Act. While the compensatory provisions of the Act are remedial, it is well to remember the cautionary note struck in Carr v Western Australia[38] by Gleeson CJ who said:[39]Legislation rarely pursues a single purpose at all costs. Where the problem is one of doubt about the extent to which the legislation pursues a purpose, stating the purpose is unlikely to solve the problem. For a court to construe the legislation as though it pursued the purpose to the fullest possible extent may be contrary to the manifest intention of the legislation and a purported exercise of judicial power for a legislative purpose.[38] [2007] HCA 47, (2007) 232 CLR 138.[39] [2007] HCA 47 at [5], (2007) 232 CLR 138 at 143.