Anderson v Commissioner of Highways

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

ANDERSON v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS

[2019] SASCFC 119

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Stanley)

4 October 2019

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT

Appeal against the judgment of a judge of the Supreme Court.

The appellant had an interest in land acquired by the Commissioner of Highways under the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) (the Act). He claimed to have suffered personal injury (in the nature of psychiatric injury) as a result of the acquisition and that the injury was not attributable to the compulsory nature of the acquisition. He seeks compensation for this loss.

Section 22B of the Act provides an entitlement to compensation if a person's interest is divested or diminished or enjoyment of the interest is adversely affected. Section 25 prescribes the principles applicable to the determination of the entitlement to compensation.

The appellant referred a question arising in the course of negotiations to the judge pursuant to s 23C of the Act. The question was whether a personal injury of the nature suffered by the appellant is compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act. The judge answered the question in the negative.

The appellant appeals on one ground. The appellant submits that the judge erred in concluding that statutory compensation payable under the Act is limited to compensation for economic loss related to or arising in the appellant’s capacity as the holder of an interest in the acquired land and does not extend to damages for personal injury alleged to be caused by an acquisition.

Held, per Stanley J (Blue J and Kelly J agreeing):

1.  The judge correctly found that compensation provided under the Act does not extend to compensation for personal injury arising from acquisition of land.

2.  Appeal dismissed.

Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) ss3, 6, 10, 12, 12A, 14, 15, 16, 22B, 23, 23A, 23C, 24, 25; Highways Act 1926 (SA) s 20; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 14; Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925 (SA) ss 7, 12, 9; Public Works Act 1912 (SA) s 51; Land Acquisition Act 1978 (NT), referred to.
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378; SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, applied.
Northern Territory V Griffiths [2019] HCA 7, distinguished.
Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 4 SASR 476; Anderson v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (2018) 131 SASR 437; Commissioner of Highways v George Eblen (1975) 10 SASR 384; South Australian Land Commission v Bletas (1978) LSJS 344; Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603; Carr v Western Australia [2007] HCA 47; Chadrysiak v Commissioner for Highways (2018) 132 SASR 277; Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASCFC 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the extent of compensation payable under the *Land Acquisition Act 1969* (SA) (the Act) following the compulsory acquisition of land. The appellant, who had resided at and operated businesses from his parents' property for many years, claimed to have suffered an adjustment disorder with post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms, including anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideations, as a result of the acquisition process. He contended that this personal injury was compensable under the Act. The Commissioner of Highways argued that compensation under the Act was limited to economic loss directly related to the acquired interest in the land.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether the phrase "any loss" within section 25(1)(a) of the Act extended the statutory entitlement to compensation beyond economic losses to include damages for personal injury allegedly caused by the compulsory acquisition. The court was required to interpret the scope of the compensation provisions in light of the Act's text, context, purpose, and relevant case law.

The court reasoned that while section 25(1)(a) might, in isolation, appear to support a broad interpretation of "any loss," such a construction was contrary to the overall context and purpose of the Act. The court noted that the established legal basis for compensation for compulsory acquisition generally did not extend to personal injury, and any departure from this principle would require express legislative provision or a clear statement of intent. The court distinguished the present Act from other legislation, such as the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth), which contained specific provisions for non-economic loss. Furthermore, the court found that section 25(1)(g) of the Act expressly precluded compensation for certain non-economic losses, such as solatium, which could arise from the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The court concluded that the High Court's decision in *Northern Territory v Griffiths*, which concerned different legislation, did not undermine this interpretation.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming the primary judge's conclusion that compensation under the Act was limited to economic loss arising from the acquisition of the land interest and did not extend to damages for personal injury. The parties were to be heard on the issue of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant submits that the judge erred in concluding that statutory compensation payable under the Act is limited to compensation for economic loss related to or arising in the appellant’s capacity as the holder of an interest in the acquired land and does not extend to damages for personal injury alleged to be caused by an acquisition. Background The background to the appellant’s application for compensation is set out in the judge’s reasons for decision on his ruling that the interests of justice would be best served by answering, as a preliminary point, the question of whether or not personal injury is compensable under the Act.[2] His Honour said:[3]For many years the parents of the applicant owned a home on Main South Road at Bedford Park (“the Property”). The Property has been compulsorily acquired by the Commissioner for the purpose of undertaking major road works. Compensation has been paid to the applicant’s parents and they have moved to another home in a nearby suburb.The applicant is now aged 43 years. From 1980 to 2002 he resided with his parents at the Property and operated home businesses from that address. From 2002 to 2009 the applicant resided elsewhere in Adelaide but still attended at the Property on a daily basis for the purpose of conducting his home businesses. The applicant married in 2007 but separated in November/December 2015. In 2009 the applicant resumed living at the Property with his wife and two children and continued to conduct his business activities at and from the Property. The two businesses conducted by the applicant have been described as a vending machine business and a blind cleaning business. The applicant contends that during the period from July 2014, being about the time that the Commissioner notified the applicant and his parents of the proposed acquisition, until May 2016 the applicant suffered from an adjustment disorder with post-traumatic stress disorder type symptoms including anxiety, mental stress, forgetfulness, insomnia, depression, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness and suicidal ideations. The applicant further contends that this injury was caused by factors other than the acquisition process being made without his consent or against his will. The latter contention is of particular importance given that s 25(1)(g) of the Act provides that, in determining compensation, no allowance shall be made on account of the fact that the acquisition is effected without the consent, or against the will, of any person.[2] [2018] SASC 13.[3] [2018] SASC 13 at [5]-[7].The Act and the statutory scheme for the compulsory acquisition of land The Act repealed the Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925 (SA) (the repealed Act). By s 3 of the Act its object is to provide for the acquisition of land on just terms. The Act provides a mechanism by which the State can compulsorily acquire land required in the public interest. The Act further provides an entitlement to compensation where land is compulsorily acquired. The sole statutory source of the entitlement to compensation for the acquisition of land under the Act is to be found in s 22B. The Act establishes machinery for the purposes of awarding such compensation. Section 25 of the Act prescribes the principles applicable to the determination of the entitlement to compensation.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In their reasons the plurality state that under the general law, compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land comprises the freehold value of the land as well as compensation for severance, injurious affection, disturbance, special value, solatium, or other non-economic loss.[76] While the plurality recognise that the various land acquisition statutes address the non-economic aspect of compensation in different terms,[77] there is nothing in their reasons to suggest that non-economic loss is compensable under the Act. There is no equivalent in the Act to s 51 of the NTA. While the judgments in Griffiths refer to the Lands Acquisition Act 1978 (NT), which provides that where the acquired land is the claimant’s principal place of residence the amount of compensation otherwise payable may be increased by an amount that will reasonably compensate the claimant for “intangible disadvantages” resulting from the acquisition, again there is no equivalent provision under the Act. Finally, the judgments give some consideration to the concept of solatium. In particular, Edelman J characterised such compensation as a payment that arises because of the disruption to a person’s life that follows the compulsory, rather than voluntary, nature of the deprivation of their rights.[78] Section 25(1)(g) of the Act expressly precludes payment of this category of compensation. The judgments in Griffiths substantially turn on the construction of s 51 of the NTA. The terms of the Act and the NTA are readily distinguishable. Accordingly, there is nothing in Griffiths which undermines the judge’s reasons or supports the appellant’s construction. [76] [2019] HCA 7 at [51].[77] [2019] HCA 7 at [52].[78] [2019] HCA 7 at [272].Conclusion I would dismiss the appeal. I would hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent submits that the judge was correct in his analysis of the text, context and purpose of the Act in determining the nature of the losses compensable under the Act. The judge did not misapply the dicta of Bray CJ and Wells J in Brewarrana. The respondent further submits that the appellant’s construction is acontextual and ahistorical. It would be erroneous to attribute to the legislature an intention to depart from the settled legal basis of compensation for compulsory acquisition, which does not extend to compensation for personal injury, in the absence of an express provision or, at the very least, a clear statement of such purpose in the second reading speech. Finally, the respondent submits there is nothing in the reasons of the High Court in Northern Territory v Griffiths that contradicts the judge’s reasons or conclusion in this matter. Consideration The issue on this appeal is whether the expression “any loss” in s 25(1)(a) extends the entitlement to compensation conferred by s 22B to a loss in the nature of personal injury suffered by reason of the acquisition of land. In my view, for the reasons that follow the judge was correct in holding that it does not. While the text of s 25(1)(a), considered in isolation, might lend some support to the construction pressed by the appellant, that construction is contrary to the context and purpose of the Act. Further, it is not supported by the authorities. The appellant emphasises the obiter observation of Wells J in Eblen that the meaning of “loss” in s 25(1)(a) is at large. That observation does not answer the question of constructional choice that arises on this appeal. The meaning of “any loss” in s 25(1)(a) is to be ascertained by application of the accepted principles of statutory construction. The appellant also seeks to rely on the reasons of Gaudron J in Marshall v Director-General[36] that:[37][T]he right to compensation for injurious affection following upon the resumption of land is an important right of that kind and statutory provisions conferring such a right should be construed with all the generality that their words permit. Certainly, such provisions should not be construed on the basis that the right to compensation is subject to limitations or qualifications which are not found in the terms of the statute.[36] [2001] HCA 37, (2001) 205 CLR 603.[37] [2001] HCA 37 at [38], (2001) 205 CLR 603 at 623. At issue on this appeal is what limitations or qualifications on the right to compensation, if any, are found in the terms of the Act. While the compensatory provisions of the Act are remedial, it is well to remember the cautionary note struck in Carr v Western Australia[38] by Gleeson CJ who said:[39]Legislation rarely pursues a single purpose at all costs. Where the problem is one of doubt about the extent to which the legislation pursues a purpose, stating the purpose is unlikely to solve the problem. For a court to construe the legislation as though it pursued the purpose to the fullest possible extent may be contrary to the manifest intention of the legislation and a purported exercise of judicial power for a legislative purpose.[38] [2007] HCA 47, (2007) 232 CLR 138.[39] [2007] HCA 47 at [5], (2007) 232 CLR 138 at 143.