SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Land and Valuation Division: Civil)
ANDERSON v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS (NO 2)
[2018] SASC 121
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker
31 August 2018
REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT
REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - POWERS OF ACQUISITION
REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - PROCEEDINGS FOR COMPENSATION - SOUTH AUSTRALIA
The Commissioner of Highways acquired certain land in which the claimant has an interest within the meaning of s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) (‘the Act’). The claimant contends that he is entitled to the payment of compensation on account of a personal injury that he claims to have suffered arising from the acquisition of the subject land.
A ‘question arising in the course of negotiations’ was referred to the Court under s 23C of the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA). In substance, the question referred to the Court is: is a personal injury of the nature suffered by the applicant compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act?
Held, per Parker J:
1. Compensation under the Act does not extend to compensation for personal injury arising from an acquisition (at [86]).
2. The right to be compensated for severance, disturbance and injurious affection, or any other newly identified ground, is based upon the acquisition of the interest in property held by the claimant rather than the administrative processes which surround that event (at [90]).
Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) ss 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 12B, 15, 16, 17, 22B, 23A, 23C, 25, 27, 30; Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) s 20; Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic) s 44; Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) s 60, referred to.
Anderson v Commissioner of Highways [2018] SASC 13; Commissioner of Highways v George Eblen Pty Ltd (1975) 10 SASR 384; McInnes v Commissioner of Highways (1992) 78 LGERA 410; Marshall v Director General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603; Commissioner of Highways v Tynan (1982) 53 LGRA 1; Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; Sotirianakos v Commissioner of Highways [2018] SASC 16; South Australian Land Commission v Bletas (1978) 77 LSJS 344; March v City of Frankston (No 1) [1969] VR 350; Secretary to the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources v Driver [2015] VCAT 813; Roads Corporation v Love (2010) 31 VR 451; Bailey v Derby Corporation [1965] 1 All ER 443; Patterson v British Colombia (Minister of Transportation and Highways) (1997) 62 LCR 89; Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 4 SASR 476; Boland v Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 575; Mitsui v City of Hamilton (1984) 30 LGR 46; Zobel v Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1969) 1 LCR 139; Owners of Dredger Liesbosch v Owners of Steamship Edison
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- Case
- [2018] SASC 121
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the applicant's personal injury was compensable under the Act. The applicant contended that the statutory provisions for compensation were broad enough to cover his claim, while the Commissioner argued that compensation under the Act is limited to economic loss related to the acquisition of land and does not extend to personal injury. The court held that the compensation provided under the Act is limited to economic loss related to or arising in the claimant’s capacity as the holder of an interest in land. Compensation is to be fixed by reference to the value of the acquired land and any loss occasioned by severance, disturbance, or injurious affection. Those matters do not extend to personal injury. Therefore, the applicant's claim for compensation for personal injury was not valid under the Act.
The court concluded that the applicant's personal injury was not compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act. The court also held that the applicant's claim should be dismissed as it was not limited to the relevant legal event, which is the taking of the applicant's interest in the land. The court held that the claimant cannot properly base his claim on the administrative processes and other events that may have surrounded the taking of his interest in the land. Therefore, the applicant's claim for compensation for personal injury was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Commissioner also notes that the claimant has alleged that his personal injury was caused by the acquisition process, that being a series of events that occurred between July 2014 and May 2016. For that reason, the claimant’s claim does not focus upon the only relevant legal event, that being the point at which his interest in the land was divested or diminished or otherwise adversely affected. The claimant cannot properly base his claim on the administrative processes and other events that may have surrounded the taking of his interest in the land.[23] Thus, the Commissioner submits that if the Court finds that the claimant can pursue a claim for personal injury, his claim should be reformulated so as to limit it only to the relevant legal event, that being the taking of his interest in the land. The Commissioner submits that if the claim is not limited in that way, it should be dismissed. Consideration[23] Mitsui v City of Hamilton (1984) 30 LGR 46 at 58.Observations concerning the interpretation of the Act It is of fundamental importance that the entitlement to compensation upon the acquisition of land is derived entirely from the Act. While there is a great deal of judicial authority as to the meaning of the terms used in the Act, and the similar provisions found elsewhere, the task of the Court is to determine whether the present claim for compensation is covered by the legislative scheme. For that reason, close attention must be paid to the terms of the Act. While cases decided in other jurisdictions under different legislation may provide some guidance, because the entitlement to compensation depends upon the precise terms of the Act, a cautious approach must be taken to cases decided elsewhere. The right to compensation for the acquisition of land under the Act arises solely under s 22B. That statutory entitlement arises if either the person’s interest in land is divested or diminished by the acquisition or if the enjoyment of their interest in land is adversely affected by the acquisition. The clear focus of s 22B is upon compensation in respect of interests in land as such. Section 25 sets out the principles of compensation. Section 25(1)(a) requires that the compensation shall be such as to adequately compensate the claimant for any loss suffered by reason of acquisition of the land. In assessing what is adequate compensation, s 25(1)(b) provides that consideration may be given to “(i) the actual value of the subject land; and (ii) the loss occasioned by reason of severance, disturbance or injurious affection.” I have emphasised the words “any loss” and “may” as their inclusion forms an important part of the claimant’s submissions. The subsequent nine paragraphs of s 25(1), enumerated as (c) to (k), contain specific directions about the assessment of compensation. Some of those provisions preclude a particular fact or matter being taken into account in the assessment of compensation (see paragraphs (e), (f) (h), and (k)) and others require or permit particular matters to be taken into account that may operate to the benefit of a claimant (see paragraphs (d) and (i)). As previously noted, s 25(1)(g) provides that when assessing compensation “no allowance shall be made on account of the fact that the acquisition is effected without the consent, or against the will, of any person”. Section 25(1)(c) deals with timing by providing that “compensation shall be fixed as at the date of acquisition of the land.” However, that limitation does not apply to the assessment of loss under any of the heads in placitum (ii) of s 25(1)(b).[24] [24] Commissioner of Highways v George Eblen Pty Ltd (1975) 10 SASR 384 at 391-392, Wells J; Sotirianakos v Commissioner of Highways [2018] SASC 16 at [85], Blue J.