Anderson v Commissioner of Highways (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division: Civil)

ANDERSON v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS (NO 2)

[2018] SASC 121

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker

31 August 2018

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - POWERS OF ACQUISITION

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - PROCEEDINGS FOR COMPENSATION - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

The Commissioner of Highways acquired certain land in which the claimant has an interest within the meaning of s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) (‘the Act’). The claimant contends that he is entitled to the payment of compensation on account of a personal injury that he claims to have suffered arising from the acquisition of the subject land.

A ‘question arising in the course of negotiations’ was referred to the Court under s 23C of the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA). In substance, the question referred to the Court is: is a personal injury of the nature suffered by the applicant compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act?

Held, per Parker J:

1. Compensation under the Act does not extend to compensation for personal injury arising from an acquisition (at [86]).

2.  The right to be compensated for severance, disturbance and injurious affection, or any other newly identified ground, is based upon the acquisition of the interest in property held by the claimant rather than the administrative processes which surround that event (at [90]).

Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) ss 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 12B, 15, 16, 17, 22B, 23A, 23C, 25, 27, 30; Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) s 20; Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic) s 44; Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) s 60, referred to.
Anderson v Commissioner of Highways [2018] SASC 13; Commissioner of Highways v George Eblen Pty Ltd (1975) 10 SASR 384; McInnes v Commissioner of Highways (1992) 78 LGERA 410; Marshall v Director General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603; Commissioner of Highways v Tynan (1982) 53 LGRA 1; Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; Sotirianakos v Commissioner of Highways [2018] SASC 16; South Australian Land Commission v Bletas (1978) 77 LSJS 344; March v City of Frankston (No 1) [1969] VR 350; Secretary to the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources v Driver [2015] VCAT 813; Roads Corporation v Love (2010) 31 VR 451; Bailey v Derby Corporation [1965] 1 All ER 443; Patterson v British Colombia (Minister of Transportation and Highways) (1997) 62 LCR 89; Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 4 SASR 476; Boland v Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 575; Mitsui v City of Hamilton (1984) 30 LGR 46; Zobel v Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1969) 1 LCR 139; Owners of Dredger Liesbosch v Owners of Steamship Edison

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Anderson v Commissioner of Highways (No 2), the applicant sought compensation for personal injury that he claimed was caused by the compulsory acquisition of his home under the Highways Act 1961 (SA). The Commissioner of Highways argued that the applicant's claim for compensation was not valid under the Act, as the compensation provisions only cover economic loss related to the acquisition of land and not personal injury.

The court had to determine whether the applicant's personal injury was compensable under the Act. The applicant contended that the statutory provisions for compensation were broad enough to cover his claim, while the Commissioner argued that compensation under the Act is limited to economic loss related to the acquisition of land and does not extend to personal injury. The court held that the compensation provided under the Act is limited to economic loss related to or arising in the claimant’s capacity as the holder of an interest in land. Compensation is to be fixed by reference to the value of the acquired land and any loss occasioned by severance, disturbance, or injurious affection. Those matters do not extend to personal injury. Therefore, the applicant's claim for compensation for personal injury was not valid under the Act.

The court concluded that the applicant's personal injury was not compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act. The court also held that the applicant's claim should be dismissed as it was not limited to the relevant legal event, which is the taking of the applicant's interest in the land. The court held that the claimant cannot properly base his claim on the administrative processes and other events that may have surrounded the taking of his interest in the land. Therefore, the applicant's claim for compensation for personal injury was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

If the claimant were to persuade the Court that his contention is correct, this would apparently be the first occasion in Australia and in comparable jurisdictions where a finding was made that compensation is payable for personal injury arising from the compulsory acquisition of land. Background It is convenient to adopt the background information that I included in the ruling dated 16 February 2018:[2][5]For many years the parents of the applicant owned a home on Main South Road at Bedford Park (‘the Property’). The Property has been compulsorily acquired by the Commissioner for the purpose of undertaking major road works. Compensation has been paid to the applicant’s parents and they have moved to another home in a nearby suburb.[6]The applicant is now aged 43 years. From 1980 to 2002 he resided with his parents at the Property and operated home businesses from that address. From 2002 to 2009 the applicant resided elsewhere in Adelaide but still attended at the Property on a daily basis for the purpose of conducting his home businesses. The applicant married in 2007 but separated in November/December 2015. In 2009 the applicant resumed living at the Property with his wife and two children and continued to conduct his business activities at and from the Property. The two businesses conducted by the applicant have been described as a vending machine business and a blind cleaning business. [7]The applicant contends that during the period from July 2014, being about the time that the Commissioner notified the applicant and his parents of the proposed acquisition, until May 2016 the applicant suffered from an adjustment disorder with post-traumatic stress disorder type symptoms including anxiety, mental stress, forgetfulness, insomnia, depression, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness and suicidal ideations. The applicant further contends that this injury was caused by factors other than the acquisition process being made without his consent or against his will. The latter contention is of particular importance given that s 25(1)(g) of the Act provides that, in determining compensation, no allowance shall be made on account of the fact that the acquisition is effected without the consent, or against the will, of any person.[2] Ibid at [5]-[7].The relevant provisions of the Act The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:3—Object of this Act The object of this Act is to provide for the acquisition of land on just terms.6—Interpretation …interest in land means— (a) a legal or equitable estate or interest in the land; or (b) an easement, right, power, or privilege in, under, over, affecting, or in connection with, the land; or (c) native title in the land;…22B—Entitlement to compensation Subject to this Act, a person is entitled to compensation for the acquisition of land under this Act if— (a) the person's interest in land is divested or diminished by the acquisition; or (b) the enjoyment of the person's interest in land is adversely affected by the acquisition.…23C—Reference of matters into court (1) The Authority or a claimant may refer a question arising in the course of negotiations into Court. (2) On the reference of a matter into the Court, the Court may— (a)if of the opinion that the question should be the subject of further negotiation—adjourn the matter to allow further negotiation to take place; or (b) make any order necessary to resolve the question. (3) In particular— (a)if there is a dispute about whether the claimant is interested in the subject land, or the nature of the claimant's interest—the Court may, subject to subsection (4), declare whether the claimant has an interest in the subject land and, if so, the nature of the interest; and (b)the Court may make orders for compensation that the Court finds to be justified on the claim; and (c)the Court may make other orders that may be just in the circumstances of the case.…25—Principles of compensation (1) The compensation payable under this Act in respect of the acquisition of land shall be determined according to the following principles: (a)the compensation payable to a claimant shall be such as adequately to compensate him for any loss that he has suffered by reason of the acquisition of the land; and (b)in assessing the amount referred to in paragraph (a) of this section consideration may be given to— (i) the actual value of the subject land; and (ii)the loss occasioned by reason of severance, disturbance or injurious affection; and(c)compensation shall be fixed as at the date of acquisition of the land; and (d)where the claimant's interest in the subject land was liable to expire or be determined, any reasonable prospect of renewal or continuation of the interest must be taken into account; and (e)any special suitability or adaptability of the land for any purpose shall not be taken into account if it could be applied to that purpose in pursuance only of statute, or if the suitability or adaptability is peculiar to the purposes or requirements of a particular person or of any Governmental or local governing authority but any bona fide offer to acquire the land made before the passing of the special Act shall be taken into account; and (f)where the value of the land is enhanced by reason of its use, or the use of any premises on the land, in a manner that may be restrained by any court, or is contrary to law, or is detrimental to the health of any persons, the amount of that enhancement shall not be taken into account; and (g)no allowance shall be made on account of the fact that the acquisition is effected without the consent, or against the will, of any person; and (h)no allowance shall be made for any enhancement or diminution in the value of the land in consequence of—(a) the passing of the special Act; or (b) the acquisition under this Act of any other land; or (c)any proposed or expected development of the land after its acquisition; and (i)where the land is, and but for acquisition would continue to be, devoted to a particular purpose, and there is no general demand or market for land devoted to that purpose, the compensation may, if reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended, be assessed on the basis of the reasonable cost of equivalent reinstatement; and (j)allowance shall be made in favour of the Authority for any enhancement in value of land adjoining the subject land in which the claimant is interested by reason of development of the land after its acquisition, but in no case shall the claimant be liable to make any payment to the Authority in respect of such enhancement in value; and (k)where a notice of intention to acquire land has been served upon a person interested in the land, any sales, transactions, arrangements, licences or approvals effected or obtained with respect to the land, and any improvements to the land effected, after service of the notice, shall not be taken into account unless it is proved that they were effected or obtained bona fide.(2) The reference to loss in subsection (1)(a) extends, in the case of acquisition of native title, to diminution, impairment or other adverse effect on native title that results or will result from the acquisition project.1 (3) Subject to subsections (1) and (2), the total compensation payable for the acquisition of native title must not exceed the amount that would be payable for the acquisition of an estate in fee simple in the relevant land. (4) A reference in this section to a claimant is limited to a claimant who is entitled to compensation.2 Notes—1 Compare section 51(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cwth). 2 See section 22B.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not inconceivable that the approach adopted by an Authority to the acquisition of land in a particular case might be so egregious as to give rise to a valid claim for damages in tort, e.g. for negligence or misfeasance in public office. However, that is not asserted in this case and is a very different matter to the payment of compensation under the Act for personal injury said to be caused by the fact of acquisition. Conclusion I conclude that the personal injury said to be suffered by the claimant is not compensable. That is because the compensation provided under the Act is limited to economic loss related to or arising in the claimant’s capacity as the holder of an interest in land. Compensation is to be fixed by reference to the value of the acquired land and any loss occasioned by severance, disturbance or injurious affection. Those matters do not extend to personal injury. In that light my answer to the question: Is a personal injury of the nature suffered by the applicant compensable as loss arising under s 22B of the Act as qualified by the principles of compensation set out in s 25 of the Act?is “No.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commissioner also notes that the claimant has alleged that his personal injury was caused by the acquisition process, that being a series of events that occurred between July 2014 and May 2016. For that reason, the claimant’s claim does not focus upon the only relevant legal event, that being the point at which his interest in the land was divested or diminished or otherwise adversely affected. The claimant cannot properly base his claim on the administrative processes and other events that may have surrounded the taking of his interest in the land.[23] Thus, the Commissioner submits that if the Court finds that the claimant can pursue a claim for personal injury, his claim should be reformulated so as to limit it only to the relevant legal event, that being the taking of his interest in the land. The Commissioner submits that if the claim is not limited in that way, it should be dismissed. Consideration[23] Mitsui v City of Hamilton (1984) 30 LGR 46 at 58.Observations concerning the interpretation of the Act It is of fundamental importance that the entitlement to compensation upon the acquisition of land is derived entirely from the Act. While there is a great deal of judicial authority as to the meaning of the terms used in the Act, and the similar provisions found elsewhere, the task of the Court is to determine whether the present claim for compensation is covered by the legislative scheme. For that reason, close attention must be paid to the terms of the Act. While cases decided in other jurisdictions under different legislation may provide some guidance, because the entitlement to compensation depends upon the precise terms of the Act, a cautious approach must be taken to cases decided elsewhere. The right to compensation for the acquisition of land under the Act arises solely under s 22B. That statutory entitlement arises if either the person’s interest in land is divested or diminished by the acquisition or if the enjoyment of their interest in land is adversely affected by the acquisition. The clear focus of s 22B is upon compensation in respect of interests in land as such. Section 25 sets out the principles of compensation. Section 25(1)(a) requires that the compensation shall be such as to adequately compensate the claimant for any loss suffered by reason of acquisition of the land. In assessing what is adequate compensation, s 25(1)(b) provides that consideration may be given to “(i) the actual value of the subject land; and (ii) the loss occasioned by reason of severance, disturbance or injurious affection.” I have emphasised the words “any loss” and “may” as their inclusion forms an important part of the claimant’s submissions. The subsequent nine paragraphs of s 25(1), enumerated as (c) to (k), contain specific directions about the assessment of compensation. Some of those provisions preclude a particular fact or matter being taken into account in the assessment of compensation (see paragraphs (e), (f) (h), and (k)) and others require or permit particular matters to be taken into account that may operate to the benefit of a claimant (see paragraphs (d) and (i)). As previously noted, s 25(1)(g) provides that when assessing compensation “no allowance shall be made on account of the fact that the acquisition is effected without the consent, or against the will, of any person”. Section 25(1)(c) deals with timing by providing that “compensation shall be fixed as at the date of acquisition of the land.” However, that limitation does not apply to the assessment of loss under any of the heads in placitum (ii) of s 25(1)(b).[24] [24] Commissioner of Highways v George Eblen Pty Ltd (1975) 10 SASR 384 at 391-392, Wells J; Sotirianakos v Commissioner of Highways [2018] SASC 16 at [85], Blue J.