Sotirianakos v Commissioner of Highways

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

SOTIRIANAKOS v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS

[2018] SASC 16

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue

26 February 2018

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - RIGHT TO COMPENSATION - GENERALLY

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT - MARKET VALUE - PARTICULAR CASES

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - RIGHT TO COMPENSATION - PERSONS ENTITLED - OCCUPIERS

Reference into Court of question concerning entitlement to compensation for acquisition of land.

In 1996 Vasilios and Angeliki Sotirianakos were the registered proprietors of the fee simple in a house property on Main South Road.  They entered into an agreement with the applicants, Tony and Rosa Sotirianakos, for the applicants to carry out renovations, move into the property, maintain the property, pay all outgoings and not pay rent. 

In November 2015 the respondent Commissioner of Highways separately acquired the fee simple from Vasilios Sotirianakos and the interest in the property of Tony and Rosa Sotirianakos. In January 2017 Vasilios Sotirianakos died. 

The issues on the reference are:

1.  Do the applicants have a life interest in the property or merely a licence or tenancy at will to reside in it? 

2.  To what extent should the assessment of compensation take into account the fact that, while the average life expectancy of an 87 year old male such as Vasilios Sotirianakos was 5.26 years, he in fact died 14 months after the acquisition?

3.  Should the assessment be based on the average life expectancy of an 87 year old male or a different period by reference to Vasilios’ state of health?

Held:

(1)  The terms of the agreement made in 1996 included that the applicants were to have exclusive possession of the property during the collective lives of Vasilios and Angeliki (at [58]).

(2)  The applicants had a life interest in the property (at [75]).

(3) Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) requires the assessment of the actual value of an interest in land to be made based on the position as at the date of acquisition without regard to subsequent events (at [102]).

(4)  For the purposes of valuation, there is a presumption that a life tenant had an average life expectancy at the relevant date and the onus lies on the party contending otherwise to prove otherwise (at [107]).

(5)  There is no basis to find other than that Vasilios had an average life expectancy (at 109]).

(6)  Value of compensation assessed at $66,755 (at [116]).

Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) Sections 6, 10, 14, 16, 22B, 23A, 23C and 25; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA Sections 30 and 31; Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925 (SA)  S 12; Public Works Act 1912 (NSW) S 124; Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) S 20, referred to.
Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133; Brisbane City Council v Mio Art Pty Ltd (2011) 183 LGERA 352; Housing Commission of NSW v Falconer

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sotirianakos v Commissioner of Highways involved the compulsory acquisition of land and the compensation owed for the Sotirianakos' interest in the Property. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia. The primary legal issues were whether the Sotirianakos held a life interest in the property or merely a licence or tenancy at will, and if they did hold a life interest, how the value of that interest should be assessed for the purpose of compensation.

The court considered the contract made in mid-1996 between the parties. It found that the Sotirianakos did indeed have a life interest in the property, either as an estate pur autre vie or as a lease for life, based on the terms of the contract and their actions, such as renovations and ongoing maintenance of the property. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the Sotirianakos only had a revocable licence or a tenancy at will.

Regarding the assessment of the life interest's value, the court addressed whether the compensation should be based on a prospective or retrospective assessment. The Sotirianakos argued for a prospective assessment based on the average life expectancy of an 87-year-old male, which was 5.26 years. The Commissioner argued for a retrospective assessment, considering that Vasilios, one of the life tenants, died only 15 months after the acquisition. The court concluded that the proper approach was a prospective assessment, but it should take into account Vasilios' health condition at the time of acquisition, which indicated a life expectancy less than the average for an 87-year-old male. This nuanced approach balanced the statutory requirements with the realities of the individual circumstances.

Ultimately, the court ordered the Commissioner to pay compensation to the Sotirianakos based on the value of their life interest in the property, taking into account the prospective assessment with adjustments for Vasilios' health condition.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The issues on the reference are:1Did the Sotirianakos have a life interest in the Property or merely a licence or tenancy at will to reside in it?2If the Sotirianakos had a life interest in the Property, what is its value in respect of which they are entitled to compensation? In particular:(a)To what extent is the assessment to take into account the fact that, while the average life expectancy of an 87 year old male (such as Vasilios) was 5.26 years, he in fact died 14 months after November 2015? (b)If the fact that Vasilios died is not to be taken into account, should the assessment be based on the average life expectancy of an 87 year old male or some different period by reference to Vasilios’ state of health as at November 2015?Background In July 1928 Vasilios was born. In due course he married Angeliki Sotirianakos (Angeliki) and they had two sons being Tony and Dimetrios Sotirianakos (Jim). In 1982 Vasilios and Angeliki purchased the Property. They lived in the Property with Tony and Jim. In May 1992 Vasilios and Angeliki purchased another house property at Keswick (the Keswick property). The Sotirianakos family moved into the Keswick property. The Property was rented from time to time and was vacant from time to time. In December 1995 Tony and Rosa became engaged. In February 1996 Vasilios and Angeliki rented the Property to Mr Norris for three months expiring on 22 May 1996. I infer as a result of the letter referred to at [14] below that in May 1996 the parties extended the lease for three months to expire on 22 August 1996. In mid 1996 there was a meeting between Vasilios, Angeliki, Tony and Jim. It is common ground that it was agreed that the Sotirianakos would carry out renovations to the Property, move into the Property, maintain the Property, pay all outgoings and not pay rent. I make findings concerning what more was agreed below. I infer as a result of the letter referred to in the following paragraph that the meeting occurred before 15 July 1996. On 15 July 1996 Vasilios and Angeliki gave notice in writing to Mr Norris to vacate the Property by 22 August 2015 for repairs and because the Sotirianakos were going to live in it. In about September 1996 the Sotirianakos undertook renovations to the Property. Renovations comprised painting the house and installation of new carpets, toilet, stove, sink and cupboard. Tony and Rosa married on 26 October 1996 and moved into the Property immediately after their marriage. Vasilios, Angeliki and Jim continue to live at the Keswick property. Over the next 19 years, the Sotirianakos undertook maintenance of and paid the outgoings in respect of the Property. They also undertook renovations comprising replacing a plumbing component, laying concrete at the back of the Property, installing a new window-wall air-conditioning unit, plastering cracks in the lounge room and a bedroom and polishing the floorboards in the lounge room and hallway. In 2005 Angeliki died and Vasilios became the sole registered proprietor of the fee simple in the Property.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In August 2017 the Sotirianakos filed a statement of claim pursuant to section 23C of the Act seeking determination of the amount of compensation payable to them in respect to the acquisition of their interest in the Property.The evidence An affidavit by Tony was tendered and in addition he gave oral evidence. There is no challenge to his credit and I accept him as an honest witness. There was some challenge to the reliability of his recollection concerning discussions with his family in 1996 on the topic of the Property due to the effluxion of time since then. I address that specific topic below. In relation to other matters, I accept Tony’s evidence, which is reflected in the findings made above under the heading Background. Two affidavits by Rosa were tendered and in addition she gave oral evidence. There is no challenge to her credit and I accept her as an honest witness. There was a challenge to the admissibility of her evidence concerning discussions with Tony’s family in 1996 on the topic of the Property. I address that specific topic below. In general, I accept Rosa’s evidence, which is reflected in the findings made above under the heading Background. An affidavit by Jim was tendered. There was an objection to the admissibility of three paragraphs of the affidavit which in light of the evidence given by Tony need not be resolved. Otherwise I accept Jim’s evidence, which is reflected in the findings made above under the heading Background. An expert valuation report by Stan Pamula was tendered by the Sotirianakos. Mr Pamula also gave oral evidence, being called by the Commissioner. Mr Pamula valued the market rental of the Property at $18,200 per annum as at November 2015. He deducted various outgoings borne by the Sotirianakos that would normally be borne by the landlord under a market rental to give a net annual advantage of $15,661.50 which he converted to a net monthly advantage of $1,305. Mr Pamula expressed opinions concerning an appropriate multiplier in the circumstances which I address below together with other aspects of his evidence. An expert actuarial report by Laurance Brett was tendered by the Sotirianakos. He also gave oral evidence. He gave evidence that the life expectancy as at November 2015 of an 87 year-old male was 5.26 years (which is common ground). He expressed the opinion that the present value of $1,305 per month for the remainder of the life of Vasilios was $73,328. I otherwise address his evidence below. A number of documents were also tendered.Interest in land The Sotirianakos contend that, pursuant to the terms of a contract made in mid 1996, they had a life interest in the Property being an estate pur autre vie, ie for the lives of Vasilios and Angeliki. The Commissioner accepts that the parties entered into a contract in mid 1996. However the Commissioner contends that, pursuant to the terms of the contract, the Sotirianakos only had a licence giving them a personal right to reside in the Property and had no proprietary interest in the Property being a licence revocable at will (or perhaps a tenancy at will).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commissioner accepts that the taking of possession of the Property by the Sotirianakos, the payment of outgoings and the making of renovations and maintenance amount to part performance for this purpose. The Commissioner accepts that the fact that the contract was not in writing does not prevent the Sotirianakos having acquired an interest in land in 1996 if they otherwise would have acquired such an interest.Conclusion The Sotirianakos acquired an interest in the Property in 1996 being a life estate or a lease for life.Assessment of value Subsection 22B(a) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation for the acquisition of land under the Act if his or her interest in land is divested or diminished by the acquisition. The Sotirianakos’ interest in the Property was divested by the acquisition. Section 25(1)(b) proceeds on the basis that, where an interest in land is divested, ordinarily compensation will be assessed by reference to:(i)the actual value of the land that is divested (actual value); and (ii)the loss occasioned by reason of severance, disturbance or injurious affection (collectively disturbance). The Sotirianakos contend that the actual value of their interest in the Property is to be assessed as at the date of acquisition on the basis that their life interest would have continued for 5.26 years after the acquisition based on the average life expectancy of an 87 year old male. The Commissioner contends that the value of the Sotirianakos’ interest in the Property should be assessed having regard to the fact that but for the acquisition their life interest would in fact only have continued for 15 months because that is the length of time that Vasilios lived after the acquisition. The Commissioner put this submission in different ways; initially contending that the assessment should be undertaken with the wisdom of hindsight and later contending that even on a prospective assessment regard should be had to the fact that Vasilios died 15 months after the acquisition. The Commissioner contends that, by reference to Vasilios’ state of health as at the date of acquisition, the value should be assessed on the basis that his life expectancy was substantially less than the average for an 87 year old male.Prospective or retrospective assessment The question whether the assessment of actual value should be undertaken as at November 2015 based on the future prospects as at that date (a prospective assessment) or based on the wisdom of hindsight as to what actually occurred (a retrospective assessment) turns on the proper construction of section 25 of the Act. The Commissioner’s initial contention was that when damages are assessed at common law, they are usually assessed as at the date of the wrong but taking into account events which have since occurred[17] and the same approach is to be taken to an assessment of value under section 25 of the Act.[17] Citing HTW Valuers v Astonland Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 54; (2004) 217 CLR 640 at [45] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ; Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd v O'Sullivan [2009] NSWCA 119 at [21] per Macfarlan JA (with whom Giles and Ipp JJA agreed); Australian Executor Trustees Limited v Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 522 at [119] per Barker J; Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Limited [2012] FCAFC 31; (2012) 202 FCR 158 at [4]-[9] per Stone J and [80]-[81] per Collier J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established