Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Limited [2012] FCAFC 31

Citation: Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Limited [2012] FCAFC 31
Appeal from: Australian Executor Trustees Limited v Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 522
Australian Executor Trustees Limited v Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 966
Parties: PROPELL NATIONAL VALUERS (WA) PTY LTD (ACN 009 455 056) and TRAVIS COLEMAN v AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LIMITED (ACN 007 869 794) and SEIZA MORTGAGE COMPANY PTY LTD (ACN 114 436 412)
File number(s): WAD 209 of 2011
WAD 376 of 2011
Judges: STONE, COLLIER AND GILMOUR JJ
Date of judgment: 20 March 2012
Catchwords:

TRADE PRACTICES – misleading or deceptive conduct – negligence – duty of valuers to third party financial institution – expert evidence – whether trial judge ought to have disregarded evidence of sales subsequent to valuation date in determining liability – relevance of authorities accepting evidence of subsequent sale – whether competent valuers could have, using the comparable sales methodology, ascribed relevant value – whether trial judge erred in fact in finding properties comparable – personal liability of employee – whether principles articulated in Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 applicable in Australia – requisite knowledge of accessory to contravention of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – third party reliance upon misleading or deceptive conduct – whether evidence of agency relationship

TRUSTS – whether trustee entitled to commence proceedings if losses to trusts funds – whether trustee required to plead that it had suffered a recoverable loss – power of trustee to commence proceedings on behalf of trust

COSTS – indemnity costs – discretion – whether trial judge erred in testing the reasonableness of offer of compromise – whether trial judge had regard to subsequent findings after trial

Legislation: Arbitration Act 1902 (NSW)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Land Tax Assessment Act 1910 (Cth)
Lands Acquisition Act 1906 (Cth)
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 85
Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 75B, 82
Cases cited:

Adwell Holdings Pty Ltd v Mark Smith [2003] NSWCA 103 cited
Alpine Hardwood (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121 cited
Astonland Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 302 cited
Australian Mutual Provident Society v Overseas Telecommunications Commission (Aust) [1972] 2 NSWLR 806 cited
Australian Executor Trustees Limited v Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 522 cited
Australian Executor Trustees Limited v Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 966 cited
Australian Mutual Provident Society v Overseas Telecommunications Commission (Australia) [1972] 2 NSWLR 806 cited
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 cited
Commonwealth v Arklay (1952) 87 CLR 159 cited
Corisand Investments Ltd v Druce & Co (1978) 248 EG 315 cited
Daandine Pastoral Company Pty…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd, the appeal was brought by the first appellant, Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd, and the second appellant, Mr Coleman, against the decision of the primary judge. The primary judge had found that the appellants had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct and had been negligent in preparing a valuation report of a property at 95 Curtin Avenue. The respondents, Australian Executor Trustees Ltd and Seiza, sought damages under section 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and at common law. The central issue in the appeal was whether the primary judge erred in law in finding that the appellants' valuation was misleading or deceptive and was prepared negligently.

The court examined the evidence and submissions of the parties, particularly the expert evidence, to determine whether the primary judge correctly assessed the value of the property as at 3 April 2007. The court noted that the primary judge distinguished authorities that accepted evidence of subsequent sales and held that such evidence was irrelevant to the question of whether the appellants' conduct was misleading or negligent. The court agreed with the primary judge that the valuation of $1.6 million was a gross over-valuation and was well outside the acceptable margin of error of 15%.

The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and that the appellants should pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. The court found that the primary judge correctly assessed the value of the property and that the appellants had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct and had been negligent in preparing the valuation report. The court held that the principles articulated in Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 were applicable in Australia and that the requisite knowledge of accessory to contravention of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was established. The court also found that the trustee was entitled to commence proceedings if losses to trust funds and that it was not required to plead that it had suffered a recoverable loss. Finally, the court held that the trial judge did not err in testing the reasonableness of the offer of compromise and had regard to subsequent findings after trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to these grounds of appeal it is useful to summarise relevant background facts. I have taken the following facts substantially from the judgments below.THE FACTS At the hearing before his Honour the only relief sought was by the first appellant (“AET”). AET sought damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act and damages at common law. The first respondent (“Propell”) carried on business as a valuer. The second respondent (Mr Coleman) was employed by Propell as a licensed valuer in Western Australia. On or about 20 April 2007 the second respondent (“Seiza”) received a loan application from Mr Michael Pell. The stated purpose of the loan application was, in part, to refinance an existing mortgage with another entity, Mortgage Ezy Pty Ltd (“Mortgage Ezy”) over property located at 95 Curtin Avenue in the sum of $1.2 million. Mr Pell’s loan application included a copy of a valuation for 95 Curtin Avenue dated 3 April 2007 addressed to Mortgage Ezy, which had been issued by Propell and signed by Mr Coleman. An officer of Seiza – Mr Dean Italila – recommended approval of a loan subject to a valuation report. By a “pre-approval” letter dated 26 April 2007, AET (on the face of the letter, by its agent “Mortgage Ezy Pty Ltd – Qld”) notified Mr Pell that, among other things, a valuation report was required. Propell was then reinstructed by Mr Pell to prepare a new valuation. Mr Coleman visited 95 Curtin Avenue and satisfied himself that it was in the same condition as when he had completed the valuation on 3 April 2007. A new valuation was issued by Propell, signed by Mr Coleman, on 7 May 2007. That valuation contained a representation that the market value of 95 Curtin Avenue as at 3 April 2007 was $1.6 million. His Honour observed that Mr Coleman accepted, in the course of evidence, that the 7 May 2007 valuation was issued with the intention or expectation that the appellants could rely on it for the purposes of assessing and approving 95 Curtin Avenue as security for a loan (at [9]). On or about 7 May 2007 AET made a written offer to Mr Pell for a principal loan advance of $1.2 million to refinance his existing loan over the subject property, as well as $20,650 for fees payable by Mr Pell on settlement of the loan. The loan was to be a “Residential Lo Doc 4 Year Cash Flow Manager Loan”, secured by way of first registered mortgage over 95 Curtin Avenue. His Honour observed that a consequence of this arrangement was that Mr Pell’s repayment obligations did not require repayment of principal, and required payment of less interest than would actually accrue, during the first four years of the loan (at [12]). Mr Pell accepted the loan offer, and on 25 May 2007 AET advanced the sum of $1,220,650 to Mr Pell. It is not in dispute that Mr Pell subsequently defaulted on the loan, and was eventually declared bankrupt. AET commenced proceedings for possession of 95 Curtin Avenue, obtained judgment and entered into possession in October 2009.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The substance of the first ground is that, in determining the market value of the property as at 3 April 2007, the primary judge erred in finding in his reasons at [121] that it was impermissible, when determining such value, to have regard to sales of comparable properties which occurred subsequent to 3 April 2007 and as a consequence that the expert opinion of Mr Kish must be disregarded or discounted to the extent that he had regard to such subsequent sales. Relevance of subsequent sales evidence The primary judge concluded that evidence of sales subsequent to 3 April 2007 was irrelevant to the question whether the appellants’ conduct was misleading or negligent A relevant but not sole consideration in determining whether a property valuation has been prepared negligently and/or is misleading and deceptive, is what the market value of the property was at the date of the valuation. If the valuation is within a bracket of 10% or even 15% of the market value, this is prima facie evidence that it is not tainted by negligence, and not misleading or deceptive: Singer & Friedlander Ltd v John D Wood & Co (1977) 243 EG 212 cited, albeit incorrectly, and approved in Adwell Holdings Pty Ltd v Mark Smith [2003] NSWCA 103. This approach does not amount to some principle that no valuation within the bracket can, as a matter of law, be negligent: Adwell Holdings at [9]. However, that question does not arise on this appeal. The finding of the primary judge at [163]-[164] was that a valuation of $1.2 million + 15% would not have been negligent. The upper end of the “bracket” was in his Honour’s judgment $1.35 million. I am not certain why this figure was chosen. Using a ±15% range produces an upper figure of $1.38 million. It may simply be a typographical error. Nothing, it seems to me, turns on the difference between the two figures. His Honour found that viewed against that range, a value of $1.6 million attributed by the appellants was a gross over-valuation. It was, in other words, well outside the “bracket”. Ordinarily, a court, in determining the market value of a property may have regard to subsequent sales of comparable properties. In Daandine Pastoral Company Proprietary Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax of the Commonwealth of Australia (1943) 7 The Valuer 299 at p 304 and in McCathie v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 1 at p 16, Williams J said:Values must be calculated in the light of circumstances which existed on the material date... but subsequent events can be taken into account in order to determine the proper weight to attach to such circumstances. Subsequent sales are just as admissible in evidence as prior sales, provided that in all the circumstances they are comparable. If between the material date and the date of subsequent sale, supervening events occur which alter conditions previously existing, the subsequent sales would not be comparable and would be useless... The whole tendency of the courts is to admit evidence of any events prior to the date of trial which throw any real light on the issues.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In summary Propell and Mr Coleman claimed that:·the valuations did not contain representations which were false and misleading;·the representations were not negligent;·Mr Coleman was not a party to making false and misleading representations;·AET and Seiza did not rely on those representations and suffer loss; and ·AET and Seiza did not adequately mitigate any such loss.FINDINGS OF HIS HONOUR IN THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT AND THE COSTS JUDGMENT In summary, his Honour made the following findings in the Primary Judgment. It was common ground before his Honour that a margin of 15% error above market value was permissible in respect of a valuation and would not constitute misleading or deceptive conduct by the valuer or a breach of duty of care. His Honour accepted this proposition. In relation to the question whether representations were false or misleading and the valuation negligently prepared, his Honour observed that Mr Coleman’s valuation relied upon seven comparable sales (at [30]). His Honour examined Mr Coleman’s evidence in detail, as well as expert valuation evidence of Mr Ross Hughes (called by AET and Seiza) and Mr Steve Kish (called by Propell and Mr Coleman), and the joint statement produced by Mr Hughes and Mr Kish. His Honour noted that the primary question which Mr Hughes and Mr Kish disputed was whether it was permissible, for the purposes of the hearing, for a valuer to have regard to subsequent sales in expressing an opinion as to the value of 95 Curtin Avenue as at 3 April 2007. His Honour accepted the opinion of Mr Hughes that it was inappropriate to take account of subsequent sales, because the task before the Court was to assess whether, upon the sales evidence available as of 3 April 2007, a competent valuer could have, using the comparable sales methodology, ascribed a value of $1,600,000 to 95 Curtin Avenue (at [100]-[101]). In so finding his Honour distinguished the decision of Williams J in Daandine Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax of the Commonwealth of Australia (1943) 7 The Valuer 299) and that of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd v O’Sullivan [2009] NSWCA 119. His Honour also discussed in detail the decision of the High Court in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640 and concluded:[119] The decision of the High Court in HTW Valuers demonstrates why, in some circumstances, hindsight can be and, indeed, must be regarded in determining questions of damage or loss where the question of lost value arises and, it might be added, in the particular statutory circumstances in Daandine, unimproved value of land. But hindsight has no place in an action concerning the competency of a valuation of land at a certain point in time for the purposes of the law of negligence or for the purposes of an action founded on breach of s 52 of the TP Act.[120] The point can finally be demonstrated in a rather simple way. In order to determine whether Mr Coleman negligently prepared his valuation as of 3 April 2007, or by his valuation misled or deceived the applicants as to the true value of the property at the time they relied on it for mortgage security purposes, it is of no relevance to say that, with the benefit of hindsight, it turns out that the applicants got good value. To say that is to say nothing about whether, at the material time, the valuation provided was prepared in accordance with due skill or misrepresented the position as to the value of the subject property to a person, such as the applicants in this case, who relied on that report for mortgage security purposes, at the time assuming it was based on sound valuation principles. The judgment that needs to be made by the Court in this regard can only be relevantly assisted by a valuation made after the event that itself takes into account the relevant sales evidence that was available to a competent valuer as at the material date of valuation.[121] In these circumstances, in my view, it is impermissible, in conducting a valuation for the purposes of the s52 proceeding and the negligence proceedings in the proceedings now before the Court, for the Court to take into account sales subsequent to 3 April 2007 for the purpose of deciding these competence and representational issues. Similarly, it is not open to the expert witnesses to have regard to such subsequent sales and, to the extent that Mr Kish has done so, his expert opinion must be disregarded or discounted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In assessing the value of the land, the trial Judge relied on comparable sales to determine its value.Consideration“Bracket” The appellants submit that:·a relevant consideration in determining whether a property valuation has been prepared negligently and/or is misleading and deceptive is the market value of the property at the date of the valuation; and·if the valuation is within 10% (or on occasion within 15%) of the market value, this is prima facie evidence that it is not tainted by negligence and is not misleading or deceptive. The appellants rely on Singer & Friedlander Ltd v John D Wood & Co (1977) 10 LDAB 30, Adwell Holdings Pty Ltd v Mark Smith [2003] NSWCA 103 at [9] and MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 313 at 356 in support of this proposition. In my view this submission is not controversial to the extent that, in light of the element of uncertainty in respect of valuations, the Courts recognise a “bracket” within which a valuation may fall. As Watkins J observed in Singer & Friedlander at 574:The valuation of land by trained, competent and careful men is a task which rarely, if ever, admits of precise conclusion. Often beyond certain well-founded facts so many imponderables confront the valuer that he is obliged to proceed on the basis of assumptions. Therefore, he cannot be faulted for achieving a result which does not admit of some degree of error. Thus, two able and experienced men, each confronted with the same task, might come to different conclusions without any one being justified in saying that either of them has lacked competence and reasonable care, still less integrity in doing his work. The permissible margin of error is said by Mr Dean, and agreed by Mr Ross, to be generally 10 per cent either side of a figure which can be said to be the right figure, ie so I am informed, not a figure which later, with hindsight, proves to be right but which at the time of valuation is the figure which a competent, careful and experienced valuer arrives at after making all the necessary inquiries and paying proper regard to the then state of the market. In exceptional circumstances the permissible margin, they say, could be extended to about 15 per cent, or a little more, either way. Any valuation falling outside what I shall call the “bracket” brings into question the competence of the valuer and the sort of care he gave to the task of valuation. However the principle recognised by the Court in Singer & Friedlander simply concerns the range of tolerated variation in a reasonable valuation opinion, given the element of judgment involved. It does not raise any immutable presumption in respect of claimed negligence. As was pointed out by Meagher JA (Mason P and Buddin J agreeing) in Adwell Holdings at [9]:Since [Singer & Friedlander], judges seem to have taken a figure of 10% (or, in some cases at least, perhaps 15%) of the true figure to constitute an area, or bracket, within which, prima facie, a valuation is not negligent. But the importance of that “bracket” notion must not be misunderstood. It is not a statement of some principle that no valuation within the bracket can, as a matter of law, be negligent. That such a valuation can still be negligent is not only a matter of common sense, but has been judicially developed in such cases as Interchase Corp Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (Supreme Court, Queensland, 520 of 1994, BC 200000188) and Lion Nathan Ltd v Coca-Cola Bottlers Ltd [1996] UKPC 9; [1996] 1 WLR 1438. Once one finds that a valuation is within the “bracket”, one can infer that prima facie, but only prima facie, it is not tainted by negligence; of course, it may have been arrived at by negligence, but that fact must be proved; one can never say that purely because a figure is within the “bracket”, no negligence can be involved; but, on the other hand, if one arrives at a conclusion that a particular valuation is correct, one may turn to the “bracket” test as a check.Relevance of subsequent sales