Kitchen v Director of Professional Services Review

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kitchen v Director of Professional Services Review [2023] FCAFC 160

Appeal from: Kitchen v Director of Professional Services Review (No 4) [2022] FCA 780
File number(s): QUD 267 of 2022
Judgment of: CHARLESWORTH, SARAH C DERRINGTON AND DOWNES JJ
Date of judgment: 3 October 2023
Catchwords: COSTS – application for leave to appeal a costs order – whether leave to appeal should be granted – whether primary judgment attended by sufficient doubt – whether adequate reasons given by primary judge – where delay in giving judgment – whether primary judge erred in concluding that first respondent’s resistance of the proceeding was not unarguable or hopeless – application for leave to appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 21, 24(1A), 43(2)

Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) ss 82, 89C

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430

Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31

Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502

Commonwealth of Australia v Sanofi (formerly Sanofi-Aventis) [2023] FCAFC 97

DécorCorporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26

Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; [2004] FCAFC 189

Goodwin v HBCA Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 166

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Dimension Agriculture Pty Ltd (in liq) [2023] FCAFC 140

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378

IFTC Broking Services Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1; [2010] FCAFC 22

Kitchen v Director of Professional Services Review (No 4) [2022] FCA 780

Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Ltd (2017) 252 FCR 1; [2017] FCAFC 98

Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725

Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70

NRM Corporation Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2016] FCAFC 98

Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311

Police Federation of Australia v Nixon (2011) 198 FCR 267; [2011] FCAFC 161

Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 158; [2012] FCAFC 31

Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 81 ATR 36; [2010] FCAFC 139

Robinson v Deep Investments Pty Ltd (2018) 364 ALR 305; [2018] FCAFC 232

Sullivan v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd (2017) 255 FCR 503; [2017] FCAFC 153

TechnologyOne Ltd v Roohizadegan (2021) 309 IR 202; [2021] FCAFC 137

Vicforests v Environment East Gippsland Inc [2023] VSCA 159

Wainohuv New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; [2011] HCA 24

Webuildem Pty Ltd (ACN 102 786 621) v Arab Bank Australia Ltd (ABN 37 002 950 745) (2013) 300 ALR 99; [2013] FCA 37

Division: General Division
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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Dr Kitchen, an ophthalmologist, sought judicial review of the conduct of the Professional Services Review Committee and the decision by the Director of Professional Services Review to refer his practices to the Committee. The primary issue for the court was whether Dr Kitchen's application for leave to appeal a costs order should be granted. The court had to determine whether the primary judgment was attended by sufficient doubt, whether adequate reasons were given by the primary judge, and whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Director's resistance of the proceeding was not unarguable or hopeless.

The court found that the primary judge had adequately explained the basis of the decision, and the reasons were sufficient. The court noted that while there is a judicial duty to provide reasons for most decisions, the absence of reasons does not in itself indicate that a judge has erroneously exercised the discretion to award costs. The court also found that there was no sufficient doubt as to the primary judge's decision, and the primary judge did not err in concluding that the Director's resistance of the proceeding was not unarguable or hopeless. The court held that it was not necessary for the primary judge to analyse each of the individual principal arguments put by Dr Kitchen and to explain in her reasons why she did not accept each of them.

As a result of the court's reasoning, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal. This decision highlights the importance of providing adequate reasons for decisions and the court's discretion in determining the appropriate costs order to be made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, the application for leave to appeal will be refused, with costs.RELEVANT BACKGROUND The Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) establishes a professional services review scheme, under which a person’s conduct can be examined to ascertain whether they have engaged in “inappropriate practice” as defined in s 82 of that Act. A review under the scheme is commenced by a request made by the Chief Executive Medicare to the Director. The Director then decides whether to conduct a review of the person’s provision of services (and, if so, will undertake that review) and, after the review, will decide whether to take certain steps, including to make a referral to a Professional Services Review Committee (such as the second respondent, which we will refer to as the Committee in these reasons). Dr Kitchen is an ophthalmologist. On 11 December 2017, the Director received a request from a delegate of the Chief Executive Medicare that a review be undertaken of Dr Kitchen’s provision of specialist ophthalmic services. The Director conducted a review into Dr Kitchen’s conduct, and on 16 August 2018, issued a report under s 89C of the Health Insurance Act and invited Dr Kitchen to make written submissions. On 29 October 2018, Dr Kitchen made lengthy submissions concerning the report, which his solicitors emailed to a member of the professional services review scheme. The Director received a copy of those submissions on 6 November 2018. Shortly after receiving the submissions and on the same date, the Director sent an internal email stating that she was “establishing a Committee” and was “inclined to refer everything” to that Committee. On 14 November 2018, the Director formally determined to refer Dr Kitchen’s practices to the Committee (the Referral). In a letter to Dr Kitchen advising him of the same, the Director stated that she had taken his submissions into account in deciding to make the Referral (as she was required to do under s 89C(2) of the Health Insurance Act). The Committee subsequently commenced its investigation into Dr Kitchen. Almost a year later, on 13 November 2019, Dr Kitchen filed an originating application in this Court seeking judicial review of the conduct of the Committee and the decision to make the Referral, by which he also applied for an extension of time under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). The extension of time required was 334 days. Dr Kitchen chose to commence those proceedings relying solely on the ADJR Act despite previously being told of his ability to seek judicial review under both the ADJR Act and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The originating application raised four proposed grounds of review, with the fourth being that the Director failed to take Dr Kitchen’s submissions into account in making the Referral. Dr Kitchen sought final orders to restrain the conduct of the Committee. Although he sought that the decision of the Director to make the Referral be reviewed, no relief was specifically sought against the Director.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Dr Kitchen otherwise submits that her Honour erred in reaching that conclusion, in that a careful consideration of the facts should have led to the opposite conclusion. Dr Kitchen’s particular focus was not only upon the purportedly unmeritorious position taken by the Director in the proceeding below, but her knowledge of that lack of merit. Dr Kitchen submitted that:…The Director did not file evidence explaining her conduct in making the concession on 4 December 2020. There was no evidence that the person holding the office of Director had changed between November 2018 and December 2020. And that person was uniquely placed at all times to know whether she had or had not taken Dr Kitchen’s submissions into account in making the Referral. No evidence was filed on behalf of the Director as to any material change in circumstances that would explain the change of position on 4 December 2020. The Director chose to remain silent.The inference should be drawn, from the failure to give evidence explaining her conduct, that there was nothing the Director could say that would have assisted her case (to resist indemnity costs). An inference should be drawn that the Director must have known at all times that she had not taken Dr Kitchen’s submissions into account. That being so, the Director must have known at all times that she had no reasonable basis for resisting the orders sought by Dr Kitchen setting aside the Referral. In the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the Director to have resisted the proceedings for more than a year and, only after enormous costs were incurred, to have then belatedly made the concession in December 2020 that should have been made on day one.(footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) As to the lack of affidavit evidence, it was properly conceded by senior counsel who appeared for Dr Kitchen that the question of whether the Director took into account the submissions was a question of fact and law. The Director is not a lawyer and had legal representation throughout the course of the proceedings below. Therefore, any affidavit by the Director explaining why she had decided to make the concession in December 2020 might have needed to expose legal advice which she had received, and any change in that legal advice. That the Director decided not to provide such an affidavit, and to not waive legal professional privilege, is just as likely an explanation as one which requires an inference to be drawn that she knew at all times during the proceedings below that she had no reasonable basis to resist the orders sought by Dr Kitchen. This provides one strong reason not to draw the inference which is pressed upon us. Indeed, the content of the Director’s offer to compromise dated 4 December 2020 (set out above), tends to indicate that the Director’s position (even at the point of offering a compromise) was that she believed that her resistance of the application was not unarguable or hopeless as a matter of law. This is especially as the letter stated that, while the Director “remains of the opinion that she properly exercised her power under s 93 of the [Health Insurance Act], to avoid further costs of litigating that point, the Director is prepared to concede a failure to take into account … the submissions made by the Applicant as required by s 89C(2) of the [Health Insurance Act]”. Dr Kitchen is therefore seeking that an inference be drawn which is contradicted by the evidence which is before the Court. This provides another reason not to draw the inference sought.

Decision

Reasons for decision

We deal with each of these contentions below.WHETHER DECISION ATTENDED BY SUFFICIENT DOUBTAdequacy of reasons It is well-recognised that there is a judicial duty to provide reasons for most decisions, including for final decisions and “important interlocutory rulings”: Wainohuv New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; [2011] HCA 24 (French CJ and Kiefel J, as her Honour then was) at [54], see also [104]–[109] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). It is also accepted that where reasons are provided, they must be adequate: DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26 (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ) at [32]. A failure to provide adequate reasons may amount to an error of law: see TechnologyOne Ltd v Roohizadegan (2021) 309 IR 202; [2021] FCAFC 137 (Rangiah, O’Callaghan and White JJ) at [108]; Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31 (Tamberlin, Sundberg and Besanko JJ) at [45]–[46]; Police Federation of Australia v Nixon (2011) 198 FCR 267; [2011] FCAFC 161 (Lander, Gilmour and Gordon JJ) at [70]. However, the absence of reasons does not in itself indicate that a judge has erroneously exercised the discretion to award costs: Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311 (Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ) at 315–16. An appellate court will generally only intervene when “it is left with no choice” because the statement of reasons, looked at as a whole, betrays a miscarriage of justice: see Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 (Meagher JA) at 444. Further, adequacy is assessed in the context of the nature of the decision: see Wainohu at [56], cited with approval in DL v The Queen at [32]. Indeed, the extent to which a court must go in giving reasons is incapable of precise definition and is context specific: Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 (Hutley JA, with whom Samuels JA agreed) at 381; see also Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725 (Samuels JA, with whom Clarke JA and Hope A-JA agreed) at 728. Whilst the basis of a decision should be apparent, this does not mean that the reasons given must be elaborate: IFTC Broking Services Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1; [2010] FCAFC 22 (Stone, Edmonds and Jagot JJ) at [4]; Beale at 443. Reasons need only be given so far as is necessary to indicate to the parties why the decision was made and to allow them to exercise such rights as may be available to them in respect of it: Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 158; [2012] FCAFC 31 (Collier J, with whom Stone J agreed) at [146]. Dr Kitchen submits that where the dispute involves a form of “intellectual exchange, with reasons and analysis advanced on either side”, the judge “must enter into the issues canvassed before him [or her] and explain why he [or she] prefers one case over the other”. To the extent that this submission suggests that the primary judge was required to analyse each of the individual principal arguments put by Dr Kitchen, and to explain in her reasons why she did not accept each of them, this argument goes too far. A judge is permitted to decide the matter before them in a way which does not require the determination of each submission made by the parties: see Housing Commission of New South Wales (Mahoney JA) at 385. Indeed, the Full Court of this Court has accepted that an elaborate argument may not require elaborate reasons: IFTC at [4]. We consider that this is particularly the case in the context of a determination as to the appropriate costs order to be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established