FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mercedes Holdings Pty Limited v Waters (No 2) [2010] FCA 472
Citation: Mercedes Holdings Pty Limited v Waters (No 2) [2010] FCA 472 Parties: MERCEDES HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED, MAX INVESTMENTS (AUST) PTY LIMITED, MANSTED ENTERPRISES PTY LTD, MICHELLE O’GARR, JM CUSTOMS & FREIGHT SERVICES PTY LIMITED, OSVON PTY LIMITED, ADAM JOHN THORN & GRAHAM DEAN and MARK ROBERT HODGES & JANET ANNE HODGES v ANDREA JANE WATERS, MICHAEL JOHN ANDREW, WELLINGTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED, OCTAVIA LIMITED, GUY HUTCHINGS, JOHN ARTHUR WHATELEY, JACK SIMON DIAMOND, CRAIG ROBERT WHITE, DEBORAH BEALE, STEVEN KRIS KYLING, STUART ROBERTSON PRICE, MICHAEL GORDON HISCOCK, MICHAEL CHRISTODOULOU KING, PAUL JOSEPH MANKA and IAN ZELINSKI File number: NSD 324 of 2009 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 14 May 2010 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – Managed Investment Schemes – Contravention of provisions by officers and auditors of the scheme – Compensation sought – Whether investors are limited to remedies against the responsible entity
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – Statement of claim – Particulars – Purpose to outline the manner in which an allegation will be proven
STATUTES – Interpretation – Explanatory material – Cannot subvert ordinary meaning of statute
TRUSTS – Beneficiary – Standing – Trustee unwilling to sue – Where beneficiary and trustee have separate causes of action but similar losses there is no bar to the beneficiary pursuing his/her own claim – Unlike principle of ‘reflective loss’ in corporate law – Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215Legislation: Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth)
Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) ss 22, 82
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FC, 601FD, 601HG(3), 601HG(4), 601MA, 1311(1), 1317E, 1317G, 1317H, 1317J, 1325(2)
Corporations Law ss 232, 1063(2), 1317HA, 1324, 1325(2)
Corporations Amendment Regulations 2000 (No 1)
Corporations Regulations (Amendment) 1998 (No 186 of 1998) reg 13.1 cl 5C.11.07
Criminal Code (Cth) ss 5.2(1), 5.6(1)
Federal Court Rules Or 11 r 8(2)
Managed Investments Act 1998 (Cth) Sch 2 s 143Cases cited: Airpeak Pty Ltd v Jetstream Aircraft Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 161 cited
Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109 cited
Boys v Geneva Finance Ltd (Receiver and Manager appointed) [2001] WASCA 376 cited
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 cited
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 cited
Combined State Unions v State Services Co-ordinating Committee [1982] 1 NZLR 742 cited
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 cited
In the matter of CSR Limited [2010] FCAFC 34 cited
CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440 cited
Deming No 456 Pty Ltd v Brisbane Unit Development Corporation Pty Ltd (1983) 155 CLR 129 cited
English and Scottish Mercantile Investment Company Ltd v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700 cited
Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 distinguished
Forge v ASIC (2004) 213 ALR 574 applied
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 cited
Hercules Management Ltd v Ernst & Young [1997] 2 SCR 165
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 472
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the plaintiffs' use of inconsistent pleadings was permissible under Order 11 r 8(2) of the Federal Court Rules, but the use of the word "further" in their pleading was misleading and should be corrected. The court concluded that the case based on s 601HG(4) could not proceed because it failed to establish the necessary awareness on the part of the auditors regarding related party transactions and member approval. The court held that the plaintiffs' pleading was insufficiently formulated, lacking the necessary particulars to establish a valid case. The court also dismissed the negligence claims, noting that the auditors owed no specific duty of care to the plaintiffs beyond what was required by law.
The court's reasoning led to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims under s 601HG(4) were not permitted to proceed due to the insufficient formulation of the awareness requirement. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs' reliance on s 1317J for a compensation order was misplaced because they had not alleged a contravention of a civil penalty provision. Instead, their allegations pertained to s 601FD(1), which did not trigger the compensation regime under s 1317J(2). Consequently, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims and denied them leave to amend their pleadings.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims and deny them leave to amend their pleadings, effectively barring them from proceeding with their action against the auditors.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This must be read with s 1317J(2) which provides:Who may apply for a declaration or order…(2)The corporation, or the responsible entity for the registered scheme, may apply for a compensation order. The list of civil penalty provisions in s 1317E(1) includes s 601FD(3). The text of s 601FD is set out above. A comparison with it shows that it is not, however, s 601FD(3) which imposes any duties upon the officers of a responsible entity. The substantive duties are imposed by s 601FD(1). Section 601FD(3) assumes that s 601FD(1) has been contravened; it says as much. It then declares that a person contravening s 601FD(1) also contravenes s 601FD(3). This is a curious statement in some ways. “Contravene” means to infringe or to disobey. Subsection (3) establishes no rule or norm susceptible to disobedience. That entails that “contravenes” must really mean “is taken to contravene” and, in that light, s 601FD(3) appears in its true light as a deeming provision. The sixth, seventh and ninth defendants submitted that the compensation regime revealed by Part 9.4B is an exhaustive code setting out all and the only ways in which compensation may be recovered for a breach of a civil penalty provision. Below I set out my reasons for rejecting that proposition. However, even if I were otherwise disposed to accept that argument it would not avail the sixth, seventh and ninth defendants. The plaintiffs submit, and I accept, that the proposed pleading does not allege that the officers in question contravened the civil penalty provision, s 601FD(3). The contraventions alleged are set out in paragraph 298 (at page 382) and they are contraventions of s 601FD(1) not s 601FD(3). I cannot read the reference to s 601FD(3) in s 1317E as a reference to s 601FD(1). The legislative decision to make some, but not all, contraventions of the Act civil penalty contraventions is very far from the kind of obvious slip or error which might justify a different reading: cf. Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305 per Gibbs CJ, 310-311 per Stephen J and 320 per Mason and Wilson JJ. Indeed, the legislative decision seems to have been a deliberate one whose end was the confinement of the serious and quasi-criminal consequences of contraventions of civil penalty provisions to a tightly controlled list. In that circumstance, I find it is textually impossible to resist the plaintiffs’ argument that since they are not alleging a contravention of a civil penalty provision, a compensation order could not be obtained under s 1317J(2). The exhaustive nature of Part 9.4B, even if established, is irrelevant. Mr Jackman SC, who appeared for the sixth, seventh and ninth defendants, described the plaintiffs’ submission in paragraph 21 above as one of purest formalism and accused the plaintiffs of hair-splitting and that, I suppose, is true. But formality – even of a pure kind – is not without its place in curial proceedings and what is one person’s hair-splitting is another’s important distinction.