FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3) [2011] FCA 236
Citation: Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3) [2011] FCA 236 Parties: MERCEDES HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED, MAX INVESTMENTS (AUST) PTY LIMITED, MANSTED ENTERPRISES PTY LTD, MICHELLE O'GARR, JM CUSTOMS & FREIGHT SERVICES PTY LIMITED, OSVON PTY LIMITED, ADAM JOHN THORN & GRAHAM DEAN and MARK ROBERT HODGES & JANET ANNE HODGES v ANDREA JANE WATERS, MICHAEL JOHN ANDREW, WELLINGTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED, OCTAVIA LIMITED, GUY HUTCHINGS, JOHN ARTHUR WHATELEY, JACK SIMON DIAMOND, CRAIG ROBERT WHITE, DEBORAH BEALE, STEVEN KRIS KYLING, STUART ROBERTSON PRICE, MICHAEL GORDON HISCOCK, MICHAEL CHRISTODOULOU KING, PAUL JOSEPH MANKA and IAN ZELINSKI File number: NSD 324 of 2009 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 18 March 2011 Corrigendum: 3 May 2011 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Provable debts – whether persistence of claim against bankrupt for breach of fiduciary duty a claim for provable debt – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 82, 229
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to discontinue – representative proceedings – principles applicable to grant of leave to discontinue –Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33v
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – Statement of Claim – application to amend – representative proceedings – particulars – principles applicable to grant of leave to amend – whether proposed allegations sufficiently particularised – nature of proposed claim
TRUSTS – Beneficiary – standing – Trustee unwilling to sue – whether principle of “reflective loss” applies to trust
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 82, 229
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FC, 601FD, 601HG, 1325Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33V(1)
Federal Court Rules Order 13 rule 2
Cases cited: Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 250 cited
Auto Group Ltd v England (2008) 6 ABC(NS) 72 cited
Ballard v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 208 cited
Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 cited
Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 cited
Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 cited
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 cited
Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376 cited
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 cited
Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 510 cited
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 cited
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 cited
Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781 cited
Gleeson v J Wippell & Co [1977] 1 WLR 510 cited
Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 cited
Groeneveld Australia Pty Ltd v Nolten [2010] VSC 249 cited
Jakeman v Hawkins [2006] QSC 289 cited
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 cited
Lamru Pty Ltd v Kation Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 432 cited
Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2011] FCA 236
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the nature of the proposed pleading, which was 676 pages long, and noted that it was prolix, repetitious, and frequently obscure. The Court also considered the principle of reflective loss, which prevents shareholders from recovering losses caused by harm to the company, as well as the principle of “reflective loss” in the context of trusts. The Court found that the principle of reflective loss applied to the present case, and that the applicants' claims were reflective of the harm suffered by the Fund.
The Court refused to grant leave to the applicants to file the proposed pleading and to discontinue proceedings against Mr Zelinski. The Court imposed a 50-page limit on any further attempts to amend the pleadings and directed the applicants to deliver the final pleaded version of the case by a specified date. The Court also ordered the applicants to pay the costs of certain respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability.
The Court's decision was based on the principle that it is generally not open to a party who has lost a substantial interlocutory argument to seek to reventilate the same issue once more. The Court found that the auditors had not had the opportunity to make submissions on whether the principle of reflective loss was distinguishable because of the different implications of capital reductions in the law of trusts. The Court accepted that the auditors should be permitted to argue that leave should be refused on the basis of the reflective loss principle.
The final orders of the Court were to dismiss the applicants' notice of motion filed on 5 July 2010 with costs, to direct any party wishing to file an application to dismiss the balance of proceedings summarily to do so by a specified date, to direct the applicants to file any application to amend the proceedings to pursue a claim in negligence against the first and second respondents by a specified date, to direct the applicants to deliver only one version of the proposed pleading and not to deliver any further drafts of any proposed pleadings after a specified date, to direct the applicants that any pleading delivered by them pursuant to certain orders not exceed 50 pages in length, to order the applicants to pay the costs of certain respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability, to dismiss the application for leave to discontinue against the fifteenth respondent, and to allow the confidential exhibit on the discontinuance motion to be returned.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Dismiss the applicants’ notice of motion filed 5 July 2010 with costs.
2. Direct any party wishing to file an application to dismiss the balance of proceedings summarily to do so by Friday 22 April 2011.
3. Direct the applicants to file any application to amend the proceedings to pursue a claim in negligence against the first and second respondents by Friday 22 April 2011 in the form of a notice of motion supported by an affidavit.
4. Direct the applicants to deliver only one version of the proposed pleading and not to deliver any further drafts of any proposed pleadings after Friday 22 April 2011 with the intent that the applicants are to deliver the final pleaded version of the case by Friday 22 April 2011 come what may.
5. Direct the applicants that any pleading delivered by them pursuant to Orders 3 and 4 not exceed 50 pages in length.
6. Order the applicants to pay the costs of the fifth, eleventh and thirteenth respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability.
7. The application for leave to discontinue against the fifteenth respondent is dismissed.
8. The confidential exhibit on the discontinuance motion may be returned.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants submit that the question of whether leave to amend should be denied because of the reflective loss principle was determined in Mercedes (No. 2) and that authority suggested that it was not open to the auditors to seek to recanvas that prior interlocutory ruling: Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46 per McLelland J. They also say that the issue of unauthorised capital reductions was argued in Mercedes (No. 2).Consideration The submissions of the auditors are to be preferred. It is generally not open to a party who has lost a substantial interlocutory argument to seek to reventilate the same issue once more. Whilst it is true that a court always retains the power to vary, set aside or discharge interlocutory orders that power is subject to the overriding public interest in avoiding the deployment of the court’s processes in an abusive fashion. When a substantive argument has been had and determined then, absent fresh material not available at the time of the original hearing, it will generally be impermissible to seek to argue the matter once more. Were it otherwise, the Court and the parties might well be vexed by an endless array of never ending interlocutory disputes. As McLelland J remarked in Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46 of a case involving an interlocutory order made following substantive argument with the understanding that the order would apply for the balance of the proceeding “…the rule of practice is that an application to set aside, vary or discharge the order must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the court on the hearing of the original application”. Of course, that is not quite the present situation for it is not sought to vary a prior order. Nevertheless, the same principles apply to substantive interlocutory determinations generally and not just to those embodied in orders. In this case there is no doubt that the auditors were heard on the question of reflective loss as the applicants correctly submit. However, to put the matter that way is to ignore the rather more critical point that they did not have the opportunity to make submissions on whether the principle was distinguishable because of the different implications of capital reductions in the law of trusts. I reject the applicants’ argument that the capital reduction point was argued. The words were said but there is a difference between that and running an argument about the concept. I accept, therefore, that the auditors should be permitted to argue that leave should be refused on the basis of the reflective loss principle.(b) The status of the reflective loss principle The auditors submit that it is a well established principle of company law that a shareholder cannot sue to recover loss caused to the value of its shares by reason of harm to the company. Such losses are merely a reflection of the losses suffered by the company: Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 Ch 204 at 222-223 per Cumming-Bruce, Templeman and Brightman LJJ. They admit the possibility of a shareholder being permitted to recover loss and damage which is distinct from the harm to the company but not otherwise. In this case, however, they submit that the loss claimed by the unit holders is plainly a reflective one. Such a claim should not be permitted to go forward because, so they submit, the policy reasons underlying the principle in the case of corporations apply with equal force to trusts. Further, the English Court of Appeal has determined that the principle does apply to trusts: Webster v Sandersons Solicitors (A Firm) [2009] EWCA Civ 830 at [31] per Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony MR, Arden and Lloyd LJJ.