Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3) [2011] FCA 236

Citation: Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3) [2011] FCA 236
Parties: MERCEDES HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED, MAX INVESTMENTS (AUST) PTY LIMITED, MANSTED ENTERPRISES PTY LTD, MICHELLE O'GARR, JM CUSTOMS & FREIGHT SERVICES PTY LIMITED, OSVON PTY LIMITED, ADAM JOHN THORN & GRAHAM DEAN and MARK ROBERT HODGES & JANET ANNE HODGES v ANDREA JANE WATERS, MICHAEL JOHN ANDREW, WELLINGTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED, OCTAVIA LIMITED, GUY HUTCHINGS, JOHN ARTHUR WHATELEY, JACK SIMON DIAMOND, CRAIG ROBERT WHITE, DEBORAH BEALE, STEVEN KRIS KYLING, STUART ROBERTSON PRICE, MICHAEL GORDON HISCOCK, MICHAEL CHRISTODOULOU KING, PAUL JOSEPH MANKA and IAN ZELINSKI
File number: NSD 324 of 2009
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 18 March 2011
Corrigendum: 3 May 2011
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY – Provable debts – whether persistence of claim against bankrupt for breach of fiduciary duty a claim for provable debt – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 82, 229

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to discontinue – representative proceedings – principles applicable to grant of leave to discontinue –Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33v

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – Statement of Claim – application to amend – representative proceedings – particulars – principles applicable to grant of leave to amend – whether proposed allegations sufficiently particularised – nature of proposed claim

TRUSTS – Beneficiary – standing – Trustee unwilling to sue – whether principle of “reflective loss” applies to trust

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 82, 229
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FC, 601FD, 601HG, 1325

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33V(1)

Federal Court Rules Order 13 rule 2

Cases cited:

Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 250 cited
Auto Group Ltd v England (2008) 6 ABC(NS) 72 cited
Ballard v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 208 cited
Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 cited
Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 cited
Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 cited
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 cited
Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376 cited
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 cited
Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 510 cited
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 cited
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 cited
Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781 cited
Gleeson v J Wippell & Co [1977] 1 WLR 510 cited
Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 cited
Groeneveld Australia Pty Ltd v Nolten [2010] VSC 249 cited
Jakeman v Hawkins [2006] QSC 289 cited
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 cited
Lamru Pty Ltd v Kation Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 432 cited
Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 236
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 3) involved an application by the applicants, who are unitholders in the MFS Premium Income Fund (now known as the Premium Income Fund), to amend their statement of claim and discontinue proceedings against certain respondents, including the fifteenth respondent, Mr Zelinski. The applicants sought to bring a representative action on behalf of themselves and other unitholders against various respondents, including the trustees and auditors of the Fund, for breaches of fiduciary duty and negligence. The Federal Court of Australia was required to decide whether the applicants should be granted leave to amend their statement of claim and discontinue proceedings against Mr Zelinski.

The Court considered the nature of the proposed pleading, which was 676 pages long, and noted that it was prolix, repetitious, and frequently obscure. The Court also considered the principle of reflective loss, which prevents shareholders from recovering losses caused by harm to the company, as well as the principle of “reflective loss” in the context of trusts. The Court found that the principle of reflective loss applied to the present case, and that the applicants' claims were reflective of the harm suffered by the Fund.

The Court refused to grant leave to the applicants to file the proposed pleading and to discontinue proceedings against Mr Zelinski. The Court imposed a 50-page limit on any further attempts to amend the pleadings and directed the applicants to deliver the final pleaded version of the case by a specified date. The Court also ordered the applicants to pay the costs of certain respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability.

The Court's decision was based on the principle that it is generally not open to a party who has lost a substantial interlocutory argument to seek to reventilate the same issue once more. The Court found that the auditors had not had the opportunity to make submissions on whether the principle of reflective loss was distinguishable because of the different implications of capital reductions in the law of trusts. The Court accepted that the auditors should be permitted to argue that leave should be refused on the basis of the reflective loss principle.

The final orders of the Court were to dismiss the applicants' notice of motion filed on 5 July 2010 with costs, to direct any party wishing to file an application to dismiss the balance of proceedings summarily to do so by a specified date, to direct the applicants to file any application to amend the proceedings to pursue a claim in negligence against the first and second respondents by a specified date, to direct the applicants to deliver only one version of the proposed pleading and not to deliver any further drafts of any proposed pleadings after a specified date, to direct the applicants that any pleading delivered by them pursuant to certain orders not exceed 50 pages in length, to order the applicants to pay the costs of certain respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability, to dismiss the application for leave to discontinue against the fifteenth respondent, and to allow the confidential exhibit on the discontinuance motion to be returned.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Dismiss the applicants’ notice of motion filed 5 July 2010 with costs.

2. Direct any party wishing to file an application to dismiss the balance of proceedings summarily to do so by Friday 22 April 2011.

3. Direct the applicants to file any application to amend the proceedings to pursue a claim in negligence against the first and second respondents by Friday 22 April 2011 in the form of a notice of motion supported by an affidavit.

4. Direct the applicants to deliver only one version of the proposed pleading and not to deliver any further drafts of any proposed pleadings after Friday 22 April 2011 with the intent that the applicants are to deliver the final pleaded version of the case by Friday 22 April 2011 come what may.

5. Direct the applicants that any pleading delivered by them pursuant to Orders 3 and 4 not exceed 50 pages in length.

6. Order the applicants to pay the costs of the fifth, eleventh and thirteenth respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability.

7. The application for leave to discontinue against the fifteenth respondent is dismissed.

8. The confidential exhibit on the discontinuance motion may be returned.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicants bring suit on their own and others’ behalf for events arising out of the affairs of a property trust known at the relevant times as the MFS Premium Income Fund which is now known as the Premium Income Fund. I shall refer to it as the Fund. The applicants have previously applied to amend their statement of claim but that application was refused because of various difficulties with the pleading: Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 2) (2010) 186 FCR 450 (Mercedes (No 2)). The applicants have regrouped and they now again apply by motion for leave to amend their statement of claim. At the same time, they seek leave to discontinue against the fifteenth respondent, Mr Zelinski. Leave is required because the representative nature of the proceeding engages s 33V(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and thereby the necessity of the Court’s sanction for its discontinuation. For the reasons which follow both applications should be refused. The applicants must bear the costs of the application to amend. It is convenient in the first instance to commence with the amendment application.IIThe application to amend: the evidence and the various parties The applicants proceeded on a notice of motion filed on 5 July 2010 which sought generally a grant of leave to file an amended statement of claim and a further amended application. In support of that application Mr Martin SC who, with Mr Drew of counsel, appeared for the applicants, read an affidavit of Mr George Robert Charles Hoddle sworn 9 July 2010. This affidavit exhibited earlier iterations of the proposed pleading which, as events have turned out, have been largely superseded by later versions and those exhibits were not placed before me. Ultimately the only significance of Mr Hoddle’s evidence was to prove that a box of five lever arch folders of papers known as the Core Documents were the set of documents referred to in a letter written on the applicants’ behalf on 4 June 2010. These Core Documents – and their origins – are of considerable importance to one set of the issues to be resolved on the present application and I return to them below. The five folders of Core Documents and the box containing them formed Exhibit 2. The final version of the proposed further amended application and the proposed amended statement of claim ultimately filled two lever arch folders and became Exhibit 1. The proposed pleading is 676 pages in length. Its predecessor, leave to file which was refused in Mercedes (No 2), was 571 pages in length. Of that document I was moved on the last occasion to remark that it was “prolix, repetitious and frequently obscure” (Mercedes (No 2) at 453 [6]), a sentiment which I apprehend has left the pleader of the present document largely unmoved. I should record, however, that on this occasion the proposed pleading was accompanied by a 13 page aide-mémoire to assist me in understanding, and perhaps better appreciating, the apparent necessity for what appears to be, at least at first blush, a document of extraordinary length.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The sixth, seventh and ninth respondents invited me, if leave be denied, to dismiss the proceedings summarily. I will not take that course. There is no formal application before me calling on the applicants to defend the current (as opposed to the proposed) form of their proceeding and there has been no consideration of its merits.XVConclusion on the amendment application I refuse to grant leave to the applicants to file the proposed pleading. In light of the above conclusions the only claim which is presently viable is the claim in negligence against the auditors. I will not, however, grant leave to pursue that claim in the absence of an articulated document. I am concerned about the manner in which the applicants have approached the drawing of their pleadings. That which has been articulated on the two most recent occasions is intolerable. This case, although potentially complex, does not warrant a pleading running to over 600 pages. This is particularly so when it has now become apparent that the applicants’ advisors have only had access to the five volumes of the Core Documents. The extraction of a two volume pleading from a five volume set is cause for disquiet, particularly when the only point of the five volume set lies in what it is said not to contain. That signals to me the presence of one of three things: a desire to give the claim the appearance of substance when, in truth, nothing of any substance is known about the respondents; a lack of clarity and discipline in drawing the pleading; or, a misguided perception that length is somehow a virtue. In any event, regardless of the reason for this prolixity it must cease. It is oppressive for all concerned and borders on an abuse of the Court’s processes. I attempted to indicate as much to the applicants’ advisors in Mercedes (No 2) at [6] in a way which I thought was clear but I must now conclude that that approach was ineffective. In those circumstances, I have no choice but to take the unusual step of imposing a 50 page limit on any further attempts. To give some procedural regularity to this case I will make the following directions:1.Dismiss the applicants’ notice of motion filed 5 July 2010 with costs.2.Direct any party wishing to file an application to dismiss the balance of proceedings summarily to do so by Friday 22 April 2011.3.Direct the applicants to file any application to amend the proceedings to pursue a claim in negligence against the first and second respondents by Friday 22 April 2011 in the form of a notice of motion supported by an affidavit.4.Direct the applicants to deliver only one version of the proposed pleading and not to deliver any further drafts of any proposed pleadings after Friday 22 April 2011 with the intent that the applicants are to deliver the final pleaded version of the case by Friday 22 April 2011 come what may.5.Direct the applicants that any pleading delivered by them pursuant to Orders 3 and 4 not exceed 50 pages in length.6.Order the applicants to pay the costs of the fifth, eleventh and thirteenth respondents associated with the abandoned claim for accessorial liability.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants submit that the question of whether leave to amend should be denied because of the reflective loss principle was determined in Mercedes (No. 2) and that authority suggested that it was not open to the auditors to seek to recanvas that prior interlocutory ruling: Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46 per McLelland J. They also say that the issue of unauthorised capital reductions was argued in Mercedes (No. 2).Consideration The submissions of the auditors are to be preferred. It is generally not open to a party who has lost a substantial interlocutory argument to seek to reventilate the same issue once more. Whilst it is true that a court always retains the power to vary, set aside or discharge interlocutory orders that power is subject to the overriding public interest in avoiding the deployment of the court’s processes in an abusive fashion. When a substantive argument has been had and determined then, absent fresh material not available at the time of the original hearing, it will generally be impermissible to seek to argue the matter once more. Were it otherwise, the Court and the parties might well be vexed by an endless array of never ending interlocutory disputes. As McLelland J remarked in Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46 of a case involving an interlocutory order made following substantive argument with the understanding that the order would apply for the balance of the proceeding “…the rule of practice is that an application to set aside, vary or discharge the order must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the court on the hearing of the original application”. Of course, that is not quite the present situation for it is not sought to vary a prior order. Nevertheless, the same principles apply to substantive interlocutory determinations generally and not just to those embodied in orders. In this case there is no doubt that the auditors were heard on the question of reflective loss as the applicants correctly submit. However, to put the matter that way is to ignore the rather more critical point that they did not have the opportunity to make submissions on whether the principle was distinguishable because of the different implications of capital reductions in the law of trusts. I reject the applicants’ argument that the capital reduction point was argued. The words were said but there is a difference between that and running an argument about the concept. I accept, therefore, that the auditors should be permitted to argue that leave should be refused on the basis of the reflective loss principle.(b) The status of the reflective loss principle The auditors submit that it is a well established principle of company law that a shareholder cannot sue to recover loss caused to the value of its shares by reason of harm to the company. Such losses are merely a reflection of the losses suffered by the company: Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 Ch 204 at 222-223 per Cumming-Bruce, Templeman and Brightman LJJ. They admit the possibility of a shareholder being permitted to recover loss and damage which is distinct from the harm to the company but not otherwise. In this case, however, they submit that the loss claimed by the unit holders is plainly a reflective one. Such a claim should not be permitted to go forward because, so they submit, the policy reasons underlying the principle in the case of corporations apply with equal force to trusts. Further, the English Court of Appeal has determined that the principle does apply to trusts: Webster v Sandersons Solicitors (A Firm) [2009] EWCA Civ 830 at [31] per Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony MR, Arden and Lloyd LJJ.