Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) [2017] FCA 19

Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480
File number: SAD 193 of 2016
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 25 January 2017
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – judgment debt consequent upon an adverse costs order – where judgment debt said to be affected by fraud – circumstances in which bankruptcy court may go behind judgment – application of House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 on an appeal from a finding that there was no “sufficient cause” not to make sequestration order – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 52(2)(b)

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES – personal liability of trustees for debts incurred in the performance of a trust – action commenced against appellant in relation to a transaction entered into in his capacity as trustee – trustee personally liable for costs in the action

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), s 56

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 41, 43, 52, 60

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s 104

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 296

Trustee Act 1936 (SA), s 35

Cases cited:

Astram Financial Services Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2010] FCA 1010

Balkin v Peck (1998) 43 NSWLR 706

Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 331

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2015] SASC 66

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2015] SASC 139

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480

Dean v Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Trustee) [2016] FCA 648

Elders Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v EG Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193

Gordon v Campbell (1842) 1 Bell App 428

Holden v Black (1905) 2 CLR 768

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

In re Johnson; Shearman v Robinson (1880) 15 Ch D 548

Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176, (2014) 319 ALR 646

McIntosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494

Mercedes Holdings Pty Ltd v Waters (No 2) (2010) 186 FCR 450

Muir v City of Glasgow Bank and Liquidators (1879) 4 AC 337

Octavo Investments Proprietary Limited v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360

Picone v Velos [2007] FCA 1183

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 844

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 1118

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCCA 978

Tov-Lev v Lowbeer (No 2) [2014] FCA 379

Vacuum Oil Company Proprietary Limited v Wiltshire (1945) 72 CLR 319

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534

Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212

Heydon JD and Leeming MJ, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (8th ed, Butterworths, 2016)

Date of hearing: 1 September 2016
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Roberts SC
Solicitor for…
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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) involved Mr Psevdos, who was subject to a sequestration order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) on a creditor’s petition presented by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA). The primary issue before the court was whether the bankruptcy court had the authority to go behind the judgment to investigate whether there was a good debt to support it, particularly in light of Mr Psevdos' allegations of fraud. The court was required to decide if the FCC erred in its determination of the existence of the debt and whether it had sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order under section 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

The Federal Court of Australia, in its reasoning, referred to the principles established in Corney v Brien, which highlighted that while a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt, it is not conclusive in bankruptcy cases. The court has the discretion to investigate whether there was a good debt to support the judgment. However, this discretion is not to be exercised lightly, particularly in cases where the judgment followed a full investigation at trial. The court must consider whether there is a prima facie case of fraud, collusion, or miscarriage of justice. The court also noted that the mere fact that a compromise may not have been in accordance with the true merits of the claims made is not sufficient to impugn the compromise.

In this case, the Federal Court found that the FCC did not err in its determination. The court held that Mr Psevdos' allegations of fraud and the circumstances surrounding the Supreme Court proceedings did not meet the threshold for the court to go behind the judgment. The court concluded that the FCC had sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order, as the judgment debt was valid and supported by the evidence presented. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the sequestration order against Mr Psevdos was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the appeal should be dismissed.BACKGROUND The sequestration order against Mr Psevdos was made on a creditor’s petition presented by the respondent, Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA). The FCC was satisfied that Mr Psevdos had committed an act of bankruptcy in that he had failed to comply with a bankruptcy notice issued under s 41(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and served on him by CBA. I should note at this early juncture that Mr Psevdos made an earlier application to the Registrar of the FCC to set aside the bankruptcy notice. When that application was dismissed, Mr Psevdos made an application to the FCC pursuant to s 104(2) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) for review of the Registrar’s decision. That application was also dismissed: Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCCA 978. For convenience I will refer to that judgment as the Review Judgment and to the judgment appealed against as the Sequestration Judgment. Mr Psevdos appealed to this Court against the Review Judgment (the first appeal). The sequestration order was made after the first appeal was commenced. On 27 July 2016 I made a declaratory order to the effect that the first appeal was stayed by the operation of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and subsequently deemed to have been abandoned by the operation of s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act: Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 844 (First Appeal Judgment). In doing so, I determined (and it was acknowledged by CBA) that it remained open to Mr Psevdos to agitate the same issues arising on the first appeal in the course of this appeal: First Appeal Judgment at [18]. By interlocutory application dated 29 July 2016, Mr Psevdos sought an array of orders with a view to obtaining further evidence to adduce on this appeal. I dismissed that application: Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 1118 (Interlocutory Judgment). There had already been a significant history of litigation between Mr Psevdos and CBA prior to the presentation of CBA’s creditor’s petition. It is necessary to traverse some of that history to the extent that it bears on the issues now arising on this appeal. In 2014, CBA commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia against Mr Psevdos (Supreme Court Proceedings). It sought a declaration that its equitable interest in certain parcels of land situated in the Bugle Ranges had priority over any equitable interest in the land held by Mr Psevdos. At the relevant time, the registered proprietor of the land was Schutara Pty Ltd (Schutara). Prior to 2009, a first registered mortgage over the land was held by Provident Capital Limited. The competing equitable interests in the land are conveniently described in the judgment given by the Honourable Justice Parker in the Supreme Court Proceedings, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2015] SASC 66 at [3] – [4]:3.On 5 June 2009, Schutara entered into a written loan agreement with CBA in the amount of $2,550,200. Security for the loan included a mortgage over the land which Schutara executed and delivered to CBA on the same day. Settlement occurred on 19 June 2009. CBA advanced $2,521,062.70 to Provident Capital in exchange for an executed discharge of mortgage and the original certificates of title. In substance, CBA replaced Provident Capital as the lender to Schutara.4.On 29 June 2009, Schutara and others entered into a written loan agreement with Mr Psevdos, as trustee for Orio Investment Trust, in the amount of $378,000. The agreed security for the loan included a mortgage over the land. On the same day, Schutara executed a mortgage in registrable form over the land in favour of Mr Psevdos. The funds were then advanced to Schutara. On 10 July 2009, Mr Psevdos lodged a caveat claiming an equitable interest as mortgagee over the land.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The principles governing the discretion to “go behind” a judgment were conveniently stated by Wigney J in Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176; (2014) 319 ALR 646 (Katter) at [69] – [79] as follows:Relevant principles – ‘going behind’ a judgment 69. The existence of a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 (Corney v Brien) at 355 (Fullagar J). However, a judgment is never conclusive in bankruptcy and the Court has a discretion to ‘go behind’ the judgment to investigate whether there was a good debt to support it: Corney v Brien at 347 (Dixon, Williams, Webb, Kitto JJ), 353-354 (Fullagar J).70. The Court will not, however, inquire into the consideration for a judgment as a matter of course: Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 222-223 (Barwick CJ). Whilst the circumstances in which the Court will inquire into the validity of a judgment debt are not closed (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans [2005] FCA 978 (Commonwealth Bank v Jeans) at [15]) and there is no inflexible rule (Re Wong; Ex parte Kitson (1979) 27 ALR 405; Chancliff Holdings Pty Ltd v Bell [1999] FCA 1708 (Chancliff) at [90]), it is possible to identify a number of guiding principles.71. First, the Court looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments: Corney v Brien at 348 (Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ) citing Latham CJ in Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 44 at 48-49. Where the judgment in question is a default judgment, it appears that the Court will always ‘go behind’ the judgment if there is what it regards as a bona fide allegation that no real debt lay behind the judgment: Corney v Brien at 357-358 (Fullagar J).72. Second, if the judgment in question followed a full investigation at a trial at which both parties appeared, the Court will not reopen the matter unless a prima facie case of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice is made out: Corney v Brien at 356-357 (Fullagar J). In Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 86, Fry LJ said: ‘this power has never, so far as I am aware, been extended to cases in which a judgment has been obtained after issues have been tried out before a [c]ourt’. In Corney v Brien, Fullagar J said (at 358) that he had not been able to find any such case since Fry LJ made this statement in 1888.73. Third, where judgment has been entered in pursuance of a compromise, grounds must be shown for challenging the compromise before the subject matter of the judgment will be reopened: Corney v Brien at 357 (Fullagar J). That is because it is the compromise and not the claim that was compromised that is the foundation of the judgment: Harrison v Charalambous [1999] FCA 902 (Harrison v Charalambous) at [9].74. Where a party challenges a judgment entered on a compromise and that party has acted on the advice of counsel, the judgment will not generally be reopened: Corney v Brien at 357. The presumption in such circumstances is that it is difficult, although not impossible, to impugn the compromise: Harrison v Charalambous at [9]. One instance where the Court may go behind a judgment in these circumstances is where both parties knew the original claim was not a bona fide claim and the judgment or compromise was obtained by dishonesty known to both parties: Ex parte Banner; In re Blythe (1881) 17 Ch D 480 (Re Blythe). If, however, counsel had full knowledge of all relevant facts, and no suspicion of unfairness or impropriety in the compromise arises, a court may decline to go behind a judgment submitted to on the advice of counsel: Inre A Debtor [1929] 1 Ch. 125; Chancliff at [100]; Smith v Abbott, Stillman & Wilson [2007] FCA 1256.75. The fact that the debtor may have been pressured by his legal advisers to compromise the claim, despite the merits of his defence, will not generally be sufficient to warrant going behind the judgment entered pursuant to that compromise. That will particularly be the case where the judgment creditor was unaware of, or was not implicated in, the alleged undue pressure: Harrison v Charalambous at [11]. In that case, Finkelstein J said (at [12]):To my mind, what has occurred in this case is not a sufficient basis to go behind the judgment based on the compromise. Although the debtor may have been placed under undue pressure to enter into the compromise, I cannot discern any unfairness or impropriety of such a kind as would justify me in looking behind the judgment. The reality is that the debtor, perhaps through no fault of his own, was placed in a position where his commercial interests necessitated a compromise and he agreed to it in accordance with those interests. In one sense the position the debtor found himself in is not very different to the circumstances which other litigants have often had to confront. I do not doubt that litigants regularly compromise actions otherwise than in accordance with the true merits of the claims made, but that is not a sufficient reason to deny efficacy to the agreements to compromise that these litigants reach. It is certainly not a sufficient reason in this case.76. It is implicit in this statement that the mere fact that the compromise may not have been ‘in accordance with the true merits of the claims made’ will not be sufficient to impugn the compromise. Such a circumstance alone will therefore not warrant the Court going behind the judgment.77. Fourth, the Court should not go behind a judgment where the grounds upon which the judgment is challenged are such that, if accepted, they would only support a finding that the amount of the debt be reduced and would not support a finding that there was, in truth, no debt at all: Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 at 589; Olivieri v Stafford (1989) 24 FCR 413 (Olivieri v Stafford) at 431-432 (Gummow J); Re Cosimo Longo Ex parte: Cosimo Longo [1995] FCA 1324 at [23]-[25]; Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 425 at [7]-[10]; Re Riviere; Ex parte Original Mont de Piete Ltd (1919) 20 SR (NSW) 77 (Re Riviere) at 83-84.78. The particular circumstances of any given case may no doubt throw up other considerations relevant to whether the Court should exercise its discretion to go behind a judgment. Where the judgment debtor seeks to go behind the judgment on particular grounds, it is difficult to see why it would not be a relevant consideration that those grounds could have been, but were not, raised in opposition to the judgment, or in an application to set aside the judgment. Parties are ordinarily bound by the way they have chosen to conduct litigation. The fact that, for whatever reason, a party did not put particular arguments before the court that made (or refused to set aside) the judgment does not mean that there was no relevant hearing on the merits: Commonwealth Bank v Jeans at [18]-[21]; Olivieri v Stafford at 424 (Beaumont J).79. The question whether the judgment is to be reopened or ‘gone behind’ at all will usually involve some preliminary investigation of the merits of the attack of the judgment: Corney v Brien at 358. That question can and often is dealt with as a preliminary question: see for example Commonwealth Bank v Jeans. Once the Court decides that it will go behind the judgment ‘the whole [of the] matter is open’: Corney v Brien at 358. Where it is legitimate to go behind a judgment entered after trial, there would effectively be no alternative but to retry the whole case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Given its length, I will not recite every issue verbatim from the Notice of Appeal. I will instead consider whether the learned primary judge erred in making any one of the determinations I have identified in [30] of these reasons as it is clear that each of those determinations are subject to challenge. Those determinations, and the grounds of appeal, fall broadly under three topics: alleged fraud and the Supreme Court Proceedings, Mr Psevdos’ personal liability for the debt and the Deposit. I will deal with the issues in that order.CONSIDERATIONAlleged fraud and the Supreme Court Proceedings: Notice of Appeal, paragraphs 4II – VI, 10 and 12 In Dean v Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Trustee) [2016] FCA 648, Katzmann J said (at [43]):… When a court decides to inquire into the existence of the debt, it does not set aside the judgment; it has no power to do that: Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 (Full Court) at 588. Rather, it ‘goes round the judgment, and inquires into the subject matter’ for the purpose of satisfying itself that the petitioning creditor founds his petition on a ‘good debt’: In Re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 633 at 636 (Lord Esher MR). The principles governing the discretion to “go behind” a judgment were conveniently stated by Wigney J in Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176; (2014) 319 ALR 646 (Katter) at [69] – [79] as follows:Relevant principles – ‘going behind’ a judgment 69. The existence of a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 (Corney v Brien) at 355 (Fullagar J). However, a judgment is never conclusive in bankruptcy and the Court has a discretion to ‘go behind’ the judgment to investigate whether there was a good debt to support it: Corney v Brien at 347 (Dixon, Williams, Webb, Kitto JJ), 353-354 (Fullagar J).70. The Court will not, however, inquire into the consideration for a judgment as a matter of course: Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 222-223 (Barwick CJ). Whilst the circumstances in which the Court will inquire into the validity of a judgment debt are not closed (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans [2005] FCA 978 (Commonwealth Bank v Jeans) at [15]) and there is no inflexible rule (Re Wong; Ex parte Kitson (1979) 27 ALR 405; Chancliff Holdings Pty Ltd v Bell [1999] FCA 1708 (Chancliff) at [90]), it is possible to identify a number of guiding principles.71. First, the Court looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments: Corney v Brien at 348 (Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ) citing Latham CJ in Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 44 at 48-49. Where the judgment in question is a default judgment, it appears that the Court will always ‘go behind’ the judgment if there is what it regards as a bona fide allegation that no real debt lay behind the judgment: Corney v Brien at 357-358 (Fullagar J).72. Second, if the judgment in question followed a full investigation at a trial at which both parties appeared, the Court will not reopen the matter unless a prima facie case of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice is made out: Corney v Brien at 356-357 (Fullagar J). In Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 86, Fry LJ said: ‘this power has never, so far as I am aware, been extended to cases in which a judgment has been obtained after issues have been tried out before a [c]ourt’. In Corney v Brien, Fullagar J said (at 358) that he had not been able to find any such case since Fry LJ made this statement in 1888.73. Third, where judgment has been entered in pursuance of a compromise, grounds must be shown for challenging the compromise before the subject matter of the judgment will be reopened: Corney v Brien at 357 (Fullagar J). That is because it is the compromise and not the claim that was compromised that is the foundation of the judgment: Harrison v Charalambous [1999] FCA 902 (Harrison v Charalambous) at [9].74. Where a party challenges a judgment entered on a compromise and that party has acted on the advice of counsel, the judgment will not generally be reopened: Corney v Brien at 357. The presumption in such circumstances is that it is difficult, although not impossible, to impugn the compromise: Harrison v Charalambous at [9]. One instance where the Court may go behind a judgment in these circumstances is where both parties knew the original claim was not a bona fide claim and the judgment or compromise was obtained by dishonesty known to both parties: Ex parte Banner; In re Blythe (1881) 17 Ch D 480 (Re Blythe). If, however, counsel had full knowledge of all relevant facts, and no suspicion of unfairness or impropriety in the compromise arises, a court may decline to go behind a judgment submitted to on the advice of counsel: Inre A Debtor [1929] 1 Ch. 125; Chancliff at [100]; Smith v Abbott, Stillman & Wilson [2007] FCA 1256.75. The fact that the debtor may have been pressured by his legal advisers to compromise the claim, despite the merits of his defence, will not generally be sufficient to warrant going behind the judgment entered pursuant to that compromise. That will particularly be the case where the judgment creditor was unaware of, or was not implicated in, the alleged undue pressure: Harrison v Charalambous at [11]. In that case, Finkelstein J said (at [12]):To my mind, what has occurred in this case is not a sufficient basis to go behind the judgment based on the compromise. Although the debtor may have been placed under undue pressure to enter into the compromise, I cannot discern any unfairness or impropriety of such a kind as would justify me in looking behind the judgment. The reality is that the debtor, perhaps through no fault of his own, was placed in a position where his commercial interests necessitated a compromise and he agreed to it in accordance with those interests. In one sense the position the debtor found himself in is not very different to the circumstances which other litigants have often had to confront. I do not doubt that litigants regularly compromise actions otherwise than in accordance with the true merits of the claims made, but that is not a sufficient reason to deny efficacy to the agreements to compromise that these litigants reach. It is certainly not a sufficient reason in this case.76. It is implicit in this statement that the mere fact that the compromise may not have been ‘in accordance with the true merits of the claims made’ will not be sufficient to impugn the compromise. Such a circumstance alone will therefore not warrant the Court going behind the judgment.77. Fourth, the Court should not go behind a judgment where the grounds upon which the judgment is challenged are such that, if accepted, they would only support a finding that the amount of the debt be reduced and would not support a finding that there was, in truth, no debt at all: Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 at 589; Olivieri v Stafford (1989) 24 FCR 413 (Olivieri v Stafford) at 431-432 (Gummow J); Re Cosimo Longo Ex parte: Cosimo Longo [1995] FCA 1324 at [23]-[25]; Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 425 at [7]-[10]; Re Riviere; Ex parte Original Mont de Piete Ltd (1919) 20 SR (NSW) 77 (Re Riviere) at 83-84.78. The particular circumstances of any given case may no doubt throw up other considerations relevant to whether the Court should exercise its discretion to go behind a judgment. Where the judgment debtor seeks to go behind the judgment on particular grounds, it is difficult to see why it would not be a relevant consideration that those grounds could have been, but were not, raised in opposition to the judgment, or in an application to set aside the judgment. Parties are ordinarily bound by the way they have chosen to conduct litigation. The fact that, for whatever reason, a party did not put particular arguments before the court that made (or refused to set aside) the judgment does not mean that there was no relevant hearing on the merits: Commonwealth Bank v Jeans at [18]-[21]; Olivieri v Stafford at 424 (Beaumont J).79. The question whether the judgment is to be reopened or ‘gone behind’ at all will usually involve some preliminary investigation of the merits of the attack of the judgment: Corney v Brien at 358. That question can and often is dealt with as a preliminary question: see for example Commonwealth Bank v Jeans. Once the Court decides that it will go behind the judgment ‘the whole [of the] matter is open’: Corney v Brien at 358. Where it is legitimate to go behind a judgment entered after trial, there would effectively be no alternative but to retry the whole case.