Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v PSEVDOS

[2015] SASC 139

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton

11 September 2015

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SECURITY FOR COSTS

PROCEDURE - COSTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS

The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the CBA) and Mr Psevdos as trustee for Orio Investment Trust made loans to Schutara Pty Ltd (Schutara) – Schutara granted each lender a mortgage over real property (the Schutara property) as security – a dispute arose as to which mortgage had priority – following a trial in the Supreme Court the CBA mortgage was found to have priority over the Psevdos mortgage – Mr Psevdos was ordered to pay costs of the entire action on an indemnity basis – Mr Psevdos filed a notice of appeal to the Full Court against that decision – the CBA applied for security for costs – whether special circumstances exist justifying the making of an order for security.

Held:

1.  Special circumstances exist.

2.  Mr Psevdos to pay security for costs in the sum of $15,000.

3.  Appeal stayed pending payment of security.

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 295(1)(g), referred to.

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v PSEVDOS
[2015] SASC 139

Civil:  Application

BAMPTON J.

  1. On 21 May 2015, Mr Psevdos sought to appeal a judgment of Parker J delivered on 30 April 2015.  The notice of appeal was served on the respondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the CBA).  The cheque Mr Psevdos tendered to the Supreme Court Registry in payment of the appeal filing fee was dishonoured on 2 June 2015.

  2. On 2 June 2015, unaware that the appeal had not been regularly instituted, the CBA made application for an order that Mr Psevdos pay security for costs in respect of his appeal.

    Background

  3. The trial of this matter concerned competing equitable interests in real property known as Trenance, Bonython Road, Bugle Ranges (the Schutara property).  The CBA sought a declaration that its equitable interest has priority over any equitable interest held by the appellant, Mr Psevdos, acting as trustee of the Orio Investment Trust. 

  4. The CBA entered into a loan agreement in the sum of $2,550,200 with the registered proprietor of the Schutara property, Schutara Pty Ltd (Schutara) on 5 June 2009.  Schutara gave a mortgage over the Schutara property to the CBA as security.  Subsequently, on 29 June 2009, Schutara entered into a written loan agreement with Mr Psevdos, as trustee for Orio Investment Trust, in the amount of $378,000.  Schutara granted Mr Psevdos a mortgage in registrable form as the agreed security.  Mr Psevdos then lodged a caveat claiming an equitable interest as mortgagee over the Schutara property.  The CBA became aware of the caveat and the CBA mortgage was amended to be expressly made subject to Mr Psevdos’ caveat so as to enable registration.  The CBA mortgage was then registered subject to the caveat. 

  5. On 30 April 2015, Parker J found in…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASC 139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) sought a declaration that its equitable interest in a mortgage had priority over any equitable interest held by Mr Psevdos, who was acting as trustee for Orio Investment Trust. The dispute arose over which mortgage had priority over real property known as the Schutara property. The Supreme Court found in favour of the CBA, ordering Mr Psevdos to pay the CBA’s costs on an indemnity basis. Mr Psevdos appealed the decision, prompting the CBA to apply for security for costs of the appeal. The court had to determine whether special circumstances existed that would justify ordering Mr Psevdos to pay security for costs.

The legal issues before the court were whether the CBA had established special circumstances warranting the making of an order for security for costs and whether it was appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion in that regard. The court considered the reasons for the indemnity costs order, Mr Psevdos’ financial position, and the dishonour of a cheque tendered to the Registry as potential special circumstances. The court also noted the grounds of appeal as being largely without merit or potentially an abuse of process.

The court concluded that the special circumstances did justify the ordering of security for costs. The CBA had established that there were special circumstances warranting the making of the order and that it was appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion. The court ordered Mr Psevdos to pay security in the sum of $15,000. The appeal is stayed pending payment of the security.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 2 June 2015, unaware that the appeal had not been regularly instituted, the CBA made application for an order that Mr Psevdos pay security for costs in respect of his appeal. Background The trial of this matter concerned competing equitable interests in real property known as Trenance, Bonython Road, Bugle Ranges (the Schutara property). The CBA sought a declaration that its equitable interest has priority over any equitable interest held by the appellant, Mr Psevdos, acting as trustee of the Orio Investment Trust. The CBA entered into a loan agreement in the sum of $2,550,200 with the registered proprietor of the Schutara property, Schutara Pty Ltd (Schutara) on 5 June 2009. Schutara gave a mortgage over the Schutara property to the CBA as security. Subsequently, on 29 June 2009, Schutara entered into a written loan agreement with Mr Psevdos, as trustee for Orio Investment Trust, in the amount of $378,000. Schutara granted Mr Psevdos a mortgage in registrable form as the agreed security. Mr Psevdos then lodged a caveat claiming an equitable interest as mortgagee over the Schutara property. The CBA became aware of the caveat and the CBA mortgage was amended to be expressly made subject to Mr Psevdos’ caveat so as to enable registration. The CBA mortgage was then registered subject to the caveat. On 30 April 2015, Parker J found in favour of the CBA, holding that the lodgement of Mr Psevdos’ caveat and the registration of the CBA mortgage subject to the caveat did not bear upon the priorities as between the parties’ competing equities. Justice Parker was satisfied that the CBA mortgage had priority over Mr Psevdos’ mortgage. His Honour said that:·the CBA mortgage was first in time and Mr Psevdos was unable to establish any act or neglect on the part of CBA such as to make it inequitable for it to retain its priority;·the failure by the CBA to lodge a caveat did not of itself constitute postponing conduct;·the CBA’s position was strengthened by the fact that Mr Psevdos had notice of the CBA’s prior equitable interest when he entered into the loan agreement and executed the mortgage; and·he was satisfied that the better equity lay with the CBA. The trial of the matter commenced on the basis that a number of central factual issues concerning the making of the Psevdos loan and mortgage and lodgement of the caveat were in dispute. Justice Parker stated that the trial was protracted by about four days hearing evidence in relation to those matters.The circumstances of the abandonment of the defence On the fifth day of the trial before Parker J, a document was produced on subpoena from Mr Psevdos’ conveyancer, Ms Graetz, in relation to the transactions that are the subject of the underlying dispute. During the course of the morning on 27 February, the CBA uplifted and inspected the subpoenaed file. During Mr Psevdos’ cross-examination, counsel for the CBA placed before him an email dated 29 June 2009 (the Graetz email) that had come from Ms Graetz’s conveyancing file produced under subpoena. In the Graetz email addressed to Mr Psevdos, Ms Graetz wrote “I also confirm your instructions that I am not to caveat the properties known as Tenance – Bonython Rd Bugle Ranges via Mt Barker Road until the CBA refinance has gone through. I check searched these titles today and note that the mortgage to Provident is still registered and there are no unregistered documents showing up therefore CBA’s mortgage has not been lodged to date”. Mr Psevdos was cross-examined about the Graetz email in the context of his evidence that he knew nothing of the CBA mortgage. Mr Psevdos gave evidence that he had no recollection of the email. It was put to him that he responded to the Graetz email saying “And the Cba needs to register first on the balance of five lots Bonython Road”. In other words, the CBA submitted that Mr Psevdos was not merely being told by his conveyancer of the proposed CBA mortgage coming in as a first registered mortgage but that he responded in a confirmatory way to his conveyancer. It was put to Mr Psevdos that he had collected the original Graetz file and delivered it to his solicitors for the purposes of discovery being made in the proceedings and yet the file, as discovered, had removed from it, or did not include within it, documents such as the Graetz email regarding the registration of the mortgage. Following this cross-examination, counsel for Mr Psevdos informed the Court that he had instructions that the equitable argument would not be pursued.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BAMPTON J
Mr Psevdos said he was not, at the time of the argument, writing any mortgage business, that he has restructured his business, he has seconded his staff to other firms, and that he is not renewing his financial licence until this matter has resolved. He said that he is, in effect, taking sabbatical leave pending resolution. He said given Parker J’s judgment, even though there were no findings of credit against him, the fact that he had indemnity costs ordered against him compromised his licence. Conclusion In order to enliven the Court’s discretion to order security for costs of the appeal the CBA needs to establish two matters. First, that there are special circumstances warranting the making of the order and, second, that it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion. Following argument, on the CBA’s application (FDN 35) pursuant to rule 295(1)(g) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, I ordered that Mr Psevdos pay security in the sum of $15,000. As the notice of appeal challenges Parker J’s findings on grounds that were abandoned at trial, many of the grounds are in my view without merit and arguably an abuse of process. I am satisfied that collectively the following matters amount to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security:·the reasons of Parker J for making the indemnity costs order following the abandoning of the much of the defence.·Mr Psevdos’ information that he had wound down his business pending resolution of the appeal. In the absence of any affidavit from Mr Psevdos deposing to his financial position, this information suggests he may not have capacity to meet the outstanding indemnity costs order.·the dishonour of the cheque tendered to the Registry and the failure to remedy the matter until the dishonour was brought to Mr Psevdos’ attention.·Mr Psevdos said he is receiving income by way of trailing commissions but he chose not to depose to this in an affidavit, choosing to rely on his asserted interest in the Schutara property. Mr Psevdos said that if I did not accept his oral submissions, then he could not persuade me otherwise. He said if I was asking him to produce his “own personal position”, he was not prepared to do that and he did not think he was required to. The appeal is stayed pending payment of the security.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BAMPTON J

The court, in granting the application for security for costs, found that special circumstances existed which justified the making of such an order. Firstly, the court considered the reasons given by Parker J for making the indemnity costs order, following the abandonment of much of the defence. The court found that this amounted to special circumstances because it indicated that the appeal was likely to be without merit or an abuse of process. The court noted that the notice of appeal challenged Parker J’s findings on grounds that were abandoned at trial and that many of the grounds were without merit, arguably constituting an abuse of process.

Secondly, the court found that Mr Psevdos' information that he had wound down his business pending resolution of the appeal, in the absence of any affidavit from Mr Psevdos deposing to his financial position, suggested he may not have the capacity to meet the outstanding indemnity costs order. This, the court found, amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The court noted that Mr Psevdos had not provided any evidence of his financial position, which further supported the conclusion that he may not have the capacity to meet the outstanding costs order.

Thirdly, the court found that the dishonour of the cheque tendered to the Registry and the failure to remedy the matter until the dishonour was brought to Mr Psevdos’ attention amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The court found that this demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility on the part of Mr Psevdos.

Finally, the court found that Mr Psevdos' assertion that he was receiving income by way of trailing commissions, but choosing not to depose to this in an affidavit and choosing to rely on his asserted interest in the Schutara property, amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The court found that Mr Psevdos' refusal to provide evidence of his financial position, despite being asked to do so, further supported the conclusion that special circumstances existed.

In conclusion, the court found that special circumstances existed justifying the making of an order for security for costs, and ordered that Mr Psevdos pay security in the sum of $15,000. The court stayed the appeal pending payment of the security. The court followed prior authority in finding that special circumstances existed justifying the making of an order for security for costs, and in ordering the amount of security to be paid. The court distinguished prior authority in finding that Mr Psevdos' information that he had wound down his business pending resolution of the appeal, in the absence of any affidavit from Mr Psevdos deposing to his financial position, suggested he may not have the capacity to meet the outstanding indemnity costs order, amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The ratio decidendi of this case is that special circumstances exist justifying the making of an order for security for costs when there is evidence of a lack of financial responsibility, a refusal to provide evidence of financial position despite being asked to do so, and where the appeal is likely to be without merit or an abuse of process.