SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v PSEVDOS
[2015] SASC 139
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton
11 September 2015
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SECURITY FOR COSTS
PROCEDURE - COSTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the CBA) and Mr Psevdos as trustee for Orio Investment Trust made loans to Schutara Pty Ltd (Schutara) – Schutara granted each lender a mortgage over real property (the Schutara property) as security – a dispute arose as to which mortgage had priority – following a trial in the Supreme Court the CBA mortgage was found to have priority over the Psevdos mortgage – Mr Psevdos was ordered to pay costs of the entire action on an indemnity basis – Mr Psevdos filed a notice of appeal to the Full Court against that decision – the CBA applied for security for costs – whether special circumstances exist justifying the making of an order for security.
Held:
1. Special circumstances exist.
2. Mr Psevdos to pay security for costs in the sum of $15,000.
3. Appeal stayed pending payment of security.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 295(1)(g), referred to.
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v PSEVDOS
[2015] SASC 139Civil: Application
BAMPTON J.
On 21 May 2015, Mr Psevdos sought to appeal a judgment of Parker J delivered on 30 April 2015. The notice of appeal was served on the respondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the CBA). The cheque Mr Psevdos tendered to the Supreme Court Registry in payment of the appeal filing fee was dishonoured on 2 June 2015.
On 2 June 2015, unaware that the appeal had not been regularly instituted, the CBA made application for an order that Mr Psevdos pay security for costs in respect of his appeal.
Background
The trial of this matter concerned competing equitable interests in real property known as Trenance, Bonython Road, Bugle Ranges (the Schutara property). The CBA sought a declaration that its equitable interest has priority over any equitable interest held by the appellant, Mr Psevdos, acting as trustee of the Orio Investment Trust.
The CBA entered into a loan agreement in the sum of $2,550,200 with the registered proprietor of the Schutara property, Schutara Pty Ltd (Schutara) on 5 June 2009. Schutara gave a mortgage over the Schutara property to the CBA as security. Subsequently, on 29 June 2009, Schutara entered into a written loan agreement with Mr Psevdos, as trustee for Orio Investment Trust, in the amount of $378,000. Schutara granted Mr Psevdos a mortgage in registrable form as the agreed security. Mr Psevdos then lodged a caveat claiming an equitable interest as mortgagee over the Schutara property. The CBA became aware of the caveat and the CBA mortgage was amended to be expressly made subject to Mr Psevdos’ caveat so as to enable registration. The CBA mortgage was then registered subject to the caveat.
On 30 April 2015, Parker J found in…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] SASC 139
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the CBA had established special circumstances warranting the making of an order for security for costs and whether it was appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion in that regard. The court considered the reasons for the indemnity costs order, Mr Psevdos’ financial position, and the dishonour of a cheque tendered to the Registry as potential special circumstances. The court also noted the grounds of appeal as being largely without merit or potentially an abuse of process.
The court concluded that the special circumstances did justify the ordering of security for costs. The CBA had established that there were special circumstances warranting the making of the order and that it was appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion. The court ordered Mr Psevdos to pay security in the sum of $15,000. The appeal is stayed pending payment of the security.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BAMPTON J
The court, in granting the application for security for costs, found that special circumstances existed which justified the making of such an order. Firstly, the court considered the reasons given by Parker J for making the indemnity costs order, following the abandonment of much of the defence. The court found that this amounted to special circumstances because it indicated that the appeal was likely to be without merit or an abuse of process. The court noted that the notice of appeal challenged Parker J’s findings on grounds that were abandoned at trial and that many of the grounds were without merit, arguably constituting an abuse of process.
Secondly, the court found that Mr Psevdos' information that he had wound down his business pending resolution of the appeal, in the absence of any affidavit from Mr Psevdos deposing to his financial position, suggested he may not have the capacity to meet the outstanding indemnity costs order. This, the court found, amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The court noted that Mr Psevdos had not provided any evidence of his financial position, which further supported the conclusion that he may not have the capacity to meet the outstanding costs order.
Thirdly, the court found that the dishonour of the cheque tendered to the Registry and the failure to remedy the matter until the dishonour was brought to Mr Psevdos’ attention amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The court found that this demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility on the part of Mr Psevdos.
Finally, the court found that Mr Psevdos' assertion that he was receiving income by way of trailing commissions, but choosing not to depose to this in an affidavit and choosing to rely on his asserted interest in the Schutara property, amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The court found that Mr Psevdos' refusal to provide evidence of his financial position, despite being asked to do so, further supported the conclusion that special circumstances existed.
In conclusion, the court found that special circumstances existed justifying the making of an order for security for costs, and ordered that Mr Psevdos pay security in the sum of $15,000. The court stayed the appeal pending payment of the security. The court followed prior authority in finding that special circumstances existed justifying the making of an order for security for costs, and in ordering the amount of security to be paid. The court distinguished prior authority in finding that Mr Psevdos' information that he had wound down his business pending resolution of the appeal, in the absence of any affidavit from Mr Psevdos deposing to his financial position, suggested he may not have the capacity to meet the outstanding indemnity costs order, amounted to special circumstances justifying the ordering of security for costs. The ratio decidendi of this case is that special circumstances exist justifying the making of an order for security for costs when there is evidence of a lack of financial responsibility, a refusal to provide evidence of financial position despite being asked to do so, and where the appeal is likely to be without merit or an abuse of process.