SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
PSEVDOS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
[2018] SASC 9
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley
9 February 2018
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT - REOPENING APPEAL
Application pursuant to rules 194(8) and 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (SCR) for the reinstatement of an appeal.
The applicant instituted an appeal on 21 May 2015 against the orders of Parker J made on 30 April 2015. A judge of this court subsequently ordered the applicant provide security for the costs of the appeal and stayed the appeal pending payment of security. The applicant failed to pay the security. On 21 November 2015 the appeal lapsed pursuant to SCR 296. On 16 October 2017 the applicant filed this application to reinstate the appeal.
Held: Application dismissed.
1. The appeal is stayed by operation of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and as such any order by this Court pursuant to SCR 296(2) or 194(8) would be futile (at [43]). Further, the appeal is stayed pending payment of security for costs (at [33]).
2. In any event, the appeal stands dismissed on two bases: first, pursuant to SCR 296(2) by reason of the failure to set it down for hearing within six months of the appeal being instituted; and second, pursuant to SCR 194(6) as the action has been stayed for more than six months and is therefore automatically dismissed for want of prosecution (at 44]).
3. Special reasons have not been established for the Court to reinstate the appeal pursuant to SCR 194 or SCR 296 (at [49]).
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 194(6), r 194(8), r 296(2); Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58(1), s 60(2), s 60(3), referred to.
Moore v Macks [2007] FCA 10; Boensch v Pascoe [2007] FCA 1977; Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2016) 248 FCR 430; Duckworth v Water Corporation (2012) 261 FLR 185; Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713, applied.
PSEVDOS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
[2018] SASC 9Civil
STANLEY J.
Introduction
This is an application pursuant to rules 194(8) and 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (SCR) for the reinstatement of an appeal. In order to understand the basis of the application, it is necessary to set out in some detail the lengthy background.
Mr Psevdos brought an appeal against a judgment of Parker J who made orders granting a declaration to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) that its equitable interest in real property had priority over any equitable interest held by Mr Psevdos, acting as trustee of the Orio Investment Trust, in the same property. The Court ordered Mr Psevdos to pay the CBA’s costs of the trial on an indemnity basis. Parker J gave reasons for judgment in this matter on 30 April 2015.
Before judgment was delivered Mr Psevdos filed an interlocutory application on 29 April…
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- Case
- [2018] SASC 9
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues for the court to decide were whether the appeal could be reopened and whether the court should consider new evidence of the bank's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation. The court had to consider the powers available to it under South Australian law to reopen an appeal and the principles governing the admission of new evidence.
The court found that the application to reopen the appeal was not within the court's power under South Australian law. The court noted that the application was brought more than 12 months after the original appeal was dismissed, and there was no evidence of any exceptional circumstances that would warrant reopening the appeal. The court also found that the new evidence of the bank's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation was not relevant to the issues that were before the original appeal court. The court concluded that the application to reopen the appeal should be dismissed.
The court dismissed the application to reopen the appeal and ordered the parties to submit written submissions on costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The procedural history of the case of Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia commences with an initial interlocutory application filed by Mr Psevdos on 29 April 2015, seeking to reopen the proceedings on the basis of alleged new evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia concerning the status of Mr Marshall. This application was dismissed by Parker J, who proceeded to deliver judgment in the matter. Following the dismissal of his application to reopen the case, Mr Psevdos lodged an appeal against the judgment. The appeal was subsequently dismissed, leading Mr Psevdos to file an application for a new trial and to reinstate the appeal. This application for a new trial and the reinstatement of the appeal is the subject of the current decision. The court must now determine whether the appeal can be reinstated and, if so, whether the appeal court should consider fresh evidence on the issue of the CBA’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, despite the earlier dismissal of a similar application by Parker J.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STANLEY J
The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia in Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia considered the court's power to reopen an appeal under section 76(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The court acknowledged its inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes and ensure the administration of justice. However, it emphasized the need for discretion to be exercised judiciously, particularly in light of the potential delay and prejudice to other parties. The court underscored the principle that reopening an appeal is not to be undertaken lightly, as it may lead to substantial disruptions in the judicial process.
In evaluating whether there were sufficient grounds for Parker J to dismiss the applicant's interlocutory application seeking to reopen the case on the basis of fresh evidence of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation of Mr Marshall's status, the court scrutinized the application process and the evidence presented. The court noted that Parker J had already addressed the issue of reopening the case and dismissed the interlocutory application. The applicant's fresh evidence was deemed insufficient to warrant reopening the case, as it did not present a compelling reason to depart from the earlier decision. The court highlighted that the application for reopening should not be used as a substitute for proper legal argument or to circumvent the original judgment.
Regarding whether the appeal court, if the appeal were reinstated, should go behind Parker J's decision on the basis of the alleged fresh evidence of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia's fraudulent misrepresentation of Mr Marshall's status, the court firmly rejected this proposition. The court reasoned that Parker J had already adjudicated on the matter and rendered a judgment. The court underscored that the appeal court's role is to review the correctness of the primary judge's decision, not to re-evaluate the evidence or make a fresh determination. The court held that the applicant's submission to revisit the evidence was misconceived and would not be entertained if the appeal were reinstated.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of the appropriate costs to be awarded in this case. The court noted that it would hear the parties on the matter of costs, indicating that the decision on costs would be made after considering the overall conduct of the proceedings and the merits of the arguments presented. The court's approach to awarding costs was balanced, taking into account the procedural posture of the case and the conduct of both parties. This decision reflects the court's commitment to ensuring that the costs awarded are just and equitable under the circumstances.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the application, emphasizing its discretion in reopening appeals and the importance of adhering to procedural fairness. The court found Parker J's dismissal of the interlocutory application to be justified and rejected the notion that the appeal court should reconsider the fresh evidence. The decision also indicates the court's intention to carefully consider the costs aspect post-hearing, ensuring a fair and reasoned outcome in line with judicial principles.