Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 56 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

ISLANDER ENTERPRISES PTY LTD v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

[2024] SASCA 141

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice David)

5 December 2024

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SECURITY FOR COSTS

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - GENERALLY - REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - ADEQUACY OF REASONS

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

The appellant and the respondent entered into a contract for the provision of aerial surveillance operating in the Pacific region. The appellant commenced court proceedings arising out of the respondent’s alleged breaches of contract.

The respondent brought a security for costs application pursuant to Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (“UCR”) r 115.1. A Master of the Supreme Court (“the Master”) ordered that the appellant provide security for costs.

The appellant appealed the decision of the Master to a single Justice of the Supreme Court (“the appeal Judge”). The appeal Judge refused to grant leave to appeal, finding that there was no error in the Master’s reasoning, that the Master had taken all material considerations into account, and the finding of the appellant’s impecuniosity was justified.

On appeal, the appellant contended that the appeal Judge erred in failing to exercise the discretion afresh and failing to give adequate reasons for her decision.

The respondent filed a Notice of Alternative Contention. It also contended the appeal was incompetent as it had been automatically dismissed by operation of UCR r 115.1(5).

Held, per the Court, granting leave to appeal but dismissing the appeal:

1.It is in the interests of justice to dispense with the operation of UCR r 115.1, resulting in the proceedings being reinstated.

2.No error in the appeal Judge’s approach or reasoning has been demonstrated.

3.Upholding the Notice of Alternative Contention, irrespective of any alleged error, there was no realistic possibility that the result could have been different.

Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 1.5, 12.1, 115.1, 213.1, 215.1, 218.4, 218.13, 218.15, referred to.
AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379; Concrete Mining Structures Pty Ltd v Cellcrete Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 360; DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; Draoui v Le [2021] SASCA 33; Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (Reg) (No 2) (1991) 4 ACSR 355; Equity Access Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) ATPR 40-972; Foundas v Heritage and People’s Choice Ltd [2023] SASCA 87; Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32; Hegarty v Keogh [2021] SASCA 46; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Khoo v Bartholomaeus [2020] SASCFC 122; McDonald v Attorney-General (SA) [2022] SASCA 43; Morgan v WorkCover Corporation of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 141
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed a Master's decision to grant an application for security for costs made by the Commonwealth of Australia (the respondent). The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether the appeal judge erred in refusing leave to appeal the Master's decision, and whether the Master had properly exercised her discretion in ordering security for costs. This involved considering whether the appeal judge correctly applied the principles from *House v The King* when assessing the Master's discretionary decision, and whether the Master had taken all material considerations into account, including issues of delay, impecuniosity, potential stultification of the action, public interest, and previous costs orders.

The Full Court considered the appeal judge's reasoning, which affirmed the Master's findings. The appeal judge had declined to admit fresh evidence regarding impecuniosity, finding it should have been produced before the Master. The appeal judge found no error in the Master's assessment of delay, impecuniosity, the potential stultification of the action, the public interest, or the consideration of prior costs orders. Consequently, the appeal judge concluded that the Master had not acted on a wrong principle, been guided by irrelevant facts, mistaken the facts, or failed to consider material considerations, and that the order for security for costs was not manifestly unreasonable or unjust.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the appeal judge's decision to refuse leave to appeal the Master's order for security for costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd, an Australian company, filed a lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Australia, claiming breach of contract and seeking damages. The dispute arose from a contract for the construction of a wharf in the Northern Territory. Islander Enterprises alleged that the Commonwealth failed to fulfil its contractual obligations, resulting in significant financial losses. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, denied any breach of contract and argued that Islander Enterprises failed to meet its contractual duties.

In response to the lawsuit, the Commonwealth sought security for costs, arguing that Islander Enterprises was impecunious and there was a risk of the Commonwealth not being able to recover costs if it ultimately prevailed in the litigation. Islander Enterprises opposed the application for security for costs, submitting that it was not impecunious and that an order for security would stultify the action. The matter was heard by a Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia, who found in favour of the Commonwealth and ordered Islander Enterprises to provide security for costs.

Islander Enterprises appealed the Master’s decision to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appeal raised several grounds, including errors in the Master’s findings regarding undue delay, impecuniosity, stultification of the action, and the public interest. Islander Enterprises also sought to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, which the appeal Judge declined to admit as it was not truly "fresh" and should have been produced at the hearing before the Master. The appeal Judge ultimately found no errors in the Master’s reasoning and declined to grant leave to appeal, confirming the order for security for costs.

Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia commenced as a security for costs application in the South Australian Supreme Court. The appellant, Islander Enterprises, sought an order for the respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, to provide security for the costs of the proceeding. The Master initially declined to grant the security for costs order, finding that it was not in the interests of justice to do so. Islander Enterprises then appealed the Master’s decision to the Supreme Court. The appeal was heard by the appeal Judge, who reviewed the grounds of appeal submitted by Islander Enterprises. The appellant argued that the Master had erred in several respects, including in finding that there had been no undue delay, that Islander Enterprises was not impecunious, and that the order for security would not stultify the action. Islander Enterprises also sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, which the appeal Judge declined to admit as it was not truly fresh. The appeal Judge ultimately found no error in the Master’s reasoning and declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Master acted on a wrong principle or failed to consider material factors. Islander Enterprises subsequently applied for leave to appeal to a higher court, arguing that the appeal Judge’s decision was manifestly unreasonable. The procedural history of this matter highlights the importance of timely compliance with procedural rules and the court's discretion in managing the progression of appeals.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Master found that it was in the interests of justice to make the order.Decision of the appeal Judge The appellant appealed the Master’s decision. It was accepted before the appeal Judge that as it was an appeal from an interlocutory decision, she was to apply the principles enunciated in House v The King.[3] The appellant required leave to appeal.[3] (1936) 55 CLR 499. Before turning to the grounds of appeal, the appeal Judge dealt with the appellant’s application to produce fresh evidence. The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence on appeal (pursuant to UCR r 215.1(2)), namely affidavits of Mr Langton and the solicitor for the appellant. The content of the affidavits was relevant to the issue of impecuniosity. The appeal Judge considered this material and concluded that the material was available at the time of the hearing before the Master and should have been produced; that is, the proffered material was not ‘fresh’. The appeal Judge declined to admit the affidavits. Turning to the appeal, unsurprisingly the grounds of appeal framed the way the appeal Judge undertook her task. To assist in understanding the appeal Judge’s reasons it is necessary to outline the grounds of appeal. There were five grounds of appeal, all of which alleged errors in findings of the Master. Ground 1 alleged an error in the Master’s finding that there had been no undue delay. Ground 2 alleged an error in the Master’s finding that she could not find that the appellant was impecunious. Ground 3 alleged the Master erred in finding that an order for security would not stultify the action. Ground 4 alleged the Master erred in finding that it was in the interests of justice that the order be made. Ground 5 alleged the Master erred in failing to give appropriate weight to the fact that the respondent owed the appellant costs from a failed cross-vesting application. The appeal Judge found that in rejecting the appellant’s submissions and preferring those of the respondent, the Master took all material considerations into account. She found that both parties’ submissions had been considered, and no irrelevant or extraneous material was relied upon. The appeal Judge found that due to the lack of financial evidence, the Master’s finding that the appellant was not impecunious was justified. The appeal Judge found no error in the Master’s reasoning regarding the alleged stultification of the action against a corporation, the public interest argument and the consideration of previous costs orders. Thus, the appeal Judge declined to grant leave to appeal, finding the appellant did not demonstrate that the Master “acted on a wrong principle, was guided by extraneous or irrelevant facts, mistook the facts or failed to take into account a material consideration”. Granting the application for security for costs was not manifestly unreasonable or unjust, such that an inference could be made that there was a failure to properly exercise the discretion.Preliminary issue

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Hegarty, the appellant commenced an appeal on 30 December 2020. Under UCR r 218.13(3), the appellant was to file specified appeal documents by 30 March 2021, otherwise the appellate proceeding would be taken to be discontinued and lapse. Just prior to the expiration date, namely on 19 March 2021, the matter was listed in a callover: several documents had not been filed. On that date, Livesey JA (as he then was) granted the appellant an extension of time until 16 April 2021 in which to file an outline with that extension taking the appellant outside the three-month period. This, Livesey JA held, displaced the automatic discontinuance “otherwise effected by r 218.13(3)”.[6][6] Hegarty v Keogh [2021] SASCA 46 at [29]. Livesey JA observed:[7]The purpose of the callover extends beyond managing the listing of appeal hearing dates. The callover is the principal vehicle for the judicial management of appellate litigation in South Australia. At weekly callovers of less than one hour (civil and criminal callovers are held in alternating weeks), a single Judge will list appeals, make interlocutory orders, allocate hearing times for arguments and generally address all issues ancillary to the preparation and hearing of various appeals and applications for leave or permission to appeal. [7] Hegarty v Keogh [2021] SASCA 46 at [32]. In Mysko, UCR r 218.13 was engaged but the facts were different to those in Hegarty. The appellant commenced an appeal on 2 May 2023 and required to file appeal documents by 2 August 2023. The appellant did not do so. Unlike in Hegarty, no action was taken before the date when the appeal was deemed to have lapsed; that is, the Court had not, before the three-month time period elapsed, made any order or granted an extension of time. On 17 October 2023, the appellant lodged an interlocutory application for an adjournment of the appeal. At the hearing of that interlocutory application, Livesey P dismissed the adjournment application and ordered the respondent to file and serve an appeal book. On appeal, Doyle and Bleby JJA held that the interlocutory hearing and order for the appellant to file and serve an appeal book imposed “an alternative regime for progression of the appeal”, and so the appeal had not lapsed by reason of UCR r 218.13(3).[8][8] Mysko v Express Cargo Services [2023] SASCA 120 at [35]. The appellant submitted, based on the reasoning in Hegarty and Mysko, that there had been no “want of prosecution” and in any event by the making of orders at the callover, this Court had imposed an alternative timetable for the progression of the appeal thereby either extending the six-month period in UCR r 115.1(5) or dispensing with that requirement. Turning to the appellant’s submissions, there are similarities in the operation of UCR rr 218.13 and 115.1 but there are also differences. Both rules allow for the reinstatement of the appeal or action if special reasons are found to exist.[9] An obvious difference between the two rules is that failure to comply with UCR r 218.13(3) means the appellate proceeding is “taken to have been discontinued and lapses” whereas a failure to comply with UCR r 115.1(5) results in the action being “dismissed”. UCR r 115.1(5) operates not because of a failure to comply with a procedural requirement as to the listing of an appeal, but because of the applicant’s failure to perform the act which preserves its capacity to continue the action. A failure to comply with UCR r 115.1(5) is more serious than a failure to comply with UCR r 218.13(3).[9] Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 115.1(6) and 218.15(3).