FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 844
Appeal from: Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCCA 978 File number(s): SAD 133 of 2016 Judge(s): CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 27 July 2016 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – whether appeal stayed upon the appellant becoming a bankrupt – whether appeal deemed to have been abandoned by the trustee of the estate of the appellant – construction of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 36(1)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 41, 43, 58, 60, 116
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 21
Cases cited: Boensch v Pascoe [2007] FCA 1977
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297
Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713
Duckworth v Water Corporation (2012) 261 FLR 185, [2012] WASC 30
Farrah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89
Hicks v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757
Re Lofthouse (2001) 107 FCR 151, [2001] FCA 25
Stephen John Williams (liquidator of GP Aviation Group) v Glover and Pearson [2013] EWCH 1447 (Ch), [2014] 1 WLR 166
Date of hearing: 15 July 2016 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Roberts SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Fisher Jeffries Solicitor for the Interested Person: Mr K Ryder of O’Loughlins Lawyers ORDERS
SAD 133 of 2016 BETWEEN: SPIROS PSEVDOS
Appellant
AND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA ABN 48 123 123 124
Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 JULY 2016
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.This action was, on 6 June 2016, stayed by the operation of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2.This action is, by the operation of s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), deemed to have been abandoned as at the expiry of 18 July 2016.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
This is an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court pronounced on 28 April 2016: Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCCA 978. The primary Judge dismissed the appellant’s application for review of a decision of a Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse to set aside a bankruptcy notice served upon him by the respondent. The appeal against the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court was filed in this Court on 19 May 2016.
On 6 June 2016, a sequestration order was made against the appellant pursuant to s 43 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act) on a petition presented by the respondent: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480. The petition was…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 844
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the appeal constituted an "action" under section 60(2) of the Act, whether the appeal fell within the exceptions outlined in section 60(4)(a), and whether the appeal was deemed abandoned by the operation of section 60(3). The court had to determine if the appeal was subject to the stay provisions of the Act and if it could continue despite the appellant's bankruptcy. Additionally, the court had to examine whether the appeal was effectively abandoned by the trustee's inaction.
The court held that the appeal was a civil proceeding and thus fell within the definition of "action" in section 60(5) of the Act. However, the court found that the right to appeal was not a chose in action that vested in the trustee in bankruptcy under section 58(1) of the Act. Consequently, the court reasoned that the practical operation of section 60, when applied to an appeal concerning the legality of the bankruptcy notice itself, did not align with what could have been intended by the legislature. The court concluded that the appeal was not subject to the stay provisions of section 60(2) and that it was not deemed abandoned under section 60(3). The court granted the declaratory relief sought by the appellant, clarifying that the appeal was not stayed or abandoned by the appellant's bankruptcy.
The court did not, however, make any order dismissing the appeal. The court's decision clarified the scope of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and provided guidance on the treatment of appeals by bankrupts. This case underscores the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in a manner consistent with legislative intent, particularly in cases involving the rights and obligations of trustees in bankruptcy and the rights of bankrupts to pursue legal remedies.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons given below, the declaratory relief should be granted. I will not, however, make any order dismissing the appeal.CONSIDERATION Section 60 of the Act relevantly provides:60 Stay of legal proceedings…(2)An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action.(3)If the trustee does not make such an election within 28 days after notice of the action is served upon him or her by a defendant or other party to the action, he or she shall be deemed to have abandoned the action.(4)Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, a bankrupt may continue, in his or her own name, an action commenced by him or her before he or she became a bankrupt in respect of:(a)any personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt, his or her spouse or de facto partner or a member of his or her family; or(b)the death of his or her spouse or de facto partner or of a member of his or her family.Note: See also subsection 5(6).…(5)In this section, action means any civil proceeding, whether at law or in equity. A consequence of the sequestration order was that, subject to certain exceptions, the property of the appellant vested in the trustee of the appellant’s bankrupt estate: see s 58(1) of the Act. The property divisible between the appellant’s creditors does not, however, include (among other things) any damages or compensation for personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt: s 116(2)(g) of the Act. Three issues arise:(1)whether this appeal is an action to which s 60(2) of the Act applies;(2)whether this appeal meets the description in s 60(4)(a) such that the appellant would be entitled to continue the appeal in his own name notwithstanding anything in s 60;(3)whether this appeal is, by the operation of s 60(3) of the Act, deemed to have been abandoned as and from the expiry of 18 July 2016.Section 60(2) Section 60(2) of the Act applies to an “action” falling within the statutory definition of that word in s 60(5). In my opinion, the right to appeal exercised in the present case is not a chose in action that is properly characterised as property vested in the appellant’s trustee in bankruptcy. As to the nature of a chose in action see Stephen John Williams (liquidator of GP Aviation Group) v Glover and Pearson [2013] EWCH 1447 (Ch); [2014] 1 WLR 166. The appeal is, however, a “civil proceeding” and therefore falls within literal meaning of s 60(5). In its literal meaning, the definition of the word “action” encompasses all civil proceedings, whether or not the right to sue is a chose in action, that is, proprietary in nature and whether or not the right of action is one that is vested in the appellant’s trustee in bankruptcy under s 58(1) of the Act. An issue nonetheless arises as to whether the definition of the word “action” should, by necessary implication, be read down so as to exclude from its ambit a civil proceeding of this kind, namely an appeal concerning the legality of the very bankruptcy notice founding the sequestration order by which the appellant subsequently became a bankrupt. In their literal meaning, s 60(2), s 60(3) and s 60(5) operate to confer upon a person’s trustee in bankruptcy a discretion as to whether or not to prosecute an appeal in which the relief sought may affect a jurisdictional fact upon which the making of the sequestration order and the trustee’s own appointment may depend. I can conceive of no case in which a trustee of a bankrupt’s estate would exercise his or her discretion in favour of prosecuting such an appeal. When that circumstance is considered together with the circumstance that the right of appeal is not a chose in action vesting in the trustee under s 58, the practical operation of the Act invites the question as to whether or not a stay, discontinuance or deemed abandonment of an appeal of this kind is a consequence that could have been intended by the legislature.