Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 1118

Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480
File number(s): SAD 193 of 2016
Judge(s): CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 1 September 2016
Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – Federal Court – Powers and discretion of Federal Court – Leave to adduce further evidence on appeal under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – Principles for adducing further evidence – Procedure on an application to adduce further evidence under r 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – Where leave sought to issue subpoenas to obtain further evidence
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 60

Evidence Act 1929 (SA)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 27

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA)

Cases cited:

CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2015] SASC 66

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 844

Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCCA 978

Shannon v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2014) 318 ALR 420

Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492

Watson v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority and Others (2012) 206 FCR 365

Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212

Date of hearing: 1 September 2016
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Roberts SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Fisher Jeffries

ORDERS

SAD 193 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SPIROS PSEVDOS

Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA ABN 48 123 123 124

Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 SEPTEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s Amended Interlocutory Application dated 18 August 2016 is dismissed.

2.The question of costs on the Interlocutory Application is reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. By an Amended Interlocutory Application dated 18 August 2016, the appellant, Mr Psevdos, seeks leave to adduce further evidence on this appeal.  He also seeks leave to issue four subpoenas with a view to obtaining the further evidence he proposes to adduce.  By one subpoena Mr Psevdos seeks to compel the production of that part of a document containing material in respect of which legal professional privilege is claimed by the respondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA).  I will refer to that document as the RiskinSite Report.  By the remaining three subpoenas, Mr Psevdos seeks to compel the attendance of three witnesses to give evidence “to verify the veracity of the evidence before the Honourable Court”.…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1118
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia involved a dispute over the equitable priority of mortgages over real property. The original proceedings were between the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) and Mr Psevdos, with the Supreme Court of South Australia ruling in favour of CBA and ordering Mr Psevdos to pay indemnity costs. Mr Psevdos appealed, but the appeal lapsed due to non-payment of costs. Mr Psevdos then sought leave to adduce further evidence on appeal, specifically to cross-examine CBA's witnesses regarding their testimony in the original proceedings.

The legal issues centred on the principles governing the admission of further evidence on appeal under section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The court had to consider whether Mr Psevdos demonstrated good reason for not presenting this evidence at the original trial, and whether the proposed evidence was credible and likely to affect the outcome of the appeal. Additionally, the court had to address the procedural requirements set out in rule 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which mandates that applications for further evidence must be supported by an affidavit detailing the evidence and grounds of appeal.

The court found that Mr Psevdos did not meet the threshold for admitting further evidence. The application was dismissed on the basis that Mr Psevdos failed to demonstrate a good reason for not presenting the evidence at the original trial. The court also noted that Mr Psevdos could not provide a meaningful summary of the proposed evidence, and that he subjectively believed the original evidence was intentionally false, which did not support the admission of new evidence. Consequently, the application to adduce further evidence was dismissed, and the costs of the interlocutory application were reserved for a later determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s Amended Interlocutory Application dated 18 August 2016 is dismissed.

2. The question of costs on the Interlocutory Application is reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to the orders sought, it is necessary to traverse some of the history between Mr Psevdos and CBA.BACKGROUND In February 2015, CBA and Mr Psevdos were respectively the plaintiff and defendant in an equitable priority dispute tried in the Supreme Court of South Australia. They each alleged competing equitable interests in the nature of mortgages over real property owned by a third party and located in the Bugle Ranges. The interest asserted by Mr Psevdos is alleged to have arisen in connection with a loan contract between the registered proprietor of the property and Mr Psevdos “as Trustee of the Orio Investment Trust” (Trust). The loan was said to have been advanced by Mr Psevdos in his capacity as Trustee of the Trust. CBA was not a party to that loan contract. Under the terms of the Orio Trust Deed, Mr Psevdos assumed personal liability for the debts or liabilities that he incurred in his capacity as Trustee of the Trust, although I note that issue is contentious on this appeal. The trial proceeded over four days before the Honourable Justice Parker of that Court. On the final day of the trial, Mr Psevdos abandoned substantive pleas in his Defence and otherwise sought not to challenge the evidence of CBA. On 30 April 2015, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in favour of CBA and made an indemnity costs order against Mr Psevdos in respect of the whole of the action: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2015] SASC 66, at [25] – [26] (the Costs Order). The reasons for judgment record that Mr Psevdos did not oppose an indemnity costs order being made against him. Mr Psevdos was represented by counsel for the purposes of that trial. Prior to the delivery of judgment in that action, Mr Psevdos had made an application to reopen his case to adduce further evidence and to cross examine a witness called by CBA, including a proposed addressee of a subpoena on this appeal, Mr Peter John Marshall. That application was dismissed. Mr Psevdos filed a Notice of Appeal. He was ordered to pay security for costs on the appeal, which he did not pay. The appeal has since lapsed under the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). I should note that although Mr Psevdos submitted before the learned primary judge that the appeal was capable of being revived, he has not made any application for it to be reinstated. I accept that as Mr Psevdos is presently a bankrupt, the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) would prevent him from commencing that appeal, even in his capacity as a Trustee of the Trust. Following judgment in the Supreme Court proceedings, CBA pursued the quantification of its costs in accordance with the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). At a hearing before Master Dart of the Supreme Court conducted on 18 September 2015, Mr Psevdos, by his solicitor, consented to an interim allocatur in partial satisfaction of the Costs Order in the amount of $120,068.98 (the Allocatur). The Allocatur was not expressed in terms limiting or excluding Mr Psevdos’ personal liability. It is Mr Psevdos’ position on this appeal that he consented to the issue of the Allocatur not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as the Trustee of the Trust. Execution of the Allocatur was stayed, by consent, until 30 October 2015. No appeal was commenced against the issue of the Allocatur.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The stated purpose for calling Mr Marshall, Mr Ralston and Mr Skates is to have each of those witnesses “verify the veracity of the evidence before the Honourable Court”. That is, with respect, a peculiar phrase, particularly in circumstances where CBA has neither adduced nor sought to adduce any evidence in this Court in the relevant sense. Interpreting the phrase beneficially toward Mr Psevdos, I proceed on the basis that Mr Psevdos seeks to cross examine each of the witnesses in relation to evidence given by them at least in the Supreme Court proceedings and (at least) in connection with the subject matter in dispute in that action, namely the parties’ competing propriety claims over the Bugle Ranges property. Evidence adduced for that purpose would constitute further evidence on the appeal in that such evidence could not have been before the learned primary judge on his determination of CBA’s Petition.THE APPLICATION TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE – PRINCIPLES This Court has the discretion to receive further evidence on the appeal: s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FC Act). Section 27 of the FC Act is silent as to the matters which are to govern the exercise of the discretion. The discretion is to be exercised judicially and consistently with the judicial process: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 504-505 (Dixon J). In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 Gaudron J said, in connection with a provision conferring a relevantly equivalent discretion on the Family Court of Australia (at [55]):The fact that the power to admit further evidence is conferred on a court exercising appellate jurisdiction is of conservable relevance. More particularly, it is relevant that it is a power to be exercised after a hearing conducted in accordance with procedures that allow the parties to put their case and, also, to answer the case made against them. That consideration requires that, ordinarily, further evidence should not be admitted on appeal if it was available, or could reasonably have been obtained, at the time of the hearing. … McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ said, of the same provision (at [116]):The failure to have adduced the evidence before the primary judge will be a variable factor, the weight of which will depend upon all the other factors pertinent to the case. Where the evidence has been deliberately withheld, the failure to call it will ordinarily weigh heavily in the exercise of the discretion. In other cases, the failure to call the evidence even if it could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence may be of little significance. No invariable rule concerning the failure to call the evidence can or should be laid down in view of the wide discretion conferred on the court by the section. In Shannon v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2014) 318 ALR 420, the appellant sought leave pursuant to s 27 of the FC Act to lead “further” evidence on an appeal against a sequestration order on the grounds, among others, that he had been denied procedural fairness when his adjournment application before the primary judge was refused. Logan J emphasised (at [78]) that good reason must be demonstrated as to why further evidence should be received. In the same case, Flick and Perry JJ said (at [127]):… The application to adduce ‘further’ evidence was tantamount to an invitation to this Court to revisit the findings of fact made by the primary Judge, not upon the evidence before that Judge, but upon the basis of ‘further’ evidence. To accede to such an application too readily would be tantamount to impermissibly shifting the arena of dispute from a primary judge to an appellate court: compare cf. CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 202; Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd (2003) 2 ABC (NS) 32 at 48; [2003] FCAFC 200 at [66] per French, Cooper, Rd Nicholson JJ.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Rule 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that an application to lead further evidence on an appeal must be accompanied by an affidavit explaining inter alia the further evidence sought to be adduced and the grounds of appeal to which the application relates. Compliance with that rule facilitates the objective that an applicant show that the evidence is credible and probative of an issue in the trial and, if accepted, likely to effect the result of the proceeding: see Watson v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority and Others (2012) 206 FCR 365, [110] (Lander, Jessup and Foster JJ).CONSIDERATION It is a unique feature of Mr Psevdos’ application that he does not presently have in his possession the further evidence he seeks to adduce on the appeal. Nor is Mr Psevdos in a position to give a meaningful summary of the testimony that would be given by the three proposed witnesses, assuming that he was to be granted leave to issue subpoenas to them, and also assuming that he was to be granted leave to cross examine the witnesses on limited topics or otherwise at large. In an affidavit sworn on 27 November 2015 in support of his application to have the Bankruptcy Notice set aside, Mr Psevdos deposed to matters arising in the Supreme Court proceedings in connection with the Bugle Ranges property. He claimed that it was the CBA’s case at trial that “the deposit of five titles pertaining to the security property was made with its authorised purported employee” Mr Peter Marshall. He stated that it had come to his attention after the conclusion of evidence in the Supreme Court proceedings that Mr Marshall was not an employee of CBA but an independent contractor. He states that he had brought Mr Marshall’s true employment status to the attention of the Honourable Justice Parker by making an application to adduce further evidence in those proceedings on 29 April 2015. Mr Psevdos goes on to state:42.To wit: the application mentioned above was unsuccessful. Mr Marshall’s employment status is questionable and when that fact was drawn to the attention of the Court, the Honourable Justice Parker deemed it irrelevant on 30th April 2015 and then proceeded to deliver his Judgment. His Honours decision to proceed regardless of fact has disturbed me greatly.43.The non-discloser of Mr Marshall true employment status at the trail was unfair and deceitful by design I believe. The expression ‘by design’ is employed in this affidavit with the intention to mean: the non-discloser was as a result of a plan to conceal the fact.(grammar and emphasis retained) I should say that Mr Psevdos’ submissions before me used the phrase “fraud” in the same sense described in that passage of his affidavit. It is apparent from that evidence that Mr Psevdos subjectively believed, from at least 29 April 2015, that the evidence given in the Supreme Court proceedings was intentionally false. That is the same subject matter in respect of which Mr Psevdos now seeks to cross-examine Mr Marshall on this appeal, again assuming he could compel the attendance of that witness by the issue of a subpoena.