FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 1118
Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480 File number(s): SAD 193 of 2016 Judge(s): CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 1 September 2016 Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – Federal Court – Powers and discretion of Federal Court – Leave to adduce further evidence on appeal under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – Principles for adducing further evidence – Procedure on an application to adduce further evidence under r 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – Where leave sought to issue subpoenas to obtain further evidence Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 60
Evidence Act 1929 (SA)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 27
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA)
Cases cited: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2015] SASC 66
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Psevdos [2016] FCCA 1480
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1
Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 844
Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCCA 978
Shannon v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2014) 318 ALR 420
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492
Watson v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority and Others (2012) 206 FCR 365
Date of hearing: 1 September 2016 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 44 Counsel for the Appellant: Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Roberts SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Fisher Jeffries ORDERS
SAD 193 of 2016 BETWEEN: SPIROS PSEVDOS
Appellant
AND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA ABN 48 123 123 124
Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 SEPTEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s Amended Interlocutory Application dated 18 August 2016 is dismissed.
2.The question of costs on the Interlocutory Application is reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
By an Amended Interlocutory Application dated 18 August 2016, the appellant, Mr Psevdos, seeks leave to adduce further evidence on this appeal. He also seeks leave to issue four subpoenas with a view to obtaining the further evidence he proposes to adduce. By one subpoena Mr Psevdos seeks to compel the production of that part of a document containing material in respect of which legal professional privilege is claimed by the respondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA). I will refer to that document as the RiskinSite Report. By the remaining three subpoenas, Mr Psevdos seeks to compel the attendance of three witnesses to give evidence “to verify the veracity of the evidence before the Honourable Court”.…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1118
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centred on the principles governing the admission of further evidence on appeal under section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The court had to consider whether Mr Psevdos demonstrated good reason for not presenting this evidence at the original trial, and whether the proposed evidence was credible and likely to affect the outcome of the appeal. Additionally, the court had to address the procedural requirements set out in rule 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which mandates that applications for further evidence must be supported by an affidavit detailing the evidence and grounds of appeal.
The court found that Mr Psevdos did not meet the threshold for admitting further evidence. The application was dismissed on the basis that Mr Psevdos failed to demonstrate a good reason for not presenting the evidence at the original trial. The court also noted that Mr Psevdos could not provide a meaningful summary of the proposed evidence, and that he subjectively believed the original evidence was intentionally false, which did not support the admission of new evidence. Consequently, the application to adduce further evidence was dismissed, and the costs of the interlocutory application were reserved for a later determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s Amended Interlocutory Application dated 18 August 2016 is dismissed.
2. The question of costs on the Interlocutory Application is reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Rule 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that an application to lead further evidence on an appeal must be accompanied by an affidavit explaining inter alia the further evidence sought to be adduced and the grounds of appeal to which the application relates. Compliance with that rule facilitates the objective that an applicant show that the evidence is credible and probative of an issue in the trial and, if accepted, likely to effect the result of the proceeding: see Watson v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority and Others (2012) 206 FCR 365, [110] (Lander, Jessup and Foster JJ).CONSIDERATION It is a unique feature of Mr Psevdos’ application that he does not presently have in his possession the further evidence he seeks to adduce on the appeal. Nor is Mr Psevdos in a position to give a meaningful summary of the testimony that would be given by the three proposed witnesses, assuming that he was to be granted leave to issue subpoenas to them, and also assuming that he was to be granted leave to cross examine the witnesses on limited topics or otherwise at large. In an affidavit sworn on 27 November 2015 in support of his application to have the Bankruptcy Notice set aside, Mr Psevdos deposed to matters arising in the Supreme Court proceedings in connection with the Bugle Ranges property. He claimed that it was the CBA’s case at trial that “the deposit of five titles pertaining to the security property was made with its authorised purported employee” Mr Peter Marshall. He stated that it had come to his attention after the conclusion of evidence in the Supreme Court proceedings that Mr Marshall was not an employee of CBA but an independent contractor. He states that he had brought Mr Marshall’s true employment status to the attention of the Honourable Justice Parker by making an application to adduce further evidence in those proceedings on 29 April 2015. Mr Psevdos goes on to state:42.To wit: the application mentioned above was unsuccessful. Mr Marshall’s employment status is questionable and when that fact was drawn to the attention of the Court, the Honourable Justice Parker deemed it irrelevant on 30th April 2015 and then proceeded to deliver his Judgment. His Honours decision to proceed regardless of fact has disturbed me greatly.43.The non-discloser of Mr Marshall true employment status at the trail was unfair and deceitful by design I believe. The expression ‘by design’ is employed in this affidavit with the intention to mean: the non-discloser was as a result of a plan to conceal the fact.(grammar and emphasis retained) I should say that Mr Psevdos’ submissions before me used the phrase “fraud” in the same sense described in that passage of his affidavit. It is apparent from that evidence that Mr Psevdos subjectively believed, from at least 29 April 2015, that the evidence given in the Supreme Court proceedings was intentionally false. That is the same subject matter in respect of which Mr Psevdos now seeks to cross-examine Mr Marshall on this appeal, again assuming he could compel the attendance of that witness by the issue of a subpoena.