Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (ABN 48123123124)

[2018] SASC 40

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Permission to Appeal)

PSEVDOS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA (ABN 48123123124)

[2018] SASC 40

Reasons for Ruling of The Honourable Justice Stanley

28 March 2018

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT - REOPENING APPEAL

Interlocutory application for permission to appeal to the Full Court pursuant to rules 288(1)(a) and 289(1) (b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006.

A judge of this court dismissed an interlocutory application by the applicant for the reinstatement of an appeal on the basis that the appeal was stayed by the operation of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and by a further order of this court, and that the applicant could not establish special reasons to reinstate the appeal.

The applicant now seeks permission to appeal to the Full Court against the judgment refusing the application to reinstate the appeal.

Held: Application dismissed.

1.  An appeal to the Full Court does not enjoy a reasonable prospect of success.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 60; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 288(1)(a), r 289(1)(b), referred to.
Psevdos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] SASC 9, discussed.

PSEVDOS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA (ABN 48123123124)
[2018] SASC 40

Civil:       Application for permission to appeal

1. STANLEY J:         On 9 February 2018, I dismissed an application by the applicant, Mr Psevdos, for the reinstatement of an appeal instituted by him from a judgment of Parker J who made orders granting a declaration to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) that its equitable interests in real property had priority over any equitable interest held by Mr Psevdos, acting as trustee of the Orio Investment Trust, in the same property.  The background to that judgment and subsequent events are set out in my Reasons for Judgment.[1]

   [1] [2018] SASC 9.

2. In short, I dismissed the application on the basis that it was futile, as the appeal was stayed by the operation of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and a further order of this Court staying the appeal pending payment of security for costs, which has not occurred. Further, I dismissed the application on the basis that Mr Psevdos could not establish special reasons to reinstate the appeal, given his failure to set it down for hearing within six months of the appeal being instituted and where the appeal had been automatically dismissed for want of prosecution, as it had been stayed for more than six months.

3. I have considered the written submissions filed by Mr Psedvos which largely reiterate the argument before me.

4. I would dismiss the application for permission to appeal to the Full Court.  In my view, an appeal to the Full Court does not enjoy a reasonable prospect of success.