FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dean v Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Trustee) [2016] FCA 648
Appeal from: Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd v Dean [2015] FCCA 3398 File number: NSD 173 of 2016 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 3 June 2016 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY — Appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of decision of Registrar to make a sequestration order — whether primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo — whether primary judge erred in declining to go behind consent judgment — whether primary judge disregarded debtor’s evidence — whether debtor’s evidence sufficient to discharge evidential burden Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss s 43, 52(1)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 104(2)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 20.03(a)
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2
Cases cited: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1
Craig v State of South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163
Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581
Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84
In Re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 633
Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207
Smith v Abbott Stillman & Wilson [2007] FCA 1256
Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491
Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480
Date of hearing: 10 May 2016 Date of last submissions: 13 May 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 94 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J M Selimi Solicitor for the Appellant: Ravi James Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Ms T M Power Solicitor for the Respondent: Gadens Lawyers Table of Corrections 9 June 2016 The date of last submissions has been corrected. ORDERS
NSD 173 of 2016 BETWEEN: NOOR DEAN
Appellant
AND: PEPPER FINANCE CORPORATION LTD (ABN 51 094 317 647) AS TRUSTEE OF THE COLLECTION SERVICE TRUST 1 (ABN 24 896 187 341)
Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 JUNE 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The respondent’s costs be paid from the appellant’s bankrupt estate.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Section 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides that at the hearing of a creditor’s petition the Court shall require proof of the matters stated in the petition, service of the petition, and the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing. Only if it is satisfied with the proof of all these matters may it make a sequestration order against the debtor’s estate. Even then, it is not obliged to do so and may dismiss the petition if it…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 648
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo, which would have required him to disregard the consent judgment and rely solely on the debtor's evidence. The court rejected this argument, noting that the primary judge did not treat the judgment as conclusive or irrebuttable, but instead exercised a discretion to decide whether to go behind the judgment. This approach was consistent with legal authorities, which do not require courts to disregard the existence of a judgment when determining whether a debt is still owed.
The court also considered whether the primary judge disregarded the debtor’s evidence. The debtor had provided an affidavit outlining his version of events, but the court found that his evidence was not sufficient to discharge the evidential burden. The debtor failed to provide any documentary evidence to support his claims, and his assertions about the documents he possessed were vague and unsubstantiated.
The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and the respondent’s costs be paid from the appellant’s bankrupt estate. The court found that the primary judge had properly exercised his discretion and that the debtor’s evidence was insufficient to rebut the creditor’s proof of debt.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The respondent’s costs be paid from the appellant’s bankrupt estate.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The jurisdiction to make a sequestration order derives from s 43 of the Act. It relevantly provides:43 Jurisdiction to make sequestration orders(1) Subject to this Act, where:(a) a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy; and(b) at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor:(i) was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;(ii) had a dwelling-house or place of business in Australia;(iii)was carrying on business in Australia, either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or(iv)was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners or of an agent or manager;the Court may, on a petition presented by a creditor, make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.(2)Upon the making of a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor, the debtor becomes a bankrupt, and continues to be a bankrupt until:(a) he or she is discharged by force of subsection 149(1); or(b) his or her bankruptcy is annulled by force of subsection 74(5) or 153A(1) or under section 153B. Section 52, to which I referred at the outset, relevantly states:52 Proceedings and order on creditor’s petition(1) At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of:(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);(b) service of the petition; and(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.…(2)If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:(a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;it may dismiss the petition. The argument in support of this ground was to the effect that the primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo of the creditor’s petition. The premise for the argument was that his Honour disregarded Mr Dean’s evidence (the subject of ground 3 of the amended notice of appeal) and relied upon the consent judgment “as conclusive proof” or “irrefutable evidence” of the existence of the debt. Consequently, so the argument ran, the primary judge fell into jurisdictional error (see Craig v State of South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163 at 175–176). The argument must be rejected because its underlying premise cannot be accepted. First, the primary judge did not hold that the judgment was conclusive or treat it as irrebuttable. If he had done so, there would have been no need for him to inquire, as he did, whether the discretion should be exercised to go behind the judgment. Mr Selimi of counsel, who appeared for Mr Dean both in this Court and the court below, emphasised the necessity for the Court to be satisfied that the underlying debt was still owing and seemed to submit, at times, that that meant that the court was bound to disregard the existence of the judgment. If that is in truth what he was saying, it is contrary to the authorities upon which he relied. A submission to similar effect was described by Lord Esher MR as “preposterous” in Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers, Limited (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 85–6 (Fry and Lopes JJ agreeing). Furthermore, it is also contrary to the position Mr Selimi put to the primary judge. There, at ts 5–6 he is recorded as saying:Firstly, in my submission, on the basis of the affidavit sworn by the applicant, Mr Dean, the court has the power to go behind a judgment. Clearly there is a discretion involved in whether it ought to go behind a judgment, particularly a consent judgment.…So I deal with that issue squarely, your Honour. It’s clearly the most formidable obstacle to success in this case.