Dean v Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Trustee)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dean v Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Trustee) [2016] FCA 648

Appeal from: Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd v Dean [2015] FCCA 3398
File number: NSD 173 of 2016
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 3 June 2016
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY — Appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of decision of Registrar to make a sequestration order — whether primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo — whether primary judge erred in declining to go behind consent judgment — whether primary judge disregarded debtor’s evidence — whether debtor’s evidence sufficient to discharge evidential burden
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss s 43, 52(1)

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 104(2)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 20.03(a)

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2

Cases cited:

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Craig v State of South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163

Dang v R [2014] NSWCCA 47

Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581

Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84

In Re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 633

Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176

O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207

Smith v Abbott Stillman & Wilson [2007] FCA 1256

Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193

Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491

Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480

Date of hearing: 10 May 2016
Date of last submissions: 13 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 94
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J M Selimi
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ravi James Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms T M Power
Solicitor for the Respondent: Gadens Lawyers
Table of Corrections
9 June 2016 The date of last submissions has been corrected.

ORDERS

NSD 173 of 2016
BETWEEN:

NOOR DEAN

Appellant

AND:

PEPPER FINANCE CORPORATION LTD (ABN 51 094 317 647) AS TRUSTEE OF THE COLLECTION SERVICE TRUST 1 (ABN 24 896 187 341)

Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The respondent’s costs be paid from the appellant’s bankrupt estate.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Section 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides that at the hearing of a creditor’s petition the Court shall require proof of the matters stated in the petition, service of the petition, and the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing. Only if it is satisfied with the proof of all these matters may it make a sequestration order against the debtor’s estate. Even then, it is not obliged to do so and may dismiss the petition if it…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 648
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dean v Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Trustee) involved an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for review of a decision of the Registrar to make a sequestration order. The dispute concerned whether the primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo, whether the primary judge erred in declining to go behind a consent judgment, whether the primary judge disregarded debtor’s evidence, and whether the debtor’s evidence was sufficient to discharge the evidential burden.

The court considered whether the primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo, which would have required him to disregard the consent judgment and rely solely on the debtor's evidence. The court rejected this argument, noting that the primary judge did not treat the judgment as conclusive or irrebuttable, but instead exercised a discretion to decide whether to go behind the judgment. This approach was consistent with legal authorities, which do not require courts to disregard the existence of a judgment when determining whether a debt is still owed.

The court also considered whether the primary judge disregarded the debtor’s evidence. The debtor had provided an affidavit outlining his version of events, but the court found that his evidence was not sufficient to discharge the evidential burden. The debtor failed to provide any documentary evidence to support his claims, and his assertions about the documents he possessed were vague and unsubstantiated.

The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and the respondent’s costs be paid from the appellant’s bankrupt estate. The court found that the primary judge had properly exercised his discretion and that the debtor’s evidence was insufficient to rebut the creditor’s proof of debt.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The respondent’s costs be paid from the appellant’s bankrupt estate.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Neither party tendered the guarantee.Mr Dean’s evidence Mr Dean’s affidavit sets out the circumstances in which he contends that the consent judgment came to be made. After referring to the creditor’s petition, which he asserted was issued “on the basis of an alleged loan from Capital Finance”, he stated (without alteration):I have previously signed an application with Capital Finance on the basis of advice from the self-styled Finance Broker, Emmanuelle Camiolo. I am not aware of and have neither received a confirmation that Capital Finance had approved finance to purchase the subject Motor Vehicle. What followed is an account of Mr Dean’s dealings with Mr Camiolo, starting with a visit from him “in or about the month of January, 2011” at Mr Dean’s then city office. Mr Dean said that Mr Camiolo was “not previously known to [him]” and had no previous association with him. He said that the purpose of the visit was to give Mr Dean instructions to act for Mr Camiolo in “a substantial case” involving his companies. A short time later, however, Mr Dean said that he was given a brief to defend Mr Camiolo on a number of fraud charges. Mr Dean said that he obtained Mr Camiolo’s release on bail and asked him to bring all his documents over for him to review. Mr Dean stated that Mr Camiolo did not visit him until some weeks later, when he walked in without an appointment and asked Mr Dean to act for him. Mr Dean said that he took Mr Camiolo’s instructions but, as Mr Camiolo did not pay Mr Dean for his services, after a time Mr Dean terminated the retainer. Mr Dean said that Mr Camiolo tried to sell him a car on a number of occasions and eventually he agreed to buy one, on finance that Mr Camiolo was to provide. After receiving the loan documents, however, Mr Dean said that he told Mr Camiolo that he did not want the car. Despite this, he said that “[t]he subject vehicle was bought using [Mr Dean’s] name and finance documents signed by [him] to obtain finance”. Mr Dean went on to claim that Mr Camiolo obtained a credit card in his name. Annexed to the affidavit is a document that appears to be a letter dated 19 January 2011 from American Express to “Mr. N Dean”, informing him that he was to receive an American Express Small Business Card, subject to Mr Dean verifying certain information or documents that American Express stated it had requested from him or his accountant. Mr Dean said that the address to which the letter was sent is not his own and is in fact Mr Camiolo’s. He did not say, however, how, if that were so, he came into possession of it. Finally, Mr Dean claimed to have discovered two further documents. One was a handwritten letter he said was “allegedly signed by [him] and bearing [his] name as an Officer of a certain Company [Camiolo] resigning from appointment”. The other was a document that on one side, he asserted, carried a forged signature “as a ‘Resignation of Director Authority’” and on the other a typed version of a “‘Deed of Appointment of New Trustee’ of ‘The Camiolo Family Trust’”, which is written on what purports to be the letterhead of Maddocks Lawyers and is marked as a draft. Once again, assuming his assertions are true, he did not say how he came to be in possession of these documents. Mr Dean also said that he has heard from other unnamed persons that Mr Camiolo has been posing as him.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge’s reasons are certainly brief, arguably too brief. The entire judgment, which was delivered ex tempore, consisted of 12 paragraphs. It also contained a number of obvious mistakes, evincing a failure to proof the judgment properly or at all. But no ground of appeal was pleaded and no argument put that the reasons were appealably inadequate. The question is whether the primary judge erred as alleged. The judgment debt The petitioning creditor (Pepper) sued Mr Dean in the Local Court of New South Wales to recover a debt arising under the terms of a guarantee. In its statement of claim, Pepper alleged that Capital Finance Australia Limited (Capital Finance), which had assigned its rights under the agreement to Pepper, had agreed to hire a Mercedes Benz two-door cabriolet to Camiolo Corporation Pty Ltd (Camiolo) and that Capital Finance had delivered the car to Camiolo in accordance with the terms of the agreement. To secure Camiolo’s obligations under the agreement, Mr Dean was said to have agreed to guarantee Camiolo’s obligations and indemnify Capital Finance for “all liabilities, losses and expenses” arising from Camiolo’s failure to pay any amount required to be paid under the agreement. Pepper pleaded that, under the terms of the agreement, if Camiolo did not pay an instalment when it fell due, Capital Finance was entitled to terminate the agreement and repossess the car and Mr Dean was required to pay Capital Finance on demand all outstanding amounts, the costs of repossession, and certain other sums specified in the agreement. After Camiolo defaulted under the agreement by failing to make an instalment when it fell due, Capital Finance called on Mr Dean to pay the full amount owing under the agreement but Mr Dean failed to comply with the demand. Mr Dean filed a defence denying liability on the basis that the car was never delivered to Camiolo (though the particulars to this allegation state that the car was never delivered to Mr Dean), but he offered no evidence and consented to the entry of judgment in Pepper’s favour.The bankruptcy proceedings Nevertheless, Mr Dean did not pay the judgment sum and on 21 January 2015 a bankruptcy notice was issued at Pepper’s request claiming that he owed Pepper $52,400.70, being five cents shy of the full amount of the judgment debt. Under the terms of the notice, within 21 days after it was served upon him Mr Dean was required to pay Pepper that amount or make arrangements to Pepper’s satisfaction for settlement of the debt. The bankruptcy notice, together with a copy of the “judgment/order” which it attached, was served on Mr Dean personally at the law offices where he then worked on 2 February 2015. Consequently, he had until 23 February to comply unless within that time he applied to have the notice set aside. He did not comply with the notice or apply to have it set aside, so on 16 April 2015 Pepper filed a creditor’s petition in the Federal Circuit Court. Rule 2.06 of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth) required a person who intends to oppose a petition to file and serve a notice in the approved form setting out the grounds of opposition to the petition. But no such document was ever filed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The jurisdiction to make a sequestration order derives from s 43 of the Act. It relevantly provides:43 Jurisdiction to make sequestration orders(1) Subject to this Act, where:(a) a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy; and(b) at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor:(i) was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;(ii) had a dwelling-house or place of business in Australia;(iii)was carrying on business in Australia, either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or(iv)was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners or of an agent or manager;the Court may, on a petition presented by a creditor, make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.(2)Upon the making of a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor, the debtor becomes a bankrupt, and continues to be a bankrupt until:(a) he or she is discharged by force of subsection 149(1); or(b) his or her bankruptcy is annulled by force of subsection 74(5) or 153A(1) or under section 153B. Section 52, to which I referred at the outset, relevantly states:52 Proceedings and order on creditor’s petition(1) At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of:(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);(b) service of the petition; and(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.…(2)If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:(a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;it may dismiss the petition. The argument in support of this ground was to the effect that the primary judge failed to conduct a hearing de novo of the creditor’s petition. The premise for the argument was that his Honour disregarded Mr Dean’s evidence (the subject of ground 3 of the amended notice of appeal) and relied upon the consent judgment “as conclusive proof” or “irrefutable evidence” of the existence of the debt. Consequently, so the argument ran, the primary judge fell into jurisdictional error (see Craig v State of South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163 at 175–176). The argument must be rejected because its underlying premise cannot be accepted. First, the primary judge did not hold that the judgment was conclusive or treat it as irrebuttable. If he had done so, there would have been no need for him to inquire, as he did, whether the discretion should be exercised to go behind the judgment. Mr Selimi of counsel, who appeared for Mr Dean both in this Court and the court below, emphasised the necessity for the Court to be satisfied that the underlying debt was still owing and seemed to submit, at times, that that meant that the court was bound to disregard the existence of the judgment. If that is in truth what he was saying, it is contrary to the authorities upon which he relied. A submission to similar effect was described by Lord Esher MR as “preposterous” in Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers, Limited (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 85–6 (Fry and Lopes JJ agreeing). Furthermore, it is also contrary to the position Mr Selimi put to the primary judge. There, at ts 5–6 he is recorded as saying:Firstly, in my submission, on the basis of the affidavit sworn by the applicant, Mr Dean, the court has the power to go behind a judgment. Clearly there is a discretion involved in whether it ought to go behind a judgment, particularly a consent judgment.…So I deal with that issue squarely, your Honour. It’s clearly the most formidable obstacle to success in this case.