Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207

Citation: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207
Parties: RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 003 184 889) v ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON
File number: NSD 660 of 2015
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2015
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – exercise of discretion to “go behind” a judgment – circumstances in which discretion may be exercised not enlivened – alternatively, discretion exercised adversely to judgment debtor    
Cases cited: Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (QLD) (1987) 76 ALR 137
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans [2005] FCA 978
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343
Hacker v Weston [2015] FCA 363
Re Hughes; Ex parte Geo M Hume Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 680
Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176, (2014) 319 ALR 646
Ramsay Health Care Pty Limited v Adrian Compton [2015] NSWSC 163
Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212
Date of hearing: 24 September 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Newlinds SC with Mr J Hynes
Solicitor for the Applicant: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Cotman SC with Mr A Di Francesco
Solicitor for the Respondent: Pavuk Legal

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 660 of 2015

BETWEEN:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ACN 003 184 889)

Applicant

AND:

ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON
Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties are to bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons within 14 days.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 660 of 2015

BETWEEN:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ACN 003 184 889)

Applicant

AND:

ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON
Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE:

11 NOVEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In June 2015 there was filed in this Court a Creditor’s Petition.  The petitioning creditor is Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd (“Ramsay Health Care”).  The Respondent is Adrian John Compton.  Ramsay Health Care’s Petition maintained that Mr Compton owed it $9,810,312.33, that amount being the amount of a judgment entered pursuant to orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the “Supreme Court”).

  2. Mr Compton was a director of Compton Fellers Pty Ltd, which formerly traded as MediChoice.  The company is now in liquidation.  It acted as a distributor to co-ordinate the procurement, logistics and inventory management of medical non-consumable products for use in hospitals operated by the Ramsay group of companies.  Mr Compton had signed a guarantee.

  3. A Notice stating grounds of opposition to the Creditor’s Petition was filed on 7 July 2015.  Mr Compton opposes the Creditor’s Petition upon the basis that no debt “

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1207
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton involved a dispute concerning the enforcement of a judgment in bankruptcy proceedings. The primary issue before the court was whether the discretion to "go behind" a judgment should be exercised in this case, particularly given that the judgment was obtained following a trial. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The court was required to determine the circumstances under which it could exercise its discretion to "go behind" a judgment. The principles governing this discretion were well-established: the court generally looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments, and will not reopen a judgment obtained after a full trial unless there is evidence of fraud, collusion, or a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, if the challenge to the judgment only seeks a reduction in the debt amount, rather than negating the existence of the debt, the court is unlikely to exercise its discretion. The court also considered whether the debtor had raised the grounds for challenging the judgment at the appropriate time.

The court found that the circumstances did not justify exercising the discretion to "go behind" the judgment. The judgment had been obtained following a trial where both parties were present, and there was no evidence of fraud, collusion, or a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, the debtor had not raised the grounds for challenging the judgment at the appropriate stage of the litigation. Consequently, the court exercised its discretion against the debtor.

The court ordered that the parties were to bring in Short Minutes of Orders within 14 days to give effect to these reasons, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons within 14 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The earlier decisions have also been more recently reviewed by Wigney J in Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176, (2014) 319 ALR 646. His Honour there helpfully summarised the principles to be applied as follows:Relevant principles — “Going behind” a judgment[69] The existence of a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 355; [1951] ALR 525 (Corney v Brien) per Fullagar J. However, a judgment is never conclusive in bankruptcy and the court has a discretion to “go behind” the judgment to investigate whether there was a good debt to support it: Corney v Brien at CLR 347 per Dixon, Williams, Webb, Kitto JJ, at 353–4 per Fullagar J.[70] The court will not, however, inquire into the consideration for a judgment as a matter of course: Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 222–3; [1972] ALR 307 per Barwick CJ. Whilst the circumstances in which the court will inquire into the validity of a judgment debt are not closed … and there is no inflexible rule … it is possible to identify a number of guiding principles.[71] First, the court looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments … Where the judgment in question is a default judgment, it appears that the court will always “go behind” the judgment if there is what it regards as a bona fide allegation that no real debt lay behind the judgment: Corney v Brien at 357–8 per Fullagar J.[72] Second, if the judgment in question followed a full investigation at a trial at which both parties appeared, the court will not reopen the matter unless a prima facie case of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice is made out: Corney v Brien at 356–7 per Fullagar J. In Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 86, Fry LJ said: “this power has never, so far as I am aware, been extended to cases in which a judgment has been obtained after issues have been tried out before a [c]ourt”. In Corney v Brien, Fullagar J said (Corney v Brien at 358) that he had not been able to find any such case since Fry LJ made this statement in 1888.[73] Third, where judgment has been entered in pursuance of a compromise, grounds must be shown for challenging the compromise before the subject matter of the judgment will be reopened: Corney v Brien at 357 per Fullagar J. That is because it is the compromise and not the claim that was compromised that is the foundation of the judgment …… [77] Fourth, the court should not go behind a judgment where the grounds upon which the judgment is challenged are such that, if accepted, they would only support a finding that the amount of the debt be reduced and would not support a finding that there was, in truth, no debt at all …[78] The particular circumstances of any given case may no doubt throw up other considerations relevant to whether the court should exercise its discretion to go behind a judgment. Where the judgment debtor seeks to go behind the judgment on particular grounds, it is difficult to see why it would not be a relevant consideration that those grounds could have been, but were not, raised in opposition to the judgment, or in an application to set aside the judgment. Parties are ordinarily bound by the way they have chosen to conduct litigation. The fact that, for whatever reason, a party did not put particular arguments before the court that made (or refused to set aside) the judgment does not mean that there was no relevant hearing on the merits …[79] The question whether the judgment is to be reopened or “gone behind” at all will usually involve some preliminary investigation of the merits of the attack of the judgment: Corney v Brien at 358. That question can and often is dealt with as a preliminary question … Once the court decides that it will go behind the judgment “the whole [of the] matter is open”: Corney v Brien at 358. Where it is legitimate to go behind a judgment entered after trial, there would effectively be no alternative but to retry the whole case.The discretion exercised

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.