Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (No 2) [2016] FCA 691

File number: NSD 660 of 2015
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 8 June 2016
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY – when is a petition “presented” – lapse of petition

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to extend duration of creditor’s petition – slip rule – application made after petition had lapsed

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 52

Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth), rr 1.34, 2.24, 2.25, 39.05

Cases cited:

Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385

Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 131, (2013) 216 FCR 375

Nugawela v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 578

Purden Pty Ltd v Registrar in Bankruptcy (1982) 64 FLR 306

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207

Date of hearing: 8 June 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A J McInerney SC with Mr K Josifoski
Solicitor for the Applicant: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Cotman SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Pavuk Legal

ORDERS

NSD 660 of 2015
BETWEEN:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ACN 008 184 889)

Applicant

AND:

ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON

Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties are to bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons forthwith.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In June 2015 there was filed in this Court a Creditor’s Petition.  The petitioning creditor is Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd (“Ramsay Health Care”).  The Respondent is Adrian John Compton.  Ramsay Health Care maintains that Mr Compton owes it $9,810,312.33, that amount being the amount of a judgment entered pursuant to orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

  2. In July 2015 Mr Compton filed an Interim Application seeking (inter alia) an order that this Court “go behind” the Supreme Court judgment.

  3. In November 2015 it was concluded that the Court would not “go behind” the judgment: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207.

  4. An application for leave to appeal (and the appeal, if leave were granted) was heard in May 2016.  The Full Court has reserved its decision.

  5. The matter has assumed some present degree of urgency because Ramsay Health Care seeks an extension of the duration of its petition pursuant to s 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the “Bankruptcy Act”).

  6. Section 52 provides as follows:

    Proceedings and order on creditor's petition

    (1)        At the hearing of a creditor's petition, the Court shall require proof of:

    (a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 691
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (No 2), the court was required to determine whether an application to extend the duration of a creditor’s petition could be made after the petition had lapsed. The dispute arose from an accidental slip or omission in the drafting of an order that resulted in the petition lapsing before it could be served. The petitioner, Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd, sought to invoke the slip rule to correct the error.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of the slip rule under Rule 39.05(h) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, and whether this rule could be invoked to correct an error that occurred after the statutory period for the application to be made had expired. The petitioner argued that the rule could be invoked irrespective of the time constraints set by statute, while the respondent argued that the statutory period was mandatory and could not be extended by the application of the slip rule.

The court held that the slip rule could be invoked to correct an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order, even if the statutory period for making the application had expired. The court relied on previous cases such as Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd and Lockhart J’s observation that the slip rule applies where the proposed amendment is one upon which no real difference of opinion can exist. The court also noted that the slip rule extends to permit the correction of an order or decree where the omission results from the inadvertence of a party’s legal representative. The court concluded that an order under the slip rule in relation to such an order is appropriately seen not as varying it or setting it aside, but as merely correcting it by including an ancillary order which the court and the parties intended to be included.

The court ordered that the parties bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons forthwith, as per Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons forthwith.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It is by recourse to r 39.05(h) that Ramsay Health Care, it is respectfully considered, meets with greater success. Rule 39.04 provides as follows:Varying or setting aside a judgment or order before it has been entered The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order before it has been entered.Rule 39.05 provides in part as follows:Varying or setting aside judgment or order after it has been entered The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if: …(h)there is an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission. The rule, it is concluded, may be invoked even though the period prescribed by s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act has expired: cf. Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385. Section 459R of the Corporations Law there prescribed that the Court could extend the period within which an application to wind up a company could be made only if “the order is made within that period”, namely 6 months. With reference to the predecessor provision to that now found in r 39.05(h), Lockhart J there concluded:The slip rule applies where the proposed amendment is one upon which no real difference of opinion can exist. It does not apply where the amendment is a matter of controversy, nor does it extend to mistakes that are the consequence of a deliberate decision …The slip rule may be invoked irrespective of whether the order has been drawn up, passed and entered …It is well settled that the application of the slip rule is not confined to giving effect to the intention of the judge at the time when the court's order was made, or judgment given. It extends to the intention which the court would have had, but for the failure that caused the accidental slip or omission … The rule also extends to permit the correction of an order or decree where the omission results from the inadvertence of a party's legal representative …Justice Lindgren similarly observed:Availability of an order under the slip ruleThe question remains whether s 459R(2) and (3) have the effect of excluding the availability of the slip rule in any case where the court does not in fact make an order for extension within the time specified. This was correctly treated by the parties as the most substantial issue raised by the case.It is a strong thing to hold that the rule is not available. Cases even more demanding of an order under the rule than the present one can be imagined …His Honour reviewed the authorities and concluded:What this analysis emphasises in the context of the facts of the present case is, first, that there must have been an order made within the statutory period, and secondly, that an order under the slip rule in relation to such an order is appropriately seen not as varying it or setting it aside, but as merely correcting it by including an ancillary order which the court and the parties intended to be included.Chief Justice Black agreed with both Lockhart and Lindgren JJ. The rule is “not confined to errors or omissions of the Court; it extends to errors or omissions resulting from the inadvertence of a party’s legal representative”: Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 131 at [26], (2013) 216 FCR 375 at 380 to 381 per Allsop CJ, Katzmann and Perry JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.