Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Compton

[2016] FCAFC 125

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Compton (No 2) [2016] FCA 691
File number: NSD 1385 of 2016
Judge: RARES, GLEESON AND MARKOVIC JJ
Date of judgment: 26 August 2016
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY – creditor’s petition – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – where due to inadvertence of solicitor no order made extending time before petition lapsed under s 52(4) due to expiry of 12 months from date of presentation – where order made under slip rule extending time before which petition lapsed by three months and granting liberty to apply to seek further extension – where s 52(5) provided any extension be made before expiry of 12 months from presentation for a period exceeding 12 months and not exceeding 24 months –whether slip rule permitted extension of petition following expiration of initial statutory time limit of 12 months

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – slip rule – whether further one or more orders could be made after petition had lapsed under s 52(5) of Bankruptcy Act 1966 extending period before which creditor’s petition lapsed – whether slip rule provided power to extend petition from date of error even though no power to make order for an extension of time under s 52(5) after petition lapsed – whether use of slip rule corrected an accidental slip or omission or determined substance of result

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 33, 44, 52

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 39.05

Cases cited:

Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218

Compton v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 106

David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265

Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385

Grant Samuel Corporate Finance Pty Limited v Fletcher (2015) 254 CLR 477

L. Shaddock and Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [No 2] (1982) 151 CLR 590

Purden Pty Ltd v Registrar in Bankruptcy (1982) 64 FLR 306

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (No 3) [2016] FCA 954

Re Svir; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 314

Re Young;  Ex parte Smith (1985) 5 FCR 204

Date of hearing: 26 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Newlinds SC with Mr J Hynes
Solicitor for the Applicant: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Di Francesco
Solicitor for the Respondent: Pavuk Legal

ORDERS

NSD 1385 of 2016
BETWEEN:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED ACN 003 184 889

Applicant

AND:

ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON

Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, GLEESON AND MARKOVIC JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be granted an extension of time and leave to appeal.

2.The appellant file and serve a…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton involved a dispute concerning a creditor's petition under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether an extension of the time limit for the petition could be granted after the initial 12-month statutory period had expired, considering the inadvertent oversight by the petitioner's solicitor. The court was required to determine whether the slip rule could be applied to permit such an extension and whether it corrected an accidental error or affected the substantive outcome.

The primary judge found that the petition was presented when it was electronically lodged, and the solicitor's error in not applying for an extension was an accidental slip. He concluded that the slip rule could be used to extend the petition's life, drawing on precedents that supported the court's discretion to correct errors in its orders. However, it was noted that the primary judge had erred in believing that a further extension could be granted after the initial 12-month period under s 52(5). The court clarified that such extensions could only be made during the initial 12 months.

The court ultimately decided that the slip rule could indeed be used to correct the inadvertent oversight, but it had to be exercised within the statutory timeframe. The appeal was allowed, and the court set aside the previous orders, substituting them with an amendment that the petition would lapse 24 months from its presentation. Ramsay Health Care was granted leave to appeal and an extension of time, while the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application and appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted an extension of time and leave to appeal.

2. The appellant file and serve a notice of appeal in the form of the draft accompanying the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal within 7 days.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. Orders 1 and 3 made on 9 June 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the orders made on 3 December 2015 be amended by adding:

“5A Pursuant to s 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) the creditor’s petition will lapse at the expiration of the period of 24 months following its presentation on 5 June 2015, namely on 5 June 2017.”

5. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Rule 39.05(h) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides:The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:…(h)there is an error or omission arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.Background The first slip arose because of the inadvertence of Ramsay’s solicitor by overlooking the operation of s 52(4) and (5) of the Act. That occurred, as the solicitor frankly explained in her affidavit of 8 June 2016, because she had thought that the time for determining the petition had been “adjourned” on 3 December 2015 when his Honour made order 5 that provided that:There is to be an adjournment of the creditor’s petition proceedings pending the determination of the application for leave to appeal and (if leave is granted) the appeal. That order was necessary because the primary judge had also ordered, as a separate question on 3 December 2015, that he would not go behind the judgment debt on which the petition had been founded. Mr Compton wanted to challenge that decision in the application he made for leave to appeal. Thus, the remaining issues on the petition would not be decided until the proposed appellate processes had been completed. In the event, on 6 May 2016, a Full Court heard concurrently the application for leave to appeal with the appeal, and then their Honours reserved their decision. It was only on 8 June 2016 that the solicitor realised that Ramsay needed to apply under s 52(5) to extend the life of the petition. She had thought that, although the petition had been electronically lodged on 5 June 2015, it had only been presented when the Court’s registry recorded, at 1.53 pm on 9 June 2015, that it had accepted that lodgment.The primary judge’s decision The primary judge followed what Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ had held in Purden Pty Ltd v Registrar in Bankruptcy (1982) 64 FLR 306, namely that the presentation of a petition occurred when and as soon as the document is delivered to, and accepted by, an officer of the Court. Accordingly, he found that the electronic lodgment of the petition, on 5 June 2015, that bore the electronic acknowledgment that the document “has been accepted for filing under the Court’s Rules”, amounted to the act of presentation under s 44(1) of the Act. That finding is not challenged on the appeal. Next, the primary judge found that the solicitor’s misunderstanding of the effect of order 5, made on 3 December 2015, was an accidental slip for the purposes of r 39.05(h). He found that, had the necessity to apply under s 52(5) for an extension of the life of the petition occurred to Ramsay’s solicitor at the conclusion of the Full Court hearing on 6 May 2016, their Honours would have ordered an extension of time before the petition would otherwise have lapsed on 5 June 2016. As that had not happened, the primary judge concluded that he had jurisdiction, under r 39.05(h), to make an order extending the period under s 52(5). His Honour followed a similar approach to the approach Black CJ, Lockhart and Lindgren JJ had adopted in Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 in granting an extension of time for determination of an application to wind up a company in insolvency under s 459R of the Corporations Law. However, the primary judge did not vary, or set aside, any order in exercising the power under r 39.05(h).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was only on 8 June 2016 that the solicitor realised that Ramsay needed to apply under s 52(5) to extend the life of the petition. She had thought that, although the petition had been electronically lodged on 5 June 2015, it had only been presented when the Court’s registry recorded, at 1.53 pm on 9 June 2015, that it had accepted that lodgment.The primary judge’s decision The primary judge followed what Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ had held in Purden Pty Ltd v Registrar in Bankruptcy (1982) 64 FLR 306, namely that the presentation of a petition occurred when and as soon as the document is delivered to, and accepted by, an officer of the Court. Accordingly, he found that the electronic lodgment of the petition, on 5 June 2015, that bore the electronic acknowledgment that the document “has been accepted for filing under the Court’s Rules”, amounted to the act of presentation under s 44(1) of the Act. That finding is not challenged on the appeal. Next, the primary judge found that the solicitor’s misunderstanding of the effect of order 5, made on 3 December 2015, was an accidental slip for the purposes of r 39.05(h). He found that, had the necessity to apply under s 52(5) for an extension of the life of the petition occurred to Ramsay’s solicitor at the conclusion of the Full Court hearing on 6 May 2016, their Honours would have ordered an extension of time before the petition would otherwise have lapsed on 5 June 2016. As that had not happened, the primary judge concluded that he had jurisdiction, under r 39.05(h), to make an order extending the period under s 52(5). His Honour followed a similar approach to the approach Black CJ, Lockhart and Lindgren JJ had adopted in Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 in granting an extension of time for determination of an application to wind up a company in insolvency under s 459R of the Corporations Law. However, the primary judge did not vary, or set aside, any order in exercising the power under r 39.05(h). Next, his Honour found that he should grant an extension of three months, to 5 September 2016, and the petition would then lapse unless otherwise extended. In addition, as we have noted, he made an order that a further application to extend time under s 52(5) could be made before then. Both parties agreed that his Honour erred in his understanding that a further extension could be granted after the expiration of 12 months following the presentation of the petition specified for granting an extension under s 52(5), leaving aside the capacity to do so under the slip rule. The primary judge did not have his attention drawn to Re Svir; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 314 where Burchett J had held that the power under s 52(5) to order any extension of the 12-month period could only be exercised during that period. That was by dint of the words “…at any time before the expiration of the period of 12 months” as they qualify the discretionary power in s 52(5). Burchett J applied what Bowen CJ, Sweeney and Lockhart JJ had said in Re Young; Ex parte Smith (1985) 5 FCR 204 at 208, namely:… s 52(4) and (5) ensure, first, that petitions lapse upon the expiration of twelve months from the date of presentation of the petition unless, within that period, the court extends the duration of the petition to a maximum of a further twelve months; and second, that the court's power cannot be exercised outside the initial twelve months period. (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Relevantly, s 33(1)(c) of the Act gives the Court a discretion to extend any time limited by the Act after its expiration “if this Act does not expressly provide to the contrary” and s 52(4) and (5) provide:(4) A creditor’s petition lapses at the expiration of:(a)subject to paragraph (b), the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of the petition; or(b)if the Court makes an order under subsection (5) in relation to the petition – the period fixed by the order;unless, before the expiration of whichever of those periods is applicable, a sequestration order is made on the petition or the petition is dismissed or withdrawn.(5) The Court may, at any time before the expiration of the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of a creditor’s petition, if it considers it just and equitable to do so, upon such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, order that the period at the expiration of which the petition will lapse be such period, being a period exceeding 12 months and not exceeding 24 months, commencing on the date of presentation of the petition as is specified in the order. (emphasis added) Rule 39.05(h) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides:The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:…(h)there is an error or omission arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.Background The first slip arose because of the inadvertence of Ramsay’s solicitor by overlooking the operation of s 52(4) and (5) of the Act. That occurred, as the solicitor frankly explained in her affidavit of 8 June 2016, because she had thought that the time for determining the petition had been “adjourned” on 3 December 2015 when his Honour made order 5 that provided that:There is to be an adjournment of the creditor’s petition proceedings pending the determination of the application for leave to appeal and (if leave is granted) the appeal. That order was necessary because the primary judge had also ordered, as a separate question on 3 December 2015, that he would not go behind the judgment debt on which the petition had been founded. Mr Compton wanted to challenge that decision in the application he made for leave to appeal. Thus, the remaining issues on the petition would not be decided until the proposed appellate processes had been completed. In the event, on 6 May 2016, a Full Court heard concurrently the application for leave to appeal with the appeal, and then their Honours reserved their decision. It was only on 8 June 2016 that the solicitor realised that Ramsay needed to apply under s 52(5) to extend the life of the petition. She had thought that, although the petition had been electronically lodged on 5 June 2015, it had only been presented when the Court’s registry recorded, at 1.53 pm on 9 June 2015, that it had accepted that lodgment.The primary judge’s decision The primary judge followed what Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ had held in Purden Pty Ltd v Registrar in Bankruptcy (1982) 64 FLR 306, namely that the presentation of a petition occurred when and as soon as the document is delivered to, and accepted by, an officer of the Court. Accordingly, he found that the electronic lodgment of the petition, on 5 June 2015, that bore the electronic acknowledgment that the document “has been accepted for filing under the Court’s Rules”, amounted to the act of presentation under s 44(1) of the Act. That finding is not challenged on the appeal.