FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Hrycenko (by His Legal Representative Hycenko) v Hrycenko [2022] FedCFamC2G 2
File number(s): MLG 2739 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE BURCHARDT Date of judgment: 14 January 2022 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application to extend time for preparation of creditor’s petition – application made after sequestration order made – whether court has power to extend the petition nunc pro tunc in these circumstances – lapse of petition due to inadvertent error by solicitor for the applicant – where court would undoubtedly have extended time had it been sought – orders made as sought by the creditor. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (General Federal Law) Rules 2021
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001Cases cited: Amorin Constructions Pty Ltd v Kamtech Electrical Services Pty Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 627; [2008] NSWSC 285
ASIC v Mitchell (No 4) [2021] FCA 1387
Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385
Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission [1997] 188 CLR 114
Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCAFC 197
Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375
Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd (2006) 154 FCR 554
L Shaddock and Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590
Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2018] FCAFC 102
Ramsay Health Care v Compton (2016) 247 FCR 387Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 67 Date of last submission/s: 14 December 2021 Date of hearing: 14 December 2021 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Bevan Solicitor for the Applicant: Kennedy Guy Solicitors Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Fary SC Solicitor for the Respondent: NOH Legal ORDERS
MLG 2739 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
IN THE MATTER OF VICTOR HRYCENKO
BETWEEN: GEORGE HRYCENKO (BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NICHOLAS HYCENKO)
Applicant
AND: VICTOR HRYCENKO
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE BURCHARDT
DATE OF ORDER:
14 JANUARY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to Order 39.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 the orders made 14 May 2021 be amended nunc pro tunc by the addition of an order that:
(a)Pursuant to section 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that the time for expiration of the Creditor’s Petition in this proceeding be extended up to and including 15 July 2022.
2.Any application for costs to be filed and served together with submissions of no more than 3 pages on or before 21 January 2022.
3.Any submissions in reply limited to 3 pages be filed and served on or before 28 January 2022.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 2
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether it had the power to extend the petition nunc pro tunc, considering the inadvertent error by the applicant's solicitor. The court considered the established authority on the matter, which held that the court has the power to extend the life of a lapsed petition in appropriate circumstances. The court also examined the specific circumstances of this case, including the substantial delay caused by the debtor's actions and the inadvertent error made by both parties. The court concluded that had the applicant sought an extension of time, it would have been just and equitable to grant it.
The court held that it had the power to extend the petition nunc pro tunc and that it was appropriate to do so in this case. The court reasoned that all parties proceeded on the assumption that the petition was properly before the court and to be heard and determined. The court found that there was no basis to summarily dismiss the petition due to the delay, which was substantially caused by the debtor. Consequently, the court granted the application as sought by the creditor.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel then turned to the second proposition and submitted that there must be an error in the relevant order. It is not the Court’s role to monitor the expiration of the petition. The Court might not have extended the petition. This was not a case like Luck where there was only a two-week gap. Here, it was 11 weeks, and an application could have been made to the Court. It was not inevitable that it would be made on 14 May. It was not an error of the Court but rather an error of the solicitor to apply prior to expiry of the petitionCONSIDERATION From all the wealth of authority to which I have been referred, I would take it to be established that:(a)the Court has power to extend the life of a petition which has lapsed in appropriate circumstances. This is established by Ramsay and Endresz. (b)whether the power is available will depend upon the particular circumstances of each case; (c)the respondent’s strong submission as to the distinction between jurisdictional and procedural characterisation is not supported by the majority decision in Emanuele; (d)there must be an error in the relevant order for the Court’s power under the slip rule to arise; (e)whether there is an error in the order may be proved either by direct evidence or by inference (see Griffiths at [68]). In this case, the following pertinent facts, in my view, are not open to challenge. The petition was presented on 29 July 2020 and therefore lapsed, prima facie, on 28 July 2020. A relatively substantial period of delay was occasioned solely by the conduct of the debtor in seeking to challenge the decision of the Registrar in relation to the setting aside of the bankruptcy notice and resulting in, ultimately, the decision of Judge McNab. Thereafter, it was the respondent debtor who suggested, via his legal representatives, to the applicant that the matter not be listed before 23 July 2021 to suit the convenience of senior Counsel of the debtor. The debtor did not turn their mind to the expiration or lapse of the petition (see the affidavit of Mr El-Hissi). Likewise, the solicitor for the applicant did not turn his mind to the expiration of the petition. Likewise, again, neither did I. In asking for a listing of the matter within five days of the expiration, the parties plainly committed an inadvertent error. It must have been readily foreseeable, had they turned their minds to the matter, that the Court would be unable, given its general listing pressures, to be able to accommodate the matter prior to 28 July, let alone giving a decision. Contrary to the submissions advanced by Counsel for the debtor, I have no doubt whatever, having considered the matter further (I expressed a slightly more nuanced view during the trial), that I would have extended the time for the hearing of the petition. All parties proceeded on the footing that the petition was properly before the Court and to be heard and determined. Orders were made by consent for the filing of material. There is no conceivable basis upon which I would have in effect summarily dismissed the petition merely because of a delay that was most substantially caused by the conduct and requirements of the debtor himself. If the applicant had sought an extension of time in the 14 May 2021 Orders I would certainly have regarded it as just and equitable to make it.