Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Limited [2006] FCAFC 149

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – the slip rule – whether the slip rule authorizes the making of an order after the expiration of the statutory time limit for doing so – whether the power for doing so is restricted to a superior court of record

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether ‘reserving judgment’ is an order in itself – whether ‘reserving judgment’ is an order of adjournment

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘judgment or order’, ‘adjourn’, ‘adjournment’

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43, 52(4), 52(5)
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) ss 42, 43, 90
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459R
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 4, 59(4)
Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 13
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules, O 1 r 4, O 19 r 7, O 30 r 3, O 35 r 7(3)
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 rr 1.05, 16.05, 16.5, 16.07, 16.08

Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld) ss 24, 30, 33

Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1991) 61 FCR 384 questioned
Gikas v Paparagiouto (1977) 2 NSWLR 945 cited
R v Essex Justices; ex parte Final [1963] 2 QB 816 cited
Bankstown Grammar School Ltd v Park [2000] FCA 1205 discussed
Re Howell; ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 70 FCR 261 considered
Komesaroff v Law Institute of Victoria (1997) FCA 965 considered
Re Langridge; ex parte Bennett Carroll and Gibbons (1998) FCA 879 considered
Matthews v Collett [2000] FCA 224 discussed
Re Young; ex parte Smith (1985) 5 FCR 204 cited
Ah Toy vRegistrar of Companies (1985) 10 FCR 280 cited
Minister for Works (WA) v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd (1966-67) 116 CLR 273 considered
Driclad Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 121 CLR 45 discussed
Moller v Roy (1975) 132 CLR 622 discussed
Saffron v The Queen (1953) 88 CLR 523 considered
The President of India v The Moor Line Limited (No 2) (1955-1958) 99 CLR 212 cited
Westpac Banking Corporation v E & W Jury Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 540 discussed
Whitaker v Wisbey (1852) Cox’s CC 107 cited
Yapp v Williams (1901) WN 91 13 ALR 645 considered
In re Keystone Knitting Mills’ Trade Mark [1929] 1 Ch 92 cited
Thunderbird Products Corporation v Thunderbird Marine Products Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 592 cited
R v McGregor (1977) 13 ALR 645 cited

E Campbell, ‘Revocation and Variation of Administrative Decisions’, (1996) 22(1) Mon LR 30
K Mason (now President of the News South Wales Court of Appeal), ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’, (1983) 57 ALJ 449

Hale’s, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, vol II, E. Lynch, 1778
The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol 6, Oxford University Press, 2003
Holdsworth’s, A History of English Law, vol 1, Sweet and Maxwell, 1982
The Supreme Court Practice 1987 (the White Book)

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd, the dispute centred around the interpretation and application of court rules concerning the correction of judgments or orders. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the plaintiff sought to amend a previous judgment under specific rules that allow for such corrections due to clerical errors or similar oversights.

The primary legal issue was whether the court could extend the time limits for correcting a judgment under the relevant statutes. The court had to determine if the statutory provisions allowed for such extensions beyond the prescribed deadlines, and if so, under what conditions. Additionally, the court needed to clarify the scope of the power to correct errors, distinguishing it from the power to set aside or vary a judgment.

The court held that the power to correct a judgment is narrowly defined and is intended to address clerical errors or similar oversights, not substantive errors in judgment. The court emphasized that there is no general power to relieve from the consequences of time limits imposed by statute. For an extension of time to be granted, there must be a clear causal connection between the error and the failure to meet the statutory deadlines. The court also noted that the power to correct is distinct from the power to vary or set aside a judgment, reinforcing the limited scope of the correction power.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made on 2 August 2005, and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceedings below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made on 2 August 2005 be set aside.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings below.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER ACJ, DOWSETT AND COLLIER JJ
In the latter case, the rule contemplates a causal connection between the slip or omission and the error. If the rule is to be invoked in order to effect an extension of time beyond the time permitted by s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act or s 459R of the Corporations Act, then there must be a judgment or order to be corrected, and it must have been made within the prescribed time. The power is to correct, not to vary or set aside. There is no general power to relieve from the consequences of either section. A JUDGMENT OR ORDER The expression ‘judgment or order’ in O 35 r 7.3 has the same meaning as that expression has in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the “Federal Court Act”). See subs 59(4) of the Federal Court Act and s 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth). In s 4 of the Federal Court Act the term “judgment” is defined to mean ‘a judgment, decree or order, whether final or interlocutory, or a sentence …’. It seems to have been generally accepted that those words should be given the same meaning as similar expressions in the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (the “Judiciary Act”) and in the Constitution. See Ah Toy vRegistrar of Companies (1985) 10 FCR 280 at 285. The definition of “judgment” in s 4 suggests that there is no need, for present purposes, to distinguish between a judgment, a decree, an order or a sentence. In Minister for Works (WA) v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd (1966-67) 116 CLR 273, Barwick J said at 277:‘It is of the essence of a judgment within the meaning of the Constitution that it is binding upon parties and definitive of legal rights. It is not enough that the judge or court exercise a jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a manner judicial in its substance. The judge or court must authorizedly give a binding judgment which determines or settles rights.’ In Driclad Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 121 CLR 45 at 64 Barwick CJ and Kitto J said:‘The taxpayers lodged notices of appeal to the Full Court which were expressed as if the appeals were against the reasons of Taylor J relating to the “B” part of the fund rather than against the orders that he made. Needless to say, this was erroneous, because it is of the nature of appeals, as s 73 of the Constitution recognizes, that they lie only against “judgments decrees orders and sentences”, not against reasons. The word “judgments” in this connection refers only to operative judicial acts, and is not used, as it often is in other contexts, as a convenient abbreviation for reasons for judgment.’ In Moller v Roy (1975) 132 CLR 622 at 639, Mason J said:‘However, I see no alternative but to give the word “judgment” as it appears in s 46 its accepted legal meaning, that is, the formal order made by a court which disposes of, or deals with, the proceeding then before it … .’ There may be a difference in emphasis between the view of Barwick CJ in Minister for Works (WA) and that of Mason J in Moller. Whereas Barwick CJ considered that a judgment must be binding upon the parties and definitive of legal rights, Mason J considered that it need only dispose of, or deal with, the proceeding before the court. However two other decisions offer support for the former view. The first is Saffron v The Queen (1953) 88 CLR 523 in which the Court (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ) considered whether an appeal lay to the High Court from a decision of a state Court of Criminal Appeal on a case stated after acquittal, where the outcome could not affect the result of the trial. At 527-8, Dixon CJ (Kitto and Taylor JJ concurring) said:‘Our jurisdiction to entertain appeals is one conferred by s 73 of the Constitution, and it is a jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments, decrees, orders or sentences of a number of tribunals. When a court is authorized by legislation to give an advisory opinion, no matter what language is used, its opinion is not a judgment, decree, order or sentence from which an appeal lies. Various statutes have provided for raising questions by a case stated, in such a way as to make it difficult to know whether the result of the determination of the questions so raised is advisory or not. The present section raises that question in an unprecedented form. It is quite definite in providing that the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the question reserved shall not in any way affect or invalidate any verdict or decision given at the trial. The acquittal must therefore remain undisturbed. It does, however, use the expression “reserve the question for decision”, and it does use the expression “determine”; but it is apparent that these expressions cannot be directed to the determination of any rights or liabilities which are to be litigated or affected. The rights and liabilities involved in the charge have already been determined. The acquittal of the person has determined that he is not guilty, and that determination is to remain entirely unaffected.I think that there can be no question that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal … cannot affect the rights of the person who has been acquitted, or his liability. It can operate only as a judicial precedent, having at best the effect which in English jurisprudence is afforded to the decisions of a court as precedents. That is an entirely different thing from binding a right or creating a liability, or precluding a person who asserts a right or denies a liability. I think the applicant in the present case is not affected in respect of his rights or liabilities by the determination. At most he is, like any other of the Queen’s subjects, liable to have the decision cited against him as evidence of what is the state of the law. In those circumstances I am of opinion that the decision on the case stated … is not appealable, and that special leave should be refused.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER ACJ, DOWSETT AND COLLIER JJ

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