FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCAFC 197
Appeal from: Commonwealth of Australia v Endresz [2019] FCA 301 File numbers: ACD 23 of 2019
ACD 24 of 2019
ACD 25 of 2019
ACD 26 of 2019Judges: RARES, MARKOVIC AND CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 15 November 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application of “slip rule” (r 16.05(2)(h) of Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)) to extend life of creditor’s petitions – where 12 month period had expired and creditor’s petitions had lapsed – whether slip rule available to retrospectively extend life of creditor’s petitions – whether invocation of slip rule precluded where independent discretion required by s 52(5) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) not in fact exercised – whether there was a relevant accidental slip or omission – whether discretion could only be exercised one way
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine claims on which judgment debt in creditor’s petitions based – whether pleaded causes of action in statement of claim exceeded metes and bounds of indorsements in originating application – whether equitable jurisdiction of Supreme Court invoked – whether equitable claims liable to be struck out
BANKRUPTCY – whether primary judge failed to consider separate ground on which sequestration order ought not to have been made – whether finding that payments illegal and void precluded liability under second limb of Barnes v Addy – whether there was in reality a debt owing to the Commonwealth
Held: Appeal allowed – creditor’s petitions lapsed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 52(4), (5)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 16.05(2)(e), (h)
Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 25, 26
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(e)
Supreme Court Rules 1937 (ACT) OO 69 r 2, 24 r 3
Cases cited: Auckland Harbour Board v The King [1924] AC 318
Barnes v Addy [1874] LR 9 Ch App 244
Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364
Commonwealth v Burns [1971] VR 825
Commonwealth v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 282 FLR 1; [2013] ACTSC 146
Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Limited (No 8) [2014] ACTSC 312
Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 11) (2017) 316 FLR 159; [2017] ACTSC 2
Davis Samuel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] ACTCA 22
Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385
Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375
Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd (2006) 154 FCR 554
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296
L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [No2] (1982) 151 CLR 590
Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2018] FCAFC 102
Ramsay Health Care Australia Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Compton (2016) 247 FCR 387; [2016] FCAFC 125
Re Pritchard [1963] Ch 502
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 197
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the slip rule could be applied retrospectively to extend the life of creditor's petitions after the 12-month period had expired and whether there was a relevant accidental slip or omission that would allow the exercise of the discretion under section 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Additionally, the court had to determine whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the claims and if the equitable claims were liable to be struck out.
The court found that the creditor's petitions had indeed lapsed as per section 52(4) of the Act, and the slip rule could not be applied retrospectively. The court also held that the primary judge had not failed to consider a separate ground for making a sequestration order, and there was no error in the findings that the payments were illegal and void, which precluded any liability under the second limb of Barnes v Addy. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the creditor's petitions were declared to have lapsed. The court ordered that the Commonwealth pay 50% of the appellants' costs of the appeal, with no order for costs of the proceedings before the FCCA judge or the primary judge. The trustees in bankruptcy were given an opportunity to file submissions regarding the form of the proposed orders and any costs or remuneration due to them. If no submissions were received, the orders would take effect on 2 December 2019.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties deliver a copy of the reasons of the Full Court published today to the appellant’s trustee in bankruptcy (Trustee) by 4.00 pm on 18 November 2019.
2. Leave be granted to the Trustee to file and serve submissions, not exceeding five pages in length, in relation to the form of the orders proposed to be made to dispose of this appeal and the costs incurred by or remuneration due to the Trustee as a result of Order 1 made on 15 March 2019 sequestrating the appellant's estate by 4.00 pm on 22 November 2019.
3. Leave be granted to the appellant and the respondent to file and serve submissions in reply to any submissions served by the Trustee in accordance with Order 2 or addressing the proposed orders as to costs referred to at [137] of the joint reasons of Rares and Markovic JJ, not exceeding five pages in length, by 4.00 pm on 29 November 2019.
4. If submissions are filed in accordance with Orders 2 or 3 and none of the parties or the Trustee requests that there be an oral hearing, the form of orders to be made will be determined on the papers.
5. If no submissions are filed in accordance with Orders 2 or 3 the following orders be made with effect from 2 December 2019:
(a) The appeal be allowed.
(b) Order 4 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 May 2018 in proceeding CAG25/2017 and orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Court on 15 March 2019 in proceeding ACD44/2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following orders be made:
(i) The Court declares that the Creditor’s Petition filed on 12 April 2017 lapsed on 11 April 2018 pursuant to s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
(ii) There be no order as to costs.
(c) The respondent pay 50% of the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Subsections 52(4) and (5) of the Act set out when a creditor’s petition lapses and when a court can make an order extending the life of a petition. They provide:(4) A creditor’s petition lapses at the expiration of:(a)subject to paragraph (b), the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of the petition; or(b)if the Court makes an order under subsection (5) in relation to the petition—the period fixed by the order;unless, before the expiration of whichever of those periods is applicable, a sequestration order is made on the petition or the petition is dismissed or withdrawn.(5)The Court may, at any time before the expiration of the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of a creditor’s petition, if it considers it just and equitable to do so, upon such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, order that the period at the expiration of which the petition will lapse be such period, being a period exceeding 12 months and not exceeding 24 months, commencing on the date of presentation of the petition as is specified in the order.(emphasis added.) Rule 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules sets out when the FCCA can set aside or vary its judgments or orders. It provides:(2)The Court or a Registrar may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:(a)it was made in the absence of a party; or(b)it was obtained by fraud; or(c)it is interlocutory; or(d)it is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; or(e)it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or(f)the party in whose favour it was made consents; or(g)there is a clerical mistake in the judgment or order; or(h)there is an error arising in the judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.(emphasis added.) Rule 16.05(2)(h) of the FCC Rules, which was relied on by the FCCA Judge to amend the February Orders to include an order under s 52(5) of the Act, is known as the “slip rule”. In Re Young; ex parte Smith (1985) 5 FCR 204 a Full Court of this Court (Bowen CJ, Sweeney and Lockhart JJ) considered subss 52(4) and (5) of the Act observing that they could not be considered independently of one another and that they ensured that a petition had no life beyond a maximum of 24 months from its presentation, with the ability to extend it beyond its automatic life of 12 months provided an order is made by the court. Their Honours recognised that there were sound reasons why there should be certainty surrounding the duration of a creditor’s petition. At 207 the Full Court said:… The presentation of a petition is an event which determines many rights duties and liabilities of bankrupts and creditors under bankruptcy law and from which important consequences flow. For example, before a debtor becomes a bankrupt, the court may appoint a trustee to take control of his property (s 50), stay legal proceedings against his person or property (s 60), or order his arrest in certain circumstances and the seizure of his property (s 78) - in each case after the presentation of the petition against him.After a debtor becomes a bankrupt, the date of commission of an act of bankruptcy and the date of presentation of the petition on which he was made a bankrupt are critical for various purposes including the determination of the period of relation back (s 115), the ascertainment of the property divisible amongst his creditors (s 116), the avoidance of preferences (ss 122 and 123), the avoidance of voluntary settlements (s 120) and the repayment by creditors to the trustee of his estate of moneys received as a result of execution by those creditors against his property (s 118).