Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCAFC 18  

Appeal from: Commonwealth of Australia v Endresz, in the matter of Endresz [2020] FCA 1228
File number: NSD 1073 of 2020
Judgment of: GRIFFITHS, THAWLEY AND O’BRYAN JJ
Date of judgment: 15 February 2021
Date of publication of reasons:  23 February 2021
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – appeal from order sequestrating appellant’s estate – whether there was in truth and reality a debt owing to the Commonwealth – whether equitable jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory engaged – whether liability under Barnes v Addy unavailable by reason of Auckland Harbour Board v The King – whether liability under Barnes v Addy available when moneys stolen in excess of authority – no error on part of primary judge demonstrated – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 43

Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia s 75(iii)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39, 78AA, 79

Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) s 68

Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) rule 7000

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 25, 26

Supreme Court Rules 1937 (ACT) orders 2, 24, 69

Cases cited:

Auckland Harbour Board v The King [1924] AC 318

Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244

Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364

Black v S Freeman & Co (1910) 12 CLR 105

Clarke v Shee and Johnson (1774) 98 ER 1041

Commonwealth v Davis Samuel (No 11) (2017) 316 FLR 159

Commonwealth v Davis Samuel (No 7) (2013) 282 FLR 1

Commonwealth of Australia v Endresz, in the matter of Endresz [2020] FCA 1228

Creak v More (1912) 15 CLR 426

Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia (2019) 273 FCR 286

Moses v Macferlan (1760) 97 ER 676

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132

Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 (CA)

Renowden v McMullen (1970) 123 CLR 584

Spedding v Spedding (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 81

Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212

Heydon JD, Leeming M and Turner PA, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines & Remedies (5th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015)

Gummow WMC, “Moses v Macferlan: 250 Years On” (2010) 84 ALJ 756

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 27
Date of hearing:  15 February 2021
Counsel for the Appellant:  P Dunning QC with J Leung
Solicitor for the Appellant: Cornwalls Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: J Hogan-Doran SC
Solicitor for the Respondent:  Australian Government Solicitor

   

ORDERS

NSD 1073 of 2020
BETWEEN:

ALLAN PAUL ENDRESZ

Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

GRIFFITHS, THAWLEY AND O’BRYAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 FEBRUARY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the Commonwealth’s costs. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. I also agree with…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia, the appellant challenged the decision of the primary judge to sequestrate his estate on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate a valid debt owed by the appellant. The case was heard in the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court. The primary legal issues revolved around whether there was indeed a debt owed to the Commonwealth, whether the court’s equitable jurisdiction was engaged, and whether the liability under Barnes v Addy was available considering the circumstances of the case.

The court examined whether the moneys paid in April and September 1998 constituted trust money, a question that had been previously decided in cases such as Black v S Freeman & Co and Re Hallett’s Estate. The court concluded that fiduciary obligations were owed by the contractors, and the payments were trust money regardless of whether the contractors acted within or beyond their authority. Furthermore, the court held that the Commonwealth could pursue a claim of accessorial liability against the appellant for receipt of trust property and could seek equitable relief. The court rejected the argument that the liability under Barnes v Addy was unavailable due to the Auckland Harbour Board case. The court found no demonstrated error in the primary judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the Commonwealth’s costs. This decision reinforces the court's authority to grant equitable relief in appropriate circumstances and the availability of claims for accessory liability in cases involving trust property.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the Commonwealth’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Davis Samuel (No 7), Refshauge J concluded that fiduciary obligations were owed by the contractors. This conclusion was not called into question before the primary judge. The fact that a person acts in excess of their own authority in misappropriating property does not mean that the stolen property is not trust property. Indeed, whether or not the contractors owed antecedent obligations of a fiduciary nature, the April and September 1998 payments constituted trust money: Black v S Freeman & Co (1910) 12 CLR 105; Spedding v Spedding (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 81; Creak v More (1912) 15 CLR 426; Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 (CA). A claim of accessorial liability against a person for receipt of, or knowing assistance in connection with, stolen property, being trust property in the hands of the thief, was available to the Commonwealth, as was equitable relief, whether or not the payments were effected in excess of the Commonwealth’s authority or that of the contractors. CONCLUSION The appellant has not demonstrated error on the part of the primary judge. The appeal should be dismissed, with costs. I agree with the judgment of Justice Thawley and have nothing to add.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Order 24 rule 3 provided:3. Alteration of claim without amendment of writ Whenever a statement of claim is delivered, the plaintiff may therein alter, modify, or extend his or her claim without any amendment of the originating application. Order 69 of the Supreme Court Rules provided:Effect of non-compliance1. Non-compliance with rules not to render proceeding voidNon-compliance with any of these rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceeding void, unless the court so directs, but such proceedings may be set aside, either wholly or in part, as irregular, or may be amended or otherwise dealt with, in such a manner, and on such terms as the court thinks fit.2. Application to set aside for irregularityAn application to set aside any proceeding for irregularity shall not be allowed unless it is made within a reasonable time, or after the party applying has taken any fresh step with knowledge of the irregularity.3. Objections of irregularityWhere an application is made to set aside any proceeding for irregularity, each objection to be relied on, and the ground for it, shall be stated in the notice of motion. The Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) and the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) applied at the time of judgment in Davis Samuel (No 7). Section 68 of the Court Procedures Act provides:68 Formal defects to be amended(1) No proceedings in the court are to be invalidated by any formal defect or by any irregularity, unless the court is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused and that the injustice cannot be remedied by an order of the court.(2)The court may make an order declaring that any proceeding is valid despite any formal defect or any irregularity. Rule 7000 of the Court Procedures Rules provides:(1)Unless the Supreme Court otherwise orders, these rules apply to an existing proceeding.(2)If a difficulty arises in the application of subrule (1) to a particular proceeding, the court may make any order it considers appropriate to resolve the difficulty.(3)The court may make an order under this rule on application by a party or on its own initiative.(4)In this rule: existing proceeding means a proceeding started in the Supreme Court, but not completed, before 1 July 2006. The ACT Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine the “matter” before it. Its jurisdiction was engaged by the bringing of an action. The Commonwealth brought proceedings in which, at least by the sixth further amended statement of claim, it sought equitable compensation for accessorial liability. The better view is that the amended originating application also sought an accounting in equity – see: [8] above. The ACT Supreme Court had jurisdiction to grant equitable relief by way of accounting and equitable compensation: s 26 of the Supreme Court Act. The defendants appeared in the proceedings without challenge to its jurisdiction. The claims involved in the matter, as pleaded in the sixth further amended statement of claim, were defended by Mr Endresz. No complaint was made by him during the conduct of the proceedings or before judgment that the claim for equitable compensation in the sixth further amended statement of claim had not also been included in the amended originating application or that there had not been a claim for equitable relief in the amended originating application. Even if the amended originating application did not make a claim for equitable relief or identify a cause of action giving rise to that relief, such procedural irregularities, being non-compliance with Order 2 rule 8(1) and Order 2 rule 9(1), would not have the consequence that the ACT Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was not engaged or that the proceedings were a nullity; the orders were and are valid until quashed or set aside – see: Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364 at [11], [15], [16]; Endresz FCAFC No 1 at [106] to [117]. Renowden v McMullen (1970) 123 CLR 584, upon which the appellant relied, is distinguishable. Renowden did not involve a situation of an amendment to a statement of claim which was argued to be outside the ambit of the writ. It dealt with the opposite situation: an amendment to the statement of claim which was agreed to be within the ambit of the writ but which had not been included in the statement of claim until after expiry of the limitation period. There is no issue here of amending a statement of claim to rely upon a cause of action within the scope of the originating application but which was statute barred when leave was sought to make the amendment (see at 613).