Donchiod Pty Ltd (in liq) v Merrion B Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 54 min read

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2023 0038
DONCHIOD PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 601 212 300) Applicant
v
MERRION B PTY LTD (ACN 624 885 598) Respondent

---

JUDGES: KENNEDY, MACAULAY & LYONS JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 22 February 2024
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25 March 2024
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2024] VSCA 44
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2023] VSC 111 (Hargrave JA)

---

CORPORATIONS – Application for winding up – Six month period for determination of application – Period expired – Associate Judge subsequently extended time under the slip rule – Associate Judge later made winding up order – Applications by insolvent company to extend times to appeal against extension order and winding up order – Judge refused extensions of time – Whether Judge erred in finding that Associate Judge had jurisdiction to make order extending time – Whether Judge erred in finding no error in Associate Judge’s exercise of discretion to apply slip rule – Whether Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 is plainly wrong – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal dismissed.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459R; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, r 36.07.

Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385, Flint v Richard Busuttil Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375, Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2018) 265 FCR 304, applied; David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265; Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 188 CLR 114; Aussie Vic Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (2008) 232 CLR 314; Hrycenko v Hrycenko (2022) 294 FCR 233; Bryant v Badenoch Integrated Logging Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 97, discussed.

---

Counsel

Applicant: Mr MGR Gronow KC with Mr P Agardy
Respondent: Mr J Schulz
Liquidator of the Applicant: Ms C Pulverman (solicitor)

Solicitors

Applicant: Holding Redlich Lawyers
Respondent: Francis V Gallichio Lawyers
Liquidator of the Applicant: FCW Lawyers

KENNEDY JA
MACAULAY JA
LYONS JA:

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from the decision of a judge of the Trial Division. The judge dismissed applications to extend the times for appeal against two orders of an associate judge:

    (a)an order made on 14 August 2020 which corrected an earlier order made on 2 March 2020 so as to include an order pursuant to s 459R(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the ‘Act’) extending the period within which a winding up application was to be determined to 4 September 2020 (‘the slip rule order’); and

    (b)an order of 4 September 2020 which wound up the applicant and appointed Craig Bolwell as liquidator (‘the winding up orders’).

  2. For reasons expressed below, the application for leave to appeal will be granted, but the appeal will be dismissed.

Background

  1. The applicant was registered in 2014. It carried on business as a property developer. In the course of development of a property…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Donchiod Pty Ltd (in liq) v Merrion B Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] VSCA 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Donchiod Pty Ltd, in liquidation, sought to appeal a decision of an Associate Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that extended the time for making a winding up order under s 459R of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the subsequent winding up order itself. The insolvent company applied to the Supreme Court for an extension of time to appeal against the Associate Judge’s orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal. The insolvent company then applied for leave to appeal the Supreme Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The insolvent company contended that the Associate Judge did not have the jurisdiction to extend time under s 459R after the six-month period had expired, and that the Associate Judge erred in exercising the discretion to apply the slip rule. The insolvent company also contended that the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd was plainly wrong. The Court of Appeal considered the legal issues relating to the Associate Judge’s jurisdiction to extend time and the exercise of the slip rule discretion. The Court found that the Associate Judge had the jurisdiction to extend time under s 459R and did not err in exercising the discretion to apply the slip rule. The Court found that Elyard was not plainly wrong and declined to depart from its authority. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The insolvent company, Donchiod Pty Ltd, in liquidation, sought to appeal the decision of an Associate Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Associate Judge had extended the time for making a winding up order under s 459R of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and subsequently made the winding up order. Donchiod applied to the Supreme Court for an extension of time to appeal the Associate Judge’s orders, but the Supreme Court dismissed the application. Donchiod then sought leave to appeal the Supreme Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered whether the Associate Judge had the jurisdiction to extend time under s 459R after the six-month period had expired, and whether the Associate Judge erred in exercising the discretion to apply the slip rule. The Court also considered whether the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd was plainly wrong. The Court of Appeal found that the Associate Judge had the jurisdiction to extend time and did not err in exercising the slip rule discretion. The Court found that Elyard was not plainly wrong and declined to depart from its authority. The Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the Associate Judge had the jurisdiction to extend time under s 459R of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) notwithstanding that the six-month period had expired. The Associate Judge cited the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd, which held that the slip rule could be utilised notwithstanding that, at the time of the making of the order, the requisite period provided for in s 459R had expired. The Court of Appeal found that Elyard was not plainly wrong and declined to depart from its authority. The Court of Appeal also found that the Associate Judge did not err in exercising the discretion to apply the slip rule. The Court considered that the order was made at a time relatively close to the expiry of the winding up application and that there was no fault on the part of the parties. The Court found that relitigation of a subsequent application based upon a new statutory demand would lead to an outcome at the expense of the Court’s resources thereby causing injustice. The Court also found that the above factors outweighed the underlying policy of s 459R to determine a winding up application expeditiously.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal. The Court found that the Associate Judge had the jurisdiction to extend time under s 459R and did not err in exercising the discretion to apply the slip rule. The Court found that Elyard was not plainly wrong and declined to depart from its authority. The Court of Appeal held that the Associate Judge’s orders were valid and that Donchiod’s appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 36.07 of the Rules provides:36.07 Amendment of judgment or orderThe Court may at any time correct a clerical mistake in a judgment or an order or an error arising in a judgment or an order from any accidental slip or omission. The associate judge considered the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (‘Elyard’)[10] which held that the slip rule could be utilised notwithstanding that, at the time of the making of the order, the requisite period provided for in s 459R had expired. He cited authorities which have subsequently considered Elyard, including those which had cast doubt on the decision in the bankruptcy jurisdiction. However, he considered that such cases had not explicitly held that the decision was wrongly decided and concluded that it continued to apply.[11][10](1995) 61 FCR 385.[11]Extension Reasons, [26]. The associate judge then proceeded to consider whether the slip rule applied in this particular case. He stated:It would be fair to say that on the hearing of 2 March 2020, and referring to the order obtained on that date, neither the parties nor the Court turned their minds to the issue of the expiry of the winding up application on 3 April 2020. Given that on 2 March 2020, the hearing had been completed save for the requirement of filing further submissions, if the parties or myself had turned our mind to the volume of the work that I was required to undertake, in general, it would have almost gone without saying that any application for extension would have been granted such that the discretion to extend could only have been exercised in one way. If, however, the defendant had opposed such an application, as it now does, it is clear that the interests of justice would have dictated that an extension of time be permitted to enable me to publish reasons and an order.[12][12]Ibid [27]. He considered other cases and observed that, where the relevant order was made many months prior to the lapse of the relevant application or petition the Court has been reluctant to grant an extension of time pursuant to the slip rule as there was sufficient time to make an application and other alternatives could have been implemented.[13] He also highlighted that, in this case, there was no fault on the part of the parties, given that all that was left to do was for him to hand down a determination.[14][13]Ibid [28].[14]Ibid [30]. He concluded that the slip rule should be applied, stating:I am satisfied that I have the power under the slip rule to correct the orders of 2 March 2020 by inserting an order to extend time under s 459R. I am satisfied that the issue was not raised as a result of an accidental slip or omission by either the practitioners or the Court. I find that had the issue been raised before me on 2 March 2020, an application under s 459R(2) would have been made and, for the reasons set out in paragraph 33 hereof, would have been granted. To the extent that I am required to exercise discretion under the slip rule, I do so in favour of the plaintiff on the following bases:(i)the order made on 2 March 2020 was made at a time relatively close to the expiry of the winding up application;(ii)it goes without saying that if the application had been made at the relevant time, and my attention had been drawn to the expiry date, I would have allowed more time given the workload of the Court in March 2020. I make the observation that, notwithstanding that COVID-19 ultimately impacted upon the length of time required for the judgment, it can only be considered an exacerbating factor, which was not foreseeable on 2 March 2020;(iii)relitigating a subsequent application based upon a new statutory demand would lead to an outcome at the expense of the Court’s resources thereby causing injustice; and(iv)the above factors outweigh the underlying policy of s 459R to determine a winding up application expeditiously.I am also satisfied that there were special circumstances on 2 March 2020 that justify the exercise of the discretion to extend the winding up application under s 459R(2), namely that:(v)the hearing had been completed save for the filing of further submissions and a determination to be handed down by myself; and(vi) more time was required for judgment given the workload of the Court.[15][15]Ibid [32]–[33].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established