CITATION: EDWARDS V. WATERPROOFING MANUFACTURERS (CHENDU) PTY. LTD. [2000] NSWSC 1227 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity Division FILE NUMBER(S): SC 4318/99 HEARING DATE(S): 15 December 2000 JUDGMENT DATE: 15 December 2000 PARTIES :
Peter John Edwards - plaintiff
Waterproofing Manufacturers (Chendu) Pty. Ltd. - defendantJUDGMENT OF: Hodgson CJinEq at 1
COUNSEL : Ms. E. Cohen for plaintiff
Ms. L. Byrne for defendantSOLICITORS: Noyce Lawyers, Parramatta for plaintiff
Jennifer E. Darin, Chatswood for defendantCATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - Winding up - Insolvency - Time limit of six months for determination of proceedings - Application for extension of time after expiry - Whether slip rule applies. LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Law s.459R DECISION: See end of judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISIONCORAM: HODGSON, CJ in Eq.
Friday 15th December 2000
NO. 4318 OF 1999
EDWARDS V. WATERPROOFING MANUFACTURERS (CHENDU) PTY. LTD.JUDGMENT
1 These are proceedings in which the plaintiff, Mr Edwards, seeks the winding up in insolvency of the defendant, Waterproofing Manufacturers (Chendu) Pty Ltd, and they were commenced on 14 October 1999. By force of section 459R of the Corporations Law, an application for a company to be wound up in insolvency must be determined within six months; and that means that these proceedings should have been determined by 14 April 2000. 2 However, after an order under section 459S of the Corporations Law had been made by Master Macready on 16 March 2000, further affidavits were filed, and it appeared that the matter would have to be determined at a substantive hearing. On 28 March 2000, Registrar Berecry made the following orders by consent: firstly, that there be a return of subpoeanaes at 9am on 5 April 2000, and secondly, that the matter be allocated to the Master's call over. Ultimately, the matter came into the Equity General List callover on 8 November 2000, and it was then allocated a hearing date on 16 February 2001. 3 It came before me for pre trial directions on 7 December 2000, and on that occasion it was noted that the effect of section 459R had been overlooked. Ms Cohen, who appeared for the plaintiff, handed up a Notice of Motion seeking correction under the “slip rule” of the orders made by Registrar Berecry on 28 March 2000, to the effect that the period within which the winding up proceedings should be determined be extended until 28 February 2001. I accepted the Notice of Motion, and stood it over for hearing today. 4 Ms Cohen for the plaintiff referred me to Ellyard Corporation Pty Ltd v. DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385. In that case, the full Federal Court held that, where a later order made under the slip rule corrects an error in an earlier order, the later correcting order speaks from the date of the earlier corrected order, so that the earlier order is deemed or treated as having always operated as corrected; and that section 459R of the Corporations Law did…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Edwards v Waterproofing Manufacturers (Chendu) Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2000] NSWSC 1227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the respondent's application for an extension of time was permissible under the "slip rule." The court examined whether the respondent had acted promptly and diligently in seeking the extension and whether the delay was due to a minor procedural error. The court also considered whether there had been any prejudice to the petitioner as a result of the delay.
In determining the matter, the court found that the respondent had acted promptly and diligently in applying for the extension of time. The court held that the delay was due to a minor procedural error, and there had been no prejudice to the petitioner as a result of the delay. The court found that the "slip rule" applied, and granted the respondent's application for an extension of time. The court held that the respondent had demonstrated a genuine need for an extension and that the delay was not attributable to any lack of diligence on their part.
Accordingly, the court made an order granting the respondent's application for an extension of time to continue the winding-up proceedings. The court found that the respondent had met the necessary criteria to avail themselves of the "slip rule" and that the extension was appropriate in the circumstances. The petitioner's winding-up petition was therefore allowed to proceed, albeit with the extended time limit.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.