FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2019] FCAFC 223
File numbers: ACD 23 of 2019
ACD 24 of 2019
ACD 25 of 2019
ACD 26 of 2019Judges: RARES, MARKOVIC AND CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 13 December 2019 Catchwords: COSTS – application for respondents to pay costs of appeals on indemnity basis and the costs of trial – where respondent’s rejection of appellants’ Calderbank offer not unreasonable in all of the circumstances – where grounds of appeal were arguable but did not have good prospects of success – where appeals could not be allowed by consent unless Court satisfied that there was arguable appealable error by trial judge Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Cases cited: Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93
Endresz v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCAFC 197
Sims v Chong (2015) 230 FCR 346
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 6 December 2019 Registry: Australian Capital Territory Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 15 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr J Rudd Solicitor for the Appellants: Cornwalls Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J A Hogan-Doran Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
ACD 23 of 2019 BETWEEN: DAWN MAY ENDRESZ
AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, MARKOVIC AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 DECEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Order 4 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 May 2018 in proceeding CAG24/2017 and orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Court on 15 March 2019 in proceeding ACD45/2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following orders be made:
i.The Court declares that the Creditor’s Petition filed on 12 April 2017 lapsed on 11 April 2018 pursuant to s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
ii.There be no order as to costs.
3.The respondent pay 50% of the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
4.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to vary the orders proposed in order 5 made on 2 December 2019.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
ACD 24 of 2019 BETWEEN: ALLAN PAUL ENDRESZ
AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, MARKOVIC AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 DECEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Order 4 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 May 2018 in proceeding CAG23/2017 and orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Court on 15 March 2019 in proceeding ACD42/2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following orders be made:
i.The Court declares that the Creditor’s Petition filed on…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 223
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the submissions of the appellants and rejected them. The Court found that the appellants had not established that it was unreasonable for the Commonwealth to reject their offer. The Court noted that the appellants had failed on, or abandoned, all of their grounds save for the one on which they succeeded. The Court also noted that the three failed grounds were discrete from the one concerning the availability of the slip rule on which the appeals were allowed. The Court found that the Commonwealth was put to substantial expense in dealing with the unrelated grounds that failed. The Court concluded that the proposed order that the Commonwealth pay 50% of the appellants’ costs of the appeal was appropriate in all of the circumstances.
The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court and the Court in the earlier proceedings. The Court declared that the Creditor’s Petition filed on 12 April 2017 lapsed on 11 April 2018 pursuant to s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The Court ordered that there be no order as to costs. The Court also ordered that the Commonwealth pay 50% of the appellants’ costs of the appeal and that the appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the application to vary the orders proposed in order 5 made on 2 December 2019.
The Court’s decision highlights the importance of considering all of the circumstances when deciding on costs. The Court found that the appellants had not established that it was unreasonable for the Commonwealth to reject their offer. The Court also noted that the appellants had failed on, or abandoned, all of their grounds save for the one on which they succeeded. The Court concluded that the proposed order that the Commonwealth pay 50% of the appellants’ costs of the appeal was appropriate in all of the circumstances.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Order 4 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 May 2018 in proceeding CAG25/2017 and orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Court on 15 March 2019 in proceeding ACD44/2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following orders be made:
i. The Court declares that the Creditor’s Petition filed on 12 April 2017 lapsed on 11 April 2018 pursuant to s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
ii. There be no order as to costs.
3. The respondent pay 50% of the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to vary the orders proposed in order 5 made on 2 December 2019.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants contended that the Commonwealth had been unreasonable in refusing their 31 May 2019 offer and that they had a high prospect of overturning the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to apply the slip rule so as, retrospectively, to extend the life of the creditor’s petitions after they had lapsed pursuant to s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). They argued that their offer was a real and substantial compromise. They submitted that there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a departure from the “usual rule” that costs should follow the event. They contended that they had been wholly successful in defending against the orders sought in the creditor’s petitions and that the grounds on which they failed were not so disproportionate as to warrant a departure from the “usual rule” as to costs.Consideration The costs of a proceeding are in the discretion of the Court pursuant to s 43(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Moreover, s 43(3)(b), (c) and (e) contemplate that the Court may make different awards as to costs in relation to different parts of a proceeding, order the parties to bear costs in specified proportions and or award costs in favour of, or against, a party regardless of that party’s success in the proceeding. The appellants’ submissions should be rejected. First, the 31 May 2019 offer gave no elaboration of why the appellants’ four grounds of appeal might have had good prospects of success. They had failed on three of those grounds before the primary judge. Those three grounds involved the parties in considerable time and effort requiring each side to prepare written submissions and to engage in oral argument both before the primary judge (who did not hear argument on the slip rule) and in the appeal. Whilst those three grounds may have been arguable, it would be difficult to characterise them as having “good prospects of success”, especially when the appellants abandoned one when filing their submissions in support of their appeals. The three grounds were all discrete from the one concerning the availability of the slip rule on which the appeals were allowed. The Commonwealth negated all three of the failed grounds before the primary judge and the two that were pressed before us. Secondly, the appeals could not have been allowed by consent as a mere formality. In order to allow an appeal, by consent, from a judgment, the Court must be satisfied that there is an arguable appealable error by the judge at first instance: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (2008) 166 FCR 64 at 77 [51] per French, Weinberg and Greenwood JJ; Sims v Chong (2015) 230 FCR 346 at 355-356 [39] per Mansfield, Siopis and Rares JJ; Smits v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 143 at [10] per Rares, Collier and Markovic JJ. The question of whether the Federal Circuit Court judge had been correct to apply the slip rule was an issue that was by no means clear cut. It could not have been dealt with in the absence of a substantive argument of the kind that occurred on the hearing of the appeals.