Smits v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 31 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Smits v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd

[2016] FCAFC 143

Appeal from:

Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd v Smits [2016] FCA 11

and Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd v Smits (No 2) [2016] FCA 106

File number: QUD 101 of 2016
Judge: RARES, COLLIER AND MARKOVIC JJ
Date of judgment: 22 August 2016
Catchwords:

BANKRUTPCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia allowing a creditor’s petition – where resolution passed at meeting of creditors in favour of debtor executing a personal insolvency agreement over the opposition of the applicant creditor and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation – where applicant creditor and respondent sought to have the appeal allowed by consent and the sequestration order set aside – where the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation opposed the appeal being allowed by consent – requirement that an arguable error be demonstrated on the part of the primary judge before allowing an appeal by consent – appeal dismissed

BANKRUTPCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia refusing to set aside a sequestration order by reason of the preclusion of the power to do so under s 37(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 37, 40, 43, 52, 188, 206

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 12.01(3)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 55ZG

Cases cited:

Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390

Croker v Commonwealth [2011] FCAFC 25

Croker v Minister for Finance [2013] FCAFC 154

DasreefPty Limited v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588

Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc. (1994) 181 CLR 404

Sims v Chong (2015) 230 FCR 346

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (2008) 166 FCR 64

Wills v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2009) 173 FCR 284

Date of hearing: 22 August 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr DR Edwards
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Loel
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Lillas & Loel Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr V Brennan
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Taxation Office

ORDERS

QUD 101 of 2016
BETWEEN:

LEONARDUS GERARADUS SMITS

Appellant

AND:

LILLAS & LOEL LAWYERS PTY LTD ABN 96 064 046 255

First Respondent

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, COLLIER AND MARKOVIC JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 12.01(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), leave be granted instanter to the second respondent to withdraw the submitting notice and to oppose the appeal.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to his appearance on the appeal today.

4.Order 1 made on 3 March…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Smits v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 143
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Smits v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd concerned an appeal against a decision to allow a creditor's petition, resulting in the debtor's sequestration and rejection of a personal insolvency agreement. The appeal was initiated by the debtor, Mr Smits, and the creditor, Lillas & Loel, who sought to have the appeal allowed by consent and the sequestration order set aside. However, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation opposed the appeal. The court had to decide whether the appeal by consent could be allowed and if the sequestration order should be set aside due to procedural errors.

The court examined the arguments presented by Mr Smits, including claims of procedural unfairness and errors in the primary judge's decision. The court found that the primary judge did not make any arguable error in refusing to adjourn the hearing of the creditor's petition, and the decision to allow the appeal by consent was also incorrect. The court further noted that the appeal was not supported by sufficient evidence, and the application to adduce further evidence was rejected. The debtor's argument that the primary judge erred in not going behind the bankruptcy notice was also dismissed for lack of evidence.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and the sequestration order was upheld. The court also ordered that the debtor pay the costs of the creditor's appearance on the appeal and discharged the earlier stay on the sequestration order. The court concluded that the grounds of appeal were without merit, and no further stay should be granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 12.01(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), leave be granted instanter to the second respondent to withdraw the submitting notice and to oppose the appeal.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to his appearance on the appeal today.

4. Order 1 made on 3 March 2016 be discharged.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As we have said, the notice of appeal is a prolix document that runs to 29 pages. Most of it is argumentative, and some of it is internally inconsistent and contradictory. Background Mr Smits had committed an act of bankruptcy in failing to comply with a bankruptcy notice filed by Lillas & Loel that relied on a judgment debt of $237,898.79 in the Supreme Court of Queensland plus interest. The creditor’s petition was filed on 14 October 2015 and first returnable before a registrar on 25 November 2015. The registrar made an order adjourning the hearing of the creditor’s petition to 20 January 2016. The Commissioner appeared as a supporting creditor by notice filed on 19 January 2016. The background to the proceedings is set out in the primary judge’s first set of reasons that he delivered at the conclusion of the hearing of the petition on 20 January 2016. Earlier, Mr Smits had applied to the Federal Circuit Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice, but that application was dismissed by a judge of that Court, and Mr Smits’ notice of appeal had been set down for hearing in this Court on 3 March 2016. It appeared, in the material before his Honour, that, on 20 November 2015, Mr Smits had executed an authority under s 188 of the Act appointing Geoffrey McDonald, a chartered accountant and registered trustee, as a controlling trustee. Mr McDonald’s first report to creditors of 25 November 2015 notified creditors of his appointment and sought the provision of information to assist him. His Honour’s detailed reasons explained that the initial meeting of creditors had been convened in Sydney on 23 December 2015, but was then adjourned until 19 January 2016. Shortly before the adjourned meeting, Mr McDonald informed Mr Smits that he would be unable to act as a trustee were the creditors to vote in favour of the personal insolvency agreement being executed. Mr Smits made inquiries that, by the time of the meeting on 19 January 2016, do not appear to have identified any other person who was willing to act as his controlling trustee. Mr Smits’ statement of affairs revealed that he had assets totalling $28,332 and debts totalling $8,035,132. The trustee formed the view from his investigations that Mr Smits’ assets were worthless and that his debts were likely to be the debts admissible to proof, ultimately, if the creditors voted in favour of the personal insolvency agreement. At the meeting held on 19 January 2016, the trustee admitted to proof creditors with claims totalling over $1.6 million. Creditors with claims worth $1,233,501 voted in favour of the execution of the agreement, and those with claims worth $381,377, being 23.62% of those present and voting, voted against. The creditors opposing were the Australian Taxation Office for a debt of $305,473, and Lillas & Loel and Mr Loel, in his personal capacity, who were admitted only for $69,404. There was no evidence as to why the trustee admitted Lillas & Loel and Mr Loel for a lesser sum than the judgment debt founding the bankruptcy notice. Mr McDonald also admitted Morgan Conley Solicitors for the full amount of their debt claimed of $667,722, which constituted 41.35% of the creditors present and voting.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

During the course of submissions today counsel for Mr Smits argued that the Commissioner’s debt was allegedly statute barred pursuant to s 105-50 of Sch 1 of the Taxation Administration Act. However, that was not a point taken in the 29 pages of the second amended notice of appeal. We refused leave to argue it. The argument was not supported by any evidence before the primary judge.The application to adduce further evidence on appeal Mr Smits applied by an interlocutory application filed on 8 August 2016 to adduce further evidence, being an expert’s report of a Mr Brett Walker that had been filed on 1 March 2016. Mr Walker was a registered tax agent and Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. He prepared a report that contained a number of assertions about matters that did not appear to have, first, a statement of the assumptions upon which the assertions were made, or, secondly, a reasoning process leading to the conclusion the subject of the assertions. For example, he said that the Australian Taxation Office accounts relating to Mr Smits’ “alleged” indebtedness to the Commissioner:…are not capable of being understood, reconciled or explained without more information from the ATO with demonstrated linkages to, and verification with, reference to the relevant assessments. I concluded that the ATO has removed amounts and BAS from the ICA [integrated client account] and transferred them to the debt recovery file or replaced them with revised amounts that were different to the original BAS amounts lodged by the Taxpayer.…Due to the above considerations I had no way of verifying or reconciling with accuracy or completeness substantial discrepancies and apparently missing data entries for broken periods with what has happened in and as between the ICA and the debt recovery file.…In my opinion the tax related liability of the Taxpayer is less than $95,473 subject to the lodgement of amended BAS returns and it is reasonably likely that the second respondent [the Commissioner] is a debtor of the Taxpayer. In our opinion the application to adduce fresh evidence should be rejected. First, Mr Walker’s evidence does not comply with the requirements of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). In DasreefPty Limited v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at 604 [36]-[37] French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ said:36.… in HG v The Queen, Gleeson CJ pointed out that, “[b]y directing attention to whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience, [s 79] requires that the opinion is presented in a form which makes it possible to answer that question” [(1999) 197 CLR 414 at 427 [39]].37It should be unnecessary, but it is nonetheless important, to emphasise that what was said by Gleeson CJ in HG (and later by Heydon JA in the Court of Appeal in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [(2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 743-744 [85]] is to be read with one basic proposition at the forefront of consideration. The admissibility of opinion evidence is to be determined by application of the requirements of the Evidence Act rather than by any attempt to parse and analyse particular statements in decided cases divorced from the context in which those statements were made. Accepting that to be so, it remains useful to record that it is ordinarily the case, as Heydon JA said in Makita [(2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 744 [85]], that “the expert's evidence must explain how the field of ‘specialised knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or experience’, and on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based’, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded”. (emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

During the course of submissions Mr Smits also argued that the primary judge erred in failing to go behind the bankruptcy notice or the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court refusing to set aside the bankruptcy notice. There was no evidence put before us to demonstrate how, or on what basis the primary judge could have gone behind that notice. Moreover, Mr Smits put to us no submission or evidence as to what material was before his Honour or in the appeal papers to justify going behind the notice. In those circumstances the submission had no evidentiary foundation and must be rejected.Conclusion For these reasons we are of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed. The application to allow it by consent must be refused. The Commissioner has applied for his costs of appearing on the hearing of the appeal today. That application is not opposed. Mr Smits argued that we should continue the stay granted on 3 March 2016 that all proceedings under the sequestration order made by the primary judge should be stayed for a further 21 days so that Mr Smits can consider his position in relation to seeking special leave to appeal to the High Court. In our opinion the grounds of appeal before us were entirely without merit. For those reasons no stay should be granted and the order for sequestration should take immediate effect. We make the following orders:(1)The appeal be dismissed.(2)The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to his appearance on the argument of the appeal today.(3)Order 1 made on 3 March 2016 be discharged.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the appeal, Mr Smits’ substantive argument was that he had been denied procedural fairness because the trial judge had proceeded on the adjourned hearing on 20 January 2016 to hear the petition without giving him a fair opportunity to advance material to resist the application for a sequestration order or to obtain evidence that there was a person prepared to act as trustee of the proposed personal insolvency agreement.Consideration The decision whether to grant or refuse an adjournment lies in the discretion of the trial judge, as Wilson J, with whom Gibbs CJ, Murphy, Aickin and Brennan JJ agreed, said in Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390 at 395 to 396:it is indeed seldom that an appellate court will feel justified in reviewing such a decision. In Maxwell v Keun [[1928] 1 KB 645 at 653]], Atkin L.J. stated the rule in terms which have won general acceptance:I quite agree the Court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with the discretion of the learned judge on such a question as an adjournment of a trial, and it very seldom does do so; but, on the other hand, if it appears that the result of the order made below is to defeat the rights of the parties altogether, and to do what which the Court of Appeal is satisfied would be an injustice to one or other of the parties, then the Court has power to review such an order, and it is, to my mind, its duty to do so. [cf. also, Hayes v Hayes [No. 1] [1934] QSR 219; Myers v Myers [1969] WAR 19; Walker v Walker [1967] 1 WLR 327; [1967] 1 All ER 412.] In our opinion no error appeared from the arguments Mr Smits advanced, lengthy and convoluted as they were, to suggest that his Honour erred in the exercise of his discretion to refuse to adjourn the hearing of the creditor’s petition. That hearing had been set down on 25 November 2015 for 20 January 2016. Mr Smits was well aware that the meeting of creditors would take place on 19 January 2016. On his own evidence, subsequently advanced on 25 January 2016, in support of his Honour revisiting his orders to sequestrate Mr Smits’ estate and not to allow the personal insolvency agreement to proceed, Mr Smits acknowledged that he knew from discussions with Mr McDonald, “a couple of days before the meeting”, that Mr McDonald had foreshadowed his intention to resign. By the time of the meeting, Mr Smits had spoken to “a couple” of other persons to see whether they would be prepared to take on the responsibility of being the trustee, apparently unsuccessfully. In those circumstances Mr Smits was well aware that, although this was not material before his Honour at the time of the hearing on 20 January 2016, there was a real possibility of there being no person at, or identified to, the meeting willing to act as trustee, that the Commissioner and Mr Loel had opposed the resolutions at the meeting and that the creditors’ petition might be heard and determined on the day for which it had been fixed, namely 20 January 2016. His Honour explained his reasons for refusing to grant the adjournment. We are not satisfied that his Honour made any error in coming to that conclusion. Indeed, for the reasons his Honour gave he was correct to have refused to adjourn the hearing of the petition.