FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Smits v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd
[2016] FCAFC 143
Appeal from: Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd v Smits [2016] FCA 11
and Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd v Smits (No 2) [2016] FCA 106
File number: QUD 101 of 2016 Judge: RARES, COLLIER AND MARKOVIC JJ Date of judgment: 22 August 2016 Catchwords: BANKRUTPCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia allowing a creditor’s petition – where resolution passed at meeting of creditors in favour of debtor executing a personal insolvency agreement over the opposition of the applicant creditor and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation – where applicant creditor and respondent sought to have the appeal allowed by consent and the sequestration order set aside – where the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation opposed the appeal being allowed by consent – requirement that an arguable error be demonstrated on the part of the primary judge before allowing an appeal by consent – appeal dismissed
BANKRUTPCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia refusing to set aside a sequestration order by reason of the preclusion of the power to do so under s 37(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 37, 40, 43, 52, 188, 206
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 12.01(3)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 55ZG
Cases cited: Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390
Croker v Commonwealth [2011] FCAFC 25
Croker v Minister for Finance [2013] FCAFC 154
DasreefPty Limited v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588
Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc. (1994) 181 CLR 404
Sims v Chong (2015) 230 FCR 346
Wills v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2009) 173 FCR 284
Date of hearing: 22 August 2016 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 61 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr DR Edwards Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Loel Solicitor for the First Respondent: Lillas & Loel Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr V Brennan Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Taxation Office ORDERS
QUD 101 of 2016 BETWEEN: LEONARDUS GERARADUS SMITS
Appellant
AND: LILLAS & LOEL LAWYERS PTY LTD ABN 96 064 046 255
First Respondent
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, COLLIER AND MARKOVIC JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 12.01(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), leave be granted instanter to the second respondent to withdraw the submitting notice and to oppose the appeal.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to his appearance on the appeal today.
4.Order 1 made on 3 March…
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the arguments presented by Mr Smits, including claims of procedural unfairness and errors in the primary judge's decision. The court found that the primary judge did not make any arguable error in refusing to adjourn the hearing of the creditor's petition, and the decision to allow the appeal by consent was also incorrect. The court further noted that the appeal was not supported by sufficient evidence, and the application to adduce further evidence was rejected. The debtor's argument that the primary judge erred in not going behind the bankruptcy notice was also dismissed for lack of evidence.
Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and the sequestration order was upheld. The court also ordered that the debtor pay the costs of the creditor's appearance on the appeal and discharged the earlier stay on the sequestration order. The court concluded that the grounds of appeal were without merit, and no further stay should be granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 12.01(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), leave be granted instanter to the second respondent to withdraw the submitting notice and to oppose the appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to his appearance on the appeal today.
4. Order 1 made on 3 March 2016 be discharged.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On the appeal, Mr Smits’ substantive argument was that he had been denied procedural fairness because the trial judge had proceeded on the adjourned hearing on 20 January 2016 to hear the petition without giving him a fair opportunity to advance material to resist the application for a sequestration order or to obtain evidence that there was a person prepared to act as trustee of the proposed personal insolvency agreement.Consideration The decision whether to grant or refuse an adjournment lies in the discretion of the trial judge, as Wilson J, with whom Gibbs CJ, Murphy, Aickin and Brennan JJ agreed, said in Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390 at 395 to 396:it is indeed seldom that an appellate court will feel justified in reviewing such a decision. In Maxwell v Keun [[1928] 1 KB 645 at 653]], Atkin L.J. stated the rule in terms which have won general acceptance:I quite agree the Court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with the discretion of the learned judge on such a question as an adjournment of a trial, and it very seldom does do so; but, on the other hand, if it appears that the result of the order made below is to defeat the rights of the parties altogether, and to do what which the Court of Appeal is satisfied would be an injustice to one or other of the parties, then the Court has power to review such an order, and it is, to my mind, its duty to do so. [cf. also, Hayes v Hayes [No. 1] [1934] QSR 219; Myers v Myers [1969] WAR 19; Walker v Walker [1967] 1 WLR 327; [1967] 1 All ER 412.] In our opinion no error appeared from the arguments Mr Smits advanced, lengthy and convoluted as they were, to suggest that his Honour erred in the exercise of his discretion to refuse to adjourn the hearing of the creditor’s petition. That hearing had been set down on 25 November 2015 for 20 January 2016. Mr Smits was well aware that the meeting of creditors would take place on 19 January 2016. On his own evidence, subsequently advanced on 25 January 2016, in support of his Honour revisiting his orders to sequestrate Mr Smits’ estate and not to allow the personal insolvency agreement to proceed, Mr Smits acknowledged that he knew from discussions with Mr McDonald, “a couple of days before the meeting”, that Mr McDonald had foreshadowed his intention to resign. By the time of the meeting, Mr Smits had spoken to “a couple” of other persons to see whether they would be prepared to take on the responsibility of being the trustee, apparently unsuccessfully. In those circumstances Mr Smits was well aware that, although this was not material before his Honour at the time of the hearing on 20 January 2016, there was a real possibility of there being no person at, or identified to, the meeting willing to act as trustee, that the Commissioner and Mr Loel had opposed the resolutions at the meeting and that the creditors’ petition might be heard and determined on the day for which it had been fixed, namely 20 January 2016. His Honour explained his reasons for refusing to grant the adjournment. We are not satisfied that his Honour made any error in coming to that conclusion. Indeed, for the reasons his Honour gave he was correct to have refused to adjourn the hearing of the petition.